Bridgewater Review

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Letters to the Editor are encouraged and should be sent to: Editor, Bridgewater Review, bridgewater.review@bridgew.edu

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Among the more popular concepts that scholars in the social sciences and humanities have bandied about recently is transnationalism: the study of how people, goods, and ideas flow and have flowed among nations and among the regions of the world. Today, at the height of globalization and our technological revolution, we are convinced that the world has never been more integrated—economically, socially, and, especially, culturally; that we have never been more transnational; and that this new reality is a really remarkable thing. The evidence is abundant and clear: Sushi bars in Topeka, McDonald’s in Beijing, Salsa week in Italy, Disneyland in France. A hookah bar in Plymouth! More than ever before, everything and everyone is everywhere. Or so it seems.

It is an annoying habit among historians (or maybe just this historian) to exercise an almost involuntary reflex whenever we encounter claims of novelty. The tool in historians’ professional toolboxes most often employed is a trump card, a wet blanket, a cocktail-party conversation killer; the one that begins, “Well, in fact, my friend, that phenomenon about which you speak is not really ‘new.’ You see…” and so it is with transnationalism. Historians and other scholars are discovering that for much of the past several centuries, the world has been a great deal more globalized than our presentist perspective today allows us to contemplate. National boundaries have always been weak containers for people, ideas and materials. The point dawned on me recently as I thumbed through some dusty, old nineteenth-century manuscript enrollment registers and photographs from the Bridgewater Normal School (BNS) housed in our Maxwell Library Archives.

Bridgewater State’s past will matter this year, perhaps more than in others. We celebrate 175 years of continuous operation as an educational institution, an uncommon mark matched by comparatively few other universities in the United States. There are a great many things about who we are and what we do that deserve our celebration. Among them is the relatively recent push to become a global campus. The activity in this regard over the past decade has been appreciably brisk: the expansion of our course offerings, the establishment of Area Studies programs and a Global Studies Major, the recruitment of foreign-exchange students and the concomitant growth of semester-abroad and travel courses, all under the guidance of dedicated, professional administrators in the Minnock Center for International Engagement. Add to this the more than 30 cooperative partnerships that BSU has signed with foreign institutions of higher education and the result is impressive. In the past decade or more, we have developed, truly, a global “footprint” and a commitment to connecting our students with the world. And that feels new.

Well, in fact…

Sitting in the Archives, it was hard not to draw some comparisons between who we are today, and what the BNS of the 1890s and 1900s must have felt like. One thing that surprised me was how global our old school was back in the day, both in terms of its students and its reputation.

The first wave of Bridgewater’s globalization began during the long and formative tenure of Albert Gardner Boyden as principal of the school (1860–1906). As early as 1876, only 36 years after the school’s founding, BNS had enrolled students from Burma, Canada and Japan, including the celebrated Shuji Isawa (1851–1917), the father of public education in Japan, whose impressive record my History Department colleagues Thomas Turner and Wing-kai To have documented so well. In the 1880s, the pattern broadened, reaching its apogee, perhaps, in the 1890s. On our campus, in these decades, could be found students from Mexico, England, Jamaica, “South America” and Armenia. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the catchment broadened further: Turkey, Peru, France, and Venezuela. A few of these students enrolled in typical 2- or 4-year programs, but most of them came to BNS as students in the college’s “Special Course” (later called “Advanced”), most of them older students who had already graduated from classical or normal colleges in other

As early as 1876… BNS had enrolled students from Burma, Canada and Japan, including the celebrated Shuji Isawa… the father of public education in Japan.
countries and had come to Bridgewater for polish, or to master the celebrated system of pedagogy that Boyden championed. “We are gathered from the old world and new, from Armenia to the land of the Incas,” the class entry for the “Specials” notes in the 1910 yearbook, the BNS Normal Offering. “The three Americas send forth their sons. We speak many languages… [I]n the pursuit of learning we are joined together.” What’s more, these foreign students were active members of the college community—athletes who represented the school on the playing field, politicians who deliberated in student government and actors who trod the boards in their class plays. In late May, 1910, in what can be read as a telling statement of globalism at BNS, the Specials’ class production was The Revenge of Shari-Hot Su, a 1880s play written by an American during the height of western infatuation with the Orient. Playing the lead role of Shari-Hot-Su Sama, “learned Japanese,” was a Canadian, Randolph Leonard Harlow, while, on the same stage, playing Kioto, “a young Japanese,” was Luis C. Infante, a Mexican-born graduate of the Peru Normal School in Lima. Transnationalism indeed.

These foreign students only ever constituted a small fraction of the student population (we can count them in the dozens before 1910, not the hundreds), but we should not underestimate the impact their presence would have had on a small, isolated, provincial campus whose students came largely from the rural towns and villages of eastern Massachusetts. These were the days before radio, newsreels, television and the internet began to bring the world to southeastern Massachusetts; and so, in a way, at BNS, these walking, talking globetrotters were the world. And BNS seems to have been peculiar in this aspect: a cursory look at the alumni records of other contemporary normal schools in New England and New York shows nothing like the numbers of foreign enrollments at BNS.

But Mr. Boyden’s School “went global” in these years in another way, too — in its growing reputation abroad. Specials and others who were educated at Bridgewater took their experiences home with them and broadcast the good news about BNS. They were Bridgewater evangels. “What have been the results of Mr. Boyden’s fifty years of teaching, forty of which have been as principal of the school?” correspondent F.H.K. asked in a Normal Offering editorial 1900. “The results in buildings and equipments stand here in Bridgewater; the beneficent work of the thousands of graduates who are to be found in all the States of this Union, in Canada, Cuba, Mexico, Chili, France, England, South Africa, India, Japan, in the Philippines, cannot be estimated” (17).

It is difficult to know why this first wave of globalism declined at BNS in the 1910s, but it seems likely that a confluence of factors contributed to it. In 1900, Massachusetts legislators passed a bill that introduced a $50 tuition fee for students from out of state and “other countries,” and demanded that all normal school applicants in the commonwealth declare it their intention after graduation to teach in Massachusetts public schools. Perhaps the end of A.G. Boyden’s principalship mattered. Certainly, the arrival of World War I blocked the ease with which foreign students could come to BNS, and the political culture of isolationism in 1920s America would have dampened local interest in hosting foreign students. Foreign-student enrollment dwindled to a trickle in the 1920s, and the Special Course disappeared. Finally, in the 1930s, the transformation of BNS into a comprehensive state college, a regional service institution, must have emphasized the school’s local mission and orientation and checked the reemergence of a transnational campus.

But, happily, not forever. One hundred years later, we can celebrate the revival of a second wave of transnational culture on campus that is grand, ambitious, robust and deliberate, even if it is not entirely new.
Alzheimer’s Disease: From Clinical Tragedy to Reason for Hope

Kenneth Adams

Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) is ruthless. At its earliest stage (Pre-Clinical AD), it begins wreaking havoc on the brains of patients without causing clinical symptoms, leaving them unaware that they need medical counsel. As the disease progresses, symptoms start to manifest as episodes of short-term memory impairment, which are often dismissed as normal cognitive decline during aging. If not dismissed, these episodes can instill fright and uncertainty about what the future holds. This period, referred to as Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) can last months or years before symptoms worsen to a degree that triggers alarm.

In this stage, referred to by clinicians as Mild AD, individuals’ short-term memory is clearly impaired and new symptoms emerge, such as difficulty speaking and understanding language, alongside frequent mood swings. Here, formal diagnosis of AD becomes much more likely, forcing patients to endure the anticipation of their looming dementia. Moreover, the disease also begins to take a physical and emotional toll on patients’ loved ones, as assistance with some aspects of daily living becomes necessary. Mild AD typically lasts 1-2 years before worsening symptoms qualify it as Moderate AD, when individuals experience severe memory loss and exhibit behaviors that can be emotionally traumatizing to all involved, such as rambling speech, delusions, and uninhibited actions. In the process, patients are robbed of their identities and their families are forced to watch helplessly. In its final stage, Severe AD, patients suffer a near complete loss of memory and the ability to communicate or process information; they lose their mobility and, eventually, even their capacity to swallow. From diagnosis to death, the disease’s duration typically lasts 8-10 years and, sadly, we lack effective therapeutics to halt, let alone reverse, the disease’s progression. As a budding cell biologist exiting graduate school in 2007 and in the process of discerning the next step in my career, this heartbreaking reality prompted me to seek research opportunities to contribute to the fight against this dreaded disease. This led to a research fellowship at the Massachusetts General Hospital Alzheimer’s Disease Research Center, where I was inspired by a diverse and collaborative community of physicians, scientists, and philanthropists who are devoted to battling AD. We have much to learn about its underlying pathology and effective approaches for treatment, but the commitment and spirit of the AD research community gives us hope that one day we can eradicate the disease.

Tracking the etiology of AD—from clinical dementia to plaques and tangles to beta-amyloid aggregation

Given its brutality and prevalence (more than 5 million people currently live with AD, a figure that is projected to rise to 13.5 million by 2050), enormous resources have been put into biomedical research focused on understanding and treating AD. Effective treatments have yet to be established; nonetheless we have learned a great deal about the pathology that takes place in the AD brain. The earliest insights were provided over a century ago by German physician Alois Alzheimer (1864–1915), after whom the disease is named (Figure 1). When his patient, Auguste Deter (a woman who was suffering...
From diagnosis to death, the disease’s duration typically lasts 8–10 years and, sadly, we lack effective therapeutics to halt, let alone reverse, the disease’s progression.

From dementia) died in 1906, Dr. Alzheimer performed an autopsy on her brain and identified three abnormalities that to this day are regarded as hallmark features of AD pathology. On a macroscopic level, Alzheimer observed that Deter’s brain had undergone severe atrophy (Figure 2, left), which we now know results from extensive neurodegeneration (the death of brain cells called neurons) that occurs during AD. Neuron activities are central to the control and execution of virtually all human behaviors including those lost in AD (memory, language and communication skills, information processing, and mobility). His discovery provided a clear causal link between brain atrophy and the clinical symptoms that take place during the disease. On a microscopic level, Alzheimer determined that Deter’s brain also contained two abnormal lesions referred to as plaques and tangles (Figure 2, right). Importantly, these observations alone suggested that Alzheimer’s Disease results from the accumulation of toxic plaques and tangles in the brain that cause neurodegeneration and the clinical symptoms associated with the disease. Testing this hypothesis, however, required answers to several fundamental questions that Alzheimer could not address due to the technological limitations of his time. These questions included: What are plaques and tangles composed of? How do they form? Why do they form in brains of AD patients? Are plaques and tangles the toxic agents that cause the neurodegeneration during AD? Or, conversely, might they be an inconsequential side effect of the disease process?

Perhaps surprisingly, addressing these fundamental questions awaited 80 years of progress in our understanding of biology, development of research technology, and national commitment to combating AD. Nevertheless, when these three developments converged in the 1980s, they ignited an explosion of AD research that has continued to present day. The explosion began in 1984 when researchers identified the core component of plaques—the protein beta-amyloid (aka, amyloid-beta and Aβ)—which set the stage for researchers to determine where it comes from and how it forms plaques. Subsequent studies showed that beta-amyloid is first produced in brain cells as part of a larger, membrane-embedded protein called APP (Figure 3), which is regularly cleaved by enzymes, releasing beta-amyloid into the surrounding brain tissue. Critically, in Alzheimer’s Disease the released beta-amyloid...
readily aggregates into insoluble deposits—plaques. Parallel to these studies on beta-amyloid, researchers also determined that the core component of tangles is a protein called tau, which was already known to play an essential role in maintaining the health of neurons through binding (adhering to) and stabilizing structures called microtubules. As depicted in Figure 4, microtubules are elongated structures inside neurons that provide stability to neuronal extensions (called neurites), a function that is indispensable to neuronal health and function. During AD, tau dissociates from microtubules and aggregates into insoluble deposits—tangles—resulting in the disassembly of microtubules and consequent degeneration of neurites.

This characterization of beta-amyloid and tau aggregation into plaques and tangles, respectively, raised several new questions about AD pathology, many of which are still being investigated today. One that is central not only to our understanding of the disease, but also to the development of AD therapeutics is this: Can the root cause of AD be attributed to either beta-amyloid aggregation into plaques or tau aggregation into tangles? If one of these events can be identified as the root cause, then we can focus resources on therapeutics that can intervene in that event. In other words, if beta-amyloid aggregation represents the triggering event in AD, then blocking beta-amyloid aggregation may represent the most promising approach to treating AD patients; likewise, if tau aggregation is the causative event in AD, then blocking it may prove more effective.

Major progress toward answering this question started in the early 1990s, stemming from genetic studies on several families whose members exhibited a rare, inherited form of AD called familial Alzheimer’s Disease (or FAD). FAD differs from the most common form of AD (called sporadic AD because it arises sporadically in population without a clear genetic cause) in that it is passed on through generations of a family due to the inheritance of a genetic mutation.

Starting in the 1990s, researchers began performing genetic analyses on families with FAD in an attempt to identify the mutation(s) responsible for the disease. Since then, more than 200 mutations have been discovered. Strikingly, all of these mutations are located within one of two genes: the gene that produces APP (see Figure 3); or the one that produces the protein presenilin, a key enzyme that cleaves APP to produce beta-amyloid. Moreover, experimental analysis of these mutations demonstrated that they cause a common, critical effect in the brain: they increase beta-amyloid aggregation into plaques. These discoveries, along with studies proving that plaques and smaller aggregates of beta-amyloid are toxic to neurons, led researchers to formulate
Given its brutality and prevalence (more than 5 million people currently live with AD, a figure that is projected to rise to 13.5 million by 2050), enormous resources have been put into biomedical research focused on understanding and treating AD.

The amyloid cascade hypothesis (Figure 5), the most significant guiding force in AD research for the past 20 years.

The amyloid hypothesis posits that Alzheimer’s Disease is triggered by the accumulation of small beta-amyloid aggregates and larger plaques that exert pathological stress on the surrounding brain tissue. This stress, in turn, causes additional pathology, including tangle formation, leading to widespread neuronal dysfunction and, ultimately, dementia. Importantly, while inheritance of the APP and presenilin mutations explain why beta-amyloid aggregates in the brains of patients with FAD, the cause of beta-amyloid aggregation in sporadic AD is not yet fully understood. Given the fact that sporadic AD constitutes greater than 95% of all cases, determining its cause is a major focus of ongoing research.

Three paths to beta-amyloid aggregation in sporadic Alzheimer’s Disease

In 1992, an important discovery was made that now frames our growing understanding of beta-amyloid pathology. The discovery was that although beta-amyloid represents the major toxic agent in AD, its presence in the brain is not limited to individuals with the disease. Rather, beta-amyloid is produced in the brains of all individuals—young and old, healthy and diseased—through continuous synthesis and cleavage of APP (see Figure 3). This is important because it dismisses simple explanations for AD etiology. Researchers need to pursue more nuanced explanations for the cause of beta-amyloid aggregation in AD. In doing so, three fundamental “paths” that contribute to beta-amyloid aggregation in sporadic AD have been defined.

First, while cleavage of APP occurs continuously in brain tissue, the rate of cleavage can vary and is affected by numerous factors that we now know contribute to AD pathology. More specifically, factors that increase the rate of APP cleavage cause increased rates of beta-amyloid production, leading to its accumulation, which can in turn drive its aggregation (Figure 6A). Second, to balance the ongoing production of beta-amyloid, brain cells have concurrent processes to continuously remove or “clear” it from tissue. Thus, factors that decrease the rate of beta-amyloid clearance can also cause its accumulation and aggregation (Figure 6B). Lastly, while no clear genetic cause for sporadic AD has been identified, one gene—apolipoprotein E (or, apoE)—has been demonstrated to influence a person’s chance of developing the disease. The apoE gene exists in population as three variants referred to as apoE2, apoE3, and apoE4, all of which produce a protein that transports cholesterol throughout the brain. In 1993, it was discovered that individuals who inherit apoE4 have a 5–10 times greater risk of developing AD. In addition, brains of AD patients carrying

**FIGURE 5. The amyloid cascade hypothesis.** Adapted from Figure 1 in Karran et al., “The Amyloid Cascade Hypothesis for Alzheimer’s Disease” Nature Reviews 10 (2011) 699.
apoE4 exhibit significantly more beta-amyloid plaques than those of patients carrying apoE2 or apoE3, suggesting that apoE4 promotes AD by increasing beta-amyloid aggregation. Subsequent studies have demonstrated that, rather than affecting beta-amyloid generation or clearance, apoE4 protein binds and enhances its aggregation (Figure 6C). From patient to patient, it is likely that one or a combination of these three paths to beta-amyloid aggregation—increased production, decreased clearance, and inheritance of apoE4—explains the onset of AD.

**Treating Alzheimer’s Disease—Where are we? Where aren’t we?**

Alongside research directed at characterizing the cause(s) of AD, enormous effort has also been focused on developing compounds with which to treat or prevent the disease. Based on the amyloid cascade hypothesis, the therapeutic approaches considered most promising entail administering medications that will block or reverse beta-amyloid aggregation in the brain. Of the compounds generated and tested to date, many have been designed using our knowledge of the three paths to beta-amyloid aggregation. For example, several compounds have been created that inhibit the enzymes responsible for APP cleavage (see Figure 6A), whereas others enhance beta-amyloid clearance (see Figure 6B). A third class of compounds has been designed to interfere with beta-amyloid aggregation directly (see Figure 6C). Sadly, however, while many of these compounds have shown promise in laboratory models of AD, we have yet to establish one that has proved effective as a medication in human clinical trials (due either to insufficient reduction in beta-amyloid aggregation or to intolerable toxic side effects). Therefore, patients and their families continue to wait for the discovery of a compound that will alleviate their tragic fear and suffering.

Will the discovery come in form of a novel medication that blocks the toxic effects of beta-amyloid aggregates? Or will it come from advances in our knowledge of AD pathology that push our focus beyond beta-amyloid and its toxic aggregation? For now, it is impossible to predict it with much certainty. I nevertheless remain optimistic that the spirit and commitment I encountered within the AD research community when I entered it in 2007 is stronger than ever and will one day prevail.

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Melodic Metaphors for Dreams in Three Classic Songs from the Disney Catalog

James Bohn

Three of the most-valued songs from the Disney catalog are “Some Day My Prince Will Come,” “When You Wish Upon a Star,” and “A Dream is a Wish Your Heart Makes.” All three songs come from animated feature films created during Walt Disney’s lifetime (1901–1966). Furthermore, all three invoke the idea of dreams or wishing. The melodies of these songs feature delayed resolution or a lack of resolution. Such approaches to resolution are symbolic of the intrinsically unresolved nature of dreams.

In my analysis of the tunes in question, I investigate the melodies in terms of Schenkerian analysis. Heinrich Schenker (1868–1935) was an accompanist, teacher, critic, and music theorist (Pankhurst, Schenker GUIDE [2008] 3). During the nineteenth century, the typical approach to music theory was harmonic analysis. Schenker’s major contribution to music was a system of analysis that focused on melodic features. To Schenker, the fundamental organizing principle of music is the elaboration of resolved melodic tension. In this system, tension is defined as distance from the tonic, which is the first note (or Do) of any musical scale. This tension is established by an initial arpeggiation or stepwise ascent to a Kopfton (head tone). In Schenker, the Kopfton is a prominent, structural melodic note, most commonly scale degree three (Mi) or five (Sol), which embodies the concept of tension. This tension can be prolonged through melodic elaboration; that is the use of musical tones that are subservient to the structural melodic line, such as neighboring tones, linear progressions, unfoldings, or arpeggiations. Ultimately, this tension is resolved through stepwise descent from the Kopfton to the tonic. In Schenker, such resolution must occur in the obligatory register; that is, in the same range where the original tonic appears, before the initial arpeggiation or ascent. Occasionally, Schenker allows for substitution of a tone in a structural melodic line in order to express a descent, or express a tone in its proper register.

These melodic formations can be elaborated through embellishments, building a layered structure. A piece of music can exhibit any number of levels from the surface to the deepest layer, the Ursatz (fundamental structure). To Schenker, the Ursatz is an embodiment of a given piece’s unity.

Perhaps more than any other approach to analysis, reception of Schenker’s approach is strongly divided between supporters and detractors. Followers find the emphasis of melodic concerns to be intuitive and meaningful. Many critics find the Ursatz to be inaccessible to nearly all listeners, and thus non-intuitive. Further criticism of Schenker can be found in the way it ignores rhythm as a musical element, and in the way that it can be characterized by reducing music to common, simplistic formations.

Schenker based his theory on an extremely limited body of music. Fully 80 percent of the musical examples in his book Free Composition (1935) are from only eight composers: Bach, Handel, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Chopin, and Brahms (Pankhurst, 180). Thus, Schenkerian analysis can be characterized as pertaining to a limited body of Western art music. Even so, Schenker can be an effective tool for examining the functions of melodic structures.

One of the most renowned melodies from Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937), the first feature film to come out of the Disney Studios, is “Some Day My Prince Will Come.” All of the songs from the movie featured music by Frank Churchill (1901–1942) with lyrics by Larry Morey (1905–1971). Part of the dreamy quality of the song comes from its emphasis of the dominant, the fifth note of the scale (or Sol). The prominence of a tone most typically associated with the tension of a Kopfton lends the melody an unresolved quality. This unsettled nature can be interpreted as complementary to the idea of dreams; that is the anticipation of an as-of-yet unachieved objective.
“Some Day My Prince Will Come” begins and ends on fifth-scale degree (Figure 1). The first sub-phrase is an elaboration of the submediant chord. This motif is transposed up a fourth to create the second sub-phrase, which elaborates the super tonic. The first half of the phrase is an arpeggiation to the dominant. The second half of the antecedent consists of a sub-phrase that alternates between root and third of the dominant chord (scale degrees five and seven), which is repeated.

The first half of the consequent is the same as the first half of the antecedent. The second half of the phrase features a linear descent from the tonic down to the dominant, sustaining the tension of the unresolved dominant. There is also an interruption of a register transfer of the supertonic down an octave, elaborated by a chromatic lower neighbor.

While “Some Day My Prince Will Come” features a harmonic resolution at the end of the song, the melody is largely unresolved. Both phrases begin and end on scale degree five. Furthermore, both feature a large-scale register transfer of the dominant up one octave. The second halves of both phrases also emphasize notes from the dominant, with the end of the first phrase alternating between the root and third of the dominant. This consistent melodic emphasis of the dominant leaves the song feeling unresolved in much the same way that a dream is open for resolution by its fulfillment.

The arrangement of “Some Day My Prince Will Come” that appears at the end of the film addresses the unresolved nature of the melody. The end of the song is appended with trombones playing a melodic fragment from “One Song” ending on the tonic.

Heinrich Schenker would almost certainly have considered “Some Day My Prince Will Come” to be unsatisfying, due to its lack of melodic resolution. However, such unresolved tension serves as a powerful musical metaphor. Furthermore, the score’s resolution to this tension at the end of the film through the use of the Prince’s melody, “One Song,” serves as a fitting musical summary of the story’s narrative.

“Some Day My Prince Will Come” is a progenitor of a song archetype that is central to the oeuvre of the Walt Disney Company. The wish/dream song instantiates itself numerous times in the company’s creations, from “When You Wish Upon a Star” to more recent works such as Tangled’s “I’ve Got A Dream.” “Some Day My Prince Will Come,” however, falls somewhat outside of the archetype in that it invokes the specific dream of the protagonist rather than relating the merits of dreams and wishes on a conceptual level.

“When You Wish Upon a Star” is the strongest exemplar of wish/dream song archetype. The tune, which originated in Pinocchio (1940), the Studio’s second feature, was written by Leigh Harline (1907-1969) with lyrics by Ned Washington (1901-1976). The song has transcended the film to become both the quintessential Disney song, as well as the company’s unofficial anthem. Like “Some Day My Prince Will Come,” “When You Wish Upon a Star” features melodic motion that is symbolic of the unfulfilled nature of dreams.

“When You Wish Upon a Star” is comprised of four phrases (Figure 2). The first features a register transfer of the dominant from the first note up an octave to the half cadence that ends the
phrase. The first sub-phrase consists of a linear ascent from scale degree five to the tonic. The second phrase is identical to the first, save for the end, which is altered to accommodate an authentic cadence. While this resolution is harmonically satisfying, the lower register tonic leaves the phrase unresolved in the obligatory register. The bridge, the third phrase, features a linear ascent from scale degree five to the leading tone, elaborating the dominant, and furthering the tension of the song.

The final phrase of “When You Wish Upon a Star” resolves the melodic tension of the bridge with an ascent from scale degree five to the tonic resolution at the cadence. The end of the first sub-phrase ends here on scale degree three, while the authentic cadence resolves the tonic in the obligatory register, coinciding with the lyrical resolution, “Your dreams come true.” The version of the final phrase presented here is the version sung by Cliff Edwards (1895-1971) and the chorus at the close of the film. The final phrase ends differently in the version of the song from the beginning of the feature.

The conclusion of “When You Wish Upon a Star” from the sung version at the opening of the film changes the final note to a dominant, a full two octaves above the first note of the song. This ending is doubly unresolved due to its settling on an unstable note, as well as the high register of its tone. The lack of resolution allows for a large-scale closure of the melody at the end of the film. While the melody of the song at the end lands on the tonic, a short tag line sung by the chorus is appended with the lyrics, “you’ll find your dreams come true,” settling on scale degree three. This large-scale resolution of the melody over the course of the movie is aided by having both the opening and concluding arrangements in the same key. The ends of both Pinocchio and Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs are musically similar in the sense that the melodic resolution of the song in question coincides with the fulfillment of the protagonist’s dream. Furthermore, both endings land on a high-register mediant, voiced by a choir.

After “When You Wish Upon a Star,” the tune that most closely exemplifies the wish/dream song archetype is “A Dream Is a Wish Your Heart Makes.” This tune originates from Cinderella (1950), the Studio’s return to single-narrative animated features after an eight-year hiatus. Walt Disney hired the songwriting team of Mack David (1912-1993), Al Hoffman (1902-1960), and Jerry Livingston (1909-1987) to create the tunes. Sung by the film’s protagonist, “A Dream Is a Wish Your Heart Makes” expresses her use of dreams as a means of escapism from a harsh reality. Like “When You Wish Upon a Star,” “A Dream Is a Wish Your Heart Makes” coincides lyrical resolution with melodic resolution.

“A Dream Is a Wish Your Heart Makes” features two phrases (Figure 3). The Kopfton of each is a mediant approached by an upward leap from the dominant. Likewise, each phrase features a stepwise descent to the tonic, very much in line with Schenker’s theory. However, the end of the first phrase actually lands on the mediant in the low register, with an implied tonic beneath. This resolution is doubly unsatisfying due to both its use of a substitution (the tonic for the mediant), as well as the lower register of its tone. The second phrase, however, not only resolves in the obligatory register, but it does so coinciding with the lyric “The dream that you wish will come true.”

The coincidental lyrical and melodic resolution in “When You Wish Upon a Star” and “A Dream Is a Wish Your Heart Makes” could be attributed to good songwriting. However, these concurrent resolutions function as effective melodic metaphors for the as yet unresolved nature of dreams and wishes. The large-scale resolution of “Some Day My Prince Will Come” within Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs and “When You Wish Upon a Star” in Pinocchio also function as metaphors for the resolution of dreams. Such large-scale resolutions also provide closure for each film’s respective scores, providing a sense of unity. Finally, the meaningful conclusions of these investigations point to the potential usefulness of Schenkerian approaches to analysis outside of the narrow band of Western art music upon which the system is based.

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The Domestic Interior, the Female Body, and the Metaphorical Irish Nation in the Works of James Joyce

Ellen Scheible

The divided island that houses the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland is the birthplace of some of the most prolific and powerful western writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Most Irish Studies critics agree that Ireland’s literary genius emerged most aggressively during the period of change that ultimately led to Irish independence and the partition of the island in the early twentieth century. Before the Irish famine in the middle of the nineteenth century, Ireland was a British colony on the edge of a progressive, modern economy that promised to bring great prosperity for Anglo-Irish landowners and British absentee landlords. After the famine, Ireland was left destitute, losing any claim to the modernity that seemed inevitable in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Consequently, Irish Catholicism and Nationalism developed as powerful cultural agents that sought to rebuild the nation through the commodification of tradition rather than the forces of European modernity. However, this new, fetishized, Catholic nationalism produced its own modernizing momentum. The Ireland that surfaced in 1922 became a nation of halves: politically, one part of a partitioned island and culturally, an idea contingent on the conflicted binary of modernist aesthetics and Irish national tradition.

The imaginary construct of Ireland that most contemporary readers, audiences, and tourists understand is a relatively recent phenomenon, even though its inventors emphasize nostalgia for a long-ago past. Many features of Irish provincial life that we like to associate with traditional Ireland, such as the famous Irish step dances and the Irish sports hurling and Gaelic football, are products of a late-nineteenth-century push to create national sentiment and pride. The writings of modernist authors such as W.B. Yeats and Lady Gregory that emphasize Irish fairy tales and folklore are examples of the turn in the early twentieth century to a mythologized version of nation that produced the great literary movement of the Celtic Revival. Yet, all of the formations of Irish nationalism that succeeded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are versions of imagined communities, as scholar Benedict Anderson describes them. This means that Irish nationalism had to invent its own history in order to propagate the version of the future that it so desperately wanted to attain. That invented history depended heavily on a mythical sense of geography and place—a belief that the land itself was somehow unique and that the culture that sprang from it essential.

Modern and contemporary Irish fiction is saturated with metaphors of location that confront, challenge, and often reconstruct both the geographical public sphere and the domestic private sphere that frame Irish life in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In many of my courses, students read Irish literature that either gestures towards the 1922 partition of the nation or confronts partition as a defining aspect of Irishness. To be Irish is to be divided. Partition and the consequent hybridity of Ireland as a nation that is both modern and traditional functions as an underlying metaphor. Within this metaphor gender identities fall victim to the ambiguity of hybridity: gender that is both traditional and progressive is only imaginable on bodies that are othered. We focus particularly on the role of women and the female body as significant figures in the ongoing struggle to construct a national image of Irish culture. The female body emerges as one version of otherness in its over-sexualized but virginal place in Irish culture. Structures such as the Anglo-Irish Big House and the Magdalene Asylums.
serve as spaces of oppression where the female body is both domesticated and repressed as a sexually reproductive vessel. Such spaces represent the need for the domestic interior to control any feminized threat to the newly formed version of Irishness that depended so heavily on a violent and dominating nationalism and, by extension, a newly formed postcolonial “manhood.”

The private/public binary reflects political space, too. “Home-making” and “nation-making” become intertwined ideologies in many of the texts that we read and they are transposed onto the female body as a reproductive agent. The body both regulates the domestic interior of the Irish family and produces the independent, postcolonial traditional Irish masculine culture and by the sexual repression of the Church. There are few places where the uses of the domestic interior theme are more potent than in the works of James Joyce (1882-1941).

Joyce wrote *Ulysses*, his opus novel, both before Irish independence, and after 1916, during the process of confrontation for an alienated and emasculated Ireland, a nation dreaming of wholeness and manhood.

Here, we might find relevance in the work of French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901–81), whose concept called “the Mirror Stage” shows how, as children, we become alienated and othered within ourselves. This is the moment, he argued, when a child realizes she is not the person in the mirror being held by her parent; that she and the mirror image are different. A nation functions under the same principle. What Lacan says about self-consciousness (that we are all alienated, othered, split within ourselves) is also inherent to Ireland as a nation. Ireland (like, perhaps, all nations) functions in a state of hybridity. Writing in an historical era when psychoanalysis redefined the meaning of subjectivity, Joyce’s texts resonate with these concepts. For Joyce, and Ireland, wholeness is elusive and unification an impossibility. In *Ulysses*, it is through a kind of mirror stage, whenever the male gaze meets the female body, that Joyce imagines a national identity based on non-unification, an Ireland that is essentially divided.

In the “Nausicaa” episode of *Ulysses*, the main character, Leopold Bloom, takes a break from his walk around Dublin to rest on the beach where he encounters a beautiful young woman named Gerty MacDowell. After a very public expression of sexual desire, Gerty leaves the beach and Bloom realizes that she walks with a limp and is permanently disabled.

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Virgin Mary and Irish girlhood, Joyce also imagines Gerty’s hybridized body as an image of domestic Ireland. When Bloom later sees Gerty on the beach, he desperately lusts for her, but then realizes that her body is disabled and her mobility limited. Gerty’s disability functions as a suppressed or hidden aspect of her identity throughout “Nausicaa” and comes as a surprise to Bloom. “Tight boots? No. She’s lame! O!” (page 13, line 771) He suddenly recognizes the obstacles hindering unification—both his unification with Gerty and the nation’s political unification.

In his 1994 book The Subaltern Ulysses, Enda Duffy persuasively argues that women, both as activists during the Irish anticolonial revolution and as characters in modernist texts, emerged as “key signifiers of the nation itself in the representational economy of the revolution.” However, he points out, “it was only as lone figures (in masculinist narratives) that they were allowed to suggest the new nation” (167). Duffy’s argument posits the female figures in Joyce’s novel, specifically Molly Bloom (Leopold’s wife), as the figures through which Joyce questions the future of the Irish nation and the unity inherent in national identity. We can read Gerty Macdowell as a figure of national identity in much the same way that Duffy reads Molly Bloom.

Duffy positions Molly alongside all of the women from the second half of the novel, including Gerty, who are “the bearers and minders of children” (170) rather than the female members of the working class that surface in the first half. The gendered division of labor that Duffy identifies as part of the colonial regime in the novel’s first half, where working-class women are symbols of the subaltern, is transformed into a representation of economic abjection in the second half. Duffy’s goal is to seek moments of “postcolonial subjectivity” in Ulysses, hoping to identify the “utopian potential of the text” of the working class that surface in the first half. Of course, the birth of the Irish Free State is coterminous with a postcolonial redefinition of nationhood that rejects unity as its founding principle. For him (and Joyce), Irish independence inherently demands division and disunity. Irishness depends on more than an aesthetic reflection in the cracked looking glass of a servant (Joyce’s famous description of Irish identity); it depends on the recognition that a looking glass without a crack is a false image of national unity.

The crack in Leopold Bloom’s looking glass is Gerty MacDowell. In the opening pages of “Nausicaa,” when we are safely housed inside of the domestic interior, Gerty is not only “as fair a specimen of winsome Irish girlhood as one could wish to see,” but she also possesses eyes of “the bluest Irish blue” and, when she blushes, she looks “so lovely in her sweet girlish shyness that of a surety God’s fair land of Ireland did not hold her equal” (Ulysses 13.81, 13.108, 13.121-22). In Gerty’s own mind, and arguably Bloom’s, she exists as the trademark image of a feminized and aesthetically perfected Ireland, where consumer culture and sentimental novels have yoked Irishness with youth, girlish beauty, and the expansiveness of God’s country. Gerty is Ireland’s perfect, complete symbol—that is, except for “that one

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shortcoming” (13.650) that she “always tried to conceal” (13.651); the “accident” that, when conjured, reminded her that “the years were slipping by” (13.649) and no longer was she a girl, winsome and shy, with an idealized sense of perpetual youth. Gerty tricks herself into believing in her perfection in “Nausicaa” by trusting the mirror that reflects it: “She did it up all by herself and what joy was hers when she tried it on then, smiling at the lovely reflection which the mirror gave back to her!” (13.161–62). Even when Gerty succumbs to the “gnawing sorrow” that “is there all the time” (13.188–89), her insecurities are mediated by the mirror. Gerty’s reflection in the mirror speaks to her, reassuring her of the existence of herself as a unified and complete being, lovely in its perfect wholeness.

From the onset of Gerty’s episode in *Ulysses*, the use of the mirror as a symbol of infinite duplicity collides with images of national duplicity and divided Irishness, positioning the female, incomplete in both body and image, as the locus for national disruption. Right before Bloom wishes he could be “the rock she sat on,” he ruminates on seeing the Howth peninsula, and by extension Ireland, in the distance: “An optical illusion. Mirage. Land of the setting sun this. Homerule sun setting in the southeast. My native land, goodnight” (13.1076–1080). In Bloom’s thoughts, his desire overlaps with his identification of the land where he is standing as the nation on which the ‘homerule sun’ finally set. It is after his voyeuristic confrontation with Gerty that Bloom says goodnight to his ‘native land,’ seeing the duplicity in both woman and land as the markers of the end of the colony, where home rule is only an option when the nation is nonexistent.

Bloom’s role as a flaneur and voyeur on the streets of Dublin traces a city that will soon birth the revolution leading to the Irish Free State. If we follow this image of the male body as the generator of national identity through Joyce’s texts, we see it reemerge, particularly in his last novel, *Finnegans Wake* (1939). HCE, the main male character in *Finnegans Wake*, like *Ulysses’s* Bloom, commits a sexual transgression, the importance of which relies on female recognition of the offense, and his broken body then becomes the text’s personified map of Dublin. In Joyce’s novels, as in much of twentieth-century Irish fiction, the partitioned nation is unimaginable without a fragmented and cracked body conjured in the mirror of female duplicity.

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Bridgewater’s Third Nature and the Re-Wilding of the Landscape

Brian Payne
With photographs by Karen Callan

The Great River Preserve in Bridgewater is a web of contradicting yet interdependent forms of land use. Located just a few miles from the Bridgewater State campus, the Preserve consists of 124 acres of Wildland Trust land and is part of the larger 410-acre Taunton River Wildlife Management Area. What makes the Preserve fascinating is the varied history of its layered landscape. Today, the Preserve’s ecology consists of open fields, mixed pine and oak forests, and a mile of waterfront that provides a diverse habitat for wildlife.

Historically, the Preserve is a remnant of the region’s agrarian and industrial past. Like most of southeastern Massachusetts, Bridgewater’s land-use history is both agrarian and industrial.

The rural feel of the Preserve is profound and it is easy to visualize the farmscape that once dominated the land. Seventeenth-century English settlers were attracted to Bridgewater due to the diverse eco-zones, including lowland marshes that provided grasses for winter fodder, sandy uplands for orchards, and a rich middle ground for grain crops. This mixed husbandry dominated agrarian strategies throughout colonial New England. The Taunton River, in contrast, is one of New England’s many industrialized environments. Human “improvement” of the river began in the seventeenth century, when it was dammed to provide power for an iron foundry.

In the 1700s, industrialists began mining the banks of the Taunton for ore, and during the nineteenth century, the Bridgewater section of the river became a site for shipbuilding. Today, despite this industrial past, the Taunton River is classified as one of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s “Wild and Scenic Rivers.”

The Great River Preserve tells us more than a little about the varied history of human relations with the nature in our midst. What appears today as a wild oasis of open fields, forests, and waterfront was once a heavily utilized environment. The result, in Bridgewater as in much of New England, is what University of Maine historian Richard Judd calls the “blended landscape.” In his recent book, Second Nature (2014), Judd explains: “The region’s long
post-pioneer settlement experience provides a panorama of shaped environments in which the layers of interaction between people and the land are so interwoven that culture and nature cannot be isolated” (x). It is too facile, in other words, to view a landscape’s history as either purely unaltered “nature” on one hand, or wholly “cultivated” and civilized, on the other.

The agrarian landscape is now part of Bridgewater’s past more than its present. A good many Bridgewater farms, like others throughout New England, went bankrupt during the second half of the twentieth century. Although the post-1970 back-to-the-land movement and the post-1990 commitment to local, organic, or “natural” food production revitalized some of the region’s agrarian landscape, vast acreage of former farmland remains meadows and young forest or built-over suburban cul-de-sacs. Strangely, our region is actually more heavily forested now than it was throughout most of its history as “New England.” The seemingly random stone walls we find as we hike through the woods of New England are historical artifacts of its agrarian past, fleeting evidence of abandoned farms taken over by a resurging nature.

Other remnants in the landscape reveal something about New England’s lost industrial might. Smoke stacks, dams, and red-brick industrial buildings now serve as museums, expensive condos, or office buildings. To some, this is a sad story of post-industrial and post-agrarian economic change that left New England trailing far behind compared to the agrarian output of California and the industrial output of the southern hemisphere. Lost jobs and dislocation were the results of this transition, this late twentieth-century “de-industrialization” that gripped much of the American northeast and midwest. The collapse of agriculture and the crumbling of industry provide an opportunity for the return of “nature;” something Judd calls a “re-wilding” of the landscape. On one edge of Bridgewater, the once heavily industrialized Taunton River now
meanders through one such re-wilded place, a seemingly natural ecosystem of woods and fields.

In his pathbreaking 1992 work *Nature’s Metropolis*, environmental historian William Cronon introduced the concept of “second nature” as a place “designed by people and ‘improved’ toward human ends, gradually emerged atop the original landscape that nature – ‘first nature’ – had created as such an inconvenient jumble” (56). Here, Cronon uses the term “second nature” to suggest that modified landscapes have become so “natural” in our minds that we cannot easily fathom the world without them. They become second nature in both physical and intellectual meanings of that phrase. Although Cronon was interested specifically in how railroads changed American nature, other scholars have since applied the concept of “second nature” to a wide variety of modified landscapes.

Historians of New England’s farmlands note that early farmers consciously sought an ecological balance that allowed for sustainable food production without dramatically affecting the region’s “natural” rivers, forests and wild species. Brian Donahue writes in his book *The Great Meadow* (2007) that colonial New England agriculture “was an ecologically sustainable adaption of English mixed husbandry to a new, challenging environment.” Combined with a Puritan ethic that stressed commonwealth over individual profit, New England colonial farmers “bound by a set of ecological and cultural constraints that guarded against unbalanced exploitation of land” (xv). In this way, the agrarian “second nature” became both a product of economic practice and an intellectual construct; a means of cultural self-definition among New Englanders. In light of Judd’s, Cronon’s, and Donahue’s historical analyses, the pastoral nature that so dominates the “unused” lands around Bridgewater is part of a massive rewilding of New England’s second nature, which represents a profoundly new yet sustainable, accessible, and rewarding relationship with nature.
The collapse of agriculture and the crumbling of industry provide an opportunity for the return of “nature;” something Judd calls a “re-wilding” of the landscape.
But the concept of second nature might be inappropriate for a place like the Great River Preserve. Cronon and Judd each argue that the agrarian landscape of the fields and the industrial use of the river represented a second-nature modification of the pre-Columbian first-nature forests. If so, then the re-wilding of that landscape in the form of a “wildlands trust” would represent a third nature, one that opens new possibilities, and problems, for environmental stewardship and wilderness preservation. While there remain virtually no accessible first-nature landscapes east of the Mississippi River, there are potentially thousands of third natures, or re-wilded places that give us culturally and emotionally rewarding interactions with nature; that re-invent and echo the wild places of our past.

Even today, many environmentalists continue to define “nature” narrowly, to see wilderness only in pristine mountainscapes or large tracts of unimproved acres. Like any other intellectual concept, our societal definitions of wilderness have profoundly changed over the course of American history. Early colonials, especially Puritans in New England, saw wilderness as the very real stomping ground of the devil and his witches. Throughout most of United States history, Americans viewed the wilderness as a place to be conquered and transformed into more productive environments. Although there were plenty of early exceptions—naturalists such as Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, or George Perkins Marsh—mainstream American culture saw conquering the wilderness as a form of progress, the triumph of the civilized over the wild.

The public rhetoric began to change during the Progressive Era (1900–1920) when popular writers such as John Muir, Gifford Pinchot, and Aldo Leopold began to champion the “wilderness” idea and became active agents for the preservation of “wild” places. The National Parks Service, the U.S. Forest Service, and a host of state and local land agencies set aside large tracts of land in these years to be designated as wild places and protected them from development. Epic political battles raged around Yellowstone, Yosemite, Hetch-Hetchy, the Colorado River, and the Grand Tetons that in the end redefined America’s understanding of and appreciation for wild places. The movement culminated in the Wilderness Act of 1964, which specifically defined wilderness as “an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.”

More recently, our ideas about nature have begun to change. Wilderness, historian Roderick Nash reminded us in his 1967 book Wilderness and the American Mind, is an intellectual creation that does not necessarily reflect any true ecological reality. Although Nash noted that “wilderness was a basic ingredient of American culture,” he concluded that “there is no specific material object that is wilderness” (xi). Wilderness is a state of mind that we project onto physical places. Building
upon this work, William Cronon notes that there is trouble with idealizing wilderness in the way that the Progressive conservationists did: “[i]dealizing a distant wilderness too often means not idealizing the environment in which we actually live, the landscape… we call home.” In other words, we need a middle ground between the categories of “wild” and “cultivated,” between use and preservation that aims at “some kind of balanced, sustainable relationship” with the land we actually live with on a daily basis (Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness” in Out of the Woods [1997] 45). His critique did not seek to dismiss wilderness as an important goal of the environmental movement, but only sought to broaden the goals of that movement to better reflect the reality of most Americans, who cannot travel to these wilderness places. The ideal of wilderness preservation is by its very nature exclusive, if not elitist, and allows us to avoid too easily the more pressing problems of environmental decay in our own backyards. A sole dedication to wilderness, Cronon fears, “may teach us to be dismissive or even contemptuous of such humble places and experiences” (46) that can be found in the more common agrarian or semi-rural landscape that surrounds us.

Today, a great many American landscapes east of the Mississippi River fall into this middle ground, this “third nature.” In Bridgewater, the Great River Preserve exemplifies well these “humble places and experiences” whose subtle layers of history are visible, legible to a discerning eye. The Preserve, to paraphrase Cronon, is neither wholly “human nor nonhuman, unnatural nor natural”; it is both. The beauty of the Preserve forces us to “embrace the full continuum of a natural landscape that is also cultural, in which the city, the suburb, the pastoral, and the wild each has its proper place, which we permit ourselves to celebrate without needlessly denigrating the other” (49).

The nuanced definition of nature that the Great River Preserve presents to us takes us beyond this “bipolar moral scale” and allows for rewarding experiences with a third nature that can become the seedbed for a more comprehensive environmental ethic.

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While there remain virtually no accessible first-nature landscapes east of the Mississippi River, there are potentially thousands of third natures, or re-wilded places that give us culturally and emotionally rewarding interactions with nature; that re-invent and echo the wild places of our past.
Some people pursue butterflies; some gather stamps. Some chase knowledge to build low walls; others collect adventures to stack one upon another in a fortune tower of experience: from the garret come stories of princesses. Stirp pursued trees.

Long before he moved to the forests, he knew it must be trees for him. As a child in the hot, dry plain he watched the desert plants day after day. They didn’t grow. They didn’t even seem to move. He dared not water them. Then one evening, unexpectedly, just after some distant object cast a shadow across it, a plant flowered. It burst out in bright purple.

Carefully he took off his shoes, sat down before it and waited. Some mystery was to be explained, he thought. He felt he deserved some account of why.

When the full darkness came he could no longer see the flower, no matter how hard he looked.

Once, for just a moment, he drifted off to sleep. His head rolled to the side; his dead hand flopped to the ground. As his fingers came back to life they touched what seemed to be a snake in the sand. He quickly yanked his hand up, then slowly reached down with two fingers to pick up the thin end of a smooth stick.

An American elm, Ulmus Americana, with a graceful vase-shaped stem. Near the ground it divides into many parts; above, its limbs spread out large and full. No sign of disease. It is separate but not by itself. Over there is another not quite as tall. And some newer ones, back in, just beyond the ironwood, Carpinus Caroliniana. Stirp loved to stroke the deep ripples and sinews of the smooth, grey bark – ironwood, Carpinus – as he searched for the catkins dangling inconspicuously. What fawn nibbled and left this remnant of a shoot? Who stole the secret of that nutshell? The trees changed and gave some vague answers with the seasons.

The egg-shaped head of the sugar maple, Acer Saccharum, listened with many-lobed leaves. Stirp sat silent, sensing the dryads in the maples and hearing the sap practicing its kiss.

After a while he stopped going back to town. He stayed in the bower. Ulmus provided seeds and small fruit. Nuts came from Carpinus and for his thirst there were Saccharum.

He tended the trees as he knew how. They did not need him. The bigger ones had been there before he came and the little ones did not always grow when he helped. It would be impossible for him to move the elm by himself, he thought, or any of the large trees, although they would look better rearranged, particularly the elm. He did transplant the smaller ones but they often caught disease and wizened.

In time, Stirp took his son to the woods but he could not explain the trees to him. His son always saw stout boughs to shape into broadswords, springy branches for bows or long limbs for lances, leaves were camouflage, and roots rifles. Yet, Stirp noticed, for his son the trees always clapped hands and danced. Later his son made a flute from a lance and a harp from a bow, and the trees sang.

Once, Stirp put a huge pan in the grassy area near the elm. He filled it with all the wonderful, imaginary food he could think of. Under it he lit a fire of air and let it play on the kindling, twigs, sticks, branches and logs. He harvested fifth-year fruit. He laid out his earthenware and made place markers – Ulmus on the left, Carpinus and Saccharum interspersed.

He hoped the trees would come to his function. Perhaps they would arrange themselves properly.

Though the winds and worms encouraged them, the trees did not move. Stirp got only dead brambles and vines. He did not sit long this time. Before the darkness came, he left.
When he returned, the pan was overturned. Something else seemed different. Things seemed to have rearranged themselves, he thought, but he was not sure he remembered. His utensils were definitely not where he left them. There was a pile of earthenware dishes, used and dirty as if marked by leaf prints.

He had not had anything to eat or drink because he had waited for his guests. He approached a *Saccharum* and sipped some syrup. It left a metallic taste in his mouth. He looked up at a *Carpinus*.

He saw that things were not the same. All was still. A blue, earthenware cup rested on its side in the wet, green grass where, he was now sure, the elm had stood.

In another place, *Ulmus*, the great elm, was now surrounded by the ironwoods. The sugar maples were grouped around the outside. Their boughs by Autumn lit up like flaming swords.

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Exporting Exoticism: Captain Brinkley’s Japan Described and Illustrated

Dan Johnson

By the end of the nineteenth century, Japan was on the fast track to modernity. Since 1855, when U.S. Navy Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry’s arrival effectively ended its self-imposed isolation, Japan embraced the technology of the age with fervor. Japan was quickly pulled into a dizzying vortex of steel, steam, and beaver-skin hats. By 1868, the Meiji era had sprung into existence and, increasingly, the old ways—epitomized by the now-outlawed samurai class—were tossed aside. Both railroads and electricity were introduced in the 1870s and with the defeat of Russia’s powerful navy in 1905, Japan became a force to be reckoned with.

Curiously, even as the turn-of-the-century Japanese discarded the old for the new, traditional *hakama* for stovepipe trousers, Americans became infatuated with the ways of old Japan. The exotic travel accounts of writers such as Americans Lafcadio Hearn (1850–1904) and John La Farge (1835–1910) and Briton Isabella Bird (1831–1904) were eagerly snatched up and consumed; silk kimonos embroidered with dragons, cranes and other symbolic creatures and flowers made their appearance at parties and luncheons thrown by well-to-do Americans. Goldfish appeared in bowls in American parlors and carp swam in Japanese-influenced ponds. In American décor, everything from wallpaper to crockery to inkwells and tea sets were embellished with Japanese-derived designs. Gilbert and Sullivan’s comedy *The Mikado; or The Town of Titipu* opened in London’s Savoy Theatre in March 1885, but it took only until August of that year before it opened in New York’s Fifth Avenue Theatre, where it ran for almost 300 performances. Likewise, *Madame Butterfly: A Tragedy of Japan* opened as a one-act play in New York in 1900.
Some of the limited editions were so costly that only a few well-heeled individuals and institutions such as libraries and collector societies could afford them.

These superficially romantic portrayals of the Japanese people and culture allowed Westerners to continue to view Japan as a primitive culture, like a fly encased in amber, unmoving and unyielding.

Americans consumed old Japan in other ways, too, perhaps no more eloquently than through the recounted exploits of Francis Brinkley (1841-1912), an Irish-born military officer who adopted Japan as his home country, living there and supporting pro-Japanese causes for more than 45 years. Born in County Meath and educated at Trinity College, he served as a military attaché to the British Embassy. In 1867, he moved to Japan for good, becoming a military advisor to the Meiji government and artillery instructor to the Imperial Navy. Brinkley married Yasuko Tanaka, the daughter of a samurai, spoke and wrote fluent Japanese, and was author of a successful two-volume Japanese/English dictionary. He owned and edited the Japan Mail (which later became the Japan Times), the most influential English-language newspaper of the day. Brinkley had the ear of the Meiji government and promoted a Japanese agenda overseas.

Beginning in 1897, “Capt. F. Brinkley” produced one of the most opulent books of the era, a 10-volume set titled Japan Described and Illustrated by the Japanese Written By Eminent Authorities and Scholars. First published by the Boston-based J.B. Millet Company, the book was reprinted several times, each slightly different but always handsome.

Subsequent editions of Japan Described and Illustrated can be found with paper covers featuring simple decorations or in massive, 16.5 x 13-inch folio form. Some of the limited editions were so costly that only a few well-heeled individuals and institutions such as libraries and collector societies could afford them. Japan Described and Illustrated was reprinted in several runs, the largest being 1000 and the smallest 25. The smaller the edition, the more extravagantly bedecked the volume.

While it remains uncertain who authored all of the articles in the text, Japanese scholar Kakuzo Okakura (author of The Awakening of Japan [1904]) was identified as one of the writers.

However, few Americans would have bought Japan Described and Illustrated for its prose. Instead, they were more likely to have bought it for its art, its sheer opulence, the visual and tactile experience it provided. While the subjects of the book’s images were themselves exotic, the volumes also demonstrated the state of the art of photography at the turn of the twentieth century.

The unnumbered, cheaper paperback editions had two photographs and one collotype, an image produced when a glass or metal plate was covered with
a gelatin and bichromate and exposed to light. But the most extravagant editions, issued in smaller and more expensive runs, were packed with just about everything Japanese. Brinkley could manage to fit between two covers: brocaded silk boards, tasseled silk hand-tied and uncut pages “bound in the Japanese manner” (in each volume came a warning not to cut the pages apart), mica-flecked endpapers, hand-painted end boards, ukiyo-e prints, samples of lace and wallpaper patterns, and sundry other items. For those who could afford the indulgence (the 1000 Yedo [Tokyo] edition was $40, or about $1,200 today, for a 10-volume folio set), Japan Described and Illustrated by the Japanese was an armchair traveler’s delight.

Beyond accoutrements, deluxe editions of the book featured collotypes of flowers and hand-colored albumin photographs (made using egg whites and salt to bind various chemicals to produce the paper print). Between silk-covered boards lay a frontis collotype of a flower made by Kazumasa Ogawa (1860–1929). A pioneer in Japanese photography and a printer, Ogawa had published folios of collotypes of Geishas, flowers and the customs of Japan, prior to the publication of Japan Described and Illustrated in 1897. Also included were three 8 x 11-inch hand-colored photographs of Japanese people at their daily toils, recreations and rest, along with landscape scenes. Several photographs depicted geishas in various stages of dishabille, which undoubtedly delighted Victorian voyeurs.

Brinkley published several more editions of his book in a smaller format as well as a follow-up offering, a two-volume set titled The Art of Japan, which was published in 1901. It is probably the scarcest of the Brinkley publications. In the same year, Brinkley added a treatment of China to Japan Described and Illustrated and the set was expanded to 12 volumes. In 1910, the last printing of this book came off the press. Today, after a long period of neglect, Captain Brinkley’s Japan Described and Illustrated is again stirring interest among scholars and collectors of American fine art printing. While some sets can be found intact, others, sadly, have been broken up so that the collotypes and photographs can be sold individually.

From the open editions which were printed without limit to the limited editions sold by subscription, the volumes of Brinkley’s Japan Described and Illustrated are important and beautiful examples of American publishing commercialism. But they also serve as reminders of or page holders in the long and complicated relationship that developed between America and Japan in the past century and a half. Less than fifty years after the Brinkley publications were first sold, Japanese-American citizens were rounded up and placed in what were euphemistically described as “relocation camps” during World War II. The face of the exotic had been transformed into the face of the enemy. Fear of Japan replaced fascination with it. After the war, Japanese goods were marked “Made in Occupied Japan.” Americans had moved from peeping in the windows to owning the house.
Contentious Compatibility and the Common Good: The University as Servant and Critic in a Democracy

**Stephen J. Nelson**

On the occasion of his inauguration as president of the University of Michigan in April 1980, Harold Shapiro chose as a title for his address “Critic and Servant: The Role of the University.” His choice was apt. Critic and servant concisely captures the expectations that colleges and universities in America have borne over centuries. From the smallest liberal arts colleges to the major research universities like the institution Shapiro was about to lead, the academy in America has shouldered this burden and performed these functions.

In his address, Shapiro asserted that “[t]he relationship between the modern university and society is very complex and fragile because of the university’s dual role as society’s servant and as its critic.” As a servant, its function is complicated by the fact that society’s current economic and cultural contexts are always changing. “On the other hand, the university has a fundamental responsibility to criticize society’s current arrangements and to construct, entertain, and test alternative ways of organizing society’s institutions, alternative approaches to understanding nature, and alternative visions of society’s values” (Shapiro, *Tradition and Change* [1987], 112).

That is a tall order. What makes it all work? How is the complexity and fragility of the university’s sway in society navigated so that the critic and servant roles can be filled? How does all this happen, particularly in a democracy that at one and the same time argues for freedom of thought, individuality, and public engagement, all the while having to maintain itself and its public with an aura of security, safety, and stability?

The pivot point for Shapiro is the place where our ideals overlap inside and outside the gates, in our colleges and universities, and in American democracy generally. This place is where Americans share fundamental principles: the use of reason, the free play of ideas and thought, and tolerance of differing points of view. Shapiro believes that society’s support for the servant and critic role “has been ultimately sustained by faith in rationalism, faith in knowledge and science, and the resulting notion of human progress” (112), all features that we see repeated in any appraisal of the university’s historic foundations.

**The Delicate Balance of the University in a Democracy**

College presidents and other commentators have debated at length the purposes of the university in its relationship to American democracy and society. Understandably, they generally agree that the needs of democracy have to be met; that the university, whether public or private, exists in part at the pleasure of society and the state. However, within that overarching goal and expectation, a number of contentious, in some cases mutually exclusive, tensions and controversies inevitably arise.

For example, to what degree is the university an elitist institution, a gateway for those already at the top of society to secure and entrench their positions of control, power, and influence in society? Democracy and democratic values are supposed to champion the common man, equitable access, and the diversity that comes with those aspirations and beliefs. James Burrill Angell, president of the University of Michigan (1871–1909), once described the university as existing to provide an “uncommon education for the common man.” The “common man,” regular folk and citizens, presumably have a meritocratic shot at upward mobility and social-economic success in a democracy.
By making students better critics—thoughtful and compassionate, self-interested and public-spirited—we will better serve today’s society and the one to come.

Americans have always pursued democratic ideals in some measure and have been especially concerned about the relationship between their institutions and society. What is considered democratic today may be different from the times when Harvard was founded in the early 1600s. But the emphasis on the concept of democracy in America remains remarkably consistent throughout the centuries since its first college was founded and given the challenges that different eras presented to it.

The nation’s aspirations, especially as a democracy, have always been experimental. Harvard scholar Louis Menand captured that quest in a March 2013 piece in *The New Yorker*: “The ‘Constitution is an experiment, as all life is an experiment’... That is what Lincoln said in the Gettysburg Address; democracy is an experiment the goal of which is to keep the experiment going. The purpose of democracy is to enable people to live democratically. That’s it. Democracy is not a means to something else; there is no higher good that we’re trying as a society to attain” (71).

The academy in America is likewise an experiment, and the basis of its experiment is revealed in its relationship to the nation, to the Republic. Democracy, according to Menand, is the highest good that America can attain. Thus, as the university functions as the nation’s servant and critic, it shapes that aspiration through both its service and its criticism.

Contemporary Realities: The University Confronts Society and the State

American society confronted an unprecedented wave of revolution and clamor in the 1960s and 1970s. Some have characterized these times as new and uniquely dramatic for the academy and society; but were the 1960s that much different from previous eras?

Federal financial support for America’s colleges and universities increased significantly in the wake of World War II. Governmental involvement in terms of financial and budgetary support of the university was a new thing. These dollars came in various forms: the GI Bill; investment in science, engineering and technology spawned by the Cold War and the arms and space races; and support for capital building projects and other financial assistance, including greater aid packages for students. Increasing monetary ties between the government and the academy created complex entanglements that grew by leaps and bounds throughout the 1950s and continued into the mid-1960s.

In addition, tensions between the university and the state heightened alarmingly in the 1960s. The triggers of these tensions were essential American issues, arguments about the fundamental exercise of democracy—the Vietnam War, racial discrimination and civil rights, equality and equal opportunity, women’s rights—and they were debated in the public square, on and off campus.

To a great degree, the loudest of these debates took place on campus, and how they were handled in the Ivory Towers across the country became a focus of media inquiry and popular discussion. The debates came in the form of protest, demonstrations, and teach-ins. Often, these events had the veneer of academic inquiry, but in many cases they were single-sided manifestos designed to promote one point of view against the government, its policies, and its ties to the corporate and industrial complex (especially those that were instrumental to the military and to the war effort). In this unmistakable time of crisis, lines were drawn between the academy and the nation and sides were taken. In some Americans’ minds, universities had become sites of disturbing radicalism, ironically protected by the same governments that sustained them.

As a result, crucial differences developed in the relationship of the Ivory Tower to the surrounding society and nation in the 1960s. Even in this environment and with these pressures at its gates, the university was still applauded by many and encouraged in its role as servant: producer of engineers and
scientists who would help America win the Cold War and the Space Race; educators of the next generation of lawyers and corporate leaders. At the same time, Americans outside the academy had little tolerance for those in the university who criticized and opposed the government, especially on issues of the war and race, and for permitting transgressions against the norms of social and cultural life in the form of unchecked carousing among students.

The passage of time since the mid-1970s has resolved few if any of the problems spawned by the 1960s. Today, the politics of the American university are more coarse, more tense, and more polarized than ever before. In the academy, numerous issues kicked off in the 1960s have persisted as problems and a search for common ground is in danger of failing.

These issues include affirmative action and matters of equity and access; diversity; continual reductions in federal and state support and its financial implications, even as U.S. citizens demand increasing control and influence; escalating expenses and tuition increases; battles over curriculum; an increasingly complicated and interlocking nexus of government, corporate and business interests, and the degree of control they exert; and finally, the challenge of upholding the ideals of liberty, free speech and academic freedom.

Today, these controversies and unsolved issues are debated in a polarized and overwrought climate by a set of players who engage each other in a death grip. Informing all of these issues is the continuing ideological struggle between Left and Right, liberals and conservatives, those who use academic issues as proxy battles for their agendas outside the gates of the academy.

Acknowledging these threats, Columbia professor Andrew Delbanco proposes an antidote to these forces that, he argues, would remake the university into something fundamentally better than its current form. In essence, he argues, we must rebalance and reintegrate the twin roles of critic and servant that universities have ascribed to for so long. His formula is simple: “A college should not be a haven from worldly contention, but a place where young people fight out among and within themselves contending ideas of the meaningful life, and where they discover that self-interest need not be at odds with concern for one another.” In other words, by making students better critics—thoughtful and compassionate, self-interested and public-spirited—we will better serve today’s society and the one to come. If that vision can be pulled off, as he maintains, the dividends could be profound: “We owe it to posterity to preserve and protect this institution. Democracy depends on it” (Delbanco, College, [2012], 171).

It has been about six decades since the university in America became a modern battleground of ideological controversy. The tribalism of those debates weakened the democratic foundations of the academy and the nation. They provide object lessons for those of us who care about the university in America. There are two of them.

One is that the university must be increasingly vigilant not to morph into simply one more political or social tool that can easily be pushed or appropriated by forces either within or outside its gates. The other is that only by sustaining vigilance against those forces can the university uphold its fundamental principles and stature.

John Kemeny, president of Dartmouth College from 1970 to 1981, often preached about a university that would fulfill this mission as critic and servant. Throughout his tenure, he delivered insightful messages in annual opening convocation addresses. One of those talks came in the fall of 1978. Do not “listen to the siren song of simplistic solutions,” he admonished students, faculty, and the Dartmouth community. “The world is complex, the world is frustrating, the world is very fascinating—take it as it is, do not live in a fantasy world.” As a citizen of the university and American society, he said, “Face the problems the world presents to you. And, above all, use your years at Dartmouth to prepare yourself for that day when you can help make this a better world” (Kemeny, Dartmouth Convocation Address, 1978).

In public utterances only three years apart, Kemeny and Shapiro, presidential voices in the Ivory Tower, did much to reclaim the territory of the university in America and its dual roles as servant and critic. In doing so, they followed in a long tradition of thinking that links the health of American democracy to the proper functioning of its universities. Those who have followed and will follow in their footsteps must do likewise.
I remember the first time that I felt overwhelmed by the why of a story that I was witnessing and trying to report on television. It was in late September 1982 in Beirut, Lebanon. I happened to be in the region for a story about the Palestinian diaspora when I was dispatched to Beirut to cover a massacre that had just occurred in two adjacent refugee camps called Sabra and Shatila. It was over by the time I got there, but I was able to cover the gruesome aftermath. You can easily imagine the images, the stink, the flies, and the carnage... It was worse than I expected. But there was one image that, for years afterward, I couldn’t get out of my mind. It was a certain expression on the faces of a group of boys who were standing near me as we watched the recovery of a dead family from a little hut that had been blown up by the killers. The expression was one of cold, silent fury. And I remember thinking: this violence didn’t start here, and it will not end here. This is part of a continuum, an epic tragedy.

That day I learned, as best I could, the what, the how, the when. And I was able to give a general impression of the why. The massacre was by a Christian militia group backed up by the Israeli Army. The victims were Palestinian civilians—women, kids and old men. It was an act of revenge for atrocities by Palestinian fighters in a Christian village called Damour, south of Beirut, which had been an act of revenge for atrocities by Christian fighters in a refugee camp called Karantina, which had been an act of revenge for an act of revenge, et cetera. The scale of the Sabra–Shatila Massacre was huge. Estimates ranged from 800 to more than 2,000... Certainly, all parties would now step back, see the absurdity of what they were involved in. But... they didn’t and the civil war went on for 18 more years.
Terror and its Legacies

Unimaginable horror often produces optimism. World War I, the “war to end all wars,” the Holocaust, 9/11: nothing like that could ever happen again. And we always hope that the optimists and the guardians of national security are right when they make that proclamation: “never again.” But I suppose after years of experiencing the reality, I wouldn’t bet on it. And here’s why: the reality that I saw etched in the expressions on the faces of those boys at Sabra and Shatila. They would have known the dead people… They were witnesses and survivors, and perhaps

Especially Canada. There’s a complacency in Canada bordering on smugness that we are immune from the violence of our time. Canada is a country [that was] founded on the ideals of conciliation, compromise and consensus. [We] feel good about that… compromise and common sense [have given] us a special role to play in world affairs. But times have changed... There are now millions of Canadians whose lives have been scarred, directly or indirectly, by violence. They are refugees and migrants from violent places. Canada for 13 years has been at war in Afghanistan and we recently signed on

lot, one shot with an old hunting rifle as he stood on guard ceremonially at the National War Memorial in Ottawa. Now, I’ve had experience with covering violent conflict including terrorism, and not just Sabra and Shatila. Twenty years ago, I helped prepare an hour-long documentary called “Seeds of Terror.” I’ve done provocative, even speculative stories about the Bush wars in the Gulf in ’91 and ’03. I was part of a team that documented the radicalization of one of the 9/11 hijackers Ziad Jarrah who, until a couple of years before September the 11th, 2001, had been a drinking, dancing, easygoing party animal. I was part of a major examination of Islamist violence in Europe by the CBC and PBS Frontline, the Bombings in Madrid and London, and the phenomenon called “home-grown terror.” [T]here isn’t anything theological about [this] modern phenomenon; it’s reactionary, a response to psychotic feelings of exclusion among people who are probably excluded because they are unbalanced and extreme by nature… [The home-grown acts in Canada were] not the beginning of an insurrection, but a crime; a crime that has become more common but still an act of deviant behavior by a misfit.

The violence we call terrorism is a kind of invasive weed with roots deep in the soil of history. Modern technology creates the alarming possibility that these roots can now link up and spread unpredictably, compromising

When there is a crisis, we put most of the emphasis on the who, the what, the where, and the when—all important details. But we avoid the why.

the most profound and lasting consequences of violence are the changes that occur in the hearts and minds of survivors. [They] would live in grief and outrage, and would be altered by it. Many of them driven mad by it. They would take the madness everywhere they went for the remainder of their lives and they would pass it on to their children, and their children’s children.

What I saw in the stern, young faces of those boys, most of them not much more than 12 years old, [was] a warning signal: the consequences of violence migrate in time and space, and are felt in distant places throughout time. And given the violence of the twentieth century… it isn’t hard to understand why so many bad things happen unexpectedly in the new millennium and in unlikely places, like Canada.

to a strange campaign of violence in Iraq and Syria. We have been, and are, part of a violent response to violence, and we can’t expect not to be infected by the consequences.

[In Canada, in October 2014, twice in the space of three days] two crazy guys killed two unsuspecting soldiers—one in a deliberate hit-and-run in a parking

[The boys] would take the madness everywhere they went for the remainder of their lives and they would pass it on to their children, and their children’s children.

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vulnerable minds, and that there is a predictable continuum from disillusionment to alienation to piety to fanaticism to murder.

**Fearism**

[We] are facing two insuperable realities each time we are faced with what we now impulsively call terrorism. The first is that people tend not to want to do a lot of thinking in a crisis. We want information, and we want reassurance that we are safe, that this is a particular situation that can be attributed to an evil individual or group, and that the situation is under control and exceptional. The second is a bit more complex and it is pure speculation on my part...I came to the opinion...in the months after 9/11 that while that project was without a doubt a terrorist attack in every sense, it revealed something terribly disturbing about public vulnerability. I began to suspect in the aftermath of 9/11 that the new laws and the security establishment, the orange and red alerts, the intolerable paranoia in airports and other public places, that the other side of the coin of terrorism is a sinister reality called "fearism."

Fearism is an impulse to take political and commercial advantage of the circumstances created by an act of terrorism: public confusion, volatile feelings of vulnerability, systemic fear. To consolidate that in that moment. To consolidate political and economic power. To advance an ideological thought becomes hard to resist. I don’t think it’s unduly speculative to suggest that when people are afraid, they are inclined to suspend the admirable quality of skepticism. We are inclined to do what our leaders tell us to do in times of peril. People in positions of leadership take on almost infallible qualities in a time of crisis. Anybody with a headset or a T-shirt or traffic pylon, a badge or gun or title becomes a figure of authority... For politicians in a democracy, it’s awfully tempting to take advantage of this momentary suspension of our critical faculties, our instinct to become followers, and to accept restrictions on our freedom in the name of freedom, our willingness to buy into propositions that would be absurd and intolerable at any other time. And the mass media play into this, it troubles me to say, because we become unwitting conduits for the fear that spreads among us. We become political facilitators, transforming rational and conscientious individuals into reactionary units in a frightened biomass. Given that, and the heat of the moment, people are screaming for information, even if it’s just fantasy or gossip. The media will struggle to oblige, and to make a lot of advertising money in the process.

In times of war, we necessarily accept the intolerable on a temporary basis. Conscription, censorship, rationing—emotional manipulation through systemic propaganda, all sorts of stuff that would make Hobbes and Orwell grin and nod their heads in their respective graveyards. But this normal phenomenon becomes an enduring problem when we allow the imperatives of crisis to become embedded in our minds and in our laws. Historically, as a crisis wanes, we seem to regain our senses and perspective.

We should be very careful that the seeds of terror planted in a violent century don’t blossom in the future as tentacles of tyranny... I have often in the course of my career as a reporter, a career that has exposed me to a lot of conflict, violence, and sometimes terror, been inspired by a line from the great American politician, Franklin Roosevelt. Everybody knows the line from Roosevelt’s First Inaugural Address in 1933. It’s one of those simple insights always worth remembering and repeating. “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”

And I would add that the best antidote for fear, the only antidote, in fact, is reason.
Rhonda Garelick takes up this task in her biography, Mademoiselle: Coco Chanel and the Pulse of History. In opening her book, Garelick establishes that “[a]lthough Chanel was born in rural poverty and raised in an orphanage with little formal education, by the time she was thirty her name was a household word in France… By 1930, when Chanel was forty-seven, she employed 2,400 people and was worth at least $15 million – close to $1 billion in today’s currency” (xiv). The book follows Chanel’s successful career, but Garelick wants to approach the designer’s life through an examination of her relationship with politics and history, recognizing that “[w]hat remains to be considered is how her work and art themselves partook of European politics, and what her many intriguing love affairs might offer beyond their anecdotal value” (xvi). This approach is reminiscent of Caroline Weber’s Queen of Fashion: What Marie Antoinette Wore to the Revolution (2006), in which she invites the reader into the Queen’s wardrobe and melds clothing into the fabric of French politics. Garelick’s analysis and narrative is not as compelling as Weber’s, though she achieves her goal when focusing on the First and Second World Wars.

The early stages of Chanel’s career coincided with the First World War, when active women turned to the more practical styles that she promoted. Chanel utilized jersey, a textile of the masses, and converted it into desirable, wearable clothing for the upper reaches of society, while emphasizing thin bodies rather than prewar curvaceousness. The war generated opportunities that enabled her business to prosper and its context offers the reader a tangible understanding of Chanel’s place in history. “Thin, androgynous, simply dressed in striped naval-uniform-style suits, or schoolboy sports clothes and blazers, the ‘Chanel woman’ conjured the silhouette of the war’s millions of soldiers – the young men dying just out of sight of the general population” (87).

Unfortunately, as the book continues, the figure of Chanel is lost to the reader. Garelick structures individual chapters on Chanel’s romantic interests, including the exiled Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovich Romanov, poet Pierre Reverdy, the wealthy Duke of Westminster, and French illustrator and nationalist, Paul Iribe. There is one chapter dedicated to her female friendships, in particular with society force, Misia Sert, but the majority of writing focuses on her male companions. In her quest to discover what these relationships “might offer beyond their anecdotal value,” Garelick outlines the lives of these men, their political convictions and connections, and their influences on Chanel. The result of these chapters is a repetitive narration where the men reside in the foreground of the story while Chanel rests in the background and her design history comes through as something of an afterthought. Garelick informs her readers that Chanel was known to bend the truth of her own past, which indicates that...
the historian would need to proceed with caution when uncovering her story. However, Gabrielle Chanel forged her own history and should be placed in the driver’s seat rather than chauffeured from one lover to the next. Chanel reemerges in the final chapters. Here, Garelick presents the notion of “Chanelism,” in which “Chanel” had become a concept, a movement, a way of life, a vast constellation of visual associations and references instantly recognizable to millions of women in Europe and the United States” (251). The author compares Chanel’s aesthetic to fascist design principles surrounding symbols and uniforms, noting that the Chanel logo appeared only one year after the swastika made its ominous arrival in Nazi Germany. She explains how the Nazis constructed attractive clothing that complemented the male body, and that Chanel applied their masculine chic to female clothing. Her style offered women “an alternate route to the manipulations of fascism, an ostensibly emancipatory worldview that seemed an appealing antidote to constraining sexism and reactionary politics, while achieving nonetheless the psychological goals of fascism” (295). Readers learn that the fascists uniformed a nation and Chanel uniformed women around the world – and that, unlike the Nazis, her popularity survived.

Throughout the book, Garelick emphasizes Chanel’s connections to men who were nationalistic and anti-Semitic, and that Chanel shared those sentiments. It was therefore no surprise to the reader that once the Nazi occupation of Paris had been established, Chanel returned to her home at the Ritz, a converted “Gestapo barracks” (327), to reclaim her residence (though she was demoted to smaller rooms) and live side by side with the ascendancy. The most distressing story revealed by Garelick involves the reminiscences of sisters Viviane Forrester and Lady Christiane Françoise Swaythling, whose aunt, Louise, was a Jewish woman relegated to a maid’s quarters. Stepping out of a chauffeured car occupied by her Nazi boyfriend, Chanel entered the unoccupied home of the sisters’ aunt and claimed some antique furniture in order to cash in on the plunder. Chanel was also involved in Nazi schemes, including an unsuccessful attempt to negotiate a settlement with Winston Churchill in 1943. Garelick places all aspects of Chanel’s involvement with the Nazis on the table, making the two chapters on fascism and the Second World War the book’s pinnacle. For readers interested in design history, the final chapter does not disappoint. The author takes the reader along the journey of Chanel’s return to fashion after years of post-WWII exile in Switzerland. We are led into her studio occupied by seamstresses and models, all directed by Chanel. In these years, the United States embraced her brand and American icons such as Jacqueline Kennedy endorsed her style. Garelick shows how Chanel’s appeal came full circle. Due to the sophistication and artistry of her designs, the public was able to conveniently forget her dark past.

Today, we want to know the sordid details of her fascinating story along with the origins of her influence upon our material lives. Garelick emphasizes just how prominent and lasting her artistic ideas remain. Many clothing articles that appear among us as everyday attire for women originated with Chanel seizing men’s clothes and converting masculine forthrightness into feminine ease. As for the woman behind the runway spectacle, we are left contemplating an individual of immense artistic talent, controlling in nature, unlucky in love, and disturbing in her political associations and beliefs. Even after one digests this fine volume, there is still more to contemplate about this complex woman. How much she was a product of her time or one who shaped her surroundings remains open to debate.

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What is Good Grammar?

Kathryn Evans


Many English teachers and professors dread meeting people in airplanes, those people who, upon learning of our profession, either apologize for any grammatical errors they might make or shut down completely, afraid to talk. Steven Pinker, in *The Sense of Style*, understands all too well the judgment many of us fear. He reassures us that *can* and *may* can be used interchangeably, that both *like* and *such as* are legitimate, that the passive voice is “unfairly maligned” (132), and—perhaps most comfortably—that *whom* is “circling the drain” (242).

Pinker goes beyond reassurance, however; he helps us see how usage patterns change over time and why some conventions are worth observing while others aren’t. To this end, he draws on evidence such as eye-tracking experiments, judgments by the 200-member Usage Panel from the *American Heritage Dictionary*, historical accounts of how particular conventions arose, and ample examples of both current and historical usage.

In addition to discussing usage, Pinker analyzes passages of “good writing” to illustrate what makes them effective, discusses strategies for achieving coherence, and gives advice on using syntax to avoid correct but convoluted prose. He also, in an especially interesting chapter, discusses “the curse of knowledge,” claiming that “the main cause of incomprehensible prose is the difficulty of imagining what it’s like for someone else not to know something that you know” (57).

In conveying these concepts, Pinker sometimes goes into eyes-glaze-over detail, and, perhaps more troublesome, doesn’t acknowledge the scholarly consensus that there is no such thing as “good writing.” He seems to ignore scholars who agree that the effectiveness of writing depends on how flexibly authors adapt their writing to new purposes, audiences, and genres. Despite Pinker’s oversimplified view of “good writing,” his informative and often surprising discussions of usage—the highlight of the book—are likely to attract a variety of audiences. Pinker envisions his audience as “aspiring wordsmiths,” but his book may also be of interest to experienced writers seeking to make their tacit knowledge explicit, professors writing for non-academic audiences, teachers hoping to help students write more effectively, and “grammar mavens” wanting to know why Pinker—a linguist and cognitive scientist at Harvard—accuses them of being “sticklers, pedants, peevers, snobs, snoots, nit-pickers, traditionalists, language police, usage nannies, grammar Nazis, and the Gotcha! Gang,” who, in their “zeal to purify usage and safeguard the language,” have made it “difficult to think clearly about felicity in expression and have muddied the task of explaining the art of writing” (188).

Addressing grammar mavens—and especially those who fear them—Pinker debunks many common misconceptions about usage. He notes, for instance, that the prohibition of split infinitives is “the quintessential bogus rule… according to which Captain Kirk should not have said to boldly go where no man has gone before, but rather to go boldly or boldly to go” (199). His discussion of this “bogus rule’s” origin is typical of his explanations of many usage conventions—and, taken together, these explanations provide a fascinating glimpse into how our rules came to exist and why so many of them shouldn’t, in fact, be rules.

For instance, Pinker explains (perhaps overzealously) that the “very terms ‘split infinitive’ and ‘split verb’ are based on a thick-witted analogy to Latin, in which it is impossible to split a verb because it consists of a single word,
such as amare, ‘to love.’ But in English, the so-called infinitive . . . consists of two words, not one” (229). Pinker goes on to quote several experts, including Theodore Bernstein, who notes that “There is nothing wrong with splitting an infinitive . . . except that eighteenth-and nineteenth-century grammarians, for one reason or another, frowned on it” (199).

Pinker also debunks the common belief that the pronoun he is gender-neutral and that using a singular they instead is incorrect. Quoting a 2013 press release, he tells us that Obama said, “No American should ever live under a cloud of suspicion just because of what they look like” (255). (Note that “No American” is singular, while “they” is typically seen as plural.) Obama, purportedly gender-neutral he, including “She and Louis had a game—who could find the ugliest photograph of himself” (257).

Pinker concedes that the singular they is less accepted today than in centuries past, but he claims we’re in the midst of a historical change. He suggests that, if we’re confronted by a reader who is unhappy with our use of a singular they, we should “tell them that Jane Austen and I think it’s fine” (261).

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Pinker is similarly passionate (and sometimes judgmental) when he condemns the notion that we shouldn’t end sentences with prepositions. This prohibition, he explains, “persists only among know-it-alls who have never opened a dictionary or style manual to check. There is nothing, repeat nothing, wrong with Who are you looking at? or . . . It’s you she’s thinking of” (220). The preposition pseudo-rule, he informs us, was invented by poet John Dryden based on a “silly analogy” with Latin in an attempt to show that Ben Jonson was an inferior poet (220). Pinker quotes Mark Liberman’s apt remark, “It’s a shame that Jonson had been dead for 35 years at the time, since he would otherwise have challenged Dryden to a duel, and saved subsequent generations a lot of grief” (220–221).

Despite his own views on usage, Pinker recognizes the complexity of the choices writers must make. He notes, for instance, that using a singular they can be dangerous because readers may think the writer made an error. In the end, he wisely notes that a variety of considerations should inform writers’ choices, telling us that “a writer must critically evaluate claims of correctness, discount the dubious ones, and make choices which inevitably trade off conflicting values” (300). Because of the choices writers must make at every turn, writing is hard, but Pinker’s debunking of so many rigid rules just made it a little easier.

Despite Pinker’s oversimplified view of “good writing,” his informative and often surprising discussions of usage—the highlight of the book—are likely to attract a variety of audiences.

Pinker points out, did not write because of what he looks like or because of what he or she looks like. Pinker’s advocacy of the singular they (258) is further buttressed by its appearance in Shakespeare, Chaucer, the King James Bible, Swift, Byron, Thackeray, Wharton, Shaw, and Auden (258). Citing scholar Henry Churchyard, Pinker notes that Jane Austen used the singular they 87 times in her work (258).

Pinker provides a number of reasons that the pronoun he does not adequately represent both sexes. He cites experiments demonstrating that when people read the word he, they typically assume that the writer intended to refer only to males, and he summarizes an experiment demonstrating that “sexist usage… stops readers in their tracks and distracts them from the writer’s message” (258). Pinker offers several examples illustrating the fallacy of the

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Will the Real Henry Kissinger Please Stand Up?

Leonid Heretz


Consider the design of the cover of Henry Kissinger’s most recent book. How many individuals’ names could stand up to a placement and juxtaposition like that? Thanks to half a century of promotion, Henry Kissinger’s can. Blurbs on the back of the book remind us of the author’s “intimate firsthand knowledge” of the high and mighty, his ability to offer “incisive strategic analysis” spanning continents and centuries and, not least, his role in shaping foreign policy and international relations. “No one can lay claim to so much influence … over the past 50 years,” according to the authoritative *Financial Times*. It is no secret that Kissinger is getting on in years, so we might hope that *World Order* is his political testament, a place where he finally tells the inside story of why things are the way they are, and how they might be fixed.

Fittingly enough for the man who is credited with bringing *Realpolitik* to the rubes, Kissinger begins with a lengthy disquisition on the grand old European system of Richelieu (“sophisticated and ruthless”) and Bismarck (“master manipulator of the balance of power”). While most of the world has had too much order (empires with universal claims) or too little (authorities incapable of exercising control beyond the local level), Europe for a time had the optimal order: mutually recognized sovereign states that enjoyed unchallenged control over their own territories and pursued secular, defined goals through rational diplomacy and limited warfare. Regrettably, the European system drove itself into the ground in the world wars, and that happened just before it was imperfectly established in the rest of the world during decolonization. According to Kissinger, the challenge and tragedy of our times is that there is no international order, and “if order cannot be achieved by consensus or imposed by force, it will be wrought, at disastrous and dehumanizing cost, from the experience of chaos” (129).

To those who have forgotten (or never took) their old-fashioned Western Civ or International Relations courses, all of this might sound rather profound, as might Kissinger’s observations about the essential characteristics of the different parts of the world beyond Europe: Russia, ominously (or is it comically?) styling itself the Third Rome, combining “globe-spanning ambitions” with “the insecurities of the parvenu” (55). The Middle East supplies the “stern landscape [from which] have issued conquerors and prophets holding aloft banners of universal aspirations” (96). China is the Middle Kingdom, viewing itself as the center of a “universal hierarchy” (213). India, secure in its “timeless matrix,” measures the comings and goings of empires and epochs “against the perspective of the infinite” (193). America is characterized by an irresistible combination of pragmatism and idealism.

Most of what Kissinger writes about the contemporary scene would be familiar to anyone who follows the news. His recommendations are also unremarkable, although he does throw in bits of his trademark Machiavellianism (for example, he suggests dumping responsibility for Afghanistan on that country’s neighbors). In recent years, Kissinger has positioned himself as the godfather (in the intellectual rather than the organized crime sense) of the ‘realist’ school of foreign policy, which argues for restraint and against the militant interventionism of the neoconservative and ‘humanitarian’ factions.
Unfortunately, there is little of this Kissingerian realism in World Order, and most of the book reads like the op-ed pages of the Wall Street Journal or the Washington Post. This is particularly true of the treatment of America’s role. Kissinger raises hopes that he will offer a realist critique of U.S. policy when he gives Woodrow Wilson credit for bequeathing “to the twentieth century’s decisive power an elevated foreign policy doctrine unmoored from a sense of history or geopolitics” (269). Instead, he provides a reverent apology for successive U.S. administrations, justifying virtually all of the major decisions made up to the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq (but not the ‘nation-building’ that followed), and showing that Wilsonianism is actually a good thing because it has inspired Americans to achieve even more than they would have otherwise.

By way of consolation, the book is full of Kissingerian aphorisms struggling to be born. “For nations, history plays the role that character confers on human beings” (167) and “[In] international affairs, a reputation for reliability is a more important asset than demonstrations of tactical cleverness” (73) are just two of many. Kissinger was on TV a lot when I was a child, so I can see his deadpan expression and hear his grave monotone when I read “[H]istory punishes strategic frivolity sooner or later” (80). We are no longer in the realm of “Power is the greatest aphrodisiac,” but that would be a lot to expect of a 91-year old.

Inspired by this example, I will try my own hand at maxim-making: “A statesman is not a pedant.” World Order is shot through with sloppy quotation and even contains factual errors. To cite only two of them: first, Kissinger helps us appreciate the role of the Saudi king by likening it to that of the Holy Roman Emperor in his capacity as “Defender of the Faith.” That honorific belongs, of course, to the English monarch, and does not illuminate Middle Eastern affairs in the slightest. Elsewhere, we learn that Eugene of Savoy led a European army that saved Vienna and Europe from the Turks in 1683. Prince Eugene of Savoy, King Jan Sobieski of Poland—what difference does it make? The confusion is very roughly equivalent to saying that George Patton and not John Pershing led the American Expeditionary Force to France in World War I. It would not matter that much if these were the memoirs of a practical politician who makes no pretense of intellectualism, but Kissinger bases his authority on a stereotypically Central European erudition and precision.

Another aphorism that suggests itself: “A statesman never plays it straight.” Kissinger gets very murky and uncharacteristically self-effacing when he comes to the Nixon and Ford administrations, the only time when he actually had any power. This is how he deals with the invasion of Cambodia and the escalation of bombing in North Vietnam (which are nowhere mentioned explicitly): “The military actions that President Nixon ordered, and that as his National Security Advisor I supported, together with the policy of diplomatic flexibility, brought about a settlement in 1973” (301).

It would seem that Henry Kissinger is not yet ready to give up his secrets, at least not in a setting where an obscure college professor might get at them.

Leonid Heretz is Professor in the Department of History.
READERS RESPOND
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That article [by William Hanna] about
the prisoner of war camp in Taunton,
mainly Italian prisoners and how they
became friends with the local Italian
population… was so fascinating. My
girlfriend’s mother is Italian and she
had a cousin who married one of the
people in the Italian part of the prison.
He was allowed to go out on weekends
and visit with families in Brockton. At
the end of the war, a whole bunch of
marriages resulted from the visitations
that they were allowed to do. That
story is so incredibly wonderful. I loved
it and my friends did too. They were
just so amazed… because they actu-
ally have some part of it in their lives.

Gayle Engstli, Grangeville, Idaho

Thoroughly enjoyed the [Editor’s
Notebook] in the most recent
Bridgewater Review. I’ve been re-
reading, Where Men Win Glory, about
Pat Tillman, who left the NFL to enlist
in the Army following 9/11, and the
mythic narrative shaped and cultivated
by the Pentagon during his service
and the subsequent cover-up of his
death by friendly fire. I often worry
that Veterans Day in the U.S has
devolved into a hollow, almost Hallmark
holiday, in that it now serves primarily
as a commercially-driven enterprise.
As such it was quite nice reading some-
thing on the subject without the need
for cynical lenses.

Conor McKeon, Boston

I enjoyed [Stephen Kaczmarek’s] article
on fracking. The people of southern
[New Jersey] had the same dilemma.
They had great paying jobs but the
chemical waste was killing people...
Read the book Toms River and you
can get the complete story of how
a German chemical company which
left Germany because it polluted the
Danube came to pristine South Jersey
and did the same thing without any
care for the people. Just plain profit!

Gerardo Tempesta, Harwichport