College and University Presidents: Authentic Leadership Principles and the Navigation of Crisis

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College and University Presidents: Authentic Leadership Principles and the Navigation of Crisis

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The college presidency is a complex and challenging leadership position in the eyes of both higher education institutions and society. In normal times the de rigueur responsibilities and expectations of the office and of the individuals who hold these esteemed posts are decidedly demanding and difficult. The traditional pressures to lead communities comprised of greatly diverse individuals, personalities and groups—professors, students, staff, alumni, trustees and other core supporters—to navigate internal and external pressures and criticisms, to shape the profile of faculty members and the academic life, to raise money, and to manage public relations are responsibilities solely sufficiently significant to force these leaders to be at the least extraordinary and maybe even exceed any normally thought human capacities.

When major disasters or crises happen on the scene and are added with little or no warning to the mix of duties and challenges, the lives of presidents can and do change dramatically and in a heartbeat. The complications of leadership grow to be significantly multiplied, and the public spotlight and scrutiny becomes even more thorough and readily makes more difficult the problems a president must address. Recent examples that have gathered such public attention underscore this reality.

The tragedy in the spring 2007 of the murders of many students at Virginia Tech at the hand of a fellow student and the subsequent microscope of scrutiny that its president and members of his cabinet and key administrative personnel faced is just one such instance of the role of public expectations about credibility and of the small margin for error that these leaders cope with in handling crisis situations. In this case, the president and his leadership group appear to have handled a most difficult situation as well as might be expected. They have also been quick to assert what they have learned as a result, how this incident will alter policies and protocols, and the ways in which campus leaders elsewhere may be able to benefit from the lessons of this tragedy.

But in other instances of crisis, the outcomes have not been so benign. The apparent cover-up by senior administrators at Eastern Michigan University of what appears to have been a murder of a student on campus resulted in the terminations and resignations of a group of leaders, including its president, and thus shows what happens when trust in leadership is suddenly and severely eroded and compromised. When presidents encounter territory that involves questions about their leadership, we often witness how rapidly the negative consequences are judged in a climate of little or no tolerance for defect or error. In recent years there have been a number of other crisis situations that quickly came into public view and to governing boards and other leaders of universities that led to the relatively swift demise of presidents. These other episodes are too numerous to mention but include the University of Colorado system when President Hoffman was in the eyes of critics too slow in responding to allegations of harassment laid at the feet of her head football coach, and the departure of the president of Hamilton College when his plagiarism in a convocation address was exposed by a faculty member who innocently discovered the misdeed upon attempting to learn
more about a subject the president had raised in his speech.

Sometimes these crises are outside the immediate control of presidents, such as some of those noted above, and other times they are self-inflicted such as the Hamilton president or the premature end of Larry Summers' tenure as president of Harvard University. In other instances maybe more rare, but nonetheless moments of significant leadership challenge, the crises crossing the leadership path of presidents is a natural disaster. Such was the case for three presidents of colleges and universities that were in the path of Hurricane Katrina, a disaster that forced their leadership and campus communities to face severe and continuing challenges.

This article draws on the concept of “authentic leadership” as first categorized and argued by Bill George in Authentic Leadership: Rediscovering the Secrets to Creating Lasting Value. George views authentic leadership as comprised of a number of key elements. He reduces these to five traits of authentic leaders: “understanding their purpose, practicing solid values, leading with their heart, establishing connected relationships, and demonstrating self-discipline.” As we will see throughout the following discussion of three college and university presidents, each leader reflects these five principles in the ways that they conducted the leadership of their offices, and in their personal traits and qualities in the face of unprecedented crisis.

In George’s framework, “Authentic leaders have a deep sense of purpose for their leadership and are true to their core values. They are people of the highest integrity who are committed to building enduring organizations.” In terms of their self-identity, “Authentic leaders see themselves as stewards of the assets they inherit and servants of all their stakeholders. They lead with their hearts, not just their heads, yet they have the self-discipline to produce consistently strong results.” He provides an example from his tenure as CEO of Medtronic: “There were occasions when I learned of problems with our products which were being reported, but where red tape was impeding the feedback getting to our engineers. As authentic leaders it was our responsibility to fix these problems as soon as possible in order to be what we wanted to be as a company.”

In late summer 2005 students were making their annual pilgrimage to college campuses returning to study or beginning the first years as undergraduates. As around the country, this was the case at colleges and universities in New Orleans and in other parts of the South near the Gulf Coast. At the time, Hurricane Katrina was brewing up over that same body of water. Within days this “perfect storm” was to wreak havoc over much of this coastal area with heavy winds and rain that would alter the face of the New Orleans and the campuses of the city and cast its effects well inland.

Three presidents of schools in New Orleans and the nearby Mississippi coast—Marlene Hughes at Dillard and Norman Francis at Xavier Universities, and Beverly Hogan at Tougaloo College—found themselves literally in the eye of the storm and as focal points of their campus communities as they sought to cope with the damage and disaster that befell them. Each of these colleges and universities are historically black (HBCU’s). The status of these institutions is the primary rationale for this research about their presidents. Though deserving of attention, in many ways HBCU’s are often not recognized to the degree the normally accorded their “mainstream” counterparts. This article focuses on these three presidents and their leadership in part because their schools are unique when compared to this “mainstream.” They are more tuition-driven institutions than their highly endowed, in most cases traditionally white, counterparts and thus these black colleges, even in normal and the best of times, confront vastly greater needs, and nearly fixed economic and fiscal challenges. In short, Xavier, Tougaloo and Dillard are not institutions with a great deal of cushion against external pressures, especially those outside their control, as was the case with the instance of Katrina and its effects on them. As these institutions often dwell in the shadow of other contemporary institutions due to public focus on more mainstream and thought-to-be elite club of colleges and universities, it is further important to examine this snapshot of these three leaders who but for Katrina would not likely have been foisted into public view to the extent that has been the case.

George’s thinking about authentic leadership is developed as an inclusive concept, not exclusively focused on leaders in the context of crisis. However, as a foundational principle of leadership this concept of authenticity is not only applicable but may be even more readily revealed in instances of institutional and leadership crises. The contention here is that the leaders discussed reflect authentic leadership through the ways they responded to the Katrina crisis and through the values they reveal as fundamental to their leadership and its style.

These three presidents confronted an array of difficulties in the face of this crisis. They handled their power and leadership in ways that deserve attention and suggest lessons that can broadly inform understandings about leaders both in crisis as well as non-crisis times. How do presidents, or any leaders
for that matter, function at moments such as this? In what ways may the context of crisis press leaders to reveal their authentic leadership? What might be learned about leadership from their experiences in the crucible of this disaster? What is suggested by the manner in which these presidents confronted the realities of crisis and navigated their institutions into futures that had suddenly become less clear? Are the individual reserves on which they drew and the lessons they reveal applicable and informative for other leaders facing similar circumstances as well as in the day-to-day conduct of the presidency?

We will explore a variety of personal qualities at the core of these presidents as leaders and as people, and that combine to reflect an authenticity of leadership. What values rose to the fore for these leaders in response to the situations they faced? What do these values exhibit as testimony to the foundations of their leadership? What is the applicability of lessons from their experience to other circumstances for both college and university presidents, as well as for leaders in other contexts and situations?

An examination of the leadership of these three presidents reveals both points of commonality, and also of unique and discrete leadership styles and approaches. Each had to find ways to deal with the economic, human resources, and physical plant impacts of the hurricane. They had to navigate plans for the future that range from securing the safety of members of the community, especially students, and managing the details of physical clean up and removal of massive amounts of debris to decisions about the viability of buildings and facilities and matters that focused on questions of institutional survival. Their experiences and those of their institutions in confronting this crisis hold the potential to inform views of the college and university presidency, especially in times of such challenges, as well as to reveal principles of leadership that may be transferable to other organizational and institutional contexts. We turn then to these unique perspectives about leadership, and the ways Presidents Francis, Hughes, and Hogan weathered these challenges and created pathways to construct and shape their institutions as they rebounded for the future.

We will concentrate on three major elements that are revealed through the stories of these presidents. Each of these elements will further be addressed and examined in the framework of George’s ideas about authentic leadership.

The first phase in confronting the crisis wrought by Katrina features reactions to the disaster that were framed by instinctive responses in which these leaders innate styles came to the fore. The major characteristic during this time was the undertaking of efforts to ensure the safety and security of people—special concern directed toward students, the young people trusted to the care of these institutions, but also the faculty and staff.

The second element of their leadership is the practical and pragmatic undertaking to assess the damage to their campuses and the emerging early impact on their institutions’ futures. This phase was coupled with the preliminary decisions that had to be made in order to promote interim planning, to engage the process of a return to a semblance of “normal,” and to begin the work necessary for longer term rebuilding.

Last, and most important, the leadership of these presidents offers the opportunity to examine the principles and values under girding their decisions. As we do so we will further apply George’s notions about authentic leadership to deepen understanding about how these personal traits provided leadership direction and inspiration. Throughout we will observe how the actions of each leader were rooted in personal rudders and compasses that they possessed and used in the exercise of leadership.

An primary theme these presidents note and that arises in their accounts of the circumstances they faced is that in a crisis situation such as the hurricane there is a strong tendency to operate nearly on a leadership version of autopilot. All three in one way or another use language to describe the way they operated in the opening hours of confronting the crisis as instinctive, instinctual, without the luxury of thinking thoroughly about what was going on.

At one level given the rush of events it might readily be expected for this to be the case and the evidence they present is overwhelmingly unified and similar. Each president instantly realized that they were confronting circumstances for which there was no real preparation. Thus, stripped of many usual pretenses or even such essentials for routine leadership and decision-making as time, ability to consult with colleagues, and consider alternate pathways and choices, these presidents relied on their core values and principles, a resource that George would argue is a reflection of authenticity. Their reactions carried critical public leadership implications for their institutions and communities, but at the same time the way they responded was rooted in their personal qualities as people. The actions they undertook in these opening hours required inner resources and reserves that they continued to have to draw upon as days turned into months of fallout from the disaster and in order to sustain the directions needed to accomplish recovery and rebuilding.
But the presidents’ reports that their initial leadership response was universally that of finding themselves functioning on autopilot, unsurprising as it may be, tell only part of the story. The other and more important question raised, one for which George provides a context that underscores its importance, is: what are the authentic values and personal guides that these leaders utilize when they are functioning on autopilot, when they are forced to react to events instinctively? George’s concern is about what operates below the surface of the public view of leaders and leadership. If the argument is that some leaders have the “right stuff,” and George’s notion of authentic leadership suggests that it certainly includes embodiment of the “right stuff,” further inquiry is necessary about those elements of character and authenticity that serve to produce good leadership and institutional outcomes. What values and anchors guide and inspire leaders, whether in a crisis such as that faced in the wake of Katrina, or in more ordinary, day-in and day-out leadership? How do they act sufficiently wisely to address the challenges of the circumstances they are forced to encounter? What elements constitute the content that leads to the judgment that a leader has led well?

For example, President Hogan portrays the nature of her initial responses to the damage at Tougaloo College as a situation in which you have “No script. You do things by instinct.”6 As she surveyed the state of her campus she was already thinking about the broader context of the expectations of her presidency and leadership, and the stake in her efforts that she anticipated would be shared by colleagues. This reaction about the importance of working closely and relying on interdependent relationships with colleagues is one of Hogan’s recurrent messages, and is shared by the two other presidents. Again the anticipated hope in the crisis situation of being able to rely on fellow administrative leaders is more likely to eventuate if the leader has already developed such a style and approach as the normal relationship with staff and manner of utilizing them. Collaborative leadership is a trait associated with good leaders and it is an ideal that is expected as a way leaders should operate in normal times. But this trait fashioned as a regular practice, becomes an even greater asset and strength in times of crisis. It is clear that this navigating principle was fundamental in the leadership of these three presidents as they shaped the pathways necessary to deal with the hurricane and its aftermath.

Despite the chaos of the early stages of the hurricane’s fallout, as well as in the weeks and months that followed, these presidents exerted a clear focus on the human aspects of the unfolding drama. It was people, especially students but also staff and faculty and their well-being and morale, not buildings, bricks and mortar and the other physical, structural, and facilities concerns, that quickly formed the core of each president’s attention and decisions. Each president independently reports that the immediate safety and security of students were the pressing major concern. Decisions needed to be made about whether students would remain on campus or that evacuations would be in the offing or forced by circumstances. Close consultation and seeking advice based on mutual exchange of ideas with cabinet level staff and other administrators were essential in order to reach wise and sensible courses of action. As we will continue to see, whether in the “war room” that Xavier had set up on campus or in the gathering of staff in off-site and distant locations, these presidents surrounded themselves with their core senior cabinet officials and other key administrators, in some cases including trustees, that were instrumental in weighing options and in making difficult decisions.

The public evacuation of the city was not well coordinated during the first week after Katrina hit, a situation that forced many personnel and citizens of New Orleans to make individual choices about their exodus. Thus, it was critical for these presidents to know as much as possible about the status of faculty and staff, where they were electing to go, and the degree to which they would be available in person or at a distance to assist with decision-making and planning. For the presidents reliance on human resources became paramount even as these employees, especially those who were citizens of New Orleans, were experiencing professional and personal travails created by the storm. The presidents, even as they confronted the demands on their leadership, faced the same personal uncertainties as staff and faculty members as ominous reports and the emerging reality developed about the gathering threat to their homes, as well as other immediate concerns for families and friends. President Francis relates a number of stunningly poignant situations he encountered.

Francis recalls that in the opening hours of the storm, everything looked fine.7 He notes that Xavier University had experienced major hurricane threats in previous years. As part of their preparation for hurricane events, Xavier had set up the previously noted “war room” to enable campus leaders to remain on campus at least as storms developed. The expectation was that this facility would ensure access to secure communications and other management tools essential for coping with an approaching disaster. When an earlier storm began to develop, Francis went to this war room with its accommodations as a meeting space for about ten of
the university’s key leaders. In advance of that storm, he had indicated that his plan and desire would be to remain on campus. As it turned out, the storm did not make an impact on the city and Francis and his colleagues were not required to take any actions.

When Katrina began to strike the coast, Francis initially went through same drill, gathering his core staff in the designated crisis center and preparing to use this arrangement to make decisions, implement protocols and develop necessary plans to deal with the situation. However, based on the dire information about the storm as it developed, the Mayor of New Orleans and the Governor of Louisiana began to urge, though not yet order, evacuation. Despite the fact that the order to evacuate came later than might have been ideal, Xavier was able to evacuate almost everyone. However, about 200 students who were not evacuated remained on campus along with about forty faculty members and staff people who were either on campus or in their homes nearby. Given the public orders, Francis decided to move to temporary headquarters in a downtown hotel rather than remain on campus as he had in the case of the previous threatened storm. When the initial impact of Katrina came and went without major damage as is now well known, many in New Orleans, Francis and his staff included, thought they might have dodged a bullet.

But when the levees broke during the night and water began to fill the streets, Francis reports that the “[c]ity began to lose communications” and as a result at the hotel location he was beginning to become “out of touch with the university” still staffed as it was by those who had remained on campus. As the water rose, Francis was forced to leave with other guests and more city residents as the hotel had to cleared out. He first “had to walk in three to four feet of water to drive to another hotel,” only then to depart the city by bus for Baton Rouge.

Francis set up his next temporary headquarters at a hotel in a small town outside Baton Rouge where some of his extended family lived. His core staff of advisors was able to join him there so that the administrative leadership of the university was in close proximity for meetings and staff interactions, and to provide the president with guidance and advice. At this point Francis was “able to get contact with staff and students on campus for their evacuation,” negotiating arrangements to get them out of the city. Despite the grave conditions of rising water, one of the campus dining services was located along with the student and other residents on sufficiently high ground and had been able as a result of an emergency power source to continue functioning and producing meals. But now those remaining on campus had to flee the New Orleans environs in the citywide evacuation that was underway. From this off-site location, Francis and his staff were able to procure buses that would transport this final group of two hundred Xavier students first to Grambling and Southern Universities and subsequently to travel to their homes.

Addressing the needs of members of their campus communities was the initial and foremost response of all three institutions and their leaders. A major first goal was to keep students safe and, even if they were to remain on campus temporarily, in the most secure situation achievable. Coupled with this response was the need to support, maintain and use as effectively as feasible the personnel and human resources of the college. At each of the three schools, students did have to leave the campus, at Xavier and Dillard because of water inundating the property. Once evacuated they were away for the remainder of the semester and in some cases slightly longer due to the extent of damage these campuses experienced. At Tougaloo power to the campus, as was the case throughout the surrounding city of Jackson, was cutoff. This forced students to leave their residence halls, though they were able to return in about a week when power was restored. Hogan remained in the President’s House and this became a headquarters from which she was able to supervise and coordinate staff regarding the initial clean up and the more long range needs that the storm created.

At Xavier and Dillard the full comprehension about the extent of damage and confrontation with its implications for the future seeped in over time. Because Presidents Francis and Hughes immediately had to leave their campuses and in short order move out of the city and region, they both collected most of their knowledge about the state of their campuses from news reports and video footage of the disaster. They shared helplessness with fellow New Orleans’ citizens, and gathered a picture of the calamity with the rest of the country from the rapid and suddenly incessant national coverage.

Francis was aware that his home was undoubtedly inundated and his first view of the damage was from an Internet satellite view of the neighborhood. On the screen he and his wife identified their home (that they owned) by what they could see of a surrounding seven-foot high brick wall, now with only its top showing and then only in certain places. Realizing that this meant their home was significantly flooded, Francis remarks that there was nothing they could do about it, that they would get to that problem in time (it was weeks later before they were even able to visit the property to survey the damage in person), and that there were more pressing
concerns for the university and the city. Francis found the reserves to lead and direct his energies to these external needs rather than to dwell on the personal problems that would in time have to be addressed. This ability to maintain a sense for the order of what was most important is another reflection of Francis’ grounding as a leader and as a person. It also reflects and displays his leadership authenticity in terms of understanding his mission and in practicing self-discipline.

This evidence of personal and professional élan is at the heart of this story and is at the base of the notion of authentic leadership. Francis reports his experience almost matter-of-factly, possibly a result of the passage of time.⁸ But it appears that his straightforward and seemingly unaffected approach is shared by fellow presidents, including Scott Cowen, President of Tulane University and describes the manner in which they led as the actual events of the storm and its damage unfolded. There is a remarkable degree to which at the time these presidents remained detached from personal concerns, were able to exert professional focus on the tasks at hand, and thus coped with the overwhelming realities they faced.⁹

Francis seconds Hogan’s notion about the reliance on instinct. He characterizes his approach as being “driven by adrenaline that said we [Xavier] had come too far and done too much to let Katrina take us down,” adding and quoting President Hughes, “We were on our knees but we were not on our backs”¹⁰ This internal capacity to move forward in the face of disaster is a major characteristic of Francis’ and his colleague’s leadership. In addition to this foundation in instinct and internal emotional motivation these presidents also reveal the importance of the self-discipline that George contends is integral to authentic leadership. Thus the argument can be made that these leaders exhibited the authenticity of self-discipline even as they marched ahead inspired by the “adrenaline” of the moment.

“Courage” may be an overused word to characterize leadership. But courage is apt in the instance of these presidents. Their voices are permeated with affirmations about the desire and decisive approach necessary to move forward, and with a capacity to extend hope to others. For each of these presidents, the interplay of personal belief that they would find a way forward through the crisis coupled with a firm yet flexible leadership style proved to be critical. These traits were also a strong determinant of their core assertions about both the short run decisions and management of the crisis they and their institutions faced, as well as the longer-term issues that had to be addressed. In many ways this latter aspect of continuing to plan the recovery and what will be required to do so has placed an even greater leadership demand as time has passed because of the energy needed to sustain momentum and commitment for the longer haul. The challenge to maintain personal convictions and hopes that disaster can be overcome while providing realistic leadership about the prospects for their communities continues two years after the storm and likely will into the foreseeable future. The manner in which these presidents have successfully faced this challenge and maintained the faith of their constituents confirms the courage of their leadership.

Like Francis, President Hughes quickly confronted the situation developing for Dillard wrought by the hurricane. Hughes began her presidency at the university less than two months before Katrina struck. Prior to this appointment she had had an extensive career in academic administration, including serving as the President of California State University beginning in 1994. Upon leaving that position she could easily have “retired” from being a president. But she found herself drawn to Dillard and its presidential post, and unabashedly describes the attraction with the vocational expression of a bygone era “calling” as the voice that led her to the university.¹¹

Hughes had spent her first weeks on campus becoming acquainted with the university, the community in and outside the gates, and the students. The first year students had arrived about a week before the hurricane struck, followed by their upper class counterparts, thus Hughes had at least some opportunity to greet and meet them. She was on a retreat with Dillard’s senior administrative cabinet when the storm began. It was from there that she began the process that would lead, as at Xavier, to the evacuation of the campus and to a crisis that she describes in language almost identical to President Hogan as having “Never experienced anything so surreal.”¹² Hughes quickly returned to campus to make plans to shut down the university. Evacuating after overseeing the immediate emergency plans for the departure of students, Hughes like Francis went first to what appeared to be a safe and secure place off campus. But shortly thereafter she chose to leave the city, moving to Atlanta and establishing the university’s “new” headquarters with senior staff gathered there to maintain Dillard’s administrative functions as seamlessly as possible.

Like fellow presidents Hughes comments that it was “So unfathomable, left watching and seeing it unfold, though [at the time] not knowing the impact to the campus.” The media’s “attention was so focused on the Convention Center and the Dome” where thousands of residents were stranded, that other features of the city such as the Dillard campus
were simply being overlooked. Hughes managed by helicopter to get an “aerial view of the campus from which she was able to see only a lake of water 8-10 feet.” It was at this point she gained full awareness of the “massive reality [she had] to deal with” and that now confronted her and her administrative group, and the Dillard community.

During these opening days of the crisis for Dillard, Hughes recalls that the major task and challenge, given the disruption to normal power, electronic devices, and computer and internet capacity, was “to communicate with the campus community, the faculty and staff.” At that time her personal and human “reserves were focused on the people rather than the place.” The immediate decision forced by the total flood of the campus and its facilities was that she and her staff would have to relocate. By the second week she had made the move “to Atlanta as a command site with a team.” The good news and a tribute to the advanced planning that Dillard, like Xavier, had exercised was that the “emergency procedures had worked and that everyone was safe.”

As the scale of the crisis became more apparent, Hughes began to develop the administrative and organizational leadership that would be required. She reports that the “emergency planning team” she had relied on while on campus “was [now] no longer an evacuation team, but a planning team” to which she now added representatives of insurance companies, and Board members. She also had the good fortune to have a former FEMA member as part of this group. Though the team was in place and functioning, it was increasingly evident that any previously entertained hope there might have been about an early return of students and others to the campus and resumption of the academic year was simply unrealistic in anything like the short run.

Thus as Hughes and Dillard communicated with students, one bridge they had to cross, as Francis likewise had to with the Xavier community, was to be unambiguous about the “reality that they could not return in the fall.” But in explaining this, and reflecting the authenticity of her leadership vis a vis George’s trait of “practicing solid values,” Hughes was clear to tell students that despite the inability for Dillard to offer classes and residence on a normal basis she “wanted them to remain on course.”

Many students had already begun to register elsewhere for the fall term. Thus the coordination of these temporary transfers, the necessary collaboration with fellow institutions, and the development of fair requirements for maintaining status with the “home” college became technical matters that Francis and Hughes (along with Cowen and other New Orleans campus leaders) had to address. Decisions regarding their status had to be transparently communicated to students and to the other colleges and universities that came to be involved by temporarily accepting Dillard, Xavier, Tulane and other students from New Orleans’ colleges and universities. Guiding these transitions was another and a major leadership demand on Hughes and her team, and one that had to be handled with the utmost care and foresight. Any mishandling of these critical decisions and the communication of choices and expectations to students (as well as working candidly with the collaborating institutions that were accepting transfers) could have created enormous public and human relations problems and controversies. Given the crisis context, and the competing pressures and concerns vying for these leaders’ attention, the fact that such mistakes were avoided, when they might easily have been made, is another example of sound leadership conducted with foresight.

These and other university communities, as does much of society, depend for communication and organizational life on various technologies and systems that were temporarily out of commission. Institutional and other computer servers were compromised as the waters rose, and electricity was first interrupted and finally disrupted completely. E-mail, Internet use and institutional websites were first compromised and eventually could not be relied upon. Telephone service, including cell phones in cases where local transmitters or infrastructure were damaged, also became unreliable. However, from off-site locations these leaders and their staffs began to reestablish connections with their constituents, also now widely spread out in different geographical locales. When these technologies and devices—telephones, computer services and instruments, web and Internet connections—were again able to be used they were even more important than in normal times as the glue that held these university communities together. With these services functioning once more these presidents and their staffs were able to engage in re-building and re-establishing community, and to maintain critical communications and provide directions and information to students, staff and faculty.

Almost as quickly as Katrina wreaked its havoc, these presidents turned attention to the monumental tasks ahead. As these significantly disrupted institutions began the slow progress of return from the impact of the storm’s surge and the waters began to recede, Francis and Hughes embarked on rebuilding. Hogan likewise, though not facing problems to the degree of her counterparts in New Orleans, had to begin the process of addressing significant damage and partial destruction of many of Tougaloo’s buildings.
The confluence of issues caused by the storm created further unprecedented leadership demands on these presidents as they began steps in recovery. For example, because Hughes was so new to her position, members of her Board thought she might simply depart her presidency, thus leaving Dillard’s planning and rebounding to the Board with the president’s office vacant, a scenario that would have placed them in a most difficult position from which to recruit and attract a successor.17 Sensing this rumor, Hughes reacted quickly to remind and assure the Board about her sense of literal “call” to the position as their president in the first place. She viewed the storm and its aftermath as a signal serving further to underscore and confirm her initial premonition: the choice to come to Dillard earlier in the spring during the search process and subsequently with her arrival in the summer 2005 was indeed a “calling.”

Leading, as George expresses the traits of authentic leadership, from the heart or with the heart may not be a conventional view of leadership, and may be even more out of fashion in university communities so dominated as they are by reliance on presumptions of objectivity, rationality and rational thinking. But it is clear that Hughes felt something in her heart that she labels a “calling.” Despite the disaster that befell Dillard and her presidency in its early days, she continued to lead from the heart. This basis was at the core of the leadership she already was offering Dillard and that would mark her presidency as Dillard recovered from Katrina. Her leadership from the heart also no doubt inspired her rapid and savvy intent to dismiss rumors about a possible departure from office, and to assert a clear commitment to the university and to the “cause” she would fashion in undertaking Dillard’s recovery from catastrophe.

In these early days after the storm, one possibility facing Dillard was the prospect that the institution would either move elsewhere in the city or leave New Orleans altogether rather than trying to rebuild on site. Damage estimates, not completely known at this time, ended up being in the vicinity of $500-650 million dollars, many buildings totally destroyed and others so badly damaged that they would likely need to be torn down. It was unprecedented for an entire college campus to be covered with water, especially in many if not most locations to a height of the first floor of numerous buildings.18

There were preliminary signals from the Board and other stakeholders that it would be in the best interests of Dillard to re-establish itself elsewhere. Hughes wanted the university to take off the table any thought about giving up on New Orleans as their home.19 Thus she proposed that the Board pass, which they subsequently did, a motion that they would rebuild in New Orleans, that they would remain in the city even if it became impossible to return to the site of the university for its 137 years. Hughes believed it was critical for the community as well as other proximate and interested parties for Dillard to make an official stand confirming it would not leave New Orleans and attempt to begin again somewhere else. This was also a way for Hughes to maintain the focus of her Board and staff, as well as other Dillard stakeholders, on the pathway for rebuilding. She also knew that considerations other than a return to New Orleans, if possible on site, would only be a distraction from this mission. (It is clear from conversation with Hughes that she views this recovery and rebuilding as nothing less than a mission, or as noted above, a “cause.”) Francis similarly reports a suggestion made in early discussions about Xavier’s future that included the prospect that it merge with Tulane, a step that would have significantly altered its tradition and position (especially as an HBCU).20 Francis made certain that such a course of action was simply not going to be considered.

The rebuilding process for Xavier and Dillard continues more than two years (as of this writing) after Katrina. The immediate crises generated by the hurricane presented unprecedented challenges to these presidents. But the longer-term problems, difficulties, and decisions have likewise tested their leadership, albeit in different ways than during the initial stages of the crisis. No longer are instantaneous and instinctive leadership decisions and wisdom the primary requirement. The requirements of a long-drawn-out reconstruction and of the necessities involved to secure the future of these schools demands additional leadership abilities than others demanded by the crisis or certainly by normal times. As they move into this future, these leaders must exert the ability to persist, and to expend personal and institutional resources crucial to tasks that will continue for the foreseeable future. For these long-range tasks and the subsequent demands on their leadership, nearly all of George’s five traits of authentic leadership will come into play. This is especially true regarding these characteristics of George’s framework: that they be able to understand purpose, to establish connected relationships (maintaining those with senior staff but also with the various internal and external resources essential to continued recovery), and maybe most importantly to continue to demonstrate self-discipline.

From the outset of this phase of recovery and reconstruction, Hughes decided on a bold assertion and strategy. It appears she hatched the
idea personally and then navigated with her Board to garner support. Her strategic view and stance is simple, yet profound: Dillard would not only come back, but she and her colleagues would rebuild the campus and return the university to a standing even better as an institution than it ever had been. What she did was simply to take advantage of the opportunity, and this is an act of leadership vision (another overused but highly applicable word in this case), of the disaster that had befallen Dillard to argue that buildings and facilities would not only be renovated and newly constructed, but that the rebuilt campus would exceed a mere status quo ante. In this undertaking Hughes relies on, but simultaneously extends to an even deeper level, George’s notion of the leader embracing a sense of mission. Hughes remained fully aware of her and Dillard’s mission, and grasped a view of the crisis brought about by the hurricane as opening a door to a more grand future for the university.

Dillard was fortunate, and it is a reflection of Hughes and her institution’s capacity to “establish” as well as to utilize “connected relationships,” that it received significant assistance and aid from Brown University whose president, Ruth Simmons, is a Dillard alumna. Brown was one of many colleges and universities to offer support and to assist the higher education institutions of New Orleans in temporarily placing students, many of whom transferred immediately for the fall semester, and enabling them to lose little if any time and course credit. But Brown, leveraging and collaborating with Princeton, provided further and ongoing assistance to Dillard regarding facilities, long range planning, and other strategic support and technical capacity.

Each of the three presidents featured here placed themselves at the nexus of their respective leadership teams. As noted, there are great similarities in the leadership styles they utilized as they asserted command in the situations breaking over them and their campuses. They relied either on already in place and functioning presidential cabinets capable of operating for emergency planning purposes, or they expanded these groups as needed to include other players who would be crucial in response and recovery efforts. However, all three also delegated significant authority to these staff colleagues as well as other less direct “reports” in order to marshal the full capacity of their institutions in coming to grips with the crisis. Thus, while clearly in charge and exerting the authority of the presidency, these leaders use sufficient wisdom and knowledge that the most effective and efficient leadership approach, especially in the face of a crisis situation, is to employ to the fullest extent possible the expertise and ability of the other “leaders” of their campuses.

In addition to the normally expected set of skills and abilities that are arguably essential to college presidents, the Katrina crisis has required both that these de rigueur capabilities be applied to an extraordinary degree, and that complementary background and experience also be brought to the fore. For example, President Francis notes that his legal background served him well “mostly because of training to be hard-nosed” and to be able to ask the critical questions: “what are the problems, what are the solutions. How do you survive?” Emphasizing the above-noted importance of delegation he adds, “We thrived because we hired people smarter than us. You give these people authority to make decisions in their areas.” This latter leadership strategy, while important in normal times, is even more critical in a crisis situation. It is also another reflection of Francis’ authenticity as a leader who is able to establish and maintain connected relationships.

But the often resorted to leadership theories that highlight the value of delegation, particularly in crisis and urgent situations, are only good as far as they go. Francis points out that much of the capacity of his Xavier colleagues and staff was grounded in “the preparation of people who had the commitment to the institution.” Here were his staff and crucial personnel living “in temporary quarters, but they worked passionately for the campus to get back.” To Francis this is what made things work and enabled the university to respond and recover. He points out the irony that the “school had the largest enrollment in its history in August 2005.” Thus they had an enormous influx of students all of whom were “wondering when would we get back?” Due to the yeoman efforts of Francis and his staff and faculty, seventy-six percent were eventually able to return to campus by the following January (2006). The university developed plans enabling these students (especially valuable to those who had not taken courses in the fall term after the hurricane) to complete an entire academic year of study compressed between January and August 2006, the one year anniversary of the storm. Thus they would be on course for the subsequent 2006-2007 academic year.

Asked what kept him going during this time, Francis replies that it was the simple fact that “he knew he had a great staff, and if there were any doubts [about that staff] Katrina erased them.” Such belief and confidence, confirmed by the crucible of an almost unimaginable crisis, is a platform on which most leaders would hope to be able to stand. This grounding sustained Francis not only in the opening days of responding to what
Katrina wrought on Xavier, but even more so during the longer-term work that continues in the efforts to return the university to full stature and vigor. Francis sums up the hard work of his Xavier colleagues during the first months: “When the lights came on at the campus, it was like a lighthouse,” adding that “This is a crisis, but we still have our lives so we will make this work.”

Underlying the concrete actions and steps these three presidents undertook to address the immediate and longer-term effects of Hurricane Katrina are the personal rudders and compasses that guide them as leaders. Here we turn especially to George’s notion of leading from the heart. The question that arises is: what sustains leaders going in circumstances such as those faced by the Katrina devastation? What were the resources and reserves that kept them going through this time? The response to these questions discloses leadership characteristics that do not readily lend themselves to be “taught” in any conventional sense. Revealed in the actions and words of these presidents are a combination of instinct, experience, beliefs and values, and to some extent the throwback word, “faith.” The individual stories these presidents relate about what kept them going in the face of such disaster are unique. However, there are similarities in the perspectives and visions each employed and that have proved essential in enabling their institutions and communities to rebound. Regardless of the differences and similarities, the personal foundations of their authentic leadership is an important feature of what we are able to learn from them.

Though Tougaloo College was not as extensively affected as its colleague institutions to the south in New Orleans, the damage and upheaval to its campus was still significant. Placing what she and her community faced into a broad context, President Hogan asserts that she believes this was “a teachable moment for what much of the rest of the world has to cope with daily.” That is, however severe the picture appeared to be, it was finally only temporary compared to the daily, chronic deficits of infrastructure and resources experienced by many fellow human beings across the globe. From the very first moments she emphasized with her staff that Tougaloo’s students would “learn from us,” that the conduct of leadership at the college would not be missed by the students.

Hogan claims that her most immediate response was a “feeling of helplessness.” The campus suffered significant damage, had no electricity, and “There was no way to just call to get power up and running.” This was especially the case as recovery from the storm progressed and the reality was that “there were places locally [such as a hospital] that needed things” much more than the campus. As events and time unfolded, Hogan reports that she received “pressure from administrators” to try to use her and Tougaloo’s local influence in order to get campus power restored ahead of other institutions and areas of the city. But her response to these entreaties was that morally and ethically “she simply could not do” this and at the same time maintain any kind of good conscience. Hogan views “These judgments,” that she had to make during the response and recovery as “testing her values and conscience.”

Reflecting on the demands of dealing with such a cataclysmic event for her and her college community, Hogan reveals an internal journey of leadership guided by basic core principles. It is impossible, and outside the bounds of this inquiry, to know and to judge the extent to which the same central assumptions were at the basis of her presidency during “normal” times. Further, it must be pointed out that she and her fellow presidents faced with this disaster did not construct overnight a set of new values and leadership styles based on those principles. However, Hogan connects these values to her understanding of what took place in the face of this crisis. She reports finding herself continually thinking about the situation and what it meant. One thing that was unmistakable was “the things we did not have for this kind of disaster,” and that, as noted above, much of the world copes with such a paucity of resources all the time.

In an effort to be highly visible and to work closely with her staff, Hogan was on campus during the bulk of each day, much time spent walking around the campus to survey damage and to consult directly with staff supervising clean up. While out on campus early in the aftermath of the storm, Tougaloo’s safety and security and grounds directors told her that it was too dangerous to be personally on site. Shortly after, a tree fell near where she was standing, but with a hard hat, she continued to be side-by-side with her staff engaged in the clean up. Each day began with an early morning meeting of the administratve group she convened to handle recovery and planning. One of the perplexing aspects of what she faced as a leader was the “awesome responsibility to have to have answers when you don’t.” Staff were asking questions about what to do next and Hogan had to grapple with a balance between the need “to exude calmness, motivation, assurance,” and the reality that she and her group would navigate the unknowns together. She simply did not have all the answers and in many cases it was impossible to gather sufficient information from which to develop them. Thus Hogan was required to operate on the best sense of
how to proceed absent the normally desired knowledge and ability from which to be reasonably able to respond to the course of events.

Hogan underscores the experience of her fellow presidents confirming that in confronting a crisis such as this there is “No script. You do lead and act by instinct.” Nothing more revelatory than the basic principle of leadership, brought to even greater clarity by the hurricane, that Hogan declares as being that “There is no job that my colleagues might have to do that is beneath me.” Thus she acted, even when college safety and security and other buildings and grounds personnel urged her not to, by being physically present as much as possible on campus.

Concluding her reflections about the meanings derived from this experience, Hogan raises a yet deeper core underlying her leadership. First, she sets the recovery in the context noted above that in a sense this was a learning and a teaching opportunity for everyone. Students would see how the adults around them reacted and functioned. But also Hogan and her staff had to be prepared to learn a great deal themselves. Second, even in the crisis she was able to connect what was ahead to the continuing aspirations of Tougaloo, rather than merely treating the problems brought about by the storm as isolated from the broad mission and purpose of the college. She captures this by saying, “We are about the creation of future and we do this every day.” Thus what should be different about the tasks ahead in recovering from this natural disaster or any similar unanticipated calamity? The future that now had to be created was urgent and possibly more tangible than in days prior to the hurricane, but it remained nonetheless connected to the normal mission of the college: that is about the “creation of the future.” Hogan’s use of this utterance to underscore the importance of purpose and mission is also another reflection of her authentic leadership.

Lastly, she indicates the obvious but often overlooked notion that “As a leader you have to be prepared to take charge.” Hogan argues that she did this primarily from the basis of instinct. But then delving a bit more into the root of her instinct, Hogan suggests: “At your center you have to have faith,” which she defines as “Something that helps assure that you are not piloting the ship.” She assumes a philosophy that on one hand may appear naïve, but on the other may much be at the core of how a leader leads: “You know that it will be okay. That you will work to do the right thing. And it will come out okay.” These comments allude in Hogan’s case to her faith and belief in some “higher power” (though not describing this as God, she implies this to be the case). Drawing these elements together, she concludes that, “Leadership traits and spirituality are [the two qualities] that inform your style.”

As Tougaloo students returned to campus, only weeks after first being evacuated, Hogan strongly urged that they organize themselves to volunteer in the local community to assist in the continuing recovery and rebuilding efforts. This is further evidence of Hogan’s notion that the entire crisis presented learning opportunities and a teachable moment for all concerned. Hughes initiated a similar expectation and program at Dillard when students were able to return to campus. She wanted the university to be part of the recovery of New Orleans, so students became involved in service endeavors, service learning and research projects. This has been one of the salutary and broadly educational stories connected to the Katrina recovery: students from local colleges and universities, complemented by contingents of colleague undergraduates along with other volunteers from around the nation reaching out to the community, especially the most poor struggling against great financial and other constraints in an effort to return to their residences and livelihoods.

Like Hogan, Hughes reflects about what she learned about herself in the initial days and months, extending to two years and beyond, of coping with the presidential leadership challenges of a campus completely inundated by water and thus its future threatened by the ravages of the storm. Hughes comments, “that she had had a lot of career experience, but it was moving through hoops,” the traditional career trek through upward positions of increasing responsibility, first in academic administration and then to two presidencies. In a further reflection of her authentic leadership, Hughes underscores that confronting the Katrina damage was different because of the purpose” and it was these stakes, resurrecting Dillard from very possible demise, that Hughes came to see as a situation in which she “is working from a different base of strength and that is the thing that makes her move forward.”

As a coda to these presidential reflections, Francis reiterates the larger picture that was revealed in the face of this crisis. This is an important reminder to those who oversee and protect the gates of the academy on a day in and day out basis, but can be easily forgotten or neglected in normal times in which the challenges are more de rigueur. Francis says that as he and his staff assessed what they were facing, he came to the conclusion that “the goal was sacred, and that goal was to get back, and to get back for the students.” When the Xavier students were able to return to campus, Francis spoke to them at a convocation marking the long-awaited reopening of
the university. His message was simple: “the university and the students had overcome a major crisis,” and in response fellow “students from all over the country are coming to help.” Arguably Francis is both leading from his own heart, but he is also enjoining students and others in his audience to reflect from their hearts as they continued to respond to the crisis and to their situations. The result is to utilize authentic leadership to urge the Xavier community to view their experience at the deepest possible level of authenticity as George would have us comprehend it.

There are a number of lessons about leadership to be drawn from the experience of these three presidents and their colleges and universities as they faced the realities, fallout, and long road of recovery Hurricane Katrina caused. First, leaders are expected to move immediately to the fore, to direct the actions of their staff and community members. They may be forced by the circumstances and the rapid unfolding of events to do much of this on the basis of nothing more than instinct. In doing so they should, as they appear to in this case, follow the advice that has guided organizations such as NASA in the midst of crises such Apollo 13: If you do not know what to do, don’t do anything.

Hogan, Francis, and Hughes moved forward systematically, though at times probably haltingly and lurching in directions out of necessity, in order to utter the decisions that had to be made and provide direction. But they did so while permitting sufficient autonomy through broad delegation to their direct cabinet and emergency team administrators. Also as Hogan points out, there are times maybe especially in crises that the leader may not have all the answers. When this is the case, leaders need both to admit and to acknowledge this state of affairs to themselves and as their leadership strength permits to key staff and advisors as well. Yet while admitting such deficits of knowledge and apparent answers, the leader, as we see through these three, must still continue to shape and plot courses of actions.

Second, these presidents immediately worked to ensure that people were the priority and that all community members had to be enabled to be as safe and secure as possible. A combination of instinctive response, especially directed toward the students in their care, coupled with foresight and some degree of pre-planning (e.g. Xavier’s emergency procedures and information sources for such occasions), and probably a bit of good fortune resulted in this task being carried out in as timely, safe (no lives lost), and orderly a fashion as could be humanly imagined under the circumstances.

Next, in very rapid order these leaders turned attention to the recovery and rebuilding stage facing their campuses. They were forced to adapt because originally hoped time lines, aspirations, and goals regarding when their institutions might be able to re-open (much less a problem for Tougaloo given the relatively less extensive damage suffered than Xavier and Dillard) had to be pushed into a much more distant future. In the meantime all efforts were expended to ensure that students would be able to continue their educations at other institutions and to compress the academic and curricular aspects of their course work upon their return.

Another challenge that had to be faced was the degree to which the disruption of communication so crucial in keeping communities of people—students, faculty, administrators, staff, and other stakeholders such as alumni and key funding sources—together had to be addressed as soon as possible. In normal times campus constituencies are able to have regular contact with each other, much in person, as a bond uniting them. Central communication initiated by college and university administrations is assumed by virtue of the technological and other capacities commonly in use. The hurricane interrupted normal commerce and communication both internally among members of the campus communities, and externally with constituencies important in the communication network and to the recovery steps that had to be undertaken. At first despite these barriers and then as communications were more fully restored, the fact that these colleges and universities were able to hold together, that the presidents were able to apply the glue essential in bonding their constituents was a critical step in the human recovery and in the capacity for everyone to take initial steps on the road back and to envision the day of their return.

As the phase of initial decision-making and action was completed, Hughes, Francis, and Hogan were then able to dedicate leadership to the tedious process of dealing with contractors, lawyers, insurance providers, and local authorities. This phase continues to the present time (as of this writing, fall 2007, more than two years after the hurricane) and likely will for the foreseeable future. The matter of how fully and well Dillard and Xavier will return to the previous or an even improved state has yet to be realized. However, it is clear that Presidents Hughes and Francis are of a mind to settle for nothing less than seeing their institutions once again whole and positioned even more strongly than in the pre-Katrina days. If student enrollments are a reasonable measure, the fact that both schools are approaching or at pre-storm levels is one sign of a return to former position and stature.

Last, and most important in terms of contribution to what we know and believe about
leaders and leadership, are the stories of the internal journey of these presidents in Katrina’s aftermath. These presidents are individual leaders, maybe unique but maybe less so than might first be thought, who appear deeply religious in the broad sense, and who view their faith and beliefs having been put to the test by the crises they were forced to navigate. Their rhetoric conveys the following critical ideas about the leadership of colleges and universities: notions about the sacredness of their task, firm belief about the transcendent importance of creating and shaping the education of students, an intent to draw meaning from present travails and to envision that meaning as a sustaining force in the unknowns of rebuilding and recovery. The presidents add to these values the humbling understanding that while you are taking charge as a leader, the situation you face is not completely in your control and that you are thus functioning in light of more transcendent forces and powers. This grounding in faith, belief, and the sacredness of their duty supports the aspirations each has developed, internal counsel and conviction that they will be able to lead their communities and constituencies to a stronger and brighter future.

To substantiate this contention about the role of faith and belief as key elements in the compass of leadership requires a more thorough exploration of these or other leaders facing similar crisis circumstances. But a provisional conclusion can be drawn that belief in larger power(s) and in a view that plights be understood in a broad, possibly transcendent context, not unlike that of prophets and those of faith, was in the minds of these presidents and appears to have sustained them.

The view of leadership these presidents provide embraces George’s notion of authentic leadership. In the examples and stories we have reviewed, each of the three in their individual style as a leader, and in the common principles and values they share and have utilized in the leadership of their communities and constituencies reveal the traits of the authentic leader. That is leaders who understand, I would contend (though George is not necessarily arguing that these are distinctive), both their purpose and that of their institutions, practice solid values, lead with the heart, establish connected relationships, and demonstrate self-discipline. The crisis they faced did not alone make them authentic leaders. In fact, to perform authentically in the crisis caused by the hurricane they no doubt first had possess these values at the fundamental core of their leadership prior to being faced with the challenges of Katrina. However, in the events of the storm and the manner in which they led their communities in the face of it, these values of authentic leadership become plainly revealed.

Hurricane Katrina created for these presidents a nearly unprecedented confrontation with threats and challenges to the very foundations of their institutions, of the education offered to their students, and of professional prospects and futures of faculty, administrators, staff and other employees. As described in these interviews their journeys shed light on how leaders cope with such demands and how they sort through the choices facing them. Much of what they share cannot be “taught” in any conventional sense. However, as with all college and university presidents, these three bring to bear a combination of experience, instinct, ability realistically to size up that which confronted them, and sound judgment in addressing the tasks they faced.

We cannot always be certain that leaders in such positions and encountering such circumstances will lead in soundly fashion. The hope and expectations about their appointments and their capacities in office are always that they will be able to provide well-grounded leadership especially in such crucibles. In this instance, Hughes, Francis, and Hogan met the challenges of their day and to Dillard, Xavier, and Tougaloo in ways that guided their campus communities well, that reflect George’s five major characteristics of authentic leadership, and that hold lessons for those interested in the college presidency and in the engagement of leadership wherever it is exercised.

(See References following page.)
References

2 Ibid., p. 18.
3 Bill George, Interview with the author, June 23, 2003.
4 These three schools are also members of the Leadership Alliance, headquartered at Brown University. The Alliance was founded over fifteen years ago in the early 1990s with a purpose and mission to increase the numbers of minorities entering academic fields for the Ph.D. and other advanced degrees and the aspiration to increase those then electing to join the academic professorate by dedicating careers to scholarship and teaching at universities and colleges.
5 Telephone interviews were conducted with these three presidents on the dates indicated for each.
6 Beverly Hogan, President, Tougaloo College, interview with author, July 20, 2006.
7 Norman Francis, President, Xavier University, interview with the author, March 25, 2007. The account that follows is taken from this interview.
8 I interviewed Francis nearly a year and a half after the onset of the Katrina crisis.
9 At its 2007 Commencement, Brown University awarded honorary degrees to the three New Orleans college and university presidents, Hughes, Francis, and Cowen.
10 Francis interview.
11 Marvelene Hughes, President, Dillard University, interview with the author, November 15, 2006. The account that follows is taken from this interview.
12 Hughes interview.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid. One of the unfortunate realities that Dillard and likely other institutions continue to deal with now almost two years after the hurricane is debate and litigation with their insurers about fair compensation for losses suffered. The dilemma is that of reimbursement at the value of the property versus the cost to replace the facilities.
16 One of the positive stories to emerge from the diaspora of students from New Orleans’ campuses in the wake of Katrina is the cooperative relationship that instantly developed between institutions there and their counterparts who temporarily took in students so they could continue their educations, but with provisos such that students would be obligated to return to their home colleges and universities, not to become permanent members of other student bodies.
17 Personal conversation with President Hughes, May 26, 2007.
18 When Dillard finally reopened it held the spring 2006 commencement, albeit about two to three months late, on the main green, its traditional location in a picturesque and historic part of the campus lined by tall oak trees had to be nearly completely rebuilt, building facades restored, and the green itself re-sodded and new trees planted in order for it to serve once again as the commencement location.
19 Hughes interview.
20 Francis interview. HBCU’s are Historically Black Colleges and Universities.
21 Hughes interview.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Hogan interview. The commentary that follows is based on Hogan’s reflections.
27 This is a notion strikingly similar to that made by Theodore Sizer in *The Students Are Watching: Schools and the Moral Contract* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999), in which he notes that students in schools are always watching their teachers and that the messages they convey in handling themselves and the students are equally as powerful as any conveying of the curricular content they teach.
28 Hogan interview.
29 Hughes interview.
30 Francis interview.
31 Ibid.
32 George, p. 18.

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