Presentation Title
Against Inference: Ananavardhana on the Status of Suggestive Language
Location
Hanover Duxbury Room
Start Date
12-10-2013 2:00 PM
End Date
12-10-2013 3:30 PM
Abstract
In the Dhvanyāloka, a text on aesthetics and the philosophy of language, the influential philosopher and literary critic Ānandavardhana (c. 875 CE) argues that his predecessors have missed a special function of language called “suggestion” (vyañjanā), which is responsible for such things as discourse-level figures of speech, aesthetic effects, and implied irony. One possible objection to this claim is that suggestion can be explained as simply a variety of inference known as anumāna. Ānanda responds to this objection with two arguments: first, that if suggestion were anumāna, there would be no disagreement about its content, but there is; second, suggestion works analogously to a lamp shining light on objects, which is non-inferential. I argue that his response is successful only insofar as anumāna is characterized as having a deductively valid formal argument structure. His argument is unsuccessful if we have a non-monotonic model of the inferential processes of language comprehension, which is not only plausible, but represented in the tradition of Indian philosophy itself.
Against Inference: Ananavardhana on the Status of Suggestive Language
Hanover Duxbury Room
In the Dhvanyāloka, a text on aesthetics and the philosophy of language, the influential philosopher and literary critic Ānandavardhana (c. 875 CE) argues that his predecessors have missed a special function of language called “suggestion” (vyañjanā), which is responsible for such things as discourse-level figures of speech, aesthetic effects, and implied irony. One possible objection to this claim is that suggestion can be explained as simply a variety of inference known as anumāna. Ānanda responds to this objection with two arguments: first, that if suggestion were anumāna, there would be no disagreement about its content, but there is; second, suggestion works analogously to a lamp shining light on objects, which is non-inferential. I argue that his response is successful only insofar as anumāna is characterized as having a deductively valid formal argument structure. His argument is unsuccessful if we have a non-monotonic model of the inferential processes of language comprehension, which is not only plausible, but represented in the tradition of Indian philosophy itself.
Comments
Presentation is included in Panel 20: Language and Logic in Classical India