Democracy, Islam and Development in the Arab World
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MIKE KRYZANEK, ANN BRUNJES, BILL LEVIN and JEAN STONEHOUSE Remember CHARLIE ANGELL
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Editor’s Notebook

Andrew C. Holman

Recently, I had the good fortune to attend a lecture given by Dr. Robert Barsky, a Vanderbilt University professor of French, Italian and English known best, perhaps, as the biographer of American left icons Noam Chomsky and Zellig Harris and an expert on the relations between scholarship and public intellectuals in America. Speaking to an audience of Fulbright-Kilham exchange students (two of whom were connected to BSU) in Ottawa’s National Arts Center, Barsky told the fascinating story of the rise and fall of Avukah, a Jewish student left-Zionist organization in the 1930s and 40s, of which Harris was a leading member. The purpose of the talk was, quite clearly, to inspire the assembled young minds to be publicly active, to take their own ideas about social justice beyond classroom and seminar discussions and into the streets... wherever they may be. Barsky’s talk was inspiring, but what struck me most was an offhand remark he made about his research on Avukah and its detractors, for some of whom he felt distinct antipathy. “My intellectual failing has been, for a long time that I have been a partisan.” Overcoming his initial feelings was critical to producing a balanced treatment of his subject, so as to craft a story that he might be able to call “true.” Barsky’s challenge, of course, is the challenge that we all face as scholars: to be (and teach our students to be) objective about the phenomena we study.

Lauding objectivity during this, the high season of political partisanship in America, might seem ill-timed and perhaps even naïve. But Barsky’s comment and the backdrop of political spin in this month’s presidential election lead one to do just that. Objectivity is an impossible value that is always under siege. It is something that those in academia and in public discourse strive toward and of which most of them invariably fall short. It is a worthy notion—an ideal—and, as a mode of expression, it may well be falling out of fashion.

As an academic ideal, objectivity has a history. In their recent book, Objectivity (2007), history of science scholars Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison define scientific objectivity rather simply: “the will to will-lessness.” Objectivity is the cornerstone of scientific inquiry and the premise for scientific method. Yet, as they argue, it is a relatively recent influence. Their book examines the ways that early modern scientists depicted nature and its actions in published atlases of scientific images. In the last half of the nineteenth century, these images changed as the experiments of (and use of photography among) physicists, anatomists, crystallographers, botanists and others gradually revealed that nature is imperfect and that there was really no singular or standard example of a leaf, a human body or a splash. In these years, scientists embraced a new way of seeing, to observe what was really there. In so doing, they redefined what it meant to be a scientist.

Objectivity is no less transitory as an ideal in the humanities and social sciences. Even in history, for example, objectivity is a relatively recent guiding concept. It was the “Father of Modern History,” German scholar Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), who first championed the idea of the scientific study of the past in the 1830s. Since then, academic historians have embraced the “noble dream” of unveiling history as it really happened (wie es eigenlicht gewesen) using rigorous and exhaustive methods for interrogating evidence from the past. Even though today’s historians seldom agree on what really happened, they still seek the truth, and objectivity remains central to the methods they employ.

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Objectivity has another use among scholars, beyond its place as a practical epistemological ideal or a methodological guide. Objectivity is a literary mindset, an important rhetorical tool, and an idiom of public discourse. Scholars in all disciplines have long cloaked their discussions in the language of objectivity. It’s how they talk; or, at least, how they used to talk.

The traditional language of scholarly objectivity is direct and forthright. The results of inquiries are stated, normally, in plain language that delivers truths unadorned with qualification or equivocation. A thesis is designed to state unassailable truth: “Slavery, westward expansion and the failure of political compromise were the main causes of the U.S. Civil War”; “Global warming and the rising of seas levels are a direct result of the increase in human-produced CO2”; “Evolution is the most convincing theory to explain the development of the natural world.”

To be eschewed are literary devices that personalize or make partisan one’s argument: “I believe that”; “In 1776, we rebelled.” Objective writing ostensibly separates the academic writer from his or her findings—truths that presumably any scholar should be able to arrive at should he or she employ the same materials, methods and rigor of the initial research. The main function of objective language is simple: to advance knowledge and avoid needless rancor. Presenting scholarly findings as one’s own belief or opinion or the product of singular thinking invites others to dismiss, disagree with or debate their ideas, and stifle progress. And this orthodoxy has sometimes been applied brutally. One colleague recalls that an undergraduate professor of his had a simple credo for essay writing: “I = F.”

But the rhetoric of objectivity may be changing in the academy. Among those who have weighed in on this matter is the renowned Canadian poet richard Harrison, a creative writing teacher at Mount Royal University in Calgary, Alberta. Harrison welcomes the personalization of scholarly writing and propounds it as the best way to get today’s students to own their scholarly work and make them feel as though they are participants in the larger academic enterprise of creating knowledge. This fits perhaps particularly well for this generation of students, those for whom email, texting, Twitter, Facebook and other social media have made routine communication intensely personal. As a mode of public discourse, subjectivity is on the rise. And it may affect even the most stalwart defenders of the objective voice soon. There is at least some evidence of first-person creep in a few recent issues of scholarly journals, a potential portent of change. Does it matter? Well, yes. The way researchers express scholarly findings reflects the assumptions that underlie them. Per Barsky, scholars have long sought not only to be impartial in the ways they approach their research subjects, but to be seen to be impartial as well. Still, as an ideal, objectivity, as Daston and Galison remind us, has its own historical style and rhythm that speaks to academic sensibilities of the day. And so in this way, the language of scholarship—its posture—is a bellwether for changes in scholars’ views about and fidelity to the long-lauded ideal of objectivity.

Richard Harrison

It is, at least, in my opinion.
Stories from the Bible—and especially the stories from Genesis—often have lives of their own beyond the pages of the text. The stories about the Garden of Eden and Adam and Eve permeate our historical memory. But when you get down to it, these stories are very short and leave out the kind of details we moderns like. The lack of detail in Genesis invites readers, interpreters and artists to fill in the gaps; we tend to like details, and Genesis stubbornly refuses to give us precise details. When I teach Genesis I emphasize this point: the narrative style is sparse, and this is not a bad thing but one of its greatest literary contributions. It is a model of using the fewest words possible, but the lack of detail also raises many questions as we try to fill in all of those gaps.

Take for instance the story of Cain and Abel. The story of the first two children of Adam and Eve takes a mere 15 verses to recount in chapter 4 of Genesis (fewer than 400 words in the King James Version). As we read the story many questions come to mind. How did Adam and Eve react? All we are told is that they bore another son and Eve says that he is in place of Abel. Did they go out looking for Abel when he didn’t return from the sacrifice? And what would his mother, Eve, have said? Questions of this sort drive not only my research but my teaching as well. When I teach the Bible in literature courses I ask students to think about what is not there. Why does the story of Cain and Abel leave out what we would consider essential details? Is there a reason for this silence? In similar fashion, I encourage them to look for things that do not at first make sense, gaps of the story of Cain and Abel. In this text, the author imagines what Cain and Abel would have said to each other leading up to the murder. Then the text moves to imagining what Eve would have said when she came

**Why does the story of Cain and Abel leave out what we would consider essential details? Is there a reason for this silence?**
out into the field and discovered her sons—one slain, the other trembling. The homily is attributed to Ephrem the Syrian, who lived at the edge of the Roman Empire in the fourth century and composed a great number of hymns in the Syriac language. He inaugurated a new tradition of Christian poetry; even St. Jerome (347–420) attests to how popular his poetry was. Within his lifetime (or at least soon thereafter) Ephrem’s poetry was being translated into Greek and Latin. But this particular homily exists only in Greek, and is part of a large collection of Greek texts attributed to the Syriac-speaking Ephrem. The dating of these texts is uncertain; they cannot be earlier than the fourth century and more likely come from the fifth century. At some point these texts, which contain features common in Syriac literature of the time, were collected together as texts of Ephrem the Syrian. Modern scholarship now refers to this collection as the work of Ephrem Graecus, or the Greek Ephrem. Historically, these texts are of major importance for the literary and religious history of Byzantium and those nations influenced by Byzantine culture. But these texts of the Greek Ephrem are not well known in English.

I am working to correct that by translating selected works—especially those engaged in imagining what Biblical characters might have said. To date I have presented these translations along with broader discussions of these works at a number of conferences, and I am in the process of working towards a collection of translations of Ephrem’s homilies on Biblical themes. This homily on Cain and Abel gives us an example of how this rhetorical device, when applied to a Biblical text, opens new avenues for interpretation while also producing a fine piece of imaginative literature.

Toward the end of the homily, Eve comes out into the plain, wondering what has taken them so long, and she tries to make sense of what is before her eyes. She came running to the plain and saw Abel lying on the plain like a sheep that has been slain and Cain groaning and trembling like a leaf blown about by the wind. Standing there, Eve did not know how to make sense of this new sight. For the child lay dead, but Eve did not know the ways of death.

Eve is perplexed. This was, after all, the very first instance of death. Rather than just stopping here and saying she didn’t understand death, the homily gives voice to her perplexity. Then we hear an imagined speech as the author imagines what Eve might have said.

*What is this strange and unendurable sight?*

*Abel, you are silent and you don’t speak to your mother [. . .]*

Cain Killing Abel (Byzantine mosaic in the Duomo of Monreale, Italy). Photo credit: Scala / Art Resource, New York.
Works of fiction that imagine a historical event from an untold perspective are as popular as ever, and recent years have seen an influx of fiction that gives voice to silent characters in older works of fiction.

I will weep and lament, my child,
because you are carried off from
my arms
suddenly, like a little sparrow.

Eve is the mother not just of Abel the slain but of Cain the slayer as well. After lamenting the fallen she turns to the other child, Cain:

Why do you groan and tremble
and why are you agitated,
like a leaf blown about by the wind?

Why are your clothes stained red?
Why does your right hand trickle with blood?

God, what is this new sight?

All of this emphasis on her perplexity is to force us to imagine what it must have been like for Eve to encounter this situation. Here we see the author noticing a silence in the text—what Eve might have said—and this gap in the text then allows for this imaginative exploration and this chance to give Eve a voice.

For obvious reasons, Cain, the first to commit murder, does not come across well in commentaries on Genesis 4. But in this homily, Eve noticeably refrains from cursing her son. First, she assumes the devil must have tricked him, and later she takes the blame upon herself instead.

And she spoke to Cain:
“Did the Devil beguile you and lead you to fratricide,
Just like he beguiled me?
Do I see the Devil made you the murderer and slayer of Abel?”

Early in the homily, she warns Cain to beware of the devil, but there is no moment when the devil approaches and talks to Cain. Her refusal to condemn Cain reflects back on her own transgression. By suggesting that the devil must have tricked Cain, as he tricked her, she implies that she was not at fault but was deceived. She then wonders how she can tell Adam. She finds herself in a dilemma. Often in Greek tragedy we encounter characters facing such ethical dilemma; each course of action has its own consequences. Eve finds herself in such a situation, where each course of action has its drawbacks:

If I say what has happened, I will be of no help for Abel
And I will accuse Cain.
How can I become the accuser of my offspring?
I pity the life of this one, and I lament the death of that one.
This imagery of the lost child as an unripe fruit is a common motif in the long tradition of Greek funeral laments, and this homily draws upon those traditions. But Eve then goes on to talk about partaking of the forbidden fruit. She discusses how this murder is the “fruit” of what she has sown; this new sight of death causes her to reflect on what the expulsion from Eden means.

But just as we partook from the tree of deception,
So too from the tree of deception he has gone astray,
Because he slays this one and deprives himself of life.

He makes known the first death and he is become
The first interpreter of the promise of God.

This notion of Cain as interpreter is very intriguing. Cain is not despised; rather, he plays an important role. He explains what God meant by “on the day you eat of the fruit you shall die” (Genesis 2:17). For someone unfamiliar with death, this curse would not have much force—what does it mean that you will die, when you don’t know yet what death is? But now Eve understands what God meant, thanks to Cain interpreting the meaning. He performs a necessary, although unpleasant, function. He is the interpreter who makes clear God’s curse. As readers of Genesis, we have to pause and ponder what it means that Adam and Eve are told that they will die on the day they partake of the fruit, when in fact they do not die right away. Cain’s murder, however, bridges this gap and offers an explanation: his murder drives home for Eve what it means that death is now part of the world.

Eve perceives that this murder is the fruit; indeed, it is what she reaps for transgressing the commandment not to eat the fruit. She cannot bear to blame her son, so she takes the blame upon herself. Her maternal bonds are so strong that she cannot condemn her own child; instead, she prefers to take the blame upon herself.

And here the homily ends, after a brief and formulaic doxology common to homilies. Indeed, as we see, we have here a fully fleshed out speech that gives us insight into the character of Eve. She is not simply a stock character; rather, we see her trying to make sense of this. She goes from blaming the devil to blaming herself. And we see her in this motherly role of being unable to condemn Cain since he is still, no matter what he has done, her offspring.

The urge to imagine what otherwise silent characters might have said is still with us. Works of fiction that imagine a historical event from an untold perspective are as popular as ever, and recent years have seen an influx of fiction that gives voice to silent characters in older works of fiction. As readers we like to imagine the other voices and the other possibilities. By imagining what other characters might have said, we also come to a deeper understanding of the text. I also have students do their own form of imagining a moment in a text from a silent character’s perspective as a writing assignment. What students discover is what educators in antiquity realized as well—there is perhaps no better way to learn to analyze a text and delve into how words are used than to try to write an imitation of a text and give voice to a silent character.

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By imagining what other characters might have said, we also come to a deeper understanding of the text.
Why Snails? How Gastropods Improve Our Understanding of Ecological Disturbance

Christopher Bloch

The concept of equilibrium—the idea that a perturbed system will tend to return to its original state—is the basis for many foundational theories in ecology. Yet, the spatial and temporal dynamics of ecosystems are strongly influenced by disturbance. In the ecological literature, a disturbance is most commonly defined as an event, distinct from ordinary demographic processes, that alters population size, environmental conditions or resource availability. That is a broad definition, potentially encompassing everything from geologic upheaval or extreme climatic events to something as simple and localized as an animal digging a burrow.

Disturbances can prevent equilibrium, or, if extreme enough, even establish a new equilibrium. As such, they have potentially far-ranging effects on ecosystems. As human populations continue to grow, our ability to manage resources and preserve biodiversity depends on our understanding of how disturbance affects natural systems. It is within this context that we study the effects of disturbance on terrestrial gastropods.

Gastropods (snails and slugs, the latter of which are really just snails that have lost their shells over evolutionary time) are excellent organisms with which to study the effects of disturbance. They are abundant and diverse and play important roles in ecosystem function by serving as prey for many other species and promoting the decomposition of dead plant matter and the subsequent recycling of nutrients. What makes them ideal for studies of disturbance, however, is their dependence on environmental conditions. When a gastropod moves from one place to another, it does so by secreting a layer of mucus and using wavelike muscular contractions of its foot to glide across it. Consequently, movement is costly for gastropods in terms of water, and they are very sensitive to changes in the availability of water in the environment. If a particular disturbance greatly alters local climatic conditions, gastropods should be among the first organisms to show a measurable response.

In 1980, the National Science Foundation established the Long-term Ecological Research (LTER) Network, a series of research sites dedicated to studying long-term ecological phenomena. Today, the LTER Network comprises 26 sites in diverse ecosystems, including temperate forests, grasslands, deserts, barrier islands, coastal waters, arctic tundra and even urban communities. One of these is located in the Luquillo Mountains of northeastern Puerto Rico. Its location is fortuitous for several reasons. El Yunque National Forest, the montane rain forest where most Luquillo LTER research occurs, experiences a warm climate year-round. The Luquillo Mountains receive high levels of precipitation, which support a rich diversity of plant and animal species, including species that are sensitive to changes in the availability of water and other environmental conditions.
and wet climate throughout the year. As a result, gastropods are particularly conspicuous. Several species are large (with shells up to 60 millimeters in diameter), abundant and arboreal, making them easy to identify, capture and study. In addition, this site is subject to periodic hurricanes, landslides, droughts and floods, and it also has a history of human activity, including logging and agriculture. This makes it an ideal “natural laboratory” in which to study effects of disturbance on tropical forest ecosystems.

Initially, the Luquillo LTER project focused on understanding how tropical forest ecosystems respond to natural disturbances such as hurricanes, landslides, droughts and floods. It quickly became clear that ecosystems in the Luquillo Mountains are highly resilient to severe natural disturbances. In other words, the time necessary to recover from the disturbance is considerably less than the time it takes before a second disturbance occurs at the same location. For example, a major hurricane (Category 3 or higher on the Saffir-Simpson scale) strikes the Luquillo Mountains on average every 20 to 60 years, but the forest canopy recovers within five to 10 years.

The story became more complex, however, as researchers investigated the interplay between natural disturbances and the history of human activity. The effects of human alteration of habitats (for example, conversion of forest to agriculture) have much longer-lasting effects than those of natural disturbances. Areas abandoned by humans in the 1930s continue to exhibit tree species composition different from those areas that did not experience extensive anthropogenic disturbance. Moreover, the most common tree species found in areas that were extensively altered by humans tend to be more susceptible to damage by hurricanes than are those that dominate areas with no anthropogenic disturbance history. Ultimately, this suggests that increasing human activity worldwide will have long-lasting effects that influence how ecosystems respond to natural disturbances in unexpected ways.

An important application of research at Luquillo LTER is to predict the consequences of environmental changes to ecosystem health and important services the forest provides to humans. For example, although El Yunque National Forest is the largest nature reserve in Puerto Rico, the surrounding region is experiencing rapid urbanization. Puerto Rico is one of the most densely populated places on Earth, with more than 400 individuals per square kilometer. Density is greatest in and around the capital of San Juan, a mere 48 kilometers from El Yunque, and growth is particularly rapid there. Consequently, the amount of water extracted from mountain streams in recent decades has increased considerably, even as average annual rainfall has slightly decreased.

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Moreover, average temperatures have increased in the urbanized regions around the forest and may be changing in the forest itself. A clear understanding of the effects of these events is critical to our ability to forecast future changes in species diversity, ecosystem structure and, ultimately, the ability of the forest to provide ecosystem services to the growing human population of eastern Puerto Rico.

I began working in Puerto Rico in March of 1998, as a first-year Ph.D. student. Initially, I was not particularly excited about the project, as snails are not the most charismatic of organisms. My perspective changed just six months later, when Hurricane Georges made landfall in Puerto Rico as a Category 3 storm, providing me with an unusual opportunity. I was lucky enough to inherit data from the same study plots stretching back to 1991. Because Hurricane Hugo (a Category 4 storm) had struck eastern Puerto Rico in September of 1989, I could examine long-term dynamics of gastropod abundance and diversity in the aftermath of two major hurricanes.

To date, I have focused primarily on three separate but related variables: It is rare to have data that allow for meaningful comparisons between large, intense disturbances. Such disturbances are infrequent and difficult to study, so researchers often try to extrapolate and draw general conclusions from a single event. This is problematic, though, because different disturbance events, even of the same type, differ in their physical characteristics and historical context. For example, Hurricane Hugo was a more intense storm than was Hurricane Georges, but the forest it encountered in the Luquillo Mountains was also very different. Before Hugo, it had been more than 50 years since a major hurricane had struck Puerto Rico, so the forest in 1989 was tall and mature. The resulting tree damage was catastrophic: near the current location of my study plots, Hugo killed approximately 25% of trees and completely defoliated over 50%. In contrast, only ten years passed between Hurricanes Hugo and Georges, so the forest in 1998 contained a greater proportion of young, healthy trees and sustained much less damage. Trying to characterize the effects of hurricanes based on either storm alone would have ignored the fact that no two hurricanes are alike.
abundance (both of individual species and of gastropods as a whole), diversity and spatial structure. Each of these addresses a slightly different aspect of responses to disturbance. Trends in abundance can reveal how resilient gastropod populations are to changing environmental conditions and enable one to predict which species might be most susceptible to novel disturbances. Changes in diversity at multiple spatial scales illustrate how the broader gastropod assemblage is affected. This may help to predict whether future disturbance events are likely to cause local extinctions. Examining the spatial structure of gastropod populations ties my other results together by allowing me to develop meaningful hypotheses about mechanisms that lead to local changes in abundance or diversity and about functional links between local populations.

In terms of abundance, different species of gastropods responded to hurricane disturbance in different ways. Some initially declined in abundance and slowly recovered over five to 10 years. Others were more abundant two to three years after disturbance and then declined back to their pre-hurricane population sizes. Still others displayed no obvious pattern at all, or a different pattern after each hurricane. The reason for this diversity of responses is that hurricanes primarily affect gastropods indirectly by modifying the environment. The storm itself kills or displaces relatively few individuals—primarily those unlucky enough to be crushed by debris or washed downstream. However, a hurricane has long-lasting effects on forest structure. It generates large openings in the forest canopy and deposits a great deal of debris on the ground. Over time, this process affects gastropods in multiple ways. Conditions in canopy gaps are hotter and drier—and, therefore, more stressful for gastropods—than under intact canopy, yet the debris deposits provide food and shelter. As a result, gastropod species that are best able to tolerate desiccation are able to be most active and take advantage of the increased resources.

Despite the variety of responses exhibited by individual species, overall gastropod abundance displayed a clear and consistent trend. Abundance declined initially and then recovered over time. Remarkably, this recovery occurred at the same rate after each hurricane, despite the considerable differences between the two storms. In fact, even though I observed considerable seasonal and inter-annual variability, I was able to explain approximately forty percent of the variation in gastropod abundance from 1991 to 2004 based solely on how much time had elapsed since a hurricane. In more recent years, the trend of increasing abundance has disappeared, so dynamics are now dominated by seasonal variation and short-term responses to climatic conditions. For example, a particularly wet year will promote juvenile survival and lead to an increase in population size, whereas an unusually dry period will have the

The effects of human alteration of habitats (for example, conversion of forest to agriculture) have much longer-lasting effects than those of natural disturbances.
The number of species observed on the long-term study plots I sample has varied between eight and 16 since 1991, but I found no correlation with time since disturbance. In contrast, species evenness was greatest immediately after hurricanes, when gastropod abundances are low, but decreased over time thereafter as communities became increasingly dominated by a few common species. Nevertheless, it does not appear that these species out-compete the rarer species or have other negative effects. Instead, it seems that populations of those species simply grow most rapidly and show the most obvious effects of hurricanes because of their high abundance and ease of capture.

The spatial distribution of species was most random and patchy immediately after hurricane disturbance and grew more predictable over time. This has implications for the abundance and diversity of gastropods. As time passes after a hurricane and the forest canopy recovers, environmental conditions improve and make movement through the forest easier for gastropods, allowing common species to become more widespread. This probably contributes to the ability of these common species to increase in abundance, as they are able to colonize areas of the forest that had been inhospitable. Most interesting to me, the rate of change in spatial structure of gastropod communities was the same after both hurricanes and did not differ among three regions that differed in their history of human activity. The latter result suggests that tree species composition, which still reflects the impact of humans over 70 years later, is less important in determining abundance and spatial distribution of gastropods than are local climatic conditions. Altered tree composition in forests where invasive species become established or where humans conduct modest silviculture, may have relatively little effect on gastropod populations.

Ultimately, all of this suggests that gastropod species native to the Luquillo Mountains are well adapted to hurricane disturbance and that extinctions are unlikely under the current disturbance regime. This optimistic conclusion is tempered, however, by the strong possibility that the disturbance...
regime will change in coming decades. Debate continues about whether increasing ocean surface temperatures will lead to increased frequency of intense hurricanes, but it is well established that average air temperatures are increasing in northeastern Puerto Rico, driven both by global warming trends and rapid urbanization, and that average annual precipitation is declining. Although gastropod populations seem remarkably resilient towards cyclical natural disturbances, it remains to be seen how they might be affected by long-term changes in climate or by increased disturbance frequency.

My ongoing research efforts build on these observations. First, I continue to monitor gastropod abundance and diversity on the long-term study plots, to watch for long-term environmental change that might be associated with urbanization or climate change. Second, I am developing collaborative projects that will examine functional links between gastropods and other organisms in the Luquillo Mountains. For example, Dr. Jenna Mendell, her student Jennifer Conway, and I are investigating the composition of the bacterial community that inhabits the intestine of a common snail species, *Pleurodonte canacolla*. This will provide insight into how these highly herbivorous snails are able to process hard-to-digest plant compounds and contribute to decomposition of leaf litter. Also, in collaboration with Dr. Craig Zimmermann of Rogers State University, I have established an experiment to test how snail shells, which provide large, concentrated sources of calcium, affect soil characteristics and leaf litter composition. Ultimately, these ongoing projects will build on past results while broadening the context and applicability of my work and facilitating more robust predictions of how tropical forests will respond to changing disturbance regimes and increasing human activity.

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Introduction

Shaheen Mozaffar

In the spring of 1974, popular demonstrations in Lisbon led to the overthrow of Portugal’s 42-year old dictatorship, spawning what the late Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington called the “third wave of democratization.” From Portugal, the third wave quickly spread to neighboring Spain and along the Mediterranean to Greece, dismantling long-standing dictatorships and replacing them with democracies in both countries. It then swept across the Atlantic and replaced once unshakeable dictatorships with democracies across Latin America. The democratic floodgate opened dramatically with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, toppling communist governments in Eastern Europe like so many teetering dominoes and replacing them with successful democracies. By the mid-1990s, the third wave had spawned democracies in Asia and Africa. While imperfect, often fragile, and susceptible to military coups and authoritarian reversals, democratic governments had become the order of the day in every region of the world.

In every region, that is, except in the Middle East and Africa (MENA). With the exception of Israel and Turkey, and the partial exception of Lebanon, the MENA region, and Arab countries within it in particular, remained immune from the onslaught of democracy’s third wave. Limited political liberalization in Kuwait and Morocco, and the United States-imposed democracy in Iraq in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War did not weaken the resilient dictatorships in the Arab World. Until the Arab Spring! The political uprisings of spring 2011 quickly dismantled dictatorships and replaced them with democracies following relatively peaceful and successful contested elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Their impact reverberates today in the growing demands for democracy across the Arab world.
The political uprisings of spring 2011 quickly dismantled dictatorships and replaced them with democracies following relatively peaceful and successful contested elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

MENA region. These potential changes are as significant in scale as the historic changes wrought by the creation of MENA as a distinct geopolitical entity with independent sovereign states at the end of World War I.

Will the current struggle for democracy in MENA become the fourth wave of democratization? Will this fourth wave be a distinctive “Arab wave” as some observers have claimed? Embedded in these two broad questions are a set of specific questions raised by previous democratic transitions: what are the likely impacts of national differences in extant authoritarian regimes? How will social diversity in language, ethnicity and religion affect the move to democracy? Will economic conditions affect the origin, trajectory and outcomes of democratic transitions in MENA?

In spring 2012, the Political Science Department in collaboration with the Center for Legislative Studies, the Center for International Engagement and the Center for Middle East Studies organized a panel to examine these questions. The articles by Erica Frantz, Shaheen Mozaffar and Sandra Popiden were presented on this panel. Jabbar Al-Obaidi was subsequently invited to contribute a piece on the role of social media in the Arab Spring and its aftermath. Frantz examines the often misunderstood and underestimated impact of authoritarian regimes on democratic transitions. Mozaffar presents a global comparison of the relationship between democracy and Islam to highlight the ways in which Islam might hinder or facilitate democracy in the Arab world. Popiden analyzes the critical importance of economic growth and improved living standards, especially for the volatile Arab youth, as the key to the viability and success of emerging democracies in the Arab world. Al-Obaidi examines the role of social media in launching and sustaining the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring, perhaps the most distinctive feature of the democratic struggle in the Arab world. The articles, individually and collectively, offer useful and important insights into a momentous and awe-inspiring event in recent history.
How and Why do Dictatorships Survive? Lessons for the Middle East

Erica Frantz

Political events in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have dominated news headlines for the past two years. Since the revolution in Tunisia in December 2010, one dictatorship after the next has appeared on the verge of collapse, as citizens gather en masse to voice their demands for democratic governance. In some countries, such as Tunisia, democratization seems all but assured following one of the most successful democratic elections in the Arab world. In countries such as Libya and Egypt, though relatively successful democratic elections were held following the collapse of long-standing dictatorships, it is uncertain whether the new political system being installed will be democratic or autocratic. And in other countries, such as Syria, autocratic government and pro-democratic forces are locked in a bloody armed confrontation, the outcome of which is undecided. Elsewhere in MENA, popular protests demanding democratic changes fizzled very quickly, and the region’s dictatorships remain as strong as ever.

The recent sequence of events in MENA (commonly referred to as the Arab Spring) has renewed our awareness that authoritarian regimes dominate the region. Figure 1 illustrates this. The figure classifies countries in the developing world according to whether they are “free” (i.e. fully democratic), “partly free” (i.e. semi-democracy) or “not free” (i.e. not fully democratic), using the Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) classifications of political rights and civil liberties released in 2011, and groups them by region (the Middle East, East and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa). More than 90% of the countries in the Middle East are either “partly free” or “not free.” In other words, democracy in the Middle East is rare. This reality has prompted many observers to ask: why is the region so inhospitable to democracy?

Though the dominance of authoritarian governments in the Middle East seems anomalous at first glance, when we expand our lens to include the rest of the developing world, we see that the experience of the Middle East is quite common. As Figure 1 shows, outside of Western Europe and North America, countries that are “partly free” or “not free” are the norm. In other words, democracy is rare not just in the Middle East; it is rare across the developing world.

What is peculiar is not that the Middle East is ruled by dictatorships, but that it is ruled by such stable ones. Though
political stability seems to many the last way the Middle East should be described these days, aside from the episodes of mass protest that swept across the region during the Arab Spring, the trend has largely been one of political stability.

A comparison with the rest of the developing world helps illustrate this pattern. Figure 2 shows the number of coups (such as the ouster of Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953 in Iran) and authoritarian collapses (such as the fall of the Iranian monarchy in 1979) from 1946 to 2009, grouped by region. Compared to other regions, the occurrence of these sorts of political events is low in the Middle East (with the exception of East and Southeast Asia, where fewer coups have happened). Turbulent events such as coups and authoritarian collapse occur far less frequently in the Middle East than elsewhere.

We see a similar story when we look at the longevity of the dictatorships in the Middle East and beyond. Between 1946 and 2009, middle eastern dictatorships lasted in power for an average of 41 years. This statistic drops to 27 years for East and Southeast Asia, 17 years for Sub-Saharan Africa, and 11 years for Latin America. Middle eastern dictatorships managed to stay in power more than a decade longer compared to their counterparts outside of the region. This is a sizable difference and prompts the question: why are middle eastern dictatorships so stable? The answer is plain. The political stability of the region’s dictatorships rests in their capacity to ensure that leadership transitions occur via expected, established guidelines. Leadership transitions occur often within authoritarian regimes. Though we sometimes view the leader and the regime as one and the same, the leader is but a single person, whereas the regime is a network of elites who have something at stake in the regime’s continuation. Leaders come and go often in dictatorships while a regime remains intact. In Iran, for example, when Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini died in 1989, the Islamic Republic did not collapse with him; instead, Khomeini was succeeded by Ali Khamenei and the regime has persisted since. In fact, in roughly half the instances when leaders fall from power, regimes survive the transition. The reverse side of this statistic is also telling: the other half of the time when leaders depart office, regimes collapse. Leadership transitions are key moments of vulnerability for dictatorships. When leaders fall from power – whether due to natural death, coups, elections, resignations or elite consensus – the most coveted political position is suddenly up for grabs. This political opening can stoke tensions among elite factions vying for their preferred candidates, which can in turn create deep fissures within the regime that can trigger its downfall. At the same time, such frenzied political activity can also signal to members of the opposition movement (and foreign observers) that the regime is unstable and that the moment is ripe to stage a protest or revolt. Leadership

**Outside of Western Europe and North America, countries that are “partly free” or “not free” are the norm.**
transitions therefore expose dictatorships to the very real risk that the regime will be toppled, either internally (through elite divisions that escalate), or externally (through mass uprisings or foreign intervention). As such, regimes only have a 50/50 shot of surviving these pivotal moments.

Thus, leadership transitions, do not always have to be destabilizing. One of the critical choices that regimes can make is to establish guidelines for how leadership turnovers will occur. In other words, dictatorships can regulate the succession process to ensure that there are clear rules in place for determining the conditions under which leaders can be replaced and the protocols for selecting their successors. In democracies, leadership changes are far less destabilizing. Regulated dictatorships survive leadership transitions about 60% of the time; unregulated dictatorships, by contrast, survive them only 45% of the time. Setting in place guidelines to manage the process of succession makes a substantial difference in protecting dictatorships during episodes of leadership transition.

For the Middle East, one key factor in explaining the political stability of the region beyond the Arab Spring, one thing seems clear: the Middle East’s monarchies do not appear to be going away any time soon.

leaders are typically replaced via free and fair elections, the rules of which are usually stipulated in a constitution. In dictatorships, though free and fair elections for the leadership post are largely absent, regimes can establish constitutional guidelines for this process.

Though we often think of dictatorships as political systems where rules have no meaning, this is far from the reality in most of them. The extent to which regimes institutionalize the political process varies widely from one regime to the next. In some dictatorships, such as Spain under Francisco Franco (1936–75), there are no rules in place for leadership succession; the process is unregulated. From 1946 to 2009, about 13% of the world’s dictatorships fell into this category. In other dictatorships, such as Saudi Arabia, there are very clear guidelines for determining leadership transfers; the process is fully regulated. About 18% of the world’s dictatorships fell into this category during the same period (see www.systemicpeace.org). Most dictatorships fall somewhere in the middle, having some protocols in place for deciding who can replace the leader and under what conditions, but lacking institutionalization and transparency. The murkiness means that the process usually entails substantial discussions among elites that occur behind closed doors.

Where dictatorships have established succession rules to guide the transfer of power from one leader to the next, the next leader, and leaders are chosen from among members of the royal family. Though such an autocratic process bars citizens from playing a role in executive selection, it is does ensure that leadership succession occurs in a regulated fashion.

As evidence of this, about 36% of leadership transitions in the Middle East from 1946 to 2009 occurred in a regulated environment. When we focus solely on the transitions that have occurred in the monarchies there, this number is an impressive 100%. By comparison, in East and Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, only 17% and 14% of leadership transitions, respectively, are regulated, and only about 7% in Latin America. The evidence suggests that the establishment of rules for succession in the Middle East, particularly in the region’s monarchies, helps to explain the political stability there.

When looking to the future of the region beyond the Arab Spring, one thing seems clear: the Middle East’s monarchies do not appear to be going away any time soon, for all of the reasons discussed in this essay. The durability of these dictatorships is seen as a negative by those within and outside the region who hope for democratization in the Arab world. However, there are positives to political stability that warrant attention: by reducing the incidences of politically chaotic events such as coups and other autocratic seizures of power, these regimes shield their citizens from the often disastrous economic consequences and violence that accompany them.

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When looking to the future of the region beyond the Arab Spring, one thing seems clear: the Middle East’s monarchies do not appear to be going away any time soon.
Why Some Muslim Countries Are Democracies and Some Are Not

Shaheen Mozaffar

The transitions to democracy in Tunisia and Egypt shortly after the popular uprisings of the Arab Spring, and subsequently in Libya, provide an opportunity to test the empirical validity of the conventional wisdom that democracy cannot be established and sustained in Muslim countries. This article undertakes this task through a systematic comparative analysis of 56 countries classified as Muslim countries by virtue of their membership in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). It first maps variations in the incidence of democracy among the 56 Muslim countries based on the widely used Freedom House Rating (FHR, www.freedomhouse.org) of countries into “Free,” “Partly Free” and “Not Free.” It then presents the results of regression analyses to illustrate the importance of cross-national variations in (1) religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity, and (2) the political institutionalization of religion to explain why some Muslim countries are democracies and some are not.

Table 1 – Democracy in Muslim Countries: A Global Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freedom House Ratings</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>MENA</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Central Asia</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Free</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 2)</td>
<td>(N = 0)</td>
<td>(N = 0)</td>
<td>(N = 0)</td>
<td>(N = 2)</td>
<td>(N = 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partly Free</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 14)</td>
<td>(N = 6)</td>
<td>(N = 5)</td>
<td>(N = 2)</td>
<td>(N = 1)</td>
<td>(N = 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Free</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 6)</td>
<td>(N = 12)</td>
<td>(N = 2)</td>
<td>(N = 4)</td>
<td>(N = 0)</td>
<td>(N = 24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 22)</td>
<td>(N = 18)</td>
<td>(N = 7)</td>
<td>(N = 6)</td>
<td>(N = 3)</td>
<td>(N = 56)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[X^2 = 26.21 \text{ (sig. = .001)}\]
examines the impact of ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity measured by quantitative indices (Alesina et al., *Journal of Economic Growth* [2003]) that classify countries on each indicator of diversity on a scale from 0 (totally homogeneous) to 1 (totally heterogeneous). The regression analysis shows, counter-intuitively, that religious diversity has a positive and statistically significant impact on the incidence of democracy in Muslim countries. Ethnic diversity has a negative impact and linguistic diversity a positive impact, but neither effect is statistically significant.

The Political Model examines the impact of the institutionalization of religion; that is, the separation or fusion of state and religion as indicated by the extent of (a) government regulation of religion and (b) government favoritism of one religion over another. Both indicators are measured by quantitative indices (Grim and Finke, *Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion* [2006]) that classify countries on each indicator on a scale from 1 (low institutionalization or separation of state and religion) to 10 (high institutionalization or fusion of state and religion). The regression analysis shows that the higher the fusion of state and religion the less likely a Muslim country will be a democracy, although the negative impact of government favoritism of one religion over another is statistically insignificant. However, its substantially high and statistically significant negative coefficient (-.455) indicates that government regulation of religion more severely reduces the prospect for democracy in a Muslim country.

The Additive Model examines the combined effects of social diversity and institutionalization of religion. It reinforces the individual results of the previous two models. Religious diversity facilitates, while the fusion of state and religion hinders, the prospects for democracy in Muslim countries.

**Implications**

The data in Table 1 show that the conventional wisdom that Muslim countries are inhospitable to democracy is flatly wrong. Not only are most Muslim countries in the world democracies, but the world’s largest and second-largest Muslim countries, Indonesia and Bangladesh, respectively, are vibrant democracies. Even in MENA, a region widely believed to be

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Table 2 – The Impact of Social Diversity and Institutionalization of Religion on Democracy in Muslim Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Social Model</th>
<th>Political Model</th>
<th>Additive Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Diversity</td>
<td>-.102 (0.06)</td>
<td>-.023 (0.06)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic Diversity</td>
<td>.167 (0.05)</td>
<td>.030 (0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Diversity</td>
<td>.398** (0.08)</td>
<td>.298* (0.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Regulation of Religion</td>
<td>-.455*** (0.162)</td>
<td>-.359** (0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Favoritism of Religion</td>
<td>-.083 (0.16)</td>
<td>-.098 (0.17)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.132*** (0.18)</td>
<td>2.663*** (0.29)</td>
<td>2.211*** (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.189 4.03**</td>
<td>.246 8.63***</td>
<td>.318 4.66***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Entries are standardized coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. All statistically significant coefficients are in bold.

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
the one most inhospitable to democracy, five of the six countries classified as semi-democracies are Arab countries (Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen). The sixth, non-Arab Turkey, is the second-largest Muslim country in the region and has been governed by a democratically elected coalition of Islamist parties for the past ten years. However, the data also confirm the fact that the democracy deficit in the Muslim world is not a Muslim deficit but an Arab deficit. All the MENA countries classified as Not Free are Arab countries, and they comprise fully half of the Muslim countries that are classified as Not Free.

The regression results in Table 2 help explain why the conventional wisdom is wrong and why some Muslim countries are democracies and some are not. The conventional wisdom assumes a reflexive congruence between culture and behavior that produces the egregiously flawed and empirically false view of religion as the overriding source of politics. The Social Model, however, suggests the salience of other social variables such as ethnicity and language as alternative sources of politics. It thus highlights the importance of cross-cutting interactions between ethnicity, language and religion in creating multiple, contingent and strategic sources and opportunities for people to define their political interests and organize their political behavior, thereby mitigating the exaggerated social salience and political relevance incorrectly attributed to religion in conventional wisdom. Herein lies the key to the democratic success of Muslim countries in SSA and Asia, all of which feature high levels of ethnic and linguistic diversity that override religious divisions. Social diversity, in other words, bolsters democracy.

Religious diversity facilitates, while the fusion of state and religion hinders, the prospects for democracy in Muslim countries. Arab countries are religiously and linguistically more homogenous, but just as ethnically diverse as Muslim countries elsewhere in the world. Ethnicity, in fact, has greater social salience than religion in some Arab countries, notably in Iraq and Libya. Yet, the high degree of institutionalization of religion, which enables authoritarian Arab states to use religion as a cost-effective political tool to suppress alternative forms of interest articulation and political organization, severely vitiates the potential of ethnicity as a source of political mobilization. This combination of high social salience of religion in the context of marked ethnic and linguistic diversity and high institutionalization of religion also accounts for the democracy deficit of Muslim countries in Central Asia. The fusion of state and religion, therefore, is not culturally determined, but a deliberate choice of rulers and the singular source of dictatorship and associated democracy deficit in Muslim countries in MENA and Central Asia.

By contrast, the low social salience of religion associated with the moderating effects of ethnic and language diversity and low political institutionalization not only encourage religious pluralism, but also help to facilitate democracy in Muslim countries in SSA and Asia. Moreover, even when a country such as Indonesia imposes some restrictions on religion, as it did in 2009 to counter the threat of Al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism, they were insufficient to offset the positive effects of entrenched social diversity, especially religious pluralism, on the country’s democracy.

This article underscores the need to reject cultural explanations of democracy that permeate the conventional wisdom about the relationship between democracy and Islam. Such explanations are not only ideologically noxious, they grossly misconstrue the nature, origin and development of democracy in the modern world. The article stresses instead the importance of examining the relationship between democracy and Islam through a conceptually sound, theoretically informed and empirically grounded analysis. Such an analysis clarifies how cross-national variations in social diversity and the institutionalization of religion, separately and jointly, establish a context in which people make rational political choices about the sorts of democracy they want.

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December 2012
Will the Arab Spring Succeed in Bringing Bread, Freedom, and Dignity?

Sandra Popiden

Tunisia has a good chance to become a democratic, peaceful, and stable state, and a good example for the whole region. However, this development will be at risk, if the government does not meet the population’s high expectations to find a quick solution for the social problems… The most important task is to find a solution to the socio-economic problems… [The people] want jobs, houses and a better future. And all of them demand to change everything at once.

Tunisian Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, 2012.

Economic discontent fueled the political dissatisfaction that erupted in the Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen in 2011. Demonstrators blamed repressive authoritarian governments for slow economic growth, increasing poverty and social inequality, high youth unemployment and rampant corruption. Alongside demands for increased political freedom, greater participation in politics, and an end to repression were calls for economic freedom and improved well-being. The uprisings, which spawned democracy in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, continue to reverberate across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) by opening up previously closed public spaces to wider popular participation in national debates over the prospects for democracy in Arab countries. Crucial to these prospects is tangible economic progress. The most urgent challenge that the newly elected leaders face, therefore, is the formulation of policies that will foster economic growth and improve living standards. As the experience of new democracies across the world over the past thirty years shows, tangible economic progress improves the likelihood of successful democratic transitions and endows otherwise fragile young democracies with legitimacy and popular support essential for their survival.

What do the Protesters Want?

In the five years prior to the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, Arab Barometer surveys found widespread agreement among the Arab public that the most important problems in the region related to the economy, corruption and authoritarianism (http://www.arabbarometer.org/). The surveys revealed vividly that the Arab public views its declining economic well-being and the continued authoritarian rule in their countries as inextricably linked. It is, therefore, not surprising that the people who spearheaded the Arab Spring uprisings demanded the replacement of ossified and unresponsive authoritarian regimes with transparent and accountable democratic governments as the means to deal with their own deteriorating well-being.

The food shortages and price shocks experienced since 2008, such as the 32% increase in food prices between 2010 and 2011, have continued even after the uprisings. Arab countries’ high dependence on food imports and declining remittances due to the global recession have only amplified these price shocks. For example, in a Gallup poll conducted in the spring of 2011, nearly half the survey respondents in Egypt expressed difficulty in meeting their needs. Their number one concern was price inflation, especially the cost of food, oil and sugar. Moreover, in a clear reflection of the decline in economic well-being, 53% of Egyptian respondents said that economic conditions in their cities are worsening, a figure twice as high as it was in the previous year (http://www.gallup.com/poll/148133/egypt-tahrir-transition.aspx).

The economic crisis is likely to be most politically destabilizing in Yemen, the least-developed Arab country. According to World Food Program spokesperson, Emilia Casella, fuel prices on the black market have risen 500% since January 2011. Prices of staple foods such as bread, flour, sugar and milk have also increased by 40–60%. The food crisis in Yemen (as one report in the 14 March 2012 Guardian noted) has resulted in five million people (22% of the population) requiring emergency food aid; another five million are experiencing moderate food insecurity. Clearly, people in MENA countries in transition are still waiting for the economic improvements they hoped their political revolutions would bring.
Making the Political and Socio-Economic Systems Work for Young People

One of the most pressing challenges in MENA stems from the fact that Arab youth (15–24 years) comprise 20% of the region's total population, but 30% of its working-age population. More critically, however, 25% of the Arab youth are unemployed, which is not only the highest rate of unemployment in the world but more than twice as high as the 11% unemployment rate across MENA (see Table 1). This youth bulge has serious economic and political implications for Arab countries generally, and for the emergence and survival of new and fragile democracies specifically.

The World Bank estimates that the costs of youth unemployment to the region amount to $50 billion annually. Unemployment rates of 30–40% are most commonly found among females and the university educated. The key to the region's economic success is incorporating the roughly 80 million young people into the labor force. This will restore the path to social mobility that has been blocked and aid in long-term projects such as improving health and education outcomes. Bolstering private-sector opportunities is essential to relieving the pressure on the overburdened public sector and counteracting the brain-drain emigration trends found among the most educated.

An imperative in Arab countries, therefore, is to engage this generation-in-waiting as productive members of society. Sound policymaking and skillful management of the economy are essential to such efforts. Reforms are needed to train the youth and give them the marketable skills that private employers require. Labor markets and banking institutions also need to be reformed so that small business

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Youth as % of Total Population</th>
<th>Youth as % of Working Age Population</th>
<th>Youth Unemployment Rate (%)</th>
<th>Total Unemployment Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>34.00</td>
<td>45.60</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>22.00</td>
<td>20.70</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>34.00</td>
<td>25.80</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>36.00</td>
<td>45.30</td>
<td>30.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>38.90</td>
<td>11.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>23.30</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>29.00</td>
<td>21.30</td>
<td>12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>34.00</td>
<td>27.30</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>32.00</td>
<td>15.70</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>33.00</td>
<td>19.60</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>31.00</td>
<td>15.90</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>38.00</td>
<td>19.80</td>
<td>21.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>31.00</td>
<td>26.50</td>
<td>14.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>23.00</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>21.00</td>
<td>42.00</td>
<td>33.10</td>
<td>25.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank/Gaza</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>38.00</td>
<td>25.13</td>
<td>10.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>19.57</td>
<td>31.12</td>
<td>25.13</td>
<td>10.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and potential entrepreneurs can have flexibility in hiring and much-needed access to physical capital. The hesitation of new leaders to tackle the economic aspects of transition is a risky do-nothing strategy. The continued presence of large numbers of educated, unemployed and discontented youth does not bode well for the region’s long-term political stability.

**Economic Transformation is Crucial to Designing a New Order**

In order to generate the stabilizing effects of economic growth, employment and development, the pioneers of democracy in Arab countries face entrenched interests in the economy, which is estimated to be about 30%. The outcome of this political standoff will affect the ability of the moderate Islamist Freedom and Justice Party to implement its pro-business and anti-corruption platform as well as its social policies targeting Egypt’s poverty and inequality problems.

Similarly, Tunisia, which was viewed by many as the economic miracle of the Arab world, also faces problems in overcoming the entrenched obstacles to reform. A key challenge for the coalition government led by the moderate Islamist party, Ennahda, is to divest “the family” or “godfathers of Tunis” who seek to protect their interests in the economy. In one Wikileaks document, a confidential assessment by the United States Ambassador to Tunisia asserted that half of all commercial elites in the country were related to the Ben Ali family. Dissolving these patronage networks is fundamental to achieving good governance and establishing new partnerships with independent entrepreneurs. Such actions would also signal to investors that the government is committed to creating competitive and transparent business conditions. Ultimately, these efforts are crucial to revitalizing the economy and improving the well-being of the population.

25% of the Arab youth are unemployed, which is not only the highest in the world but more than twice as high as the 11% unemployment rate across MENA.

Beyond diplomatic statements, western countries can signal their support for the democratization movements by working toward establishing free trade agreements and economic partnerships. At this pivotal moment in history, a progressive partnership between Arab and western countries based on creative leadership is required to fulfill the aspirations of the Arab Spring.

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Social Media and Political Changes in *Al-Alam Al-Arabi*

*Jabbar Al-Obaidi*

The Arab world (*Al-Alam Al-Arabi*) consists of 18 countries, all of which are members of the Arab League. *Al-Alam Al-Arabi* stretches from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Arabian/Persian Gulf in the east, and from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to Africa and the Indian Ocean in the southeast. Covering 10% of the earth’s surface, its population of 350 million represents 5% of the world’s population (United Nations, *Arab Human Development Report 2010*). The people in the region are connected by historical, linguistic, cultural, traditional, tribal and religious ties, but are politically and economically separated into independent countries that also differ in wealth and economic status.

The political systems of Arab countries include republics, kingdoms and sheikdoms, but they are all governed by authoritarian regimes. The Arab countries are typically described as lacking democratic traditions, freedom of the press, human rights and civil liberties. The Economic Intelligence Unit’s *Democracy Index 2011* (London, 2011), for example, classifies the governments of 165 countries and two territories in the world into four types of regimes: full democracies; flawed democracies; hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes. The index ranks countries from 1 to 167, with full democracies ranked 1–25, flawed democracies ranked 26–78, hybrid democracies ranked 79–115, and authoritarian regimes ranked 116–167.

Table 1 presents data on the different types of regimes in the Arab world based on this index, with rankings of individual countries in parentheses. The table shows that 12 Arab countries are governed by authoritarian regimes, while six are governed by hybrid regimes that combine elements of democracy and authoritarianism. No Arab country is governed by a fully or flawed democratic regime.

### Missing the Wake-Up Call

The year 1989 witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of Berlin Wall, and the speedy end of despotic regimes in eastern Europe. Across the world, these dramatic changes generated hope for political stability, the acceptance of the idea of democracy, and the implementation of democratic governments. The circumstances favored the introduction of new democratic constitutions that helped the enactment of laws advancing human rights, freedom of the press, equality, elections and the respect of international relations. They also contributed to the election of new political leaders and the emergence of flourishing democracies. Along with the rest of the world, the people in the Arab countries

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<tr>
<th>Authoritarian Regimes</th>
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<td>Algeria (130)</td>
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<td>Morocco (119)</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia (161)</td>
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<td>Yemen (150)</td>
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There are no Flawed Democracies or Full Democracies in the Arab World.

*Source: Compiled from the Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2011: Democracy Under Stress* (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011).*
looked favorably on these serious political reforms and admired what had occurred in Eastern Europe.

Leaders and political elites in *Al-Alam Al-Arabi* took notice of these dramatic changes as well. In 1998, the late King Hussein of Jordan spoke of the importance of introducing political and economic liberalization and democracy, and the Kingdom held elections that fall. Even the late Saddam Hussein of Iraq, arguably the most notorious and erratic one-man ruler, was attributed a series of editorials in the *El-thawarha* newspaper of Iraq, in which he commended the former Soviet Union leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s concepts of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, democracy and social justice. However, in practice, Saddam never committed himself or his regime to any kind of *glasnost* in Iraq. Other Arab leaders also addressed the need for progressive developments, promoting elections and pluralism, and increasing political participation. Some academicians and intellectuals warned that disaster loomed if these changes were not introduced. However, while introducing limited social and economic changes, Arab leaders missed the 1989 wake-up call for political change and retained their authoritarian regimes. As Iraqi writer Saad Al-Bazzaz noted, Arab leaders rhetorically recognized the imperative of political reforms but stopped short of translating their rhetoric into action (*A War Gives Birth to Another* [1992]).

The 1990s witnessed significant democratic transitions and economic liberalization across the world, but not in *Al-Alam Al-Arabi*. To make matters worse, Iraq invaded its neighbor Kuwait in 1990, precipitating the 1991 Gulf War and catastrophic consequences. The traditional media in Arab countries failed to perform their characteristic role as watchdogs because they were (as some still are) owned and operated by government. Between 1986 and 1996, the levels of censorship of the media in *Al-Alam Al-Arabi* were remarkably high, allowing virtually no criticism of a head of a state or the wealth of leaders, of national security or military issues. And criticism of political issues was only slightly less censored (Al-Obaidi, *Media Censorship in the Middle East* [2007]).

### Social Resentment

However, in the context of dramatic democratic changes across the world and social and economic stagnation in the Arab countries, rulers’ arguments about real or perceived threats to national security as the justification for maintaining their authoritarian power were no longer acceptable to the people. Continued economic stagnation and social inequality produced frustration and resentment among them. The number of unemployed college graduates soared. By 2010, the poverty level had reached 41.8% in Yemen, 22.6% in Algeria, 16.7% in Egypt and 14.2% in Jordan. This agonizing situation coupled with serious restrictions on political participation, civil liberties, elections and political pluralism contributed to increased political resentment. The youth in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria took to the streets and protested against their governments.

As in the rest of the world, information technology and mobile devices are now widely available to ordinary people in the Arab world. Satellite dishes sprinkle the roofs of homes across the region. *Al-Jazeera* and increasing numbers of other satellite television channels are widely popular, especially for their news programs. Consequently, the demand for political and economic reforms has gained momentum. The year 2010 signaled the beginning of popular expression of social resentment. *Al-Jazeera* aired news reports and analysis of events and incidents pertaining to social unrest and other controversial political issues. In response,
the authoritarian regimes tightened censorship on the local, regional and international media. At this point, the utilization of social media for political purposes became crucial to the widespread expression of pent-up social discontent that precipitated the Arab Spring.

**Bouazizi and the Arab Spring**

The Arab Spring was ignited on December 17, 2010 in Tunisia. In the small town of Sidi Bouzid, a 26-year-old street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire as a protest against the police’s arbitrary confiscation of his vegetable cart, the only source of his family’s income. Bouazizi’s self-immolation, from which he later died, was captured by cell phone cameras and broadcast around the country and the world. Backed by political activists and labor unions, residents of his city organized huge demonstrations to express their anger and frustration against the long-standing autocratic government and demanded political and economic reforms. The police and security forces confronted the demonstrators with force, arresting some and injuring others. People with mobile devices recorded what happened and shared it through Facebook. The Tunisian female activist Rim Nouri observed that Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution and its shocking online imagery mobilized Tunisians throughout the country, including those in the capital of Tunis, and beyond its borders (How Social Media Accelerated Tunisia’s Revolution, Huffingtonpost.com).

Uploaded videos, photos, and Twitter feeds served to outrage people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria.

**Social Media as Enabler**

Social media was an enabler of the Arab Spring. Wael Ghonim, an Egyptian Google marketing executive, spearheaded the effort and sent information and images to those Egyptians who had access to the internet. He encouraged them to take part of the uprising against President Hosni Mubarak and his regime. Ghonim also asked people to congregate in specific locations at specified times, and even prepared and transmitted slogans for them to chant. Ghonim and his online network helped to mobilize Egyptians throughout the country, and especially in Cairo, where Tahrir Square became a hub for protestors from across Egypt. Across the Arab world, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube became the principal means for rallying anti-government sentiment and demands for political and social changes.
The younger generation in Al-Alum Al-Arabi dominates the widespread use of social media. This is not surprising. Youth under 25 years comprises approximately two-thirds of the population in the Arab world, and the number is increasing. For example, the percentage of population under the age 15 is projected to reach 22.5% in Kuwait, 42.4% in Yemen, and 30.7% in Saudi Arabia by 2025. Educated youth, moreover, feel the burden of corruption and poverty among themselves, their immediate families, and the people (see Table 2). This volatile combination of a young population, authoritarian rule, corruption and poverty is prompting youth to spearhead political demonstrations and demand regime change.

The increase in the percentage of youth across the Arab world is matched by a dramatic increase in the use of social media in the region. According to one Arab social media report produced by the Dubai School of Government (Facebook in the Arab Region [2011]), the total number of Facebook users in the Arab world was expected to be more than 45 million by the end of June 2012. Across the Arab world, young people between 15 and 29 years comprise 75% of the Facebook users.

Mona Eltahawy, columnist and public speaker on Arab and Muslim issues, told the Voice of America in August 2010: “Social media has given the most marginalized groups in the region a voice” (www.voanews.com). They have become social media savvy and strive to improve their techniques of monitoring the developments in their countries. Although the political changes that transpired in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen could be viewed as positive, the youth of these countries are still mounting pressure on the newly elected or appointed leaders to do more and to answer to the people who elected them.

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Parsing the Mind with Homer
Jonathan B. Holmes

 Minds are wonderful things. Aside from all the various goodies they offer in our daily psychological functioning, such as thinking, feeling, perceiving, willing and much more, one major function—parsing—has a difficult job description.

WANTED
A psychological construct to create updated models of reality via the processing of millions of sensory representations in real time, many times per second. Though there will never be any guarantee that the various models of reality will be accurate, the position nonetheless requires the ability to act on these mental constructions to the benefit of a host organism.

The task of putting together a plausible account of how some aspect of the universe works is akin to assembling a jigsaw puzzle where the shape of the pieces may change depending on one’s viewpoint. And there is no picture on the box to serve as a guide.

All kinds of scientific enterprise and concentrated inquiry pose these sorts of challenges, but investigations into the nature of the mind bring an additional challenge—the job at hand is not just to parse reality and develop a coherent story, but in effect to “parse the parser” and develop a coherent story of its workings. How does one parse the mind? Do we categorize its functioning as mental or physical? Is it one big homogenous lump or a heterogeneous set of distinct abilities or mental faculties? Do we envision its workings to be like some kind of hydraulic mechanism, a steam engine, or more like some kind of information processor, such as a computer? A large variety of possibilities have been offered over the centuries. Current models of the mind see it functioning like an information processor with numerous distinct modules carrying out individual tasks. Faculties such as thinking, feeling and willing are usually understood to be separate processes, and though a certain degree of materialism is assumed in many debates about mental architecture, the consensus is far from clear on the ontological status of the mind.

A number of years ago I started looking at how one aspect of minds—consciousness—might operate. By consciousness, I mean subjective experience, the ongoing sense of what it is like to be you. After some time of being excited by the next new book promising to explain consciousness, it became evident that scholars were in a serious muddle about consciousness, including even how to define the term. At this point, rather than slogging through more books on consciousness, I found myself examining the history of psychology. The task was to see if the roots of various current conceptual difficulties could be found by looking at the evolution of thinking about the mind, and if not, to see if something useful for the debate could be found.

Interestingly, a number of ideas presented themselves from one of the places where it all began for Western culture, the ancient Homeric epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey. Below I provide a glimpse of what Homeric minds were like and present some ideas that might be useful for current psychological debate.

Homerian Psychology 101
In Homer, the most significant terms for psychological functioning are noos, thumos, and phren or its plural phrenes. A fourth term, psyche, does not represent much psychological functioning in Homer (a bit ironic for the root term psychology), but the term essentially referred to the non-cognitive shade that survived after death. Entire papers and monographs have been written on each of these terms, but a quick synopsis of the first three will suffice here.

Noos is associated with insight or intuition, a clear apprehension of some state of affairs. It is also associated with mental vision, a kind of mental imagery and imagination, with a way of thinking that may be the essential psychological character of a person or group, and with a person’s mental essence. At one point in the Odyssey, Circe turns Odysseus’ crewmates into swine; however, even though they are now rather different creatures than they were, they each retain their noos. By this, they remain, in a personal psychological sense, Odysseus’ human crewmates.

Phren and its plural phrenes are associated with cognition and reasoning, a way of figuring things out if noos was not able to immediately grasp a situation. Phrenes also serves as a physical place for
cognition, around the lungs, and they serve an important role in language. When people are deliberating on what they will say next, they often place this deliberation in *phrenes* for consideration.

*Thumos* also has cognitive aspects, but it is a more willful and sometimes violent flavor of cognition that is also laced with emotion. It is often the source of forceful, energetic, emotional and willful cognition that leads to action. It is also associated with life itself, as when people are deprived of their *thumos*, they also die. Finally, *thumos* is associated with inner dialogue. Such dialogue often involves some type of internal conflict that must be resolved, such as: should I strive for honor even though the cost might be great? For example, when Odysseus is confronted with an unsettling mass of Trojan warriors bearing down on him, his *thumos* debates the merits between retreat, which would carry the associated assumption of cowardice, or staying to fight the Trojans despite his tactical disadvantages. He then goes on to deliberate this decision in *phrenes* and *thumos* as the Trojan masses approach.

Aside from such basic psychological terminology, there are a number of other details to consider in order to get a better sense of these constructs and their workings. First, there is no Homeric term that corresponds to what we mean by “mind.” Mind, of course, has its own range of meanings even today, but the term is used here simply to refer to that concept, place, or domain that encapsulates our psychological structures and processes. The Homeric mental constructs are not encapsulated in a single coherent construct, such as a mind or even a soul, and they are not in the head. Rather, they are scattered in the area around the lungs, heart and diaphragm, areas of the body that could be referred to as the *splanchna*, a term generally meaning “innards” around the chest and upper abdominal area.

Thus, there were many “minds” rumbling around in the torso.

Second, the ontological status of these many minds is unclear at best, and maybe even incommensurable with current sensibilities. Some researchers have variously referred to these things as *mental organs*, an odd juxtaposition to be sure, but one that reflects the idea that they may have literally been conceptualized in some sense as a combination or blending of the mental and the physical. To current sensibilities, this may sound odd, though one must remember that the dualism of a world made of either mental or material things did not yet exist.

Third, as can be seen above, each term has a variety of psychological functions or associations. This situation, however, should be viewed carefully, as separating the term into different semantic categories is a current-day partitioning of its originally more unified semantic field. For example, *noos* may very well have meant, in a fashion that is difficult for current sensibilities to fully appreciate, all of those meanings at once.

Finally, there are many overlappings and functional or categorical blurrings both between and within the constructs. In one aspect, each psychological term may have a more or less predominant set of meanings, but the semantic and functional overlap between the terms can be very high, and in some cases the terms seem almost synonymous. In another, certain psychological processes that are currently viewed as separate were fused, such as emotion and cognition, or even those two plus volition and action. Thus, you did not just think about something, rather you *thought-felt-willed* something. Again, this is a rather odd juxtaposition given our current sensibilities. But, perhaps just as oddly, the system seemed to work, at least as far as epic poetry went.

**Two Possible Thinking Points for Current Debates**

What does one make of all this? First, it provides a fascinating glimpse into a long-gone world’s ethnopsychology. But, does it inform any current debates about mental architecture and the workings of the mind? A number of possibilities present themselves, and two of these are briefly presented below.
For one, there is no mind-body problem in Homer. The mind-body problem is a distinct hang-up for explaining consciousness; how could it be that the physical brain could possibly create what seems to be a loftier kind of thing, namely subjective experience and mental states? Figuring out exactly how a non-physical thing could interact with a physical thing, and vice versa, has been attempted throughout history by various thinkers, including Descartes (who failed), but it is also not just something of the past. Some researchers have recently proposed that quantum interactions at special points in neurons somehow give birth to mental states from the physical brain. Perhaps the mind-body problem is based on assumptions that need some reworking, and the idea that something can be both physical and non-physical, perhaps pseudo-physical, provides an interesting thinking point for such debate.

For another, the idea that a certain mental construct may have a number of different functions, overlap some functions with other mental constructs, and also combine seemingly disparate processes such as thinking, feeling, and willing into an odd-sounding combination or gestalt is very interesting. The importance here lies in our current parsings of the mind into distinct faculties or mental modules is a bit too tightly encapsulated in its own small domain. The computational theory of mind, a leading paradigm in mental functioning, is particularly known for the use of some degree of modular mental functioning based upon the flow of information through various modules and processors. Depending upon how much of the mind is thought to be modular, this is a very tidy arrangement, but nature is under no requirement to be tidy. Stephen Pinker published a book titled How the Mind Works (1997) that presents a computational model of the mind that employs a large degree of mental modularity, even for higher-level psychological functions. The philosopher of mind Jerry Fodor was one of the earlier proponents of the modular mind, though mostly for lower-level computational processes. In response to Pinker’s book, Fodor wrote The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way (2000), in which he explained why the computational model of the mind with such massive modularity is insufficient. He even gets a bit gloomy at times, such as when he states that “…what our cognitive science has found out about the mind is mostly that we don’t know how it works.” (p.100).

All this makes one wonder whether or not the ability of our own minds to parse the universe and analyze problems into their little bits may need some reining in. That is, what is logically separable may not be separable in fact. Thinking about distinct mental faculties or mental modules is a bit too sloppy. For example, there is no a priori reason that thinking and feeling must actually be different things, or at least completely unblended in some way. As well, there is also no a priori reason why certain functions of the mind must not overlap with other functions, producing a bit of mental redundancy and blending, and thereby, perhaps a more flavorful mental experience.

Minds need to be excellent parsers, categorizers, and story tellers in order to get us by in whatever reality we find ourselves.

In Conclusion

Aside from presenting a fascinating window into the mental workings of Homeric figures, the lack of a mind-body problem as well as the functional “sloppiness” of Homer’s mental organs present some interesting thinking points for current psychology. While these insights may not be a panacea that will miraculously resolve serious issues in current psychology, they do open up some interesting possibilities to think outside the current box, as it were, by looking into a much more ancient box to inform our current debate.

Additionally, an interesting methodological issue arises when pondering such things. It makes one wonder a bit about the mind’s ability to decipher itself. Minds need to be excellent parsers, categorizers, and story tellers in order to get us by in whatever reality we find ourselves. However, is it possible that the mind might be a bit parse-happy in parsing itself? It is always a bit of a trick to try to measure something with itself.

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An Interview with University Archivist Orson Kingsley

It has been about one year since Bridgewater State hired Orson Kingsley to become the head of the university’s archives, a large and growing treasure trove of information about our institutional history and the people who have passed through our doors. In September 2012, Bridgewater Review Associate Editor Ellen Scheible visited Mr. Kingsley in his Maxwell Library office and asked him to reflect on the role of the university archivist and his experiences at Bridgewater State.

ES: What is the difference between special collections and the library archive?

My full title is University Archivist and Special Collections Librarian. There are really two components to my job. The University archive basically contains the output of the University: its history, publications and other sometimes obscure things, such as blueprints from the new Science building or new dorms that were built, or lists of new faculty who were hired. For institutional purposes, old accreditation reports and student newspapers are part of the archive. We have catalogues going back to 1840 and yearbooks from 1899. We are in the process of having all of our yearbooks digitized. Soon, people will be able to do keyword searches throughout the history of BSU yearbooks. The archive is different from the special collections because special collections include things that were not produced by the University. These include donations, such as when alumni come in and donate personal papers and photographs, some of which may be from their times here as students. I put these sorts of things in special collections when I add them to our permanent collection.

ES: What does it mean to be a library archivist?

It’s kind of a mixing, for me, of a love of history and a love of things old, particularly old paper. That’s why I got into the profession. The older the institution, usually the older the material they have. Bridgewater opened in 1840, so we have a very old collection. It’s important for archivists today to have both library and history backgrounds. One part of the job is to make sense of the collections we have and make them available; but another part is to really understand the history aspect of it and to promote that effectively to faculty, classes and researchers. Using the internet or electronic resources, you can really push the archive out to the public more than you could twenty years ago, which is why knowing technology and how it affects what you do is becoming more prevalent in the field. But my main goal in the job is to get researchers in here to use the materials. I am really invested in democratizing the learning aspect of what we do at the archives because if people can’t use it, what’s the point of spending money to preserve it?

ES: What are some of the most eccentric things that we have in the archive?

One thing that I uncovered a couple of months ago was a large run of a French encyclopedia that predates the French Revolution. These are extremely rare. They were ordered by subscription, so, most people didn’t get a lot of them. It was a replacement for the famous French encyclopedia that was written in the mid 1700s by Diderot. The issues went right up to the 1830s, but the bulk was from 1782-1791. Thomas Jefferson wrote some of the History and Geography entries. The younger generation of the last wave of the French Enlightenment also wrote some of the articles. Most were created before the French Revolution, which is absolutely incredible. One article was written by Lamarck, a pre-Darwinian theorist. This encyclopedia is one of the rare and unique things in our collection that can compete with collections in all of the famous universities in Boston. It builds the prestige of our collection, and hopefully will persuade people to make donations in the future.

ES: How do you make order out of the chaos that is the archive?

It really is like playing a big game of Tetris. I can’t move one collection until I get another one moved because space is limited. Piles of material were

The University archive basically contains the output of the University: its history, publications and other sometimes obscure things...
The archive is different from the special collections because special collections include things that were not produced by the University.

everywhere when I started the job. It’s really an ongoing project where every couple of weeks I reevaluate what I’m doing and tinker with my original intention. Right now I am beginning to look at a large collection of uncatalogued books. For the archives, I created a completely new scheme. It’s based on a numerical order by subject. All records will be based on the administrative layout of the University. For instance, Academic Affairs will be one category. The intention is to keep like material together so that if somebody comes in, say, looking for the history of the Math department, all of the Math material will be in one section. For special collections, I’ve also had to come up with a completely new scheme because we have more materials to deal with than we’ve had in the past. I broke the manuscript collection down into different categories. For instance, we have a unique and rare books collection that I am still processing and adding to our online system. What I am really interested in, though, is the manuscript collection. I am hoping to put more of it onto our website in the future so that a researcher can use a finding aid to look at the collection beforehand and then come in and say “I want to look at Box 46, Folder 5.” In the past, a researcher might come in and ask “What do you have on the Civil War” and, because we have such a large collection on the Civil War, I didn’t know where to begin. The idea is to start the research process before he or she comes in. Then, I can supplement the researcher’s requests with other parts of the collection the researcher might not know about.

ES: There has been a huge push in the last ten years or so for PhDs in the Humanities and Social Sciences to return to archival study for their research. Do you feel that the archive occupies a prominent enough role in scholarship?

Of course, I’m going to encourage people to use primary-source material because I am in the field and I think it should be more of a requirement. In my own education, I wasn’t introduced to an archive until my last semester as an undergraduate. I was a lost History major and did an internship at an archive, and, instantly, I knew what my future was going to be because I loved it. But, none of my undergraduate History professors made us go to an archive or a repository or anything like that. If you get to grad school and have to write a dissertation using primary-source material, it can be very intimidating if you have never been exposed to it. I think it’s great to have undergraduate students make archive visits to expose them to the primary source material. In a general archive, good use could be made of ephemera, historical material like posters and flyers that were designed to last a week and then ripped down and thrown away. A lot of this material can be very revealing about the culture or society of the time.

ES: How can the community, specifically the faculty, best use your services?

Right now, I am a liaison to the History department and I would like to encourage people to come up here more, but I am still getting my own department ready. I would love to start giving tours to classes to expose them to the behind-the-scenes of the archive. In past jobs, I have loved doing that—if there are history buffs in the class, you can see their eyes light up because they’ve never seen the back corridors of an archive. If faculty members want to make appointments, I am here Monday through Friday, 8-4. However, I am willing to occasionally stay late to accommodate classes who want to use the archive in the evening.

ES: Could you give one or two examples of how faculty members or community members have used the archive in the past?

Most people associate an archive with straight history, but since I’ve been here, I’ve had more interest from English professors than from History professors. Last week I had a graduate class from off campus come in. The class was composed of teachers who

One thing that I uncovered a couple of months ago was a large run of a French encyclopedia that predates the French Revolution. These are extremely rare.
were getting their MAs or certification and the faculty member wanted to show them the progression of education throughout the past couple hundred years. That is one of the strengths of our collection. We have a lot of old textbooks on a range of different subjects. A lot of these students were elementary teachers and we have a very large children's books collection going back to the 1800s. This material shows students how the profession they are going into has evolved over time. When students can see how different the textbooks from the 1700s were from today, it can be quite enlightening. We have many more collections outside of our traditional scope lately. In the past year, we received a very large collection from a Massachusetts politician who was in office from this district, 1958–1972. There is material in that collection from Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, LBJ, Nixon, right up through Ford. That could even be of use to Political Science students. We also recently got a very large collection from the New England Theater Conference, a regional theater association. That collection could benefit Theater students and Creative Arts students. We are getting more and more Irish Studies materials, particularly materials from the poet Seamus Heaney, and a lot of correspondence from Irish authors of the twentieth century. We've also acquired some material from Conrad Aiken, an American poet and from May Sarton, a famous Wellesley College author.

ES: In the age of digitization, what do you think is the future of the print archive?

It's kind of like the theory from a couple of decades ago about the paperless office of the future. If anything, it's proved to be wrong because more paper is produced than ever before. In my position, you get into the field because of your love for old paper. Suddenly you have to deal with born digital material, which is extremely important because if you don't capture it now, in a month it could be gone forever. So you have to really balance paper resources with electronic resources. What we are really seeing now is more older paper material being digitized, which will not only help with future material preservation because it could result in less physical handling of those items, but push it out to a larger audience, including those who have not traditionally been drawn to archives because of physical barriers, distance, traveling or money. Now they can see the material online and they can use it and cite it. The drawback is that it is easier to steal content now, but on balance it's really exciting for the field. An example of a virtual exhibit that my coworker created recently includes shape books from the 1890s. The books are in the shapes of dolls. This is stuff that children usually ripped apart and it never lasted. They're really not too useful for onsite research; however, if you put it into a virtual exhibit, suddenly people can look at the images alongside a textual explanation of their significance.

ES: How would someone go about making a donation to the archive? What areas of the archive or special collections are you looking to expand?

It's really important to have a deed of gift and get it signed by the donor and get their information and the list of what they donated, not only for our own records so we can track where everything came from, but to avoid conflict in the future. Right now we have been going through the collections of the student newspaper, the Campus Comment, tracking what we're missing. We have been in contact with the alumni association because for a lot of this material, our only hope is to track down older alumni and get them to donate it to make it accessible. Random issues of the Comment are missing from the 30s, 50s, and 60s. We have gaps in University presidential history from the 30s and 40s. Faculty might send programs of events and any published materials that we could put on our Virtual Commons page. We want to be able to show off outstanding faculty who are publishing and keep that information for our own archival records.

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A Tribute to Charlie Angell

Along-time Book Review Editor for Bridgewater Review, English Professor, former union president and student advisor without peer, Dr. Charles F. Angell passed away on June 13, 2012, just days before our last issue went to press—too soon for us to honor him properly with a tribute, and just plain too soon. What follows are words written by some of Charlie’s colleagues who knew him personally and professionally, and who attest to the deep and lasting effect that he made in his time with us at Bridgewater State. BR

Charlie Angell was blessed with many gifts, skills and talents. His life can be described as one of unlimited generosity and kindness, a lifelong commitment to learning, a passion for classical music, and of course a deep and caring love of his family. One of Charlie’s great gifts was his insatiable desire to read and to use the knowledge gained from books to help all of us appreciate the written word. Charlie was truly a man of letters.

I came to appreciate Charlie’s great reading gift when he served as the Book Review Editor for Bridgewater Review. His writing was always clear and concise; his commentary was often poignant, sometimes hilarious, but always thoughtful. Charlie reviewed books on politics, social change, economic conditions, famous people, music, art, fiction and non-fiction, high commentary and low blather. There was no area of writing that he was not interested in and willing to put 750 words to paper, always done with a literary flourish and grand style. Charlie’s work as Book Review Editor revealed an accomplished scholar, a man who believed in the life of the mind, a man dedicated to making Bridgewater State a university that never forgot the importance of good writing and, most of all, the power of the book. One of my final memories of Charlie was when I visited him in the hospital; there he was, smiling and brave, with a Kindle in hand, books strewn around the bed—the Book Review Editor of Bridgewater Review.

When you are friends with someone for more than thirty years and have lunch with that person three or four times a week, a special bond is created and memories are boundless. Charlie could always be counted on during those lunches to offer a brilliant turn of a word or phrase that had his friends at the table in stitches. Charlie was a man of great generosity; he often took students to the opera or plays or lectures to introduce them to parts of our culture that are too often ignored. And Charlie was always there for people, whether it was helping me paint my house, baking bread for his friends, mentoring his faculty colleagues, or sitting patiently while advising a nervous student.

A university is only as good as the people who stand in front of a class of young people and open their minds to the world. Charlie was one of those English professors who made students think, not only about a poem or short story that was assigned, but about the larger meaning of the works; how the reading defined their lives or made their world more understandable. Such skills in teaching and thinking are in short supply these days, but Charlie had them in huge amounts.

When someone passes from this earth, the living have only memories. But I have hundreds of memories of Charlie, all of them good, all of them a treasure.

Charlie made those around him... appreciate the wonders of reading, the importance of lifelong learning and the absolute necessity of critical thinking. That was Charlie’s gift to all of us.
Amidst all those memories, I will never forget how Charlie made those around him—family, friends, students and staff—appreciate the wonders of reading, the importance of lifelong learning and the absolute necessity of critical thinking. That was Charlie’s gift to all of us.

Michael Kryzanek is the Director of the Global Studies Institute and Executive Director of the Center for International Engagement. He was Founding Editor of 

Charlie was a writer; a gardener; a voracious and perceptive reader; a doting family man; an admirer of Lady Gaga and Bach – both; a teacher; a lover of argument and wine and conversation. He was all those things, but the list does not add up to the man.

A life is a complicated business, difficult to capture in words. That’s the sadness of death, isn’t it? Unless you were lucky enough to experience the fullness of a person, no story, no photograph, no loving description can convey the richness of a human being. Even when we know others in life, too often the person they are evades us. We get a glimpse here, an idea there, but rarely the whole man or woman. And yet we try; we try to make ourselves understood and known to one another, and we try to keep the memory of those who have died alive as a way of keeping them alive in our own hearts.

The mind plays tricks, and sometimes I think I catch Charlie out of the corner of my eye – driving past my house on his way to work or crossing the quadrangle toward Tillinghast, wearing a fishing vest and baseball cap if he wasn’t teaching or, for more formal occasions, a slightly stained, goofy tie and Oxford shirt. But that is, of course, just the shadow of the man who was my dear friend for 15 years, who took me under his wing when I was a junior faculty member and protected me from dangers real and imagined; who instilled his love of music and politics and photography in my daughter, Nina; who told me stories and bad jokes and speculated on national elections and department politics with equal zeal. Charlie was a vivid person, a vibrant man full of ideas and energy and opinions. I wish not to diminish him in the retelling. I understand Charlie best when I think of him in the place he came from: New England. Charlie liked to joke that he had spent most of his life at one spot or another along Route 106, from Plymouth to East Bridgewater, and though he and Leslie had traveled extensively throughout Europe and the United States, Charlie was in some ways a modern Thoreau, who himself joked about having traveled widely in Concord. Like the Concord Transcendentalists, and in the best New England colonial tradition, Charlie was deeply introspective – and very hard on himself and his real or perceived failings. He had a powerful, almost overwhelming desire to be useful, to make a difference, and to care for others, and his unhappiness when he felt he was missing his own mark was palpable. About six years ago, Charlie became discontented with the quality of his teaching in literature courses, but he still loved our students and wasn’t ready to retire, believing he had more to give to BSU. After a bit of poking around, we found him a second career working as an advisor in the Academic Achievement Center. Charlie brought love, time, care and his vast knowledge of the inner workings of BSU to his advising work. Every day he had a new story about a student he helped snatch from the jaws of academic catastrophe,
or simply guided into a more fitting major. His work in the AAC, like his early leadership in the MSCA, his life in teaching, and his unceasing service in the English Department, had meaning for him and those around him. It allowed him to do, as his New England predecessor Cotton Mather demanded we do, “some good each day.”

Charlie was a writer; a gardener; a voracious and perceptive reader; a doting family man; an admirer of Lady Gaga and Bach - both; a teacher; a lover of argument and wine and conversation. He was all those things, but the list does not add up to the man. He gave me the precious gift of his friendship, and taught me a standard of professionalism and collegiality that I can only hope to live up to. I miss him every day, and like many of you reading this now, I am thankful for his love, his work, and his life.

Anyone who worked with Charlie was aware of his wit, wide-ranging curiosity and seriousness about learning. But the quality of Charlie’s that I admired most was his generous heart.

Charlie was a great colleague and friend of mine at Bridgewater, but it was outside the campus that my fondest memories of Charlie were formed. Sailing was the one place I had Charlie pretty much to myself. He loved the trips we took on board our boat, Otter. As soon as we were out of inner Sippican Harbor he would eagerly take the helm. “Where are we going today?” he’d ask, sounding like a kid at the beginning of a rare adventure. Red Brook Harbor, Megansett, West Falmouth, Quissett, West Island, Hadley Harbor near Woods Hole (his favorite), Lake Tashmoo on the Vineyard? Most afternoons we heeled so sharply that Otter’s rail was under the water. Charlie called these conditions Buzzards Bay snorters, and was always thrilled by them. One gray afternoon in six-foot seas just south of Cleveland Ledge Light he spotted a huge leatherback turtle in the face of a wave. Picture this most articulate of men reduced to blurtting out “Holy *****, Holy ******.” Every sail he was as delighted as a child who’d never been before. So was I.

Anyone who worked with Charlie was aware of his wit, wide-ranging curiosity and seriousness about learning. But the quality of Charlie’s that I admired most was his generous heart. He seemed always to be thinking of how he could show his affection for other people. He frequently surprised people with gifts that were completely about them. For me, a poster-sized photograph he had taken of Otter and a 19th century chart of the cove where she is moored. A book for someone he’d just met that was discussed in their first-ever conversation. His concert tickets when he and his wife, Leslie, could not attend. And, of course, his generous heart was always on display at lunch with his friends when he praised the people he loved: Leslie, the best-read and most charismatic teacher ever, with students lined up in the hall outside her office, waiting to talk with her about school and life; his son, Franklin, movie-star handsome and, as an early teen, absolutely bound for a career as a major-league pitcher (Charlie told us at lunch one day that Franklin could throw a baseball through a sheet of plywood. “How thick could the plywood be?” someone asked. As always, Charlie was ready. With no pause he shot back, “three quarter inch, exterior grade”); and his beloved granddaughter, Hadley, just the brightest, chattiest and most beautiful child ever.

Today, trying to express what I feel about Charlie, and how much I’ll miss him, I know that I have no way to capture his warmth, open curiosity, generosity, humor, loyalty, sense of fairness, honesty and pleasure in the company of those he loved. I’ll just have to make do with having had Charlie as a friend for more than 35 lucky years.

Ann Brunjes is Acting Associate Provost for Faculty Affairs, on leave from her position as Associate Professor in the English Department.

William Levin is Emeritus Professor of Sociology and a former Associate Editor (1982-2010) and Editor (2010-12) of Bridgewater Review.
Charlie always had something to contribute to discussions and it was we who benefited from his compassionate leadership at Bridgewater State.

When the faculty and librarians at Bridgewater State College elected him as their first-ever Massachusetts State College Association (MSCA) Chapter President, Charlie Angell faced a daunting task: leading a brand new union with a divided membership. The organizing vote had pitted the Massachusetts Teachers Association (MTA) against the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), and the Teamsters Union. Each contender had adherents on the Bridgewater campus, and some Bridgewater faculty had no wish to unionize at all. Each organization had qualities that appealed to some potential members. The MTA, with which MSCA would ultimately affiliate, represented hundreds of thousands of public school teachers in the kindergarten to twelfth grade sector. Its substantial political weight was attractive, but its K-12 worldview was worrisome. The AAUP understood college and university professors, but could it function in Massachusetts politics? For some members, the Teamster reputation for union toughness promised results.

Charlie’s task on campus: bring the membership together by providing initial leadership for an organization with the attributes of both a professional association and a union and provide assistance to members who needed it when they faced career-related problems. Chapter By-Laws needed to be devised and new governance system needed to be organized. Charlie’s second most important task – helping individual members is always first priority – was guaranteeing that the membership had a real voice in college governance, and that its professional expertise and judgments met respect.

Charlie faced a difficult challenge off campus, too: collective bargaining was unknown territory, as was hammering out a workable affiliation with nine other institutions, some of them very different from our school. Members of the first state-wide MSCA Board of Directors remember well Charlie’s active participation in state-wide affairs. Charlie always had something to contribute to discussions and it was we who benefited from his compassionate leadership at Bridgewater State.

Jean Stonehouse is President of the Bridgewater Chapter of the Massachusetts State College Association and Professor of History.
FOODWINKED

Arthur Lizie


E. H. King was an early twentieth-century agronomist relieved of his duties at the USDA Bureau of Soils for promoting controversial ideas about soil nutrition. After exiting he visited the Far East, recounting his trip in *Farmers of Forty Centuries, or Permanent Agriculture in China, Korea, and Japan* (1911), a seminal document and inspiration for the contemporary sustainable agriculture movement.

King’s legacy as an agricultural pioneer is maintained by the F.H. King Students of Sustainable Agriculture Club on the University of Wisconsin-Madison campus, where King taught for over a decade. Every week during the growing season, the group distributes free produce to a few dozen people in front of the library. Not surprisingly, the iconic likeness of King on the group’s t-shirts calls to mind similar images of Karl Marx.

The King produce giveaway I witnessed this summer was entertaining and exhilarating. As I left the spectacle, I drifted across the street to the Wisconsin Union for some local ice cream. Eating my cone by the shores of Lake Mendota, I faced the back side of the Union building. There, I saw a semi-trailer from Aramark, a multinational food services corporation. The truck was unloading food, without fanfare, for the thousands of locals who eat and drink at the Union every day.

“good food” movement, Pollan’s *The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals* (2006).

Desrochers and Shimizu structure their argument as an intense look at the “L” in SOLE (Sustainable, Organic, Local, Ethical) food. Through the local lens, they hack away at five “myths” promoted by locavores (the 2007 word-of-the-year for the Oxford American Dictionary). The myths are that the local production and consumption of food promote social cohesion, improve local economies, benefit the environment, increase food security, and is healthier, tastier and safer. Labeling these principles as “myths,” the duo concludes that local eating weakens communities, hurts local economies, harms the environment, endangers the food supply, and isn’t good for you. Whether or not you agree with their argument and conclusions probably has less to do with how you eat and more about your alignment with the duo’s political agenda, which is the real point of this book.

The book does a solid job laying out most of the moving pieces one has to consider if one wants to “eat local”; an outsider’s view is always illuminating.

The book’s greatest strength and weakness is the surgical precision of its argument, particularly its use of evidence.

My vision’s not that good, so I couldn’t see if the Aramark driver was wearing an Adam Smith t-shirt.

Pierre Desrochers and Hiroko Shimizu’s *The Locavore’s Dilemma: In Praise of the 10,000 Mile Diet* is a broadside assault on the virtues of local eating as promoted by the King students, Polyface Farm owner Joel Salatin, and “rock star” journalist Michael Pollan. The title is a direct rejoinder to the talisman of the contemporary "good food" movement, Pollan’s *The Omnivore’s Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals* (2006).

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The book does a solid job laying out most of the moving pieces one has to consider if one wants to “eat local”; an outsider’s view is always illuminating.
However, the book immediately falters by creating a straw man in its isolation of local eating from the other “SOLE” concerns, its marginalization of health as a food procurement concern, and its total neglect of the role of pleasure. While in any movement there are always outliers who are easy to assail for their orthodoxy (such as adherents of the “100-Mile Diet”) for most local eaters, local is but one among many metrics that figure in the calculus of household and personal food economy. What we choose to eat is a complex issue and this book simplifies it to the point of parody.

And the fact that Desrochers and Shimizu want to battle with rather than engage local eating ultimately derails the book. If the authors admit that “In a market economy, people do not bother tinkering with advances unless they are facing pressing problems” (p. 184), then it’s vexing that they won’t allow for the fact that local-eating consumers see the current state of the industrial food chain as a “pressing problem.”

And why this reluctance to engage? Because ultimately this book isn’t about addressing and working through real concerns about the food system: it’s about promoting a vision of how food consumers should acquiesce to a rationalized system of production. While they certainly don’t hide their lust for the unrestrained free market, Desrochers and Shimizu’s ideological purpose is never more apparent than at the conclusion of chapters two and five, respectively, when we’re told that “Providing the basic necessities of life at ever more affordable prices should be the start- ing point of all discussions on local social capital.” (p. 57) and “Economic development through trade liberalization is what food security should really be about.” (p. 140) Really? At the very least, foregrounding these foundational ideas as theses rather than conclusions for chapters would have been more intellectually honest. This is a book about unregulated free markets, not food.

It is this intellectual bait-and-switch and the shock-and-awe campaign against “the other side” that undoes a lot of good that a book like this could do. I have been a local food advocate for the past decade. I’ve started a farmers’ market, run a community garden, belonged to a Community Supported Agriculture group, given public talks about local eating, and offered courses in locavorism and globalization. I think local eating is good eating. As constructed by Desrochers and Shimizu, I am the enemy. But I don’t really see it that way. And I’ll say it: The global industrial food system has done a lot of good for a lot of people. But, from either side, there is no need for this debate to be an either/or, winner-take-all battle as presented here. And it can’t be. We can’t all eat local food and we shouldn’t eat food designed to serve stockholders rather than human needs. We need to get to that middle ground between the King students’ free heirloom lettuce and the Wisconsin Union’s industrially assembled Der Rathskeller Burger. This book doesn’t get us there.

Arthur Lizie is Associate Professor and Chairperson in the Communication Studies Department

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Call for Submissions

*Bridgewater Review* invites submissions from full- and part-time faculty and librarians for publication. *Bridgewater Review* is published twice yearly by the faculty and librarians of Bridgewater State University. It provides a forum for campus-wide conversations pertaining to research, teaching and creative expression, as well as a showcase for faculty art. Articles in all disciplines and genres are welcome and encouraged, including scholarship about research interests and trends, scholarship about teaching and learning, creative writing and short reviews of other publications.

Articles should be 1700-2200 words in length, though shorter articles will also be considered. Creative writing can be submitted at lengths briefer than 2200 words. Those wishing to submit are asked to consult the *Bridgewater Review* submission guidelines (available from the Editor). In keeping with the founding spirit of our faculty magazine, the editors are equally interested in unfinished pieces of writing that may need assistance with revision and in polished pieces that are publication ready. All submissions will be reviewed, but there is no guarantee that submitted work will be published.

*Bridgewater Review* also welcomes Letters to the Editor with the hope that BR may become a locus for community discussion at Bridgewater State University.

Submissions should be sent electronically to:
Andrew Holman
Editor,
*Bridgewater Review*
bridgewater.review@bridgew.edu

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