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Dude Looks Like a Feminist!: Moral Concerns and Feminism Among Men

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Abstract

Even though male participation in feminism is essential to its success, it is possible that men are reluctant to get involved in the movement because of its primary association with women (Holmgren & Hearn, 2009). This research investigated whether certain moral concerns contribute to men endorsing feminism. According to the Moral Foundations Theory there are five moral concerns: harm (i.e., the concern for someone’s physical and emotional well-being), fairness (i.e., the concern for equality and justice), ingroup (i.e., the concern for loyalty to group membership), authority (i.e., the concern for tradition and the social hierarchy), and purity (i.e., the concern for physical and spiritual cleanliness; Graham et al., 2011). Graham and colleagues (2009) found that harm and fairness correlate to liberalism; therefore we predicted that men’s feminism would be associated with an increased emphasis on those moral concerns and a decreased emphasis on ingroup, authority, and purity. Using an online survey methodology, participants were assessed on various aspects of feminism and morality. The results generally supported our predictions that higher support for conservative moral concerns correlates to less endorsement of feminism, whereas higher support for liberal moral concerns correlates to more endorsement of feminism, even when controlling for political ideology. This research contributes to our understanding of male resistance to and support of the feminist movement.

Keywords: Feminism, Moral Concerns, Men, Beliefs, Identity, Collective Action
Dude Looks Like a Feminist!: Moral Concerns and Feminism Among Men

Women’s rights movements have persisted well over the last century; however, feminism is still frequently misunderstood today. Although there are variations in its definition, feminism is commonly recognized as a movement driven to grant social, political, and economic equality to both women and men (Jackson, Fleury & Lewandowski, 1996). Supporting feminism can manifest in numerous ways, including endorsing feminist beliefs, identifying oneself as a feminist, and participating in feminist collective action (e.g., attending a feminist rally; Jackson et al., 1996; Nelson, Liss, Erchull, Hurt, Ramsey, Turner & Haines, 2008). Previous research indicates that women tend to endorse feminist beliefs the most, followed by smaller numbers of them choosing to self-label; in turn, feminist identification predicts feminist collective action (Burn, Aboud & Molves 2000; Nelson et al., 2008; Liss, Crawford & Popp, 2004; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). This trend highlights the subtle disconnect between beliefs, identification, and action, which could be influenced by pervasive negative stereotypes of feminists (Ramsey et al., 2007; Robnett, Anderson, & Hunter, 2012). Therefore, it is imperative to look past stigma and recognize shared beliefs of the feminist movement, before considering self-labeling and/or participating in collective action in support of the ideology.

Unfortunately, stigma and stereotypes surrounding feminism and its members are so persistent that they continue to discourage association with the word itself (Anastosopoulos & Desmarais, 2015; Robnett et al., 2012). For example, feminists have been characterized as ugly, man-hating lesbians in search of reverse discrimination (Edley & Wetherell, 2001). These adverse stereotypes reflect poorly on women and challenge their competence. Feminists experience societal backlash, such as women being painted adversely and utilized as justifications for catalyzing a defense of the existing gender hierarchy (Yeung, Kay & Peach,
Due to the negative connotation that still lingers with feminism, research shows that people respond more positively to the effort being called a women’s movement (Buschman & Lenart, 1996). However, the term “women’s movement” seems to ignore the work that feminists do to improve the lives of men, and therefore may discourage men from identifying with and supporting the movement.

Men must overcome additional hurdles beyond negative stereotypes, in order to self-label and act in support of feminism, due to the fact that feminism tends to be perceived as focusing only on women (Rudman, Mescher & Moss-Rauscin, 2012). This gender role conflict poses a significant obstacle for men, deeply rooted in a fear of femininity, which perpetuates the preference for masculinity in Western societies and defines gender-appropriate behaviors accordingly (O’Neil, Helms, Gable, David & Wrightsman, 1986). One way in which men can avoid an association with femininity, and women in general, is to purposefully exclude themselves from or elect to ignore the feminist movement (Holmgren et al., 2009). To support feminism, men must align themselves with women, a lower-status group, and risk losing the privileges that come along with being an advantaged group member in today’s patriarchal society, for no apparent benefits (Rudman et al., 2012). As a result of associating with females, men face the threat of being labeled as effeminate and experiencing vilification, humiliation, and physical attacks (Wiley, Srinivasan, Finke, Firnhaber & Shilinsky, 2013). This demotion in social status aligns men with a lower status group, women (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy & Glick, 1999), as well as gay men, due to the perception that possessing any qualities deemed feminine makes someone gay (Rudman et al., 2012).

In light of these obstacles, the most recent wave of activists has acknowledged the male role in the feminist movement (Pleasants, 2011). Researchers agree that men endorsing the effort
are extremely valuable to the cause (Holmgren et al., 2009). Males can be effective agents of change because their confrontations of sexism are “taken more seriously” than those of females (Drury & Kaiser, 2014, p. 645). Men, in particular, are more likely to listen to other male protests to sexism because eliminating all forms of sexism is predominantly understood as benefiting women and thus female advocacy can be interpreted as self-serving (Drury & Kaiser, 2014). At the risk of undermining the value of female voices and affording male voices as the loudest and most respected authority on feminism, men could work alongside women to aid the platform for gender equality by reaching a different audience.

Furthermore, contrary to the common sentiment that feminism only focuses on advancing women in society, the movement benefits men as well (Henley et al., 1998; Ramsey et al., 2007). After all, both women and men are impacted by gender bias throughout their lifespans (Henley et al., 2009). For example, sexist remarks that reinforce female dependence and passivity carry the strong implication that males must always be independent and aggressive. Hyper-masculinity boxes men in as sex-driven and domineering figures in society (Messner & Montez de Oca, 2005). This prominent social model for men subjects them to norms contingent upon the adoption of voyeuristic behaviors and learning to reject or dread the notion of being in a committed and emotionally honest relationship (Blazina & Watkins, 2000; Messner & Montez de Oca, 2005). By encouraging freedom of expression and gender fluidity for women, men can expect the same treatment in return as societal equals.

However, men who are unfamiliar with feminism may be oblivious to the potential benefits that the ideology could bring to their lives. In order for men to develop an interest in feminism, they must overcome the aforementioned obstacles of stigma and loss of status. What could motivate men to look beyond the negative stereotypes surrounding feminism and endorse
it? Perhaps male participation in feminism is contingent upon a sense of morality, or the desire to “do the right thing.”

The Moral Foundations Theory can provide a solid base to answer that question as it outlines the five moral concerns of harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity (Graham et al., 2011). Harm is defined as a concern for someone’s physical and emotional well-being. Fairness is defined as a concern for equality and justice. Ingroup is defined as a concern for loyalty to a group to which one is a member. Authority is defined as a concern for tradition and the social hierarchy. The fifth moral concern of purity is defined as a concern for physical and spiritual cleanliness.

Previous research has indicated that those five moral concerns correlate with political ideology (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009). Ingroup, authority, and purity, referred to as binding traits, correlate to conservatism (Smith, Aquino, Koleva & Graham, 2014). These traits involve the desire to benefit one’s group to increase its longevity. Those who identify with conservative beliefs often seek to achieve the goal of group longevity by remaining united, or bound to each other, to ensure stability (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). The harm and fairness concerns of morality, referred to as individualizing traits, correlate to liberalism. Those traits encompass a drive to protect individual rights and freedoms (Graham et al., 2011). Those who identify with liberal beliefs often strive to accomplish the objective of defending personal freedoms by expanding equal opportunities to all individuals. These distinctions in preferences towards and self-identification aligning with political ideology suggest differing attitudes towards gender issues (Cunningham, Miner & Benavides-Espinoza, 2012). Research has found that people who self-label as conservative are less inclined to act in opposition to sexual harassment, while those self-identifying as liberal have greater objection to misogyny.
(Cunningham et al., 2012). As feminist identification has been directly correlated to higher endorsement of liberal beliefs, this convergence of values provided grounds for investigating how the five moral concerns map onto feminism (Fitzpatrick Bettencourt, Vacha-Haase, & Byrne, 2011; Nelson et al., 2008).

The present study sought to examine a possible correlation between men’s moral concerns according to the MFT and their endorsement of feminism (i.e., feminist beliefs, identification, and collective action). We expected these moral concerns to correlate with feminism above and beyond their relationship to political ideology. In the present study, the moral concerns associated with liberalism (i.e., fairness and harm) were expected to positively correlate with men’s support of feminism. Demonstrating greater concern for the fair and equitable outcome of gender equality, as well as showing compassion and empathy for women as an oppressed social group, would illustrate higher support for feminism. Therefore, a male feminist should also be perceived as endorsing those same moral concerns (i.e., harm and fairness). In contrast, the moral concerns associated with conservatism (i.e., ingroup, authority, and purity) were expected to negatively correlate with men’s support of feminism. Supporting men before women (i.e., endorsement of loyalty to the male ingroup), seeking to maintain the status quo of the patriarchy (i.e., endorsement of authority), and viewing all women as innately pure (i.e., endorsement of purity) contradicts the common beliefs and objectives of the liberal feminist movement, and therefore should be associated with lower support for feminism (e.g., being a sexist). We predicted that loyalty to one’s ingroup would be most relevant to greater feminist endorsement because of the ingroup-outgroup dichotomy initiated by endorsing and acting on behalf of group membership. In other words, if a man advocates for feminists, a social identity that is primarily associated with women, this act could be perceived as an immoral
betrayal to other men (Brambilla & Leach 2014; van Zomeren et al., 2010). We also expected that authority would correlate with sexist beliefs (i.e., hostile and benevolent sexism), which demand that women are ranked below men in the social hierarchy (Glick & Whitehead, 2010). Finally, we predicted that purity would correlate with benevolent sexism, as it paints innocence as a preferred and naturalized characteristic for women while simultaneously implying that defiance of that standard is deplorable (Glick & Whitehead, 2010).

Previous research on feminism has primarily focused on women’s experiences rather than those of men. Furthermore, no research has explored the relationship between feminism and moral concerns. In order to rectify that void in the literature, we utilized a survey methodology to measure men’s endorsement of the five moral concerns and their endorsement of feminist and sexist beliefs, feminist identity, and feminist collective action. Political ideology was also assessed, using a separate item of political orientation, for use as a covariate in the analyses. Additionally, perceptions of a male feminist were assessed. We hypothesized that male participants with high endorsement of the binding traits (i.e., ingroup, authority, and purity, those moral concerns related to conservatism) would show low support for feminism. In contrast, the male participants with high endorsement of the individualizing traits (i.e., harm and fairness, those moral concerns related to liberalism) were predicted to show greater support for feminism.

Method

Participants and Procedure

One hundred twenty-four male participants ($M = 35.62$ yrs, $SD = 12.98$ yrs) were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, an online resource that compensates participants for each online task (such as a survey) they complete. Previous research has demonstrated that Mechanical Turk samples are more diverse and representative of the U.S. population than typical
samples gathered online or in college research settings (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011). The survey for the present research, created on Qualtrics, was listed as a questionnaire about “gender and social issues,” in order to prevent evasion to the term “feminism.” Informed consent and IRB approval was obtained prior to start of survey. Of the participants, 97 (78.23%) were White/Caucasian, 7 (5.65%) were Black/African American, 1 (.01%) were Indigenous/Native American, 8 (6.45%) were Asian/Asian American, 4 (3.23%) were Latino/Hispanic/Spanish, 6 (4.84%) were Multiracial, and 1 (.01%) did not report a race.

Measures

Morality measures. We administered the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011) to assess the extent to which participants endorsed the five moral concerns: harm (α = .68), fairness (α = .66), ingroup (α = .80), authority (α = .78), and purity (α = .89). The first half of the measure, moral judgments, investigated participants’ responses to moral assessments of specific situations throughout 15 items (three per subscale). For example, “It can never be right to kill a human being” (from the harm subscale), “Justice is the most important requirement for a society” (from the fairness subscale), “It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself” (from the ingroup subscale), “Respect for authority is something all children need to learn” (from the authority subscale), and “Chastity is an important and valuable virtue” (from the purity subscale). Response options were on a 6ptpt Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (6). The second half of the MFQ, moral relevance, investigated participants’ abstract application of the five moral concerns when making moral judgments. The prompt read: “When you decide whether something is right or wrong, to what extent are the following considerations relevant to your thinking?” Each of the 15 items, again with three per subscale, was answered on the same 6pt Likert scale as in the moral judgments
section. For example, “Whether or not someone was cruel” (i.e., harm), “Whether or not some people were treated differently from others” (i.e., fairness), “Whether or not someone did something to betray his or her group” (i.e., ingroup), “Whether or not someone conformed to the traditions of society” (i.e., authority), and “Whether or not someone did something disgusting” (i.e., purity). The moral judgments and moral relevance aspects of each moral concern were combined into one subscale for each concern, because they showed similar patterns of results in the analyses.

**Feminism measures.** A single-item measure of feminist identification was used (Ramsey et al., 2007). Participants chose which of three statements they believed best described them. The options included: “a) I am not a feminist. b) I am not a feminist, but I am in support of feminist goals. c) I am a feminist.”

To assess feminist beliefs, participants also completed the conservative/anti-feminist and liberal subscales of the Feminist Perspective Scale (Henley et al., 1998). Two sample items read: “The breakdown of the traditional family structure is responsible for the evils in our society” (i.e., anti-feminist beliefs; $\alpha = .89$) and “People should define their marriage and family roles in ways that make them feel most comfortable” (i.e., liberal feminist beliefs; $\alpha = .78$). Each 10-item subscale used a 7pt Likert scale, ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (7).

In order to further evaluate anti-feminist (i.e., sexist) beliefs, the participants took the short form of the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Whitehead, 2010). Six of the items assessed each type of sexism (i.e., hostile and benevolent) on a 6pt Likert scale that ranged from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (6). One sample item from the hostile sexism subscale is: “Women exaggerate problems they have at work” ($\alpha = .88$). A sample item from the benevolent sexism subscale is: “Men are incomplete without women” ($\alpha = .87$).
To gauge perceptions of a male feminist, we utilized a brief reading portion extracted from Rudman, Mescher, and Moss-Racusin’s (2012) study. Participants read an interview of two men, representing benevolent sexism and gender egalitarianism (i.e., feminism), who discussed the women’s rights movement and feminist identification. Participants responded to 5 items created for the present study that assessed their perceptions of the male feminist according to the five moral concerns. For each item Mark (i.e., the sexist) and John (i.e., the feminist) were labeled at opposite ends of the 6pt Likert scale. The following anchor labels were created for the scale: “I would definitely put Mark’s name in the blank” (1), “I would likely put Mark’s name in the blank” (2), “I might put Mark’s name in the blank” (3), “I might put John’s name in the blank” (4), “I would likely put John’s name in the blank” (5), “I would definitely put John’s name in the blank” (6). One sample item read: “The more loyal person is ____.”

**Collective action measure.** A collective action measure (van Zomeren et al., 2010) assessed the participants’ willingness to engage in feminist behaviors. There were four modified items with a scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). For example, one item read: “I would participate in a demonstration against gender issues” (α = .95). After that section was a link to the HeForShe campaign page, a movement dedicated to increasing male participation in gender equality. Regardless of their choice to follow the link, participants were asked in a follow-up item about their lack of interest or decision to participate in the HeForShe campaign.

**Political ideology measure.** A single-item political ideology measure was utilized to assess identification on a continuum of political liberalism and conservatism. Participants chose which of the following political orientations they believed best described them. The options
included: Liberal (1), Somewhat Liberal (2), Neither Liberal nor Conservative (3), Somewhat Conservative (4), and Conservative (5).

**Results**

This study aimed to explore whether moral concerns relate to feminist beliefs, feminist identity, feminist collective action, and perceptions of a male feminist among men. We predicted that high support for the binding traits (i.e., ingroup, authority, and purity, those moral concerns related to conservatism) would correlate to less feminist beliefs, feminist identification, and support for feminist collective action. We also predicted that high support for the individualizing traits (i.e., harm and fairness, those moral concerns related to liberalism) would correlate to more feminist beliefs, feminist identification, and support for feminist collective action. Finally, we predicted that a male feminist would be perceived as being more concerned with the individualizing traits than the binding traits. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables.

**Political Ideology as a Covariate**

The correlations revealed that political ideology was related to the moral concerns, as has been found in previous research (Graham et al., 2009). Participants with greater endorsement of conservative ideology had higher scores for ingroup, authority, and purity. Participants with greater endorsement of liberal ideology had higher scores for fairness. Political ideology did not significantly correlate to harm. Therefore, we found that political ideology generally correlates to moral concerns, confirming our prediction.

Also, as expected, participants with greater endorsement of liberal ideology had higher scores for liberal feminist beliefs and feminist collective action. Participants with greater endorsement of conservative ideology had higher scores for anti-feminist beliefs, hostile sexism,
and benevolent sexism (see Table 1). Feminist identity also related to political ideology, $F(2,121) = 30.14, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2 = .33$. Participants who identified as feminists most strongly endorsed liberal ideology ($M = 1.38, SD = .62$), supporters also endorsed liberal ideology ($M = 2.28, SD = 1.11$), and participants who identified as non-feminists most strongly endorsed conservative ideology ($M = 3.47, SD = 1.16$; all pairwise comparisons were significantly different, $ps <.02$). Therefore, we found that political ideology correlates to feminist beliefs, feminist identity, and feminist collective action. As political ideology was related to both the moral concerns and feminism, it was used as a covariate in the regression and ANOVA analyses described below.

**Feminist Beliefs**

In order to test whether the five moral concerns relate to men’s endorsement of feminist and sexist beliefs, we examined correlation and regression analyses. As shown in Table 1 and as predicted, ingroup, authority, and purity all positively correlated to anti-feminist beliefs and negatively correlated to liberal feminist beliefs. In conjunction, the binding traits positively correlated to both hostile sexism and benevolent sexism. Also as predicted, harm and fairness positively correlated to liberal feminist beliefs and negatively correlated to anti-feminist beliefs. Further, the individualizing traits negatively correlated to both hostile sexism and benevolent sexism, with the exception of harm positively correlating to benevolent sexism at a rate below statistical significance.

As political ideology correlated to both the moral concerns and feminist endorsement, we tested to see if it was a confounding variable in the relationship between the moral concerns and feminist beliefs. Therefore, we ran a series of multiple regression analyses with the morality variables predicting the feminist belief variables, controlling for political ideology (see Table 2).
Each regression model was statistically significant ($p_s < .001$), explaining 32 to 62% of the variance in feminist beliefs. For liberal feminist beliefs, fairness was a significant positive predictor, while purity was a significant negative predictor; harm was a marginally significant positive predictor, while ingroup and authority were not significant. For anti-feminist beliefs, purity and ingroup were significant positive predictors; harm was a marginally significant negative predictor, while fairness and authority were not significant predictors. For benevolent sexism, ingroup and authority were significant positive predictors; purity was a marginally significant positive predictor, while harm and fairness were not significant. For hostile sexism, purity was a significant positive predictor; harm was a marginally significant negative predictor, while fairness, ingroup, and authority were not significant. These relationships generally support our hypotheses, by showing that support for the MFT’s binding and individualizing traits predict endorsement of anti-feminist, liberal feminist, hostile sexist, and benevolent sexist beliefs.

**Feminist Identity**

In order to assess the relationship between the moral concerns and feminist identity, we ran a mixed ANOVA with one within-subjects factor (i.e., the five moral concerns) and one between-subjects factor (i.e., the three feminist identity groups: non-feminists, supporters, and feminists), controlling for political ideology. It was predicted that there would be greater support for the binding traits (i.e., ingroup, authority, and purity) amongst participants who identified as non-feminists. In contrast, it was predicted that there would be greater support for the individualizing traits (i.e., harm and fairness) amongst participants who identified as feminists. The analysis revealed a main effect of the moral concerns, $F(4,113) = 23.23$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .45$, no main effect of feminist identification, $F(2,116) = .60$, $p = .55$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$, and a significant interaction, $F(8,228) = 2.40$, $p = .02$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$. Means and standard errors are
presented in Table 3 and Figure 1; these are the estimated marginal means at the mean level of political ideology, which is 2.71.

Pairwise comparisons were used to compare endorsement of each of the five moral concerns among feminists ($n = 16$), supporters ($n = 49$), and non-feminists ($n = 55$). For ingroup, there were no significant differences between the groups ($ps > .24$). For authority, feminists had significantly lower scores than supporters ($p = .02$) and non-feminists ($p = .002$); the scores for supporters and non-feminists were not significantly different from each other ($p = .10$). For purity, the scores for feminists were marginally lower than those of the non-feminists ($p = .08$); there were no other significant differences ($ps > .13$). For harm, there were no significant differences between any of the groups ($ps > .29$). For fairness, feminists had significantly higher scores than non-feminists ($p = .01$) and marginally significantly higher than supporters ($p = .08$); there was no difference between the scores of the supporters and non-feminists ($p = .16$). Thus, these findings show partial support for both of our hypotheses.

**Feminist Collective Action**

In addition to testing feminist beliefs and identification, we also tested whether moral concerns related to feminist collective action. We examined both correlation and regression analyses relating the five moral concerns to the collective action scale. As shown in Table 1, harm and fairness positively correlated to intentions to participate in feminist collective action, while authority and purity were negatively correlated. Ingroup was not significantly correlated to feminist collective action. As shown in Table 2, the regression analysis controlling for political ideology indicated that loyalty to one’s ingroup was a positive predictor of feminist collective action, while authority was a negative predictor. Harm was a marginally significant predictor, while fairness and purity were not significant predictors of feminist collective action.
In order to assess a feminist behavior in the moment, we used independent sample \( t\)-tests to examine whether participants who expressed interest in or ultimately joined HeForShe’s movement for gender equality \((n = 50)\) had greater endorsement of the individualizing traits and lower endorsement of the binding traits. None of the independent samples \( t\)-tests found support for this prediction, as none of the \( p\)-values reached significance (all \( ts < 1.62\), all \( ps > .11\)). When controlling for political ideology in a series of ANOVAs, we also found no difference between participants who expressed interest in the HeForShe campaign and those who did not \((n = 74)\), in regards to the five moral concerns.

**Perceptions of a Feminist**

In order to determine whether the moral concerns were incorporated into the perceptions of a male feminist, we used a repeated measures ANOVA to test whether the male feminist was rated as more fair, compassionate, loyal, having a high regard for authority or high concern for purity. Means and standard errors for each rating are illustrated in Figure 2. There was a significant effect of the moral perceptions, \( F(4,118) = 31.29, p < .001\), partial \( \eta^2 = .52 \). The participants rated the male feminist as being equally concerned with compassion and fairness \((p = .44)\), and significantly more concerned with compassion and fairness than with loyalty, authority, and purity \((ps < .001)\). Specifically, loyalty and authority were viewed as being equally endorsed by the male feminist \((p = .23)\), while purity was endorsed the least \((ps < .001)\). In other words, the participants perceived the male feminist as possessing the same moral concerns that we hypothesized would be related to feminism.

Additionally, in order to more specifically compare the participants’ moral perceptions of a male feminist to a benevolent sexist, we ran a series of one-sample \( t\)-tests with 3.5 as the test value, which represents an equivalent perception of the sexist and the feminist. The male
feminist was perceived as being significantly more compassionate ($t(122) = 5.76, p < .001, d = 1.05$) and fair ($t(122) = 5.22, p < .001, d = .94$), compared to the sexist. The male feminist was perceived as being equally loyal ($t(123) = .85, p = .40, d = .15$) and concerned with authority ($t(123) = -0.64, p = .52, d = .12$) as the sexist. The sexist was perceived as being significantly more concerned with purity ($t(123) = -7.76, p < .001, d = 1.40$) than the male feminist.

**Discussion**

This study investigated the relationship between the five moral concerns of the MFT and feminist endorsement among men. While not every moral concern reached significance in every analysis, the results generally supported our hypotheses that men with high support for the binding traits (i.e., ingroup, authority, and purity) endorse anti-feminist beliefs, are less likely to identify as feminists, and are less interested in feminist collective action. Men with high support for the individualizing traits (i.e., harm and fairness) endorse feminist beliefs, are more likely to identify as feminists, and are more interested in feminist collective action. Further, the moral concerns and feminism seem to demonstrate a relationship in their own right, separate from the influence of political ideology.

**Feminist Beliefs**

Although the overall findings generally fit the predicted pattern of results (e.g., feminism and the individualizing traits versus anti-feminism and the binding traits), not every variable mapped exactly onto that dichotomy. In the regression analyses harm was not a significant predictor of any belief variables (though it was marginally significant in the predicted direction for several) and fairness was only a significant positive predictor of liberal feminist beliefs, when controlling for political ideology. These findings suggest that fairness is a stronger predictor of feminist beliefs among men than harm. Possibly, harm did not have as strong a relationship as
hypothesized because society’s norms and the feminist movement are equally concerned with the well-being of others. This moral concern may not translate into support for feminism among men if they do not perceive current gender norms as being harmful. As both harm and fairness had very high overall means and smaller standard deviations than the other moral concerns, it is possible that the concerns pertaining to the individualizing traits are more universal, which may have limited the variables’ predictive abilities. Additionally, several of the associations between the binding traits demonstrated predictive relationships with the belief variables when controlling for political ideology. Therefore, men’s moral concerns about loyalty to an ingroup, authority, and purity may relate strongly to their feminist beliefs moreso than the individualizing traits of harm and fairness.

Looking more closely at the relationships between the binding traits and the feminist belief variables, it is noteworthy that both loyalty to one’s ingroup and respect for authority were stronger predictors of benevolent sexism than hostile sexism. These predictive relationships were unexpected because we had not anticipated a difference in the endorsement of sexist beliefs. Loyalty to one’s ingroup and respect for authority may have predicted benevolent sexism because benevolent sexism emphasizes the raising of one sex, a social ingroup, above another in a hierarchy. On the other hand, purity defied our expectations and predicted hostile sexism instead of benevolent sexism, as well as emerged as the strongest predictor of men’s feminist beliefs. Purity remained at minimum a marginally significant predictor of all of the belief variables in the regression analyses. Notably, a few of the items measuring liberal feminist and anti-feminist beliefs directly mentioned homosexuality, and previous research has shown that homosexuality can elicit disgust reactions (i.e., the response to purity violations; Balzer & Jacobs 2011; Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom 2009). However, purity was also related to the sexist
beliefs and because neither the hostile nor benevolent sexism items mentioned homosexuality its connection to disgust cannot completely explain the predictive power of purity. Future research should investigate the relationship between purity and feminism, including whether purity violations might affect feminist endorsement, and why purity is more relevant than loyalty to one’s ingroup and respect for authority in men’s endorsement of feminist beliefs.

**Feminist Identity**

In the relationship between the five moral concerns and feminist identification, our results showed that the binding traits (i.e., authority and purity, but not ingroup) were more strongly endorsed by participants who self-identified as non-feminists, and that one individualizing trait (i.e., fairness, but not harm) was more strongly endorsed by participants who self-identified as feminists. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that these results demonstrated a pattern similar to one found by Graham and colleagues (2009). Their findings suggested that people who identify with conservative beliefs weigh the five moral concerns more evenly, whereas people who identify with liberal beliefs favor the individualizing traits over the binding traits. Our results showed that non-feminists weighed the five moral concerns more evenly, while the feminists favored the individualizing traits over the binding traits. We also found a pattern of fewer differences across the feminist identity levels for harm and fairness and greater differences for ingroup, authority, and purity. Thus, it is possible that justice is important to most people, while authority and purity are of greater concern to non-feminists versus feminists.

Non-feminists viewing sexism as harmless and inconsequential could explain the lack of statistical difference across the identity levels for harm. Despite considering harm (i.e., the concern for the well-being of others) a part of their sense of morality, it currently does not motivate them to support feminism. Bridging this gap by tapping into the potential universality
of harm could help increase feminist endorsement. This approach could be effective to subvert the initial stigma linked to feminists and feminism’s association with the female gender. By instead focusing on harm as a broader and more relatable construct and then tying it to fairness, feminists could gradually provide non-feminists with the insight necessary to comprehend the values behind the movement in a consumable and non-threatening manner.

**Feminist Collective Action**

Surprisingly, the individualizing traits were not significant predictors of intention towards feminist collective action, suggesting that their relationship may be contingent upon their association with liberal political ideology. Further, ingroup was a positive predictor of feminist collective action, authority was a negative predictor, and purity was not a significant predictor. These findings defied the expected pattern that the binding traits would all negatively predict feminist collective actions among men. As the ingroup variable speaks to loyalty in general, versus specifying a particular group, perhaps male feminists who are morally motivated by loyalty drove up the positive association between ingroup and feminist collective action. It is easier to understand why authority negatively correlated to and predicted a decrease in feminist collective action, aligning with our prediction. An innovative and unifying movement, such as one for gender equality, seeks to uproot an existing social hierarchy, which places feminism in direct opposition to respect for authority. Therefore, if someone endorses maintenance of authority figures and social order, it would be hypocritical for that person to also want to work towards demolishing the status quo.

Although all of the moral concerns demonstrated some relationship with collective action, whether correlational, predictive, or both, there was no connection to feminist behavior in the moment. Regardless of their level of interest in the HeForShe campaign, there was no
difference in moral concern endorsement amongst the participants. It is possible that no
differences emerged because of external factors, such as participants having concerns about the
link featured in the survey producing viruses on their computers, about whether visiting another
website would disrupt their participation in the survey, or not wanting to take time away from the
task at hand. Instead, the participants may not have questioned the mechanism or validity of the
link itself, but rather the future investment required by visiting HeForShe’s website or pledging
to join their social movement. They may have anticipated a required donation or an unwanted
e-mail subscription. These elements offer plausible explanations that diffuse participation
differences regardless of the feminist behavior or lack-thereof in the moment.

Perceptions of a Feminist

To further investigate how moral concerns relate to men’s support for feminism,
participants read a short vignette featuring a male feminist and male benevolent sexist, before
indicating which person was more concerned with each of the five moral concerns. The
participants perceived the male feminist as being more concerned with harm and fairness, and
the benevolent sexist as being more concerned with purity. They also perceived the male
feminist as being moderately concerned with ingroup and authority, in relatively equal measure.
All of these findings demonstrate some level of comprehension of the feminist perspective;
therefore this direct understanding could offer another important explanation for why people
elect not to endorse feminism. If some men recognize that feminists do not support ingroup,
authority, and purity concerns, then those men may have difficulty supporting the movement. On
the other hand, men who emphasize harm and fairness concerns over ingroup, authority, and
purity concerns may realize their values are in alignment with feminism and decide to support
the movement.
Future Research

This study discovered a relationship between the MFT’s five moral concerns and feminism among a sample of men in the United States. It provides an excellent foundation for further research, such as assessing specific subcultures or other countries to either replicate these results or find divergences. It could also be informative to assess the relationship between the five moral concerns and feminism among women, in order to draw gender comparisons. After all, participants’ personal histories and experiences of sexism could have a significant impact on their definition of and response to feminism. For men specifically, there may also be other reasons besides moral concerns that encourage or dissuade their involvement in the feminist movement (e.g., raising a daughter). Additionally, research could also investigate the role of moral concerns in other social movements (e.g., Black Lives Matter).

Investigating purity and its role in the relationship between morality and feminist endorsement would be particularly enlightening. For example, researchers could experimentally study implicit disgust reactions to feminism as a purity violation, given that Balzer and Jacobs (2011) found an association between disgust sensitivity, social attitudes, and political ideology. Additionally, feminist behavior could be studied more extensively than the brief HeForShe behavior examined in the present study, in order to establish whether moral concerns actually motivate feminist behavior or only feminist beliefs.

Finally, this study utilized a correlational design, thus limiting the degree to which we can determine causation between moral concern endorsement and men’s support for feminism. Experimental research could investigate whether morality motivates men’s interest (or disinterest) in feminism. For example, real-world feminist appeals to morality (e.g., social media campaigns, blogs, or memes) could be incorporated to explore a direct causal relationship
between exposure to morality messages and higher feminist endorsement. There are many other possibilities for future experimental research, such as assessing whether feminism shapes men’s morality by emphasizing or deemphasizing certain types of feminism to increase its appeal to men who endorse varying moral concerns. Additionally, a third, unknown factor may be affecting the endorsement of both the moral concerns and feminism. Further, cultural values (e.g., family loyalty) could have an impact on the relationship between moral concerns and feminist endorsement among men. Studying a more racially and culturally diverse sample of men would increase the representative and complex nature of these findings.

**Conclusion**

Now, more than ever, feminism has been brought back to the forefront of society due to increased media attention (Vincent, 2014). This study sheds light potential reasoning behind the low rate of male feminist endorsement. By considering the role of moral concerns in feminism, there could be a deeper understanding of obstacles that prevent male feminist endorsement and further efforts seeking to overcome them in order to allow the movement to gain further momentum. It is essential that men also know that they can endorse feminist beliefs, self-identify as feminists, and act on behalf of feminism. When men fully acknowledge gender inequality, society can finally experience a shift that allows people, regardless of sex, to work together as equals (Pleasants, 2011). A moral drive to “do the right thing” could be crucial to facilitate these changes and boost support for the feminist movement.
References

doi:10.1111/jasp.12290


doi:10.1521/soco.2014.32.4.397.


Table 1. Descriptives and Correlations

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<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Harm</th>
<th>Fairness</th>
<th>Ingroup</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Purity</th>
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Note: †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
**Table 2. Multiple Regression Analyses**

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*Note: †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001*
Table 3. Moral Concern Endorsement

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Figure 1. Mean rating of endorsement for each moral concern for participants identifying as feminists, supporters, and non-feminists, when controlling for political ideology ($M = 2.71$). Error bars represent standard errors. There was a main effect of the moral concerns, $F(4,113) = 23.23, p<.001$, partial $\eta^2 = .45$, no main effect of identification, $F(2,116) = .60, p=.55$, partial $\eta^2 = .01$, and a significant interaction, $F(8,228) = 2.40, p=.02$, partial $\eta^2 = .08$. 
Figure 2. Mean rating of participants’ perception of the male feminist’s endorsement of each moral concern, $F(4, 118) = 31.29$, $p < .001$, partial $\eta^2 = .52$. Error bars represent standard errors.