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Refugee Policy & Social Integration in Jordan:
Structural Barriers to Enclave Formation Among Forced Migrants to Jordan

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Refugee Policy & Social Integration in Jordan:

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Abstract

The displacement of over five million Syrian refugees in the past six years has brought much needed attention to issues of forced migration. Today, the majority of the world’s refugees and internally displaced reside in urban areas of middle to low-income states, particularly in Asia and Africa. There is, however, a significant gap in research on self-settled refugees in the Middle East and their integration into host countries. In addition, much of the literature that does exist focuses on policies regarding labor policies yet ignores housing and settlement pattern issues and its impact on integration and community growth. This research aims to provide a historically contextualized analysis of policies’—specifically housing and employment’s—impact on integration within Jordan. The research includes an analysis based on the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) in conjunction with an analysis of labor market and housing integration. This research finds the historical context and institutional barriers for refugees have led to negative refugee integration outcomes. Syrian refugees in Jordan have been unable to develop ethnic communities that would facilitate social mobility and future spatial integration. The paper concludes by suggesting characteristics of an improved refugee policy regime globally.

Keywords: forced migration, integration/assimilation, policy analysis, protracted refugee situation
Introduction

The ubiquitous images of refugees struggling across the Mediterranean or living in prison-like camps, while important to document, makes invisible how a majority of refugees across the globe actually live. According to the Refugee Compacts (2017:x) report, around 76% of the world’s refugees live outside of the typical camp, and have self-settled in other settlements such as urban, peri-urban and rural areas. This trend is not new, and existed prior to the UNHCR’s 2009 policy change to address self-settled refugees. In addition, while western countries—especially Europe—have seen an increase in refugees fleeing to their borders, over 85% of the world’s refugees continue to reside within middle to low-income countries in the ‘Global South’ (Huang et al. 2016). The limited agency of refugees and the increased housing demand creates high vulnerabilities from a housing perspective within the refugee population. These vulnerabilities can compound and create more issues such as physically distancing refugees from refugee specific aid centers (3RP 2016:40). Due to a dearth of research on these self-settled Global-South refugees, particularly from a housing and settlement perspective, this research aims to provide an understanding of these unique circumstances in Jordan.

Refugee situations, which often lead to protracted refugee situations (PRS), are most often handled by a number of nongovernmental organizations: most prominently the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. This is just one pivotal piece to the international refugee regime: a form of global humanitarian governance that is “no longer inherently good; instead, it can be associated with either emancipation or domination” (Barnett 2013:382). Each host country involves a network of UNHCR, non-governmental
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aid agencies, donor states, and the host country itself. Such a broad array of actors creates diverse policies and practices depending on the host country. As a country with a large refugee population, as well as a long history as a host state, Jordan provides a unique opportunity for forced migration policy analysis in regards to refugee integration: one of the durable solutions set out by the UNHCR.

The Middle Eastern country of Jordan has a unique history as one of the receiving ‘Southern’ states, with steady flows beginning with Palestinians since 1948, to the recent influx of neighboring Syrians since 2011. The lengthy history, range of policies, and diversity of refugee settlement patterns makes Jordan an excellent example to examine impacts of settlement and assimilation policies for forced migrants from an interdisciplinary perspective.

This study contributes to an understanding of the relationship between history, policy and outcomes for refugee integration and success. Necessary policy and institutional reform is required for Syrian refugees to gain access to segregated ethnic/refugee communities to create social mobility ladders to foster successful spatial integration and labor market incorporation. I argue this throughout the paper by first providing an overview of the growing literature on forced migration studies, assimilation/integration theory, and policy path dependency. I then outline the methodology, as broken down into three main sections: (1) historical/institutional context, (2) policy analysis, and (3) outcomes analysis. The first section is based in political science, adding to the path dependency literature. The second section is more interdisciplinary, combing political science policy analysis methodology with a sociological concept of integration. The last section is sociological, contributing a
sociological understanding of community integration for refugees. I conclude the paper by offering a broader perspective on housing justice, and global reform for a proactive prevention of refugee crises as opposed to (necessary) reactive humanitarianism.

**Perspectives on Forced Migration and Refugee Integration**

Prior to the 2009 policy change, much of the forced migration literature examined camps and the role they played in providing relief to refugees. The policy shift did not end research on camps, but allowed for easier access to data on self-settled refugees due to official UNHCR recognition. The debates on encampment have existed for nearly as long as the international community has utilized it as a solution to refugee crises (Chambers 1979; Van Damme 1995; Agier 2002; Hoffmann 2017). Although there is a near consensus that encampment is problematic since it is a short-term solution to a permanent or long-term problem, it continues to be a focus in policies and research (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:127).

Some more recent arguments have added nuance to encampment criticisms. Van Damme (1995) looks to the successful use of camps in Bangladesh in 1971, but argues encampment worked here because the problem was temporary. As examined in a previous section, temporary has become the exception in refugee situations that continue to go on for longer periods of time. In addition, according to Jacobsen (2001:7), governments and relief agencies tend to prefer camps because it makes “management of assistance easier” and allows for easier transition to repatriation: one of the durable solutions promoted by the UNHCR. She also argues that the context of the refugee situation in relation to the host community may sometimes call for encampment policies (Jacobsen 2001:10). In cases where camps occur or are necessary, participation in camp
planning by the target population can help promote self-sufficiency within the camp population (Stevenson & Sutton 2012; Bulley 2014). While these add nuance to anti-camp literature, the harsh critiques on UNHCR’s focus on camps and disregard for self-settled refugees led to their 2009 policy change, and the 2014 addition that the organization will avoid encampment whenever possible.

Instead, sociologists, political scientists, and forced migration experts alike have begun to focus on other solutions for refugee crises that take a longer-term perspective (Jacobsen 2001; Phillimore & Goodson 2005; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014). The UNHCR asserts three pillars of durable solutions: voluntary repatriation, resettlement, and local integration (UNHCR). Due to humanitarianism’s nature as defined by “the treatment of symptoms and not causes of suffering, and by standing clear of politics”, voluntary repatriation is often unrealizable by UNHCR efforts unless the conflict miraculously ends. Resettlement is barely more attainable as, according to the UNHCR, less than one percent of refugees are submitted for resettlement (UNHCR: Solutions).

As a result, researchers and NGOs see integration as the most attainable ‘durable solution’, yet Jacobsen (2001) noted it as a ‘forgotten solution’. Hovil (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014) argues that it is not forgotten, but in fact evaded by national and international actors. Integration efforts and their subsequent successes and failures are highly based on the socio-political context of the protracted refugee situation. This solution also goes further than simply integrating refugees physically into the host community, or by providing citizenship. While both greatly facilitate and often allow for integration, they alone “[do] not necessarily translate into inclusion for former refugees” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:489). Ager and Strang (2004:5) describe a group as integrated when
they have public outcomes similar to the host community, are socially connected with the host community and its state functions, as well as having sufficient cultural knowledge and shared notions of citizenship. This is facilitated when the refugee population has similar social and cultural structures to the host community (Phillimore & Goodson 2005:1722).

Citizenship—and host countries’ withholding of this privilege—can often act as a substantial barrier to de facto integration, as is the case of Gazan refugees in Jordan compared to their West Bank counterparts although Perez (2011:1041) asserts that by demanding citizenship, Gazans “are tacitly accepting the idea that rights are the exclusive privilege of citizens.” Others have argued, “those with formal legal status do not seem to do much better than those without legal status” (Jacobsen 2006:282). While debates continue on the relevance of citizenship in relation to integration, many agree that successful integration relies on a host community that is open to the forced migrant population (Jacobsen 2001; Jacobsen 2006; Phillimore & Goodson 2006; Valenta & Bunar 2010; Gibson 2015; Kattaa 2016b).

Enacting policy change can also pose a challenge for several countries with existing refugee populations. Many political scientists study the processes for creating and implementing policies, analyzing this in cases of policies over time and the ability of institutions to reverse policies or take other policy paths. An analytical framework to understand these processes is path dependency. Path dependency is an analytical term aimed at understanding policies over extended, and substantial stretches of time. According to Margaret Levi (1997), path dependency means, “that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high” (p. 28). For a country
such as Jordan, which has had refugees since 1947, this temporally long policy regime can be worrisome for refugees finding a home their today.

Additionally, Pierson argues, “Politics is based on authority rather than exchange. Thus in politics, institutional constraints are ubiquitous” (2004:34). Interestingly, the process of creating new policies “is, in the nature of things, to displace institutions, norms or routines that exist”—just as Syrian refugees were displaced from their homes (Orren & Skowronek 2014:5). As a result, the forcibly displaced often find themselves in a situation of ‘sticky’ policy displacement due to the long history of policies and their institutional disadvantages. Steinmo and Watts argue the “institutional context explains (and could be used to predict) future policy failures and successes (1995:330). In the context of refugee policies, one can examine the institutional context of refugees versus host community nationals, to understand and predict future policies regarding the forcibly displaced.

Integration

Others, predominantly (but not exclusively) sociologists, have looked at complexities within integration efforts. Soh et al. (2016) differentiate integration from assimilation, separation, and marginalization. The most important distinction is between integration: “when [refugees] keep both home and host identities while still interacting with the host community”; and marginalization: “when [refugees] neither have home nor host identity” (Soh et al. 2016:6). Lack of de jure integration (such as citizenship) and lack of refugee concentrations (urban enclaves/ghettos) can lead to loss of concrete identity from host or home and results in marginalization.
Literature on immigrant communities often examines how differing levels of social segregation shape social life. Due to “the initial disadvantages associated with immigrant status…they [immigrants/refugees] usually form their own ethnic enclaves” as a response to “obstacles in crossing the threshold to the large society” (Min Zhou 1992: 2; Abrahamson 2006:131). The concept of social segregation in the form of an enclave as a means of protection and self-promotion is consistent in literature on the subject (Abrahamson 2006; Yee 1996; Wacquant 2012; Portes & Zhou 1993). This often follows an understanding of the oppressive outcomes that also result from these ethnically segregated neighborhoods and ghettos. Loïc Wacquant outlines four cornerstones of these outcomes: Stigma, Constraint, Spatial confinement and Institutional parallelism (2012:7). Additionally, segregated communities hinder integration with the host society due to a lack of contact between groups. According to Meier, “More diverse neighborhoods and more encounters with difference lead to more intergroup relations and lower prejudice” (2017:253). The formation of segregated ethnic enclaves can lead to social mobility within the community, but prejudice from without.

The successful integration of these communities is often predicated on the housing rights they have access to. For example, in Istanbul, the law dictates that squatters cannot be evicted from their homes if it is sound construction with the resident already moved in. This unique law can provide poorer communities with a chance to thrive, and one particular woman stated that, “without squatting she would either be homeless or hungry” (Neuwirth 2006:150). Many assimilation theorists describe ethnic enclaves as a pivotal stepping-stone for labor market incorporation, but these are not uncritically understood as a pathway to integration (Min Zhou 1992:15). Integration
theory, on the other hand, explicitly includes structural methods to incorporate migrants into labor markets (Schneider & Crul 2010:1144). Interestingly, Wessel et al. (2017) argue labor market participation is the main driver of upward spatial mobility and integration into the larger society (p. 834).

Logically following these theoretical claims, the following syllogism must be true: If ethnic enclaves beget economic integration, and economic integration begets spatial integration, then segregated ethnic (or refugee) enclaves beget overall integration into host communities. As Desmond (2016) explains, these are all possible only in cases of residential and community stability, which can be difficult for poor families “because they are evicted at such high rates. That low-income families move often is well known”—a fact researchers have overlooked in regards to policy impacts (p. 296).

Refugee communities reflect many of the issues faced by these immigrant communities, but have some distinct characteristics as well. Without the mobility ladders offered by these ethnically homogenous communities, refugees, immigrants, and other new arrivals face a high chance of downward assimilation.

Patterns of Settlement

According to the *Oxford Handbook of Refugee & Forced Migration Studies*, “social integration has been a central theme in sociology” and they call for the sociology of evictions “to be an expanding issue within studies of forced migration” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:90 & 95). Stephen Castles (2003) calls on sociologists to examine social policy and human agency in refugee settlement through an interdisciplinary and historical lens. Additionally, Jacobsen (2006) calls for the need “to address the specific
vulnerability of refugees, [and] the resources and strategies they employ to reduce this vulnerability, and the impact of these changes on the host society” (p. 279).

Among research on urban or self-settled refugees, there remains “a disproportionate focus of research on formal camps” even though it is well understood that the majority of refugees, globally, reside in self-settled areas (Bakewell 2008:433). The majority of self-settled refugee literature examines the labor market within different regional contexts (Jacobsen 2001:15; Phillimore & Goodson 2006; Young & Jacobsen 2013; Kattaa 2016a; Kattaa 2016b) With the literature that does exist on self-settled refugees, there lacks research on the impacts of different policy strategies for refugees and host communities (Polzer 2008:476; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:94; Huang et al. 2017:29). The dearth of integration research is often limited by region as well with a large focus on Africa and industrialized western countries, while “the Middle East remains largely under-examined” (Kattaa 2016a:8). There remains a clear but shrinking gap on integration policies in the Middle East in forced migration literature.

Local integration is often regarded as an attainable durable solution for refugees, but it does have its limits. Jacobsen (2001) alleges that there are contextual and political restraints to integration. She states, “where local integration aggravates existing security problems, or adds to the economic and social problems and instabilities in the RHA, it is neither fair nor feasible to expect that integration be pursued” (p. 24). Her argument is important to note, but over emphasizes the negative impacts of refugees and misses the economic opportunities they can bring. Although, that is not to diminish her argument that self-settled refugees can cause increased demand for housing, leading to price increases, and “poorer local people may be forced out” as well as other refugees
(Jacobsen 2001:17). These housing issues are a reflection of the “forms of niche-gentrification” that Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah (2012:152) examined in their analysis on the effects of refugees and conflict on city growth in Nyala, Darfur. These authors utilize the term niche gentrification to describe a unique, homogenous group experiencing gentrification as a group. The niche gentrification refugees face adds to the need for an expansion in the study of the sociology of evictions in forced migration literature (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:94).

Furthermore, allowing for refugees to self-settle—while often cheaper than encampment—can work against attempts by the host government “to secure financial aid” due to a lack of visibility of urban refugees (Turner 2015:393). Protracted Refugee Situations often require large amounts of donor money, and host governments are less likely to accept integration policies if it decreases international funds. Moreover, a widely noted problem with integration lies in this invisibility, which makes it more difficult for aid agencies to provide necessary services to self-settled refugees (Ward 2014; Hoffmann 2017; Huang et al. 2017). Scholars continue to regard integration as an excellent solution while understanding its limitations.

This research works to fill the current gaps in forced migration literature on the importance of housing and settlement patterns to integration by combining sociological understandings of urban social life and a political science policy analysis. In addition it fills the missing literature on the Middle East region’s disproportionate refugee population. By focusing on settlement vulnerabilities—in relation to its ability to amplify or diminish the agency of the target population in Jordan, this project assesses the impact
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of various policies on refugees and their host communities and thereby shed more light on questions of labor, housing and integration of forced migrants in Jordan.

Methodology

Using Jordan as a case study, I conduct a policy analysis as well as a subsequent outcomes analysis to understand the extent of refugee integration within Jordan. To understand the analysis, a grasp of what refugee integration means is paramount. Refugee integration refers to the process of “legal, economic, social and cultural incorporation of refugees, culminating in the offer of citizenship” (Jacobsen 2001:1). The analysis utilizes this definition to determine if the policies and outcomes in Jordan have fostered successful integration or hampered Syrian refugees access to successful, integrated livelihoods.

In this study, the analysis investigates the impacts of Jordan’s refugee housing and labor policies as applied toward the current Syrian refugee population in regards to integration. Ager and Strang (2004) created an ‘Indicators of Integration’ framework for assessing integration policies. The authors encourage the flexible use of the framework in regions outside the original use (2004:2). The framework consists of ten domains, under four headings. ‘Means and Markers’ contains employment, housing, education and health. ‘Social Connections’ contains social bridges, bonds, and links within and out the different communities and structures. ‘Facilitators’ contains cultural knowledge and security/safety. Finally, ‘Foundation’ refers to the rights and citizenship aspect of integration (2004:3).

I utilize this framework similarly to Velenta & Bunar’s (2010) State Assisted Integration paper in which they analyze the integration of refugees in Norway and
Sweden, and pay closer attention to the housing and economic ‘Means and Markers’; however, due to the path dependency of these policies, instead of comparing two separate countries’ policies I analyze the current policy regime within the historical context of Jordan and the UNHCR’s history of refugees. I focus mainly on the policies and outcomes targeted at the more recent Syrian refugee population within Jordan. I give special attention to the housing domain to provide a deeper understanding of ‘niche gentrification’ and the sociology of housing within refugee/host community relations. This portion of the analysis will draw from Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah’s (2012) *City Growth Under Conflict Conditions* in which they utilize rental data to understand the impact of a refugee crisis on urban growth. This furthers the reflections on structure and agency by providing a look at what options—or lack thereof—refugees face in regards to housing, and how policies shape those opportunities.

First I provide a historical and institutional context of Jordan’s refugee policy regime through a lens of path dependency to understand the reasoning behind Jordan’s current policies, as well as predictions for reform in similar fashion to Steinmo & Watts’ (1995) analysis of failed health care reform in the United States. Next, I investigate the core principles of the refugee policies in relation to integration. To do so, I utilize the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) excel tool to analyze the level Jordan’s policies promote, or hurt integration of its refugee population within the two ‘policy areas’ of economics and housing. Originally designed for immigrant integration assessment into European and western countries, I edited some of the wording of the MIPEX tool to closer fit refugees in Jordan. In cases where no mention of the score requirement was found, this resulted in a score of 0.
I turn my attention to outcomes of integration into the labor market. To analyze this, I look for “significant differences between immigrants and the native population in aspects of everyday life—from labor market participation and income” to how refugees are “represented in low-income/low-status occupations” in relation to the host community (Valenta & Bunar 2010:470-1). I then conduct an in-depth analysis of housing/settlement outcomes through “collected information on changes to the housing sector from urban planning agencies and rental agents” allowing for a rigorous understanding of “the forms of social dislocation within the city” with data from the Jordan Department of Statistics and the REACH organization in Jordan (Bartlett, Alix-Garcia & Saah 2012:153).

Similarly to the labor market analysis, I compare rental data between Jordanian nationals and the refugees in their host communities. I continue this analysis by running regressions between average rents and different variables such as households and population to understand specific causations of disparities in rent. Finally, I utilize data on security of tenure for host community refugees compared to Jordanians, as well as the previous findings to address their access to community building and effects of evictions.

I compiled a variety of data sources, and juxtaposed these data against select policies relevant to conduct the analysis. UNHCR distributed maps, among other NGO-provided resources, along with census data provided by Jordan’s Department of Statistics (JDOS), allows for the housing and settlement analysis to understand if Syrian refugees have been successfully building and joining communities. While Jordan’s census data gather information on refugees, it is not their primary focus. Due to gaps in this data, I utilize numerous reports from the UNHCR, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), International Labour Organization (ILO), Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF),
and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) to fill in refugee specific gaps to analyze integration, specifically economic/labor integration.

While the methodology aims to do a lot, it is necessary for a complete and coherent analysis of the integration of refugees within Jordan. These different pieces contribute toward each other, as each one influences the other. This analysis is possible due to the extensive pre-existing data, which is collected on refugee circumstances in association with the distribution of aid services. This analysis brings a deeper understanding of effective integration policies in regards to housing and labor in middle-income countries to promote the livelihoods of forced migrants.

**Historical Context**

*UNHCR Policy Overview*

The overemphasis on camp refugees has not simply been a result of media portrayal. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ was founded in 1950 as a response to the refugee crisis from World War II. Its goal was to help the millions of displaced Europeans, but has since expanded its mission to its current goal to aid the world’s forcibly displaced. Although that was its mission, it has largely ignored a major component to refugee issues. Official UNHCR policy did not—until 2009—address urban, and self-settled refugees. Instead, the UNHCR solely utilized encampment to address refugees. For example, in 2005, only 25% of the world’s refugees lived in camps yet only 3 years earlier “officially designated camps [were] reported to contain altogether 87.6 percent of the refugees assisted by the UNHCR” (Dorai 2007:3; Agier 2002:320). Specifically in the Middle East, a region in the Global South host to a large portion of the world’s displaced persons had (in 2005) 60% of its refugees residing in urban areas,
“representing a 35 percent increase since 1950” (Ward 2014:81). The global trend in urbanization makes it “unsurprising that the displaced follow suit” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:139).

Since its founding, the UNHCR had not specifically addressed urban refugees until it created the *UNHCR Comprehensive Policy on Urban Refugees* in 1997. The concept of aid as a pull factor into cities, and urban refugees as a detriment to host communities informed this largely criticized policy (Ward 2014:79). Instead, the humanitarian organization used encampment as its main solution to large displacement into countries in the Global South. In 2009, after receiving severe criticisms for its policy stance regarding urban refugees, the new *Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas* states that the UNHCR will provide assistance to refugees in urban areas with or without the authorities approval of their residence there (Turner 2015:389). This policy represents the beginning of a shift regarding forced migration away from “the establishment of camps, wherever possible” and towards more durable solutions such as local integration (UNHCR 2014:6). UNHCR policy had a long history of ignoring urban refugees, and the extended period of this policy made it all the more costly to implement a policy reversal, according to path dependency theory. Although the UNHCR’s policies have shifted, it is only one actor within the international refugee regime; the organization faces an uphill battle against host states that are reluctant to formally accept forced migrants into host communities and urban areas.

This fact remains as many host countries “turn a blind eye—both to the work and the exploitation that goes with it—because refugees provide cheap labour” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:106) or because they lack the capacity to extract all the self-settled
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Refugees living outside camps (Jacobsen 2001:3). This legal invisibility opens up refugee populations to negative outcomes, which can then negatively impact the host community. According to the UNHCR’s most recent figures, there are over 60 million displaced persons, and over 20 million refugees worldwide. As fewer than 200,000 of those have been resettled, efforts must be focused on creating durable solutions and policies for the majority of the forced migrant population.

Refugee History Within Jordan

Jordan has played a pivotal role in hosting a large share of the world’s forcibly displaced. Since 1949, when the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was formed to provide relief to Palestinian refugees fleeing Israeli occupation, Jordan has been home to millions of forced migrants. According to the UNRWA, there were over two million registered Palestinian refugees in 2016, some living in 10 camps, and around two-thirds living in urban areas. Up until the 1970s, the Hashemite Kingdom—(the ruling monarchical dynasty over Jordan) was committed to a policy of integration: the kingdom provided citizenship rights to millions of Palestinian refugees, resulting in about 40% of UNRWA-registered refugees obtaining equal rights as Jordanian nationals (Soh, You, & Yu 2016:2). Many of the camps that were created were near or within existing, dense urban areas that have over time become integrated neighborhoods (Chatelard 2002:2). While proximity worked in favor for Palestinian-Jordanians, “being housed close to urban areas doesn’t always result in refugees effectively being absorbed into the local population” (Finch 2015:55). While encampment policies have been widely critiqued, the combination with some of the integrationist policies of both Jordan and the UNRWA allowed for improved outcomes for Palestinian-Jordanian citizens.
Although it is important to note that the generosity dealt out by the Hashemite Kingdom at this time was regarded as “an opportunity for the ambitious King Abdullah of Jordan to fulfill his expansionist goals” (Achilli 2014:236). In addition, the granting of citizenship rights was not equally distributed for all Palestinian refugees fleeing to the Kingdom. According to Perez (2011:1031), “at least 120,000 refugees from Gaza Strip have been denied this privilege for over 40 years”, leaving them disadvantaged compared to their West Bank brothers and sisters.

The growth of nationalism and militancy among Palestinian refugees led to the civil war in Jordan known as “Black September”, causing the Kingdom in 1988 to revert its relationship with Palestinian refugees and the West Bank, depriving them of citizenship (Achilli 2014:239). Since then, any Palestinian refugees attempting to find asylum within Jordan risk remaining stateless inside the kingdom or worse, refoulement. Refoulement is defined in the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees:

"No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."

In addition, the UNRWA historically provided basic services to any Palestinian refugees in Jordan as opposed to the UNHCR, but due to budgetary issues it has reduced social services since 1997 (Chatelard 2002:2). As Jordan’s policies have slowly reverted against refugees, these policies have created a path dependency in opposition to the rights that were once afforded to the West Bank Palestinian refugees. As the temporal distribution of
these policies goes on longer, the ability to reverse the trend becomes more cumbersome and near politically impossible.

*Recent Refugees*

Due to instability across the region from internal and external actors, flows of refugees have formed and crossed into the Kingdom steadily since the Palestinian refugees first did in 1948. For example, the Gulf War set an initial wave of Iraqi refugees into Jordan in the ‘90s. In the 2000s, the U.S. led invasion into this Arab nation set off an even larger forced migrant population to flee across the region into Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and around 450,000-500,000 to Jordan (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2014:592). Unlike the response to Palestinian refugees, Iraqis were not subject to large encampment policies (Turner 2015:387). The Iraqi refugees continued, albeit slower, to enter the Kingdom as the Syrian Civil War forced around five million people to flee the country beginning in 2011.

Jordan was among the neighboring countries to receive a large portion of the refugees from the ongoing crisis in Syria. The UNHCR has over 650,000 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan but unofficial estimates place the number around one million refugees residing in the Kingdom (Briggs 2015:10). The Jordanian government initially set up a camp to house the Syrian refugees in a small temporary tent community, which grew to be the 4th largest city in the country and is now known as the al-Zaatari camp (Ott 2015). Around 100,000 of the registered Syrians live in official UNHCR run camps (mainly al-Zaatari & Azraq camps), with 80,000 in the al-Zaatari camp alone.

All of these refugee crises within Jordan have developed—or are currently developing—into protracted refugee situations. The nature of conflict over time has
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transformed the nature of refugees’ realities into more permanent situations, although expectations have not always aligned with reality. The UNHCR has utilized several definitions for protracted situations, but the current one, accepted by the Jordanian government defines it as refugees whom have been in exile “for five or more years after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions” (UNHCR 2009:preamble). The UNRWA oversees one of the largest PRS’ in the world with over four million Palestinians, and the Syrian refugees appear to be quickly heading toward a protracted situation, with few prospects for ending the conflict, as policies and funding structures remain short-term.

*Jordan’s Policies*

While the UNHCR and UNRWA—among countless other NGOs—have played significant third party roles within the refugee situations in Jordan, the Hashemite Kingdom still plays a dominant role in deciding the outcomes for refugees within their borders. The 1951 UN Refugee Convention, signed by over 140 states, and the subsequent 1967 Protocol, outlined and defined the legal rights of refugees and the requirements for their protection. Jordan was one of several Middle Eastern states to not sign either document; however, the Kingdom did sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 1998, which reasserted some of the definitions in the Convention, but most importantly agreed to the principle of non-refoulement of refugees (MOU 1998:Translation). While the MOU has been regarded as a step forward for having a concrete document directed at refugee policy, it has been considered “somewhat ambiguous within policy frameworks” and not in line with handling protracted refugee situations due to its identification of Jordan as a ‘transit’ country (Ward 2014:81). The
Government of Jordan’s position towards refugees greatly varies as time progresses, from seeing Palestinian refugees as a benefit to society, to semi-protectionist policies for Iraqis (Chatelard 2002:8) and encampment for Syrians.

These policies over time have created institutional rifts between Jordanian nationals and refugees and refugee-citizens. According to Clark (2012), “successive monarchs have provided subsidies to Jordanian tribes and preferentially recruited them into various parts of the state apparatus” creating a Jordanian tribal elite (p. 360). The Palestinians have filled the private sector as a result of their exclusion from the tribal politics of Jordanian public administration. Refugees more generally are institutionally disenfranchised from participating in this style of democratic governance, leading to increased inability to promote and implement successful refugee policy reform.

Furthermore, Jordanian municipalities have undergone centralization of many of their services by the state, leading to decreased budgetary authority (Clark 2012:362) as well as the rate of public sector hiring to drop “precipitously since the mid to late 1980s (Assaad 2012:12). With Jordanian nationals losing work in the public sector as Palestinians, foreigners and other refugees work in the public (and largely informal) sector, tensions have risen between the two groups; retired army officers publicly demanded the renunciation of citizenship for Palestinians (Ryan 2010). The institutional context of Jordanian nationals tribal politics and its exclusion of non-Jordanians provides insight into Jordan’s refugee policy and the difficulty in reform.

\textit{Jordan Compact}

Most recently, there have been shifts in Jordan’s official political stance towards refugees, a potential outcome of foreign influence. In February of 2016, the UK,
Germany, Kuwait, Norway, and the United Nations cohosted the London Conference to find solutions and funding for the ongoing, international Syrian crisis. One of the outcomes of this fairly successful conference was the Jordan Compact. The Compact is an agreement between the Hashemite Kingdom and the international community (including the UNHCR) to create around 200,000 jobs for Syrians in exchange for increased international support of Jordan’s economy (3RP 2016:46). This represents a slight policy reversal, which according to path dependency theory would normally be a high cost for Jordan with its longer history regarding policies towards refugees; however, the international community has shouldered the cost, allowing for the policy reversal. This falls in line with Jordan’s past of promoting refugees in their borders when it appears to benefit them economically or politically.

The Compact attempts to turn the “crisis into a development opportunity…rebuild Jordanian host communities…[and] mobilize sufficient grants and concessionary financing” (Jordan Compact 2016:1). The compact provided real funding, as well as specific solutions to some of Syrian refugees’ largest hurdles to success in Jordan. The most profound outcomes of the Compact include the designation of five development zones for increased Syrian participation, decreased requirements for work permits, and simplified rules of origin to open up the EU market to business in Jordan (3RP 2016:47). These changes to Jordan’s policies are a much-needed reprieve for Syrian refugees struggling to find work, or work legally.

The Compact does have flaws, and does not truly address the roots of Jordan’s refugee crisis. First and foremost, these changes do not affect the institutional rights of refugees in Jordan, only offering a temporary economic solution to a problem that will
most likely last generations. Second, attaining a work permit still requires the employer
to represent the worker, as well as pay a 10 JOD verification fee, but the more expensive
work permit fee (180-350 JOD) was removed (ILO 2017:23). Leaving the onus to the
employer to represent the worker has been detrimental to Syrian refugees gaining access
to work permits due to a “dearth of employers willing and able to process the paperwork”
(Kattaa 2016b:76). Additionally, Jordan has a “large number of low-quality informal jobs
in construction and services that are mostly being filled by a growing legion of foreign
workers” (Assaad 2012:3). Making permits more accessible may not actually provide
more work opportunities for Syrian refugees due to Jordan’s large informal labor market;
instead, it may act more as a symbolic gesture to this especially marginalized group of
refugees in Jordan.

Other than the Memorandum of Understanding, and the recent Jordan Compact,
the Hashemite Kingdom does not have refugee-specific directives; instead it has referred
to more recent refugees as ‘guests’ and ‘visitors’: names that have “no legal meaning
under domestic laws” (Kattaa 2016a:6). The lack of concrete refugee law has left
refugees in Jordan under many of the same laws and policies that any other foreign
migrant would face. In regards to labor laws, refugees fall under the category of non-
Jordanians and must go through the arduous permit process to work in the formal sector.
The policy improvements made by the Jordan government should be understood through
the lens of their historical path with refugees: the Hashemite Kingdom promotes refugees
while it is convenient, but over time slowly takes these rights away as it loses its appeal.
Policy Assessment

Jordan holds a unique position in the world as the country with the highest ratio of refugees to host population (ILO 2015:9). While the Syrian crisis has only added to the refugee population, Jordan continues to lack significant policies targeted towards refugees. The sole document that mentions refugee specific policy is the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding, which addresses important issues such as Jordan’s official acceptance of non-refoulement for all refugees; however, it officially designates Jordan a transit-country in regards to refugee resettlement, meaning all refugees are regarded as temporary guests. This designation, along with an outright lack of refugee specific policies, means refugees and asylum seekers in Jordan are grouped in with all other immigrants who live and work in the Kingdom. While both groups represent a piece of the migrant community, forced migrants face specific challenges such as trauma, moving with little to no funds, and health issues. This leaves them especially vulnerable in a country that makes little distinction between the two. This section analytically addresses the policies themselves, and not the outcomes; moreover, it provides a context for the outcomes to be understood in later sections. This paper does not analyze overall refugee integration into Jordanian society, but simply on the policy areas of Labor and Housing.

The MIPEX tool provides a score out of 100 on each of the indicators. The scoring for this conforms to the following breakdown:
### Table 1: MIPEX Score Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80-100</td>
<td>Favorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-79</td>
<td>Slightly Favorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-59</td>
<td>Halfway Favorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-40</td>
<td>Slightly Unfavorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-20</td>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Critically Unfavorable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIPEX (http://www.mipex.eu/play/)

Each policy area (housing and labor) breaks down into several categories to develop the overall score of integration. For Labor, I chose to omit the two categories on ‘Support’ as I saw these as European Union specific and unable to conform to a refugee situation in a middle-income country—unfairly deflating the score. For housing, I chose to omit the ‘Naturalization’ and ‘Language’ categories as they were completely inapplicable to Jordan’s policies and would have had no impact on scoring. See the Appendices for further information on how I score each policy area.

**Labor/Employment Policy**

The Migrant Integration Policy Index, intended for an assessment of migrant integration in EU countries, allows for an overall score of each countries policy’s impacts on immigrant integration. Instead of utilizing the entire index for a holistic view of Jordan’s integration of refugees, I focus specifically on labor/employment, and housing policies. The core policies that address employment for refugees are the 1973 Residence and Foreign Affairs Law No. 24, the Investment Law no. (16) of 1995, and the Labor Law no. (8) of 1996. As previously stated, these laws either make no, or very brief
mention of refugees and asylum seekers, mistakenly conflating two similar yet distinct groups (refugees and immigrants).

The MIPEX breaks down the Labor and employment policy assessment section down into two categories: Access to labor market mobility, and Workers’ Rights. Jordan’s employment policies for refugees receive an overall score of about 55 (out of 100) on the integration index, giving it a halfway favorable assessment according to the MIPEX scoring breakdown. At face value, this shows that Jordan’s policies toward refugees (and migrants in general) do not do a significant job at promoting integration into the labor market, but does not harm integration. Breaking it down, Access receives a lower score of 40, while Workers’ Rights receives a potentially inflated score of 75. The Access score is low due to restrictions against foreigners obtaining work permits in certain professions, as well as the lack of self-employment for foreigners and refugees (Jordan 1996: Labor Law no. 8 Article 12). These restrictions are coupled with the complex, and expensive work permit process, which only lasts one year for foreign workers. I argue that the Workers’ Rights indicator is inflated at 75/100 due to the realities of work for refugees in Jordan, potentially a result of the restrictive Access indicator, as well as a limit on the MIPEX assessment.

Housing Policy

The Migrant Integration Policy Index breaks down the Housing indicator—slightly more than the labor indicator—into: Eligibility, Security of Status, and Rights. The scores are provided in Table 2.
Table 2: Housing Indicator Score Breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security of Status</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights Associated</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall integration index score for housing policy at 23 is significantly lower than that of the already low labor policy of 55. A score of 23 puts Jordan’s housing policies at the lower end of ‘slightly unfavorable’ according to the MIPEX scoring breakdown. This unfavorable score comes from the overall restrictive policy towards foreign residency in Jordan, as compared to the Index’s targeted European Union countries. The majority of the policy that addresses residency for refugees in Jordan is No. 24 Law on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs.

The largest factor in Jordan’s low score here is the lack of a legitimate long-term, or permanent, residency permit. The typical residence permit (10 JOD) only lasts one year, and must be renewed if the migrant moves to a new address. The longest-term permit is a five-year residency permit, but this is only offered after the migrant has lived within the Kingdom for 10 years (Jordan 1973: Law no. 24 Article 22b). The security of this status received the lowest score of 14, mostly due to a lack of a facilitated process for permit renewals compared to the original permit request. In other words, every year, or every time a refugee moves, they must pay the fee as well as provide all of the original documents required for a permit. Such restrictive policies can lead to its intended population finding housing illegally, leading to higher risk of exploitation by landlords.
Rights associated with residency status received the highest score of 50, but I argue this is another inflated score. The Overseas Development Institute produced a report mapping out which groups have access to services and assistance in Jordan. While refugees are not barred from most governmental assistance in regards to public housing, or rent control, they are not the targeted group, and most of the assistance they receive comes from NGOs such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (2017:19). The dissonance between policy and implementation of assistance actually harms integration due to the formation of parallel institutions, even though the analysis shows it has a moderate score of 50 (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 2016:146). See appendix for further breakdown of each indicator and the scoring.

**Outcomes**

Policy analysis is vital to understanding the legal and institutional opportunities refugees are afforded, but it does not provide a complete understanding of their circumstances. With negligible reference to refugees in official policy, the outcomes can potentially enhance the analysis of refugee experiences within a country home to a myriad of displaced persons. The following outcome analysis mirrors the policy analysis—focusing on the two policy areas of employment/labor and housing/settlement patterns.

*Employment Outcomes*

The policies regarding the integration of refugees into the labor market in Jordan received low to moderate scoring, but how does this translate into integration outcomes for Syrian refugees? Do the policies actually have a profound affect on integration? To find these answers, we examine some employment statistics, juxtaposing Jordan’s host
Refugee Integration

communities and the refugees living within them. Table 3 outlines the 2015 unemployment rate for both groups (including Syria’s pre-conflict rate to ensure this was not an intervening variable). The year of 2015 was when the best comparable data was available, but still allows for several years since the conflict to allow refugees time to settle down and look for work.

Table 3: Unemployment by Gender and Group (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unemployment</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host Community¹</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Refugees²</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Conflict Syria²</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Source: Jordan Department of Statistics (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/)
²Source: International Labor Organization (Staeve & Hillesund 2015:5)

The large difference (61 and 40 percentage points for women and men respectively) between pre-conflict unemployment in Syria and Syrian refugees’ unemployment in Jordan reveals that the country of origin is not impacting their current high unemployment. Additionally, Jordan’s overall unemployment for the year of 2015 is much lower (by 65 and 46 percentage points for women and men respectively) than that of Syrian refugees years into their settlement. Such a large divide indicates that Syrians experience trouble with integration into the employment sector simply by the inability of finding work. This reflects the finding that Jordan’s employment policies affecting refugees do little to promote integration.

Syrian refugees ability to find work at significantly lower levels than host communities gives insight into overall integration for employment; but for those that have found work, what does that look like and how does it compare to Jordanians? First
we look at the informality of labor for both groups. As discussed previously, Jordan has a large segment of the population working informally; therefore, it is vital to understand the role Syrian refugees play in Jordan’s informal market to understand the integration into the overall labor sector. Table 4 breaks down informal labor employment.

**Table 4: Informal Employment by Gender and Group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Employed Informally</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host Community¹</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees²</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²Source: International Labour Organization (Staeve & Hillesund 2015: 63)

The percentages confirm that Jordan’s labor market has a significant informal market, with about 50% working informally. The Syrian refugees have largely fulfilled this niche market, with 99% of Syrians working informally. While both groups have large segments in the informal labor market, the Syrian refugees clearly have been pushed to work informally as opposed to pursuing a legal path.

Syrian refugees have largely filled the informal sector, but to truly understand their integration into employment, one must understand the roles they have filled by sector of work. The following table utilizes data on work permits issued to Syrian refugees as an indicator for their work sector breakdown and compares it to data on Jordanian nationals.
Table 5: Crosstabs—Employment Sector by Refugee Issued Permits vs. Jordanians actual sector work (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work by Sector</th>
<th>Work Permits: Refugees¹</th>
<th>Jordanian Nationals²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>3,796</td>
<td>2,430.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>10,715</td>
<td>26,334.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>6,011</td>
<td>1,012.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>8,562</td>
<td>5,023.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>15,095</td>
<td>688.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>5,023.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>44,354</strong></td>
<td><strong>40,514</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Source: International Labour Organization: *Right to Work*
²Source: Jordan Department of Statistics (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/)

To test if there is a relationship between these variables, I conducted a chi-square test of independence. In this case, the null hypothesis that there is no association between the variables refers to an integrated work force. With a calculated chi-square value of 28920.20 and 5 degrees of freedom, we can conclude that the relationship between refugee status and work sector is significant at the .001 level; therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis, indicating Syrian refugees have not been able to integrate into Jordan’s workforce. Agriculture makes up a plurality of the permits Syrian refugees have been issued. According to the ILO, “Syrian workers in all sectors, except in agriculture, must have identified an employer who is willing to apply for a permit on their behalf” (ILO
2017: 39). The lax rules for agriculture create an incentive for Syrians to enter the field, as it is one of the few attainable paths to legal work.

Work permits are the legal pathways to work for Syrian refugees in Jordan; however, as we learned prior, this process is not always easy or affordable. As a result, there is a large number of Syrians joining the informal labor market. To ensure the previous test for significance was not due to the nature of Jordan’s informal labor, I conducted a similar test with the addition of estimated informal labor produced by the International Labour Organization in conjunction with UNHCR estimates.

Table 6: Crosstabs—Employment Sector by Refugee Permits plus Informal labor vs. Jordanians actual sector work (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work by Sector</th>
<th>Work Permits: Refugees¹</th>
<th>Jordanian Nationals²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>33,772</td>
<td>28,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>30.10%</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>30,070</td>
<td>318,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>26.80%</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>7,517</td>
<td>36,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.70%</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>11,556</td>
<td>374,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>10.30%</td>
<td>39.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>29,060</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>25.90%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>199,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
<td>20.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>112,202</strong></td>
<td><strong>957,466</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Source: International Labour Organization (2017:31)
²Source: Jordan Department of Statistics (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/)

Note: Due to the different classification of agriculture by Jordan’s Ministry of Labor, the Agriculture sector for Jordanians is counted as 0.
The calculated chi square value equals 33690.11, with 4 degrees of freedom giving a p-value of less than .001. As a result, we can reject the null hypothesis and confirm that neither the formal nor informal labor for Syrian refugees has outcomes that resemble the host community. The construction sector saw the largest jump with the addition of informal labor, with a 21.5% increase to represent the sector with the most workers for Syrian refugees. As only 3% of Jordanians work in the construction sector, this appears to be a gap that has been largely filled by foreign, informal labor that Syrian refugees have helped fill. Several sectors saw a percent decrease with the addition of informal work, such as Restaurants (-6.8%), Agriculture (-8.1%), and Industry (-9%). A decrease could suggest that these sectors are more structured with better paths to formal work, and less friendly to informal employment. Agriculture specifically has fewer regulations for attaining work permits (ILO 2017: 11), resulting in the high permit numbers.

Overall, Syrian refugees work separately from their Jordanian counterparts. They are disproportionately working in different industries, as well as more informally. These refugees are building Jordan’s cities, and growing their crops, and serving their food. A plurality of Jordanians works in public administration and defense: well-paid, government jobs with social security and other benefits. Syrian refugees, on the other hand must face the financial burden of legal work, in sectors such as restaurants and the service industry, as well as the simplified agriculture permits (ILO 2017:31) or as they often opt to do, choose the informal path in construction where there are fewer job protections. The type of jobs, and the formality of work influence the income one makes, leading one to infer Syrian refugees are at a higher risk of making a lower income. The
following table provides an insight on the income of Syrian refugees in northern Jordan governorates.

**Table 7: Governorate by Income Bracket (2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>No Income</th>
<th>1-150 JOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irbid</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madaba</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mafraq</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarqa</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Care Inc. (Washington & Rowell 2013:13)

A large percent, over one quarter for each governorate, make no income at all. The next category is less useful as it represents such a wide range of incomes, but this chart overall helps to reveal that the majority of Syrian refugees make 150 JOD or less, which is often narrowly enough to cover rent in many regions of the country.

This lack of integration has impacts on the economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and their agency to promote their own economic well-being and further integration into the host community. The informality of Syrian refugees’ work allows for lower wages, and less benefits that are required with legal work. Lower income, coupled with refugees often migrating with little to nothing, leaves them vulnerable to Jordan’s cost of living. Another divide Syrian refugees face is the rate of poverty. In Jordan, this equates to making less than 68 Jordanian Dinars per month. According to the World Bank, the overall poverty rate sits at 14.4%, compared to 86% of Syrian refugees in Jordan. Care international (2013) produced a report indicating the average shortfall between income and expenditures for Syrian refugees was 185 Jordanian Dinars (JOD). This shortfall prevents any wealth accumulation for this vulnerable group, and “over 67 per cent of families are living in debt, owing on average USD 818” (3RP 2016:4). The
strict limits on labor integration for foreign migrants, including the especially vulnerable refugees in Jordan—leaves them at greater risk of poverty, and few options for socio-economic mobility. One of the greatest drains on refugees’ funds is the high rent in Jordan, and this is the core of the next section of the analysis of the outcomes of integration.

**Housing/Community Outcomes**

The policy areas of labor and housing are intertwined, including in Jordan where housing permits often require prior work permit documents. Although there are some waivers for refugees and ‘laissez-passers’, the two concepts are interconnected more broadly as well: living outside camps means refugees face the market rate rental costs in Jordan with their often unstable income. Low pay and poor working conditions, coupled with the similarly arduous residence permit process, as well as scant access to housing assistance or public housing, Syrian refugees are at high risk for shelter vulnerability, low integration, and difficulty in forming cohesive refugee communities.

An important aspect to housing is cost; therefore I begin this analysis by examining the rental costs Syrian refugees typically pay. The following table outlines average rents paid by Syrian refugees in northern Jordan governorates.

**Table 8: Average Monthly Rent in JOD by Governorate (2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Irbid</th>
<th>Madaba</th>
<th>Mafraq</th>
<th>Zarqa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Rent</td>
<td>175 JOD</td>
<td>150 JOD</td>
<td>160 JOD</td>
<td>130 JOD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Care International (Washington & Rowell 2013:13)

The table reveals the governorate can play a small role in the rents a refugee will pay, but overall there is only a slight variance between the groups. Additionally, if we look back
at the income for the some of the governorates that correspond to these, a majority makes 150 JOD or less, with a large percent making no income at all. Seeing these numbers, it is no surprise that Syrian refugees are going into large amounts of debt to pay for their livelihoods. Only 43% of Jordanians pay more than 100 JOD in rent compared to 86% of Syrian Refugees; facing greater restrictions to work and live, Syrian refugees also have to pay higher rates for residences than the average Jordanian national. The disparity in rent prices may result in a lack of legal protections Syrian refugees have compared to Jordanian nationals, allowing for landlords to raise rents in exchange for the risk of renting to a refugee without a permit.

The high rents have not always been that way, and the influx of Syrian refugees living in host communities has put a strain on the housing market. I examine the effects of the Syrian conflict on rent prices similarly to Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah (2012).

Figure 1: Average Rent (JOD) (Consumer Price Index) by Year

![Average Rent (JOD) by Year](http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/)

Source: Jordan Department of Statistics (http://dosweb.dos.gov.jo/)
Large flows of Syrians began arriving in 2011 and afterwards, and the rent prices made up a large percentage of their income, and in some cases their entire income. The price rises at a steady pace until 2010. I roughly use 2011 as the beginning of the Syrian conflict to act as a reference point for shifts in rental prices. The graph below depicts the percentage increase year-year during this period.

The average year-year increase during the pre conflict period (2006-2010) falls at around 2.23%. The post-conflict average rent increase jumps up to 4.16%. For 2014, rents jumped by nearly 7% in one year. Part of the explosive rental growth could reflect post-conflict Sudan, where “rental incomes proved to be an attractive option for Sudanese nationals who already owned housing stock” and raised rents to increase profits in a high demand market (Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah 2012:160). After 2015, the year-year rate begins to level out near pre-conflict levels. This could indicate that efforts made by Jordan and the international community (e.g. the Jordan Compact of 2016) has had positive impacts on Jordan’s host communities allowing for a reprieve in the fast-paced housing market.
Influences on Rent

The following section utilizes map data produced by REACH, a non-governmental organization providing humanitarian assistance in Jordan. The data covers around 51,832 Syrian refugees in the Northern Jordan governorates of Irbid, Mafra, Jerash, and Ajloun. Collected in 2013, I analyze data regarding average rent, average household size, population within the basic service unit, and the governorate to understand and explain the outcomes for Syrian refugee communities in Jordan. I ran a linear regression analysis to model a relationship between average household size and the average rent for refugees. Due to variability between governorates, I simply focus this analysis on Irbid, the governorate with the largest Syrian population in Northern Jordan. I hypothesize the greater the household size, the lower the rent. Based on a sample of 125 basic service units, I am 95% confident there is a weak relationship, with 5.2% of the
variation in average rent influenced by average household size. For every step up in household size, there is an 11.88 decrease in average rent (JOD). In other words, as household size increases, there is a decrease in the rent Syrian refugees pay. Households with greater size have more costs to feed and take care of their families, so those refugees potentially seek out lower rents.

**Table 10**: Regression Outputs—Household Size vs. Average Rent in JOD (Irbid)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linear Regression: Household Size vs. Average Rent (Selection Variable='Irbid')</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlation Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Square (Coefficient of Determination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b (slope)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reach (http://www.reach-initiative.org/maps)

Next, I analyze the relationship between population size of Syrians in a basic service unit (BSU) and average rent. Again, I control for governorate by only inspecting the effect in Irbid. I postulate the greater the population in a basic service unit, the greater the average rent. After running the regression, I am 99.9% confident there is a weak to moderate relationship, with 9.6% of variation in average rent influenced by population size of Syrian refugees. For every step up in Syrian refugee population, there is a .02 increase in average rent. The rise in rent with the influx of Syrian refugees could be a result of simple supply versus demand, as well from the lack of residential security for refugees, resulting in Syrians taking any rent they can get. The bar chart visually displays the average rent for each of the governorates in this data set. Irbid is the largest
governorate by Syrian refuge population by a large margin, and this reflects the greater margin in average rent between Irbid and the other governorates. This provides some additional, visual indication of a relationship between higher refugee population density and higher average rents.

**Table 11:** Regression Outputs—Population (BSU) vs. Average Rent in JOD (Irbid)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linear Regression: Household Size vs. Average Rent (Selection Variable='Irbid')</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlation Coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Square (Coefficient of Determination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b (slope)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Reach (http://www.reach-initiative.org/maps)
I run a similar analysis between the number of households in a basic service unit versus average rent. Likewise, I hypothesize an increase in households correlates with an increase in average rent. Based on a sample of 208 basic service units, I am 99.9% confident there is a weak relationship, with 7.7% of the variation in average rent explained by number of Syrian refugee households. For every additional household, there is a .086 (JOD) increase in average rent. This finding reflects the population and rent relationship; however, the slope for number of households and rent is slightly higher than population versus average rent. One explanation could be the large family sizes, leading
to high populations but fewer households straining the rental market, showing a greater
effect of households on rent than actual population.

**Table 12: Regression Outputs—Number of households vs. Average Rent in JOD**
(Northern Jordan)

| Linear Regression: Household Size vs. Average Rent (Selection Variable='Irbid') |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|
| Correlation Coefficient         | .277              |
| R Square (Coefficient of Determination) | .077           |
| b (slope)                       | .086              |
| P-Value                         | .000              |
| N                               | 208               |
| Std. Error                      | .021              |

Source: Reach (http://www.reach-initiative.org/maps)

**Access to Community Formation**

These high cost rents and low wages force refugees in Jordan to live without
shelter security, and face a high risk of eviction. Their status as foreign migrants, or
temporary residents leaves them in legally precarious situations as tenants. As a result,
over 40% of Syrian refugees stated they had moved three or more times within the last
year (NRC 2015:13). This is compared to only 4% of Jordanians having moved at least
once in the last year (JDOS). Syrian refugees precarious position leaves them in a
constant state of displacement, without a chance to accrue wealth or build community.
This leads to the “social dislocation” Bartlett, Alix-Garcia, & Saah discuss in post-
conflict Sudan (2012:153). They must constantly find cheaper rent to afford the high cost
of living in Jordan. Concurrently, “70% of Syrian refugees do not have secure tenure,
with many households renting without basic rental agreements” (Goyes, Tolgay & Vidal
2016:4). The lack of agreements leaves Syrian refugees particularly vulnerable to forced
evictions. This is compounded when renting without a permit, or updated permit—
associated with the strict policy discussed in the policy analysis.

The previous findings that a greater population of Syrians and Syrian households
correlates with higher rents incentivize Syrian refugees to disperse, as opposed to
residentially concentrating into enclave communities. As a result, Syrians struggle to
form areas resembling an ethnic enclave or receive the social mobility those communities
can foster due to high rents and evictions. The lack of formal legal rights regarding
foreigners in terms of housing leaves Syrian refugees in a vulnerable and desperate
position to find affordable housing. The inability to form cohesive communities as
refugees can have negative implications for their integration into the labor market, and
their longer-term spatial integration (Schneider & Crul 2010; Wessel et al. 2017).

Discussion

This paper has investigated the policies and outcomes regarding integration of
Jordan’s Syrian refugee population into the housing and labor markets and their access to
successful integration within the Kingdom generally. This analysis illustrates how
policies can align—or sometimes misalign—with outcomes in the context of refugee
issues. The results indicate a somewhat negative outlook for the Syrian refugee
population in Jordan; however, recent policies have shown the Hashemite Kingdom
potentially reversing its stance towards refugees; time is necessary to see how these
policies are enforced and if they reflect a trend of friendly policies, or the only attempt to
aid refugees in exchange for international aid.

I first examine the policy history of refugee policies in Jordan through a lens of
path dependency. Jordan’s history with refugees is long in comparison to most countries.
The Hashemite Kingdom is home to one of the largest populations of the Palestinian diaspora, to which it granted citizenship to a select majority. Although they granted citizenship, this was dependent upon King’ Abdullah’s desire for expansion into the West Bank. Other than this gesture, Jordan’s refugee policies have a path dependency towards taking away rights and assistance to their large, and continuously growing refugee population.

I find the recent and slight policy reversal towards promoting refugees within the Kingdom through the Jordan compact a result of foreign influence taking in a percent of the costs. Due to the long history of these policies, these costs would normally be too high to reverse according to path dependency theory (Levi 1997:28). The Western countries that provided the most concessions have much to gain from greater acceptance of refugees into Global South countries. By aiding countries that take in a disproportionate amount of the world’s global refugee population, they effectively escape their moral obligation to take in a refugee population into their borders. The path dependency of Jordan’s refugee policies should make observers weary of accepting the Jordan Compact as an institutional shift in their acceptance of refugees as a legitimate, permanent population within their borders.

I then shift my focus to the actual policy analysis of Jordan’s refugee policy, assessing specifically the housing and labor market policies through an integration lens for refugees. My results overall correspond to my expected scenario. The Labor policy assessment received a ‘halfway favorable’ score on the MIPEX index, slightly higher than expected. The score is a result of Jordan’s restrictive work permits process (besides the agriculture sector) as well as the closed professions list the Ministry of Labor upholds
against a majority of foreigners. The score is slightly higher than I anticipated, due to the rights indicator not reflecting the realities of Jordan’s labor market. The restrictive work permit process and reality of informality of labor in Jordan negate the rights granted to legal foreign workers in Jordan.

The housing policy assessment assumed a relatively low score as well due to Jordan’s historical context of negative refugee policies regime. The assessment followed suit, and received a lower ‘slightly unfavorable’ score on the Migrant Integration Policy Index. Jordan has essentially no long term or permanent pathway to residency for foreigners, and this includes its host community refugees. This corresponds with their referral to refugees as ‘temporary guests’. Additionally, residential permit renewal is equally arduous as the initial permit request, as well as required for each change of address: potentially leading to renting without a permit due to lack of documentation or funds. This informal landlord-tenant relationship forming from strict policies leaves Syrian refugees vulnerable to forced evictions, and poor services.

The tool utilized for the policy assessment—the Migrant Integration Policy Index—was produced to understand how policies affect integration of migrants into mostly European states. The specific issues refugees face compared to the typical migrant makes the use of MIPEX imperfect, but the overlap is large enough to provide an accurate analysis of the policies in regards to refugees in Jordan.

I conduct the policy analysis prior to the outcome analysis to provide a context within the outcomes can be understood. The first part of the outcomes analysis examines Syrian refugees’ integration into the Jordanian labor market, postulating a reflection (or substandard) of the relatively negative policies. I first examine integration into the labor
force generally through unemployment data, controlling for pre-conflict Syria unemployment rates. The high disparity between both pre-conflict Syria and current Jordanian unemployment rate (Syrian refugees having a much higher unemployment rate) leads to assuming the postulation as true: Syrian refugees are not integrated into labor in a broad sense. I turn to quality of work by way of informality of work—especially pertinent for a country with a large informal sector. While Jordan’s host communities have a large informal sector, Syrian refugees nearly double this proportion: a sign that those Syrians that are working are not working at the same quality—or with the same benefits as legal work (i.e. social security, work contracts etc.).

I continue the labor integration analysis by looking for a segregation of labor by sector. Utilizing a chi-square test of independence, I found that both formally and informally, Syrian refugees significantly work in different sectors than their Jordanian counterparts. This corresponds to the policy analysis and postulated outcome, due to Jordan’s closed jobs list deliberately barring Syrian refugees (and all foreign migrants) from a number of occupations that only Jordanians can fill. Additionally, Syrian refugees must, for the most part, find employers willing to represent them for the expensive work permit process, or willing to risk hiring them illegally. This follows the institutional context of work in Jordan, in which there is a divide between public and private work among Jordanian nationals and refugees, refugee-citizens, and foreigners.

The postulation Syrian refugees make little to no income follows the previous findings about their ability to find work, as well as the quality of the work. Utilizing descriptive data on Northern governorates income brackets. Of the four governorates, all had at least \( \frac{1}{4} \) of Syrian refugees without a consistent income, with one (Madaba) at
nearly 50%. These figures have lead to this group’s high poverty rate compared to the host community, as well as the high proportion of families taking on debt. After examining all of these indicators of labor integration outcomes, I confidently conclude that Jordan’s labor policies—as well as the institutional framework—have negatively affected the actual labor integration for Syrian refugees in Jordan’s labor market.

The ability for Syrian refugees to access Jordan’s labor market has a direct impact on their ability to afford market rate housing, making the housing outcomes analysis the next logical step in this paper. Additionally, the connection between migrants’ ability to form ethnic communities and ability to integrate economically allows for a final analysis of the future of Syrian refugees long-term success. I assume a similarly negative outcome for Syrian refugee integration into the housing market due to the corresponding policy analysis, as well as the previous findings for the labor market outcomes analysis.

I begin the rent analysis with a descriptive set of average rent figures for Northern Jordan governorates (due to the nature of available data, much of this section analyzes this region; it is also where the largest concentration of refugees reside). The results reveal a correlation between governorate and cost of housing. When compared to Jordan’s host community, Syrian refugees actually pay higher rates than their host counterparts—a possible outcome of their lack of security in housing rights, leading to landlord-tenant exploitation of a marginal group. I utilize Consumer Price Index data on rent prices on a year-year basis to understand the Syrian conflict’s impact on Jordan’s rental market. I find that rent increases follow developments in Syria and Jordan, with rents sharply increasing after the conflict, and slowing down by the past two years—either a result of efforts by Jordan (Jordan Compact) or a slowdown in Syrian refugees
crossing over into Jordan. This presents a positive outlook for distressed Syrian refugees facing rising rents for the majority of their time in Jordan.

To further the understanding of rent increases in Jordan, explicitly Syrian refugees’ rents, I utilize REACH International’s data collected on Northern Jordan governorates’ rents and households. I make three hypotheses based on Greulich, Quigley, and Raphael’s assertion that “a large influx of immigrants may result in substantial increases in housing prices and rents in those areas” (2004:150). The three hypotheses are as follows:

(1) As average household size increases, average rent decreases.
(2) An increase in BSU population correlates with an increase in average rent.
(3) As number of households in a BSU increases, average rent increases.

Utilizing linear regressions for all three hypotheses, the results corresponded statistically significantly with the expected outcomes. The results reveal that household size impacts where residents live in order to find lower rents for their larger families. Additionally, a greater population of Syrian refugees, as well as number of households positively correlates with income, likely resulting from the increased pressure Syrian refugees place on housing.

I finally turn my attention to Syrian refugees’ ability to concentrate and form enclaves, while problematic in some ways (including initial spatial integration), they have been a demonstrated mechanism for mobility ladders and economic and spatial integration. For this analysis, I examine Syrian refugees’ security of tenure as renters, in addition to utilizing previous findings. The rate Syrian refugees state they have moved within the last year far outnumbers Jordanians. Syrian refugees stated they had moved
homes (at least three times) at forty times the rate Jordanians had moved once within the last year. This creates a challenge for the formation of community or kinship ties with other community members as refugees are in a constant state of displacement due to high rents and low housing security from a policy standpoint. The additional findings that greater population/households leading to higher rents creates a disincentive for Syrian refugees to concentrate in these areas as they cannot afford rents as it is.

This last finding has long-term implications for the success of Syrian refugees in Jordan in terms of labor market integration and eventually spatial integration. The immediate Syrian refugee dispersal means they skip a typical step in immigrant and refugee integration: ethnic enclave formation. While spatial segregation into enclaves inherently opposes spatial integration, it has often been a necessary prerequisite for integration into the labor market for immigrant communities, which is a necessary step for spatial integration across class lines (Schneider & Crul 2010:1144; Wessel et al. 2017:831). Without these enclaves to provide mobility ladders for integration into the labor market, the long-term spatial integration for Syrian refugees seems negligible. Unfortunately this paper is, for the most part, unable to assess the affects the more recent Jordan Compact has on Syrian’s housing outcomes; there are indicators (slowdown in rent increases) that positive outcomes will arise to allow for communities to form.

Due to the inability to actually travel to Jordan and collect data, the methodology is at mercy to available data on the Internet. Fortunately, Jordan’s department of statistics provides comprehensive data on Jordan by year—including recent data from 2017—on areas specific to this study, such as rental, unemployment, and labor statistics. This is a sufficient resource for understanding Jordan’s host communities, but has limited data
regarding refugees specifically (reflecting their policies lack of refugee references). This obligates a reliance on data collected by a variety of actors for refugees, which often do not have data as current as would be ideal.

Most data was collected most currently in 2015, and some in 2013 (REACH’s map data, among others). This necessitates the methodology to avoid referencing the Jordan Compact in the policy analysis because the outcome data will not represent post-compact outcomes. Additionally, the REACH data does not provide geographic size of the Basic Service Units (BSUs), making an analysis (and controlling for) of density and other geographic analyses impossible for this study.

Finally, I conclude a relationship among all three sections of the analysis. I maintain that the historical/institutional framework of refugees in Jordan inform the policies that are imposed upon them. These policies perpetuate their institutional inability to participate in policy formation/reform through their negative outcomes on integration into the Jordanian host communities and labor markets. The policies and institutions that create roadblocks to ethnic enclave formation, which is their path to success, bar Syrian refugees from this: labor market incorporation and spatial integration. As a result, the status quo is perpetual; the Jordan Compact may marginally help Syrian refugees find work, but this is not sufficient for integration without institutional reform.

Conclusion

Sociologist Matthew Desmond recently wrote in *Evicted*: “it is hard to argue that housing is not a fundamental human need. Decent, affordable housing should be a basic right for everybody in this country. The reason is simple: without stable shelter, everything else falls apart.” (2016:300). Although he is writing about US citizens in poor
neighborhoods of Milwaukee, Desmond gets at the heart of the need for stable housing for everybody, especially those in marginalized positions: it is the bedrock of life; without it, life falls apart. We can also take it a step further, arguing for accessibility to not just housing, but also a healthy community.

Jordan’s policies towards a population recently torn from their homes in often dramatic and traumatizing fashion (Washington & Rowell 2013, table 4:12) disregards these notions of housing justice. Fortunately, it does accept (nearly) all refugees into its borders, accepting the international law of non-refoulement. Once across the border, however, refugees find themselves in a state of stagnation with few routes for growth or integration. By accepting large segments of refugees but not promoting integration, Jordan has created a policy of a divided state: one of Jordanian nationals, and one of a growing and disenfranchised forcibly displaced population. This paper provides insights into how historical and institutional contexts from policies that affect the communities of a country.

While it is easy to critique the policies affecting refugees in a country that has a large refugee population, it ignores the need for countries everywhere to start committing a fair share to taking in, and housing the world’s refugees. Jordan’s refugee policy regime may have negative connotations (something worth noting and critiquing) it must be in conjunction with an understanding of other solutions to the issues refugees face, such as resettlement to Global North states after arrival to Jordan, as well as repatriation when applicable. Jordan is the country with the largest proportion of refugees to national population, reflecting the greater trend of refugees from the Global South forcibly
displaced for extended periods of time into other countries of the Global South: into low and middle income countries such as Jordan.

The findings in this study examined what happens after forced migrants arrive to their destination, but I call for increased research into the causes of refugee crises for an improved understanding in proactive preventative measures, as well as the Global North’s role in the global refugee crises: potential causation and reaction. Assessing the situation reactively is important and must be continued to improve the conditions of today’s current refugees, and more research must be conducted employing theory as a foundation; moreover, research must be done in tandem to prevent these conflicts that create refugees. Preventative measures, and a greater response by the Global North in accepting refugees into their borders can provide a chance for Jordan to pro-actively reform its refugee policy regime for the promotion of equality among all residents within its borders.
Appendices

Labor Market Policy Integration Index Score Card  I
Housing Policy Integration Index Score Card       II
### Appendix I: Labor Market Integration Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LABOUR MARKET MOBILITY</th>
<th>ACCESS</th>
<th>IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO LABOR MARKET</th>
<th>ACCESS TO PRIVATE SECTOR</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can legal migrant workers and their families’ access and change jobs in all sectors like nationals?</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1973 Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs Law instructs Jordanian nationals and companies not to employ foreigners without a valid residence permit. Although some exceptions are made for political asylums (Law no. 24 Article 35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What categories of foreign residents have equal access to employment as nationals?</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Permanent residents</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>All of them</td>
<td>A and (C or certain categories of B)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Residents on temporary work permits (excluding seasonal) within period of ≤ 1 year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Only A or None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Residents on family reunion permits (same as sponsor)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are foreign residents able to accept any private-sector employment under equal conditions as nationals?</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yes. There are no additional restrictions than those based on type of permit mentioned above</td>
<td>Other limiting conditions that apply to foreign residents, e.g. linguistic testing (please specify)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>The government closes certain professions off to foreign workers. The professions that are officially closed are administrative and accounting, clerical, telecommunicating, sales, most technical professions, including mechanical and car repair, engineering, education and some professions in hospitality (MOL 2016).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Access to public sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are foreign residents able to accept any public-sector employment under equal conditions as nationals? (excluding exercise of public authority e.g. police, defense, heads of units/divisions but not excluding civil servants and permanent staff)</th>
<th>Yes. Only restriction is exercise of public authority and safeguard general state interest</th>
<th>Other restrictions (please specify)</th>
<th>Only for nationals</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>Only Nationals (refugees not explicitly outlawed from public sector, but insignificant numbers work in it...defacto restricted)*From the Jordan Department of Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## Immediate access to self employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Permanent residents b. Residents on temporary work permits (excluding seasonal) within period of ≤ 1 year c. Residents on family reunion permits (same as sponsor)</th>
<th>All of them</th>
<th>A and (C or certain categories of B)</th>
<th>Only A or None</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>Only permanent residents have access to self-employment Article (12) of Labor Law No. 8 of 1996 specifies that foreigners must have work permit submitted by an approved employer. There are exceptions, specifically regarding investing. According to the Invest Law No. 16 of 1995, foreigners, including Syrian Refugees, are able to invest in certain sectors: Article (24)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

## Access to self employment

<p>| Are foreign residents able to take up self-employed activity under equal conditions as nationals? | Yes. There are no additional restrictions than those based on type of permit mentioned in 14 | Other limiting conditions that apply to foreign residents, e.g. linguistic testing (please specify) | Certain sectors and activities solely for nationals (please specify) | 100 | No Additional Restrictions |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Workers’ Rights</strong></th>
<th>Do legal migrants have the same work and social security rights like Jordanian nationals?</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>Some unions specifically advocate for migrant workers, and beginning to advocate for refugee workers as well (e.g. the garment industry) (Katta 2016a: 20).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership in trade unions</strong></td>
<td>Membership of and participation in trade unions associations and work-related negotiation bodies</td>
<td>Equal access with nationals</td>
<td>Restricted access to elected positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access to social security</strong></td>
<td>A. Long-term residents B. Residents on temporary worker permits C. Residents on family reunion permits</td>
<td>All of them</td>
<td>A and (C or certain categories of B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access to housing</strong></td>
<td>(e.g., public/social housing, participation in housing financing schemes) a. Long-term residents b. Residents on temporary work permits (excluding seasonal) c. Residents on family reunion permits (same as sponsor)</td>
<td>All of them</td>
<td>A and (C or certain categories of B)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most governmental social services are Jordanian only, but some are accessible to refugees, but often at low rates (ODI 2017). Additionally, there are non-governmental services targeted to refugees, but these are parallel programs, which have been noted to be detrimental to integration.

While not restricted to social housing, it is not targeted towards refugees, and separate organizations such as the Norwegian Refugee Council handles most refugee housing assistance needs (ODI 2017).
| Working conditions | Do TCNs have guaranteed equal working conditions? (safe and healthy working conditions, treatment in case of job termination or dismissal, payment/wages, taxation) | Equal treatment with nationals in all areas | No equal treatment in at least one area (please specify) | No equal treatment in more than one area (please specify) | 100 | Refugee workers with a permit are under the same work rights as nationals (Labor Law No 24). |
## Appendix II: Housing Policy Integration Index Score Card

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERMANENT RESIDENCE</th>
<th>ELIGIBILITY</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do temporary legal residents have facilitated access to a long-term residence permit?</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>No permanent residence permits allowed for foreign residents. 5 year permits = longest renewable resident permit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence period</td>
<td>Required time of habitual residence for permanent residency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Article 22 (b) of Law No. 24 states, &quot;The Minister may, on a proposal of the Director, grant a residence permit for five years to a foreigner who has lived lawfully in the Kingdom for 10 years. Not permanent but longest term permit allowed for foreigners.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permits considered</td>
<td>Documents taken into account to be eligible for residence</td>
<td>Any foreigner</td>
<td>Permit Required: must have either valid passport, or be a laissez-passer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time counted as pupil/student</td>
<td>Is time of residence as a pupil/student counted?</td>
<td>Yes, all</td>
<td>Yes, with some conditions (limited number of years or type of study)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periods of prior-absence allowed</td>
<td>Periods of absence allowed previous to granting of status</td>
<td>Longer periods (please specify)</td>
<td>Up to 10 non-consecutive months and/or 6 consecutive months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITY OF STATUS</td>
<td>Does the state protect applicants from discretionary procedures?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum duration of procedure</td>
<td>Maximum length of application procedure</td>
<td>≤ 6 months defined by law (please specify)</td>
<td>&gt; 6 months but the maximum is defined by law (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only requirement (along with the 10 Dinar fee: Article 23 of Law no. 24) for refugees is to be officially recognized by the UNHRC to be considered a laissez-passer (Article 4 a & b) and additional requirements such as employment are exempt for refugees (Article 29 h) both from Law No. 24.

Admittance to an educational establishment is grounds for a residence permit of up to one year, and exempt from permit fees (Article 26 g).

Not specified under Jordanian Laws.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration of validity of permit</th>
<th>Duration of validity of permit</th>
<th>&gt; 5 years</th>
<th>5 years</th>
<th>&lt; 5 years</th>
<th>50</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renewable permit</td>
<td>Renewable permit</td>
<td>Automatically</td>
<td>Upon application</td>
<td>Provided original requirements are still met</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Periods of absence allowed</td>
<td>Periods of absence allowed for renewal, after granting of status (continuous or cumulative)</td>
<td>≥ 3 years</td>
<td>1 year&lt;, &lt;3 years</td>
<td>≤ 1 year</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grounds for rejection, withdrawal, refusal</td>
<td>a. proven fraud in the acquisition of permit b. sentence for serious crimes, c. actual and serious threat to public policy or national security, d. original conditions are no longer satisfied (e.g. unemployment or economic resources) e. additional grounds (please specify)</td>
<td>No other than a and/or c</td>
<td>Includes three of the listed grounds</td>
<td>Includes all listed grounds (a-d) and/or additional grounds (please specify)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maximum residence permit=5 years, only available after residence of 10 years. Regular permits last 1 year (Law No. 24 Article 22)

Subject to original requirements (Article 22 a--Law No. 24)

Not stated in residence law*

Only states that original conditions must be met (d) (Article 22a & 28)
### Personal circumstances considered before expulsion

| Personal circumstances considered before expulsion | a. personal behavior  
b. age of resident,  
c. duration of residence,  
d. consequences for both the resident and his or her family,  
e. existing links to the State concerned  
f. (non-)existing links to the resident’s country of origin (including problems with re-entry for political or citizenship reasons) | More elements than b,c,d and e | At least b, c, d and e | One or more of b, c, d or e are not taken into account | 0 | Duration and family are not considered* |

### Expulsion precluded

| Expulsion precluded | a. after 20 years of residence as a long-term residence permit holder,  
b. in case of minors, and  
c. residents born in the State concerned or admitted before they were 10 once they have reached the age of 18 | In all three cases | At least one case | None | 0 | None of these exceptions mentioned in relevant laws* |
| Legal protection | Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal, non-renewal, or withdrawal:  
|                 | a. reasoned decision  
|                 | b. right to appeal  
|                 | c. representation before an independent administrative authority and/or a court | All rights | At least a and b | One or both of a and b are not guaranteed | 0 | Article 19: No explanation required for refusal of a permit. Appeals are not laid out in foreigner residence law no. 24 |
| RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH STATUS | Do long-term residents have the same residence and socio-economic rights (e.g. like EU nationals)? | | | | 50 | |
| Access to employment | Access to employment (with the only exception of activities involving the exercise of public authority), self-employment and other economic activities, and working conditions | Equal access with nationals and equal working conditions | Priority to nationals | Other limiting conditions apply | 50 | Priority to Nationals-- (e.g. 16 professions list, restrictions on self-employment etc.) but working conditions for permitted work is the same (Ministry of Labor 2016). |
| Access to social security and assistance | Access to social security (unemployment benefits, old age pension, invalidity benefits, maternity leave, family benefits, social assistance) | Equal access with nationals | Priority to nationals | Other limiting conditions apply | 50 | Governmental assistance targeted towards nationals, most assistance is from UNHCR or other humanitarian organizations (ODI 2017). |
| Access to housing | Access to housing (rent control, public/social housing, participation in housing financing schemes) | Equal access with nationals | Priority to nationals | Other limiting conditions apply | 50 | Priority to Nationals, most assistance for refugee housing comes from humanitarian organizations such as Norwegian Refugee Council (ODI 2017). |
References


REACH. 2013. “Number of Syrians in Jordan by Basic Service Unit.”

Ryan, Curtis. 2010. ““We Are All Jordan”...But Who Is We?” Middle East Research and Information Project.


