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Intersectionality and an Intra-household Analysis of the Freedom to make Decisions on the Use of Household Products: Evidence from Rural Tanzania

By Christina Mwivei Shitima¹

Abstract

This study uses intra-household and intersectionality theories to analyze the relative benefit that household member's gain from the use of goods produced by households living along the Simiyu River in Tanzania's Meatu District. The ability to benefit from the use of goods produced by a household is defined as the freedom that a person has concerning decision-making about the goods that are produced within the household. Data were collected from different household members, including household heads, spouses and children who were 18 years and older and who were involved in the production of goods. The study findings highlight that the ability to benefit from the use of goods produced by a household differs between men and women, the old and young, and between members who have a different relationship to the household head, which suggests that differences in social identities associated with age, gender and marital status are important. Furthermore, some people are positioned at the intersection of different social identities, associated with age, gender and marital status, and thus they experience multiple effects. For example, due to their gender, marital status and age, older unmarried women are less likely to benefit from the use of goods produced by a household. The study concludes that the impact of social identities is not homogeneous across all household members.

Keywords: Intra-household, intersectionality, freedom to make decisions, ability to benefit

Introduction

Ability to Benefit from Goods Produced by a Household

In non-monetized rural economies, productive resources such as land for farming are owned at the household level, with different household members using these resources in the production of goods (Singh et al., 1986; Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1996). Some of the goods produced are consumed within the household and some are sold at the market to provide capital to meet other household needs. While household members engage in production to meet household consumption needs, they are also expected to use goods produced in the household to meet their personal needs and improve their livelihood. Literature on access to resources shows that being able to produce does not guarantee an improvement in livelihood if people do not have the ability to accrue benefits from the goods produced (Leach, Mearns, & Scoones, 1999; Sen, 1999; Agard et al. 2007). Leach et al. (1999: 233) have related this to "capabilities," that is, "what people can do or be" with the goods they have produced. This means that people engage in economic activities

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to achieve personal goals in their lives, and by doing so, they are able to achieve personal wellbeing. From this vantage point, what is important to individuals is not only what they have produced, but also whether they are able (they have some freedom) to use the goods to achieve the kind of life they value. In line with Agard et al. (2007) and Sen (1999), this study defines *the ability to benefit from goods produced by a household* as the “freedom to act.” This includes freedom to make individual or collective decisions on the use of the goods produced by a household for the improvement of livelihoods.

The literature has shown that socially constructed practices determine the freedom that different members have in the use of goods produced by a household (Leach et al., 1999). Differences in identity based on social constructs such as gender, age and marital status create diverse power relations, which further affect the use of the goods produced. Some people may take advantage of their power to gain more benefits from the goods than others (de Haan & Zoomers, 2005). Similarly, the livelihood outcomes of those people without power might be affected due to socially constructed practices that deny them the right to make decisions on the use of goods produced by a household. Furthermore, some people may experience greater disadvantages than others with respect to the right to make decisions because they fall into more than one socially marginalized group. Studies on intersectionality have shown that some people experience the impact of social marginalization associated with socially constructed practices differently to others, as they are positioned at the intersection of different social identities (Crenshaw, 1989).

On the basis of the above, this study argues that in rural areas of Tanzania, the livelihoods of some household members are negatively affected because they do not benefit equally from the goods that are produced within the household. Thus, the aim of this paper is to undertake an intra-household analysis of the ability to benefit from the goods produced by a household in rural Tanzania. In particular, the study applies intra-household and intersectionality theories to understand how different social identity categories interact to affect different household members' ability to benefit from the use of resources.

The paper adds to the literature which uses intra-household analysis of livelihood outcomes by collecting data from different male and female household members, including husband and wives, heads of households and adult children. The paper also moves beyond the analysis that considers social identities as separate categories, each with different outcomes for people's livelihoods, and attempts to grasp the impact of intersectionality on these social identity categories. The findings from this paper will be of use in providing recommendations for policy that targets groups of people who experience various and combined forms of marginalization in society.

The paper is structured as follows. The following two sections, Sections 1.2 and 1.3, present the literature on intra-household differences and intersectionality respectively. Section 2 provides a brief summary of our study area and is followed by our data collection methods and analysis in Section 3. The study findings are presented and discussed in Sections 4 and 5 respectively, while Section 6 presents our conclusions and policy recommendations.

Intra-household Differences in Access to Resources

In unitary approaches or common preferences models (Haddad, Hoddinott, & Alderman, 1997), the household is considered a single unit of analysis. These models show that in rural economies most of the household members are related (Ellis 1988), either through immediate family or kinship. Productive resources such as land are owned at the household level and all household members employ their labor power in the production of goods that are collectively used

by all household members. Furthermore, all household members are assumed to share the same level of welfare maximization, and have the same preferences regarding the production and consumption of goods (Becker, 1965; Singh et al., 1986; Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1996). One household member, often the head of the household, retains the right to decide how the resources are allocated to different livelihood activities and how the goods produced are used. Thus, the head of the household's preferences are assumed to be those that maximize the welfare of all household members (Anderson, Reynolds, & Gugerty, 2017).

While the common preferences models are useful in explaining how responsibilities and goods are distributed within households, they have been criticized for assuming that household members share preferences in relation to the production and consumption of goods and thus the same level of welfare maximization (Alderman, Chiappori, Haddad, Hoddinott, & Kanbur, 1995; Doss, 1996). Some studies have revealed that husbands and wives differ in their expenditure patterns. For example, Appleton (1991) and Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) found that an increase in the income of wives was associated with an increase in household expenditure on food and a reduction in the expenditure on alcohol and cigarettes. In addition, a recent study by Kazianga and Wahhaj (2017) found that in extended families in rural Burkina Faso, household members did not share the same preferences with regard to the production and consumption decisions.

Studies and models that explicitly focus on intra-household differences were developed as an alternative to these unitary models. In studies of intra-household differences, the existence of different preferences among different household members is explicitly taken into account. Consequently, intra-household resource allocation refers to the processes in which different productive resources are allocated to household members, as well as the resulting outcomes of those processes (see e.g., Haddad et al., 1997). These allocation processes may result in inequities in access to resources between household members and in the way the benefits of resources are used. Unequal power relations and conflicts of interest often characterize the decision-making process regarding the use of household resources and products (Evans et al., 2015). These processes are affected by "socially constructed" factors, in terms of norms and practices, rather than "biological" reasons (Agarwal, 1997: 2). Socially constructed practices create intra-household differences in aspects such as access to and control over resources, time and task allocation, and decision-making processes within households.

In rural areas of developing countries, the freedom to make decisions on the use of the goods produced tend to follow cultural norms and certain historical paths. Cultural norms result in differences in social identities and social status in terms of age, gender, wealth and ethnicity, and because of these norms "women and men are located at different levels of social and class hierarchies" (Khalid, 2015: 48). Customary systems tend to favor some groups in society, while placing other groups in disadvantageous situations. For example, empirical evidence supports the notion that the norms which deny women ownership of important resources result in women's lack of decision-making power on the production and consumption of goods. A study by Lyimo-Macha and Mdoe (2002) showed that lack of female ownership is among the reasons for women's limited decision-making power in relation to the allocation of land to different economic activities in Tanzania. In Ghana, women's participation in cash-crop production is significantly influenced by the control they have over household productive resources and household income (Zakaria, 2017). A recent study in Malawi revealed that women's control over land is an important determinant of an equitable division of income within the household (Djurfeldt, Hillbom, Mulwafu, Mvula, & Djurfeldt, 2018).

This study assumes cultural norms affect an individual's ability to benefit from the use of household resources in rural Tanzania. The ability to benefit may differ between household members due to differences in social status, in terms of age, gender and marital status, which are embedded in norms. Such social status may be used as a source of power in a society: those who hold such power may use it to gain more benefits from resources than others (Cleaver et al., 2013). As Dawsey and Bookwalter (2016: 940) pointed out: "If the power to allocate resources lies with household members that maximize their own utility, improving the economic situation of the household may not benefit all of its members."

Based on the arguments above, the following questions about the ability to benefit from the use of resources will be considered: (i) Are there intra-household differences in the ability to benefit from the use of goods produced by a household among households in rural areas of Tanzania? and (ii) Are there differences in the ability to benefit from the use of goods produced by a household that are associated with differences in the social identity factors of age, gender and marital status?

Intersectionality Theories

Studies on intersectionality have their roots in legal studies, in which the impact of law is analyzed based on gender, race and class. Crenshaw (1989) showed that in the US legal system, cases of gender and race are treated as separate social categories, while in real situations the two categories interact to produce greater oppression for an Afro-American woman compared to people in other groups. According to Crenshaw (1989), Afro-American women may be subjected to a double act of marginalization by being black (in ethnicity) and female (gender) compared to either an Afro-American man, who is marginalized only because of his ethnicity, or a white woman, who is marginalized only because of her gender. Hill Collins (1990) supported this theory by further arguing that it is vital to empower minority women by showing them how the interlocking of gender and race affects their livelihoods differently to other social groups. According to Hill Collins (1990), Afro-American women do not fit into either category because, historically, gender inequality usually concerns oppression faced by majority women and racism is reserved for the oppression faced by minority men. In summary, intersectionality theory postulates that people in marginalized social groups are not homogeneous, as some simultaneously belong to various marginalized social groups. Social category factors are interconnected with each other, resulting in either disadvantage or privilege to specific groups of people (Crenshaw, 1989).

Since its inception, intersectionality theory has been applied to different issues in different fields of study, such as labor market inequality, migration and health outcomes (Ogawa, 2017). Furthermore, while the theory was originally used to study how interactions between gender, ethnicity (race) and class affect Afro-American women, it was further extended to include other social identity variables, such as disability, religion and sexuality (Turner, 2011). For example, a recent study by Tariq and Syed (2017) showed that in the UK, Muslim women who were South Asian were more likely to experience challenges and discrimination in employment than Muslim women from other ethnic groups and Muslim men in general. The study also showed that because the norms of Muslim societies in South Asia expect women to take care of children, Muslim women are not only discriminated against by the ethnic majority in the UK, but also by ethnic minority men from a similar background.

Most work on intersectionality theories have studied the combination of social categories across different ethnicity/race groups. In our study, we argue that it is also important to study other differences in groups of people with similar ethnic backgrounds. Valdez (2016: 1619), for

example, pointed out that: “Different family members within an ethnic household may experience unequal opportunities”. Differences in power relations rooted in socially constructed practices determine access to resources among members of households. Valdez (2016) also argued that, in some cases, these intra-ethnic group differences might exceed the differences that are found between ethnic groups. Based on the arguments above, we will also consider the following question: (iii) Do age, gender and marital status intersect to affect the ability of people from different groups to benefit from the use of resources?

Study Area

The study is based on a cross-sectional survey among households residing along the Simiyu River in Meatu District in Tanzania’s Simiyu Region. The Simiyu River is located in the lake zone in the northern part of Tanzania, and is one of six rivers that drain into Lake Victoria on Tanzania’s side.² People who reside along the river are predominantly Sukuma in ethnicity and are known as Wasukuma. The Sukuma ethnic group are mainly agro-pastoralists who practice farming and traditional pastoralism.

Four villages from two wards were included in the survey. These villages were designated as K1 and K2 from Kijiji ward, and M1 and M2 from Mwananchi ward.³ K1 village is located along the main road from the Meatu District capital to the town of Bariadi (the Simiyu Region capital), while the other three villages are situated in more remote areas of the district. This means K1 village is more like a small town compared to the other villages.

Methodology

Data and Data Sources

Data and findings were triangulated by combining survey data with qualitative information collected through focus group discussions (FGDs). Prior to our survey, a pilot study was conducted to obtain information on the livelihoods of people in the study areas. This included information on the nature of the economic activities pursued. During the pilot study, interviews were conducted with government officials at the district council, ward and village levels. Information from the pilot study contributed to the confirmation of some of the explanatory variables, while some other information was useful for the elaboration of the survey.

Our survey, which was our main data collection tool, included 165 households and 424 respondents. The formula below was used to select the sample size, that is, the number of households to involve in the survey in each ward (see also Kothari, 2004).

$$n_{ward} = \frac{Z^2 pq N_{ward}}{e^2 (N_{ward} - 1) + Z^2 pq}$$

Where:

- n_{ward} = sample size, or the number of households in the ward
- N_{ward} = Ward’s population, or number of households in the ward
- p = the probability that each member of the population had an equal chance of being included in the sample

² Lake Victoria is the largest lake in Africa, shared by three countries, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, and is the source of the longest river in Africa, the Nile.

³ We encoded village names for anonymity.

- $q = 1-p$
- Z = the abscissa for confidence level
- e = the random error

The total number of households in the Kijiji and Mwananchi wards are 1,121 and 1,296, respectively. The study used $p = 0.5$;⁴ $Z = 1.96$, calculated from the chosen confidence level of 95%; and $e = 10\%$. The formula gave us the sample size (n) of 88 households in the Kijiji ward and 89 households in the Mwananchi ward. After attaining the required sample for each ward, the following formula (Kothari, 2004) was used to calculate the sample size that needed to be drawn from each village.

$$n(\text{village}) = \frac{N(\text{village}) * N}{N}$$

The formula gives the sample size of 49 and 39 for K1 and K2, respectively, and 54 and 35 for M2 and M2, respectively. In each village, a simple random method was used to select households to be included in the survey. At the household level, we collected intra-household data, that is, data from husbands (household head or spouse), wives (household head or spouse) and children (biological children who were 18 years or older). Four trained research assistants and one researcher administered questionnaires to the members of the households. Every respondent was interviewed separately from the other household members to avoid interference by the latter. Moreover, questions were made as specific as possible to lower socially desirable answers.

After the survey, focus group discussions were conducted with the aim of obtaining information to supplement the quantitative data analysis. Some members of the surveyed households were brought together in groups and involved in discussions on the main topic of our study: decision-making on the use of goods that were produced by the household. In each village surveyed, four groups of heads, spouses, and male and female members of households were formed from the households surveyed. Each of the four groups consisted of 10–15 members from 10–15 households.

The data collection process encountered several limitations. Some of the household members were not at home during the daytime as the survey was conducted during farming season. We solved this problem by revisiting those respondents at other times. Communication was also a challenge during the data collection, as some of the respondents, especially the women, only spoke Sukuma, which is their ethnic language. We addressed this problem by hiring translators to facilitate communication between researchers and respondents.

Data Analysis

To measure the ability to benefit from the goods produced by a household (FRDOM), respondents were asked the following question: “Could you indicate whether you: 1. disagree, 2. neither agree nor disagree, or 3. agree with the following statement: “I am free (have the freedom) to use what I have produced to achieve my personal goals in life.” This means that we consider FRDOM to be achieved if people perceive themselves to be free to make decisions on the use of the goods they have produced. FRDOM is a Likert scale, taking values from 1 to 3, whereby 1 = disagree (DG), 2 = neither agree nor disagree (NAD), and 3 = agree (AG). In this case, as the

⁴ Ekise et al. (2013: 34) argued that a p of 0.5 is normally used for all developing country populations.

outcomes of the responses were ordered in a particular manner, and the distances between the answers was not known, an ordered logit model (OLOGIT), or proportional odds model, was used to estimate the equation (Williams, 2016).

$$W_{ij}^* = Z_i^* \delta_i^* + v_i^* \quad v \sim Normal(0,1)$$

W_{ij}^* is a latent dependent variable that shows the choice that an individual i makes among j alternatives, which are ordered in a particular manner. The observed choices were based on reported feelings toward freedom and were ranked in an ordered manner. Z_i^* is a vector of explanatory variables relating to social identity factors and v_i^* is an error term. The model does not have an intercept; instead, it has two (i.e. $j-1$) cut-off points (thresholds) that the choices can fall within.⁵ If we let, μ_1 and μ_2 be the cut off points, with $\mu_1 < \mu_2$ the observed choice, W_i is defined as:⁶

$$W_i = \begin{cases} DG & \text{if } Z_i \delta_i < \mu_1 \\ NAD & \text{if } \mu_1 < Z_i \delta_i < \mu_2 \\ AG & \text{if } Z_i \delta_i > \mu_2 \end{cases}$$

These two cut off points, μ_1 and μ_2 , were estimated by the maximum likelihood procedure with the use of Stata 13/SE 13.0 software.

Three variables, age (AGEE), gender (FEMALE) and marital status (NOT_MARD), were used to measure social identity factors. Drawing on our pilot study, these factors were considered the main drivers of differences in social status and thus as providing some form of power to some members in our specific study setting. First, an assumption was made that older people may have accumulated more resources than those who were younger and thus the former would be more likely to have authority with respect to decision-making about the goods that were produced by the household. Thus, an increase in AGEE by one year was expected to be positively related to FRDOM. However, the study also assumed that the impact of age on the dependent variable might not be similar for all ages.⁷ Thus, another variable, age squared (AGE_SQ), was added to capture the change in slope as the number of years (age) increases. Since the impact of age on the dependent variable was assumed to be positive, AGE_SQ was expected to have a negative sign, as its coefficient (given by the first derivative) would be less than one.

Second, FEMALE was a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if a person was female and 0 if male. Since the majority of women in rural societies of Africa are denied access to important productive resources (see e.g., Ellis, 2000; Agarwal, 1997), the model assumed a negative relationship between FEMALE and FRDOM.

Third, the variable for marital status (NOT_MARD) took the value of 1 if a person was not married and 0 if a person was married. While there are several studies examining the impact of

⁵ In our model, $j = 3$ because the dependent variable, FRDOM, had three alternatives: DG, NAD and AG.

⁶ Post-tests were conducted to see whether the assumption of parallel regression/proportional odds were not violated. Results showed violation of the assumption, thus the analysis and interpretation of results were based on a more generalized model of ordinary outcomes; namely, the generalized ordered logit (GOLOGIT) model (Long & Freese, 2003; R. Williams, 2006).

⁷ The impact of AGE on the dependent variable may not be linear across all ages: a linear model would mean that each additional year of age would lead to a constant change in the ability to benefit from household products, irrespective of the respondent being young or old.

marital status on access to productive resources,⁸ we could not find any relevant literature on the relationship between marital status and decision-making power concerning the use of goods produced by a household. Thus, due to a lack of existing empirical evidence, the study assumed that both a positive and a negative relationship might be found between the variables NOT_MARD and FRDOM.

To assess the importance of a specific relationship to the household head, the variable HHREL was used. HHREL took values from 1 to 3, where 1 was a reference variable referring to the head of the household (HEAD), 2 = spouse (SPOUSE), and 3 = child (CHILD). Since socially constructed factors, in terms of norms and practices, largely determine how decisions are made within households in a particular society (Agarwal, 1997:2), we cannot determine with certainty the nature of the relationships between the variables that measure HHREL and FRDOM in our study area. Thus, the study expected that both a negative and positive relationship might be found between the variables that measured HHREL and FRDOM.

Results

Intra-household Differences

Table 1 presents the results based on our models. The findings related to different positions in the household, which correspond to our first research question, show that spouses and children are less likely to benefit from the goods produced by a household compared to the heads of households. These results were confirmed during the FGD, when respondents revealed that the decision on the production and use of household goods is reserved for the male head of the household (husband). Sometimes the household head does not even engage in a process of negotiation with the spouse or other household members. The spouse's responsibility is to take care of the family (children and husband). Some participants stated that there are some households where both husband and wife make the decisions, while in others the decisions were made collectively, including the spouse and adult children. A mother or children might make a decision to sell crops or livestock, depending on the household's needs at the time. However, some other participants insisted that there are very few families where all household members sit together and make decisions as it is against Sukuma norms. One man in K2 village said: "Allowing a wife to make the decisions on the use of crops is perceived as a man being submissive to a woman." The men were proud of their role, and argued that the culture of allowing only one person to be a decision-maker in the household is one of the reasons that Sukuma people do not have food shortages in their households.

In households where the husband was deceased or lived far away, the wife played the household head function to some extent. In some households, after selling crops, the father would ask other household members about their needs. He would then give them money to satisfy those needs and keep the rest of the money for himself. If the money appeared to be squandered by the father, the children could not argue with him. As one young man in M2 village said: "asking your father how he used the money is regarded as disrespecting your parent. Some parents may threaten

⁸ The literature has found that, in rural areas, the access that women have to important productive resources such as land is limited and often mediated through their male partners (Ellis, 2000; Agarwal, 1997). In the case of divorce or the death of a husband, most women are denied the access that they previously had (Agarwal, 1997). Other studies have shown that women who are not married can easily purchase their own productive resources (Englert, 2008) and thus they can easily gain decision-making power on the use of goods that are produced from those resources.

the children that they will curse them because of disrespect. Children keep quiet, as they fear being cursed by the parent.”

The results from the FGD also showed that in Sukuma traditions, it is common to find all children (married and unmarried) living at their parents' house. Both males and females marry at young ages (soon after completing their basic education). While a married daughter is expected to move into her husband's household, a married son is expected to stay at home with his wife until they have at least two children, and/or when they find their own land to cultivate. Thus, children cultivate the household land and all household members normally rely on the harvested goods. As the head of the household is considered the owner of the resources that are used in production, he is also the decision-maker regarding the goods that are produced from those resources. Male children mentioned that they always take their orders from the household head, who is the main initiator of all household production activities. Children only offer an opinion to the household heads on the use of crops or money from their sale, and do not make decisions. Even when a male child has produced the goods himself with his wife, he must still seek advice from the household head. As one male child in M1 village said: “I cannot make decisions on the use of the goods I produce without involving my old man. Even if a cow is mine, if I live at my parent's household I cannot make a decision to sell it without involving the old man. If I convince my father about the reason for selling it, then I will be able to sell it.”

Social Identity Factors

With regard to our second research question, the findings show that social status, in terms of age and gender of the respondents, were significant positive determinants of benefits from the goods produced by a household. The AGEE variable revealed that older people are more likely to benefit. As explained in the previous section, in Sukuma norms, the heads of households make decisions. In most households, the heads (parents) are the oldest members of the households. In the case of parents being too old to make decisions, the eldest son usually assumes the responsibility of household head. However, the eldest son will still seek advice from his parents on the use of goods. Giving an example from his household, one man in K2 village emphasized: “My father is too old to participate in production. However, he still makes all the plans about how to use products, for example, either to use cattle as the bride price for a son who wants to get married or sell them to get money to extend production.”

Among the Sukuma ethnic community, older people are important members of the extended family. They are considered wise and thus their decisions always seem to prevail. It is a norm to respect elders (parents and/or grandparents) within the household and within the community in general. It is expected that younger generations will respect the advice of their elders, even when the latter are no longer involved in the production of goods. As one man in M1 village said in this respect: “although I have my own household, I always inform my parents regarding production and investment decisions. Even if they are old, they still have authority over whatever I do, and I always consider their advice to be the best.”

The results for the FEMALE variable revealed that women appear to be less likely to benefit. Findings from the FGD confirmed these results by revealing that among the Sukuma ethnic community the right to make production and consumption decisions is reserved for the men. Only men have the right to own productive resources such as land and cattle, and thus they make decisions on how to use those resources and how to use goods that are produced from those resources. Women are expected to engage in production by using the resources that are owned by their spouses, or by using family household resources if they are not married. Men involve the

women either by asking them for their advice or by informing them; however, women do not make decisions. As one married woman (spouse) in K1 village said: “Even if we cultivate together, all of the crops produced are owned by the head of the household. Sometimes I pray to God that my husband will spare some of the crops for household consumption because he may decide to sell everything. Even when I decide to sell some of the crops myself so that I can buy my own stuff, he takes the money away from me.”

During the discussions, it became apparent that women earn income from the production of crops that are considered female crops; for example, nuts, beans and sweet potatoes. However, most women are not free to use the money from these crops without a man’s involvement. As one woman in K1 village said: “When a husband sees you have money, he takes it away from you. Sometimes he sells the female crop and keeps the money for himself. If you need some money to buy something for yourself, such as a new dress, you have to ask your husband for money.” One thing that women in all of the villages had in common is related to the nature of the benefits they chose to receive from the sale of their crops. They all reported that when they sell female crops they never use the money to invest in assets such as land or cattle because those assets traditionally belong to men. As one woman in M1 village said: “Even when a woman pays to buy a piece of land, the husband would be the one to do all the negotiations and the documents would be in his name.” Women from all of the villages also said that they would never use their money to buy cattle because men can use cattle as the bride price to marry more wives. Thus, for women, they would rather use their money to buy things such as chairs, tables, beds and mattresses and not invest in assets used in production. While women thus use female crops as the major source of income to support their personal needs, it was observed during the FGD that men have started to produce female crops because of an increase in the market price of some of them. This has left women with few crops under their control.

Intersectionality

The final research question seeks to assess whether social identity factors intersect to affect the ability of people from different groups to benefit from the use of resources. An analysis of the interaction of the social identity variables showed that older unmarried females (FMAG_NOTMARD) were less likely to have the freedom to make use of the goods produced by a household compared to young unmarried females. During FGD, we found different results for widows and divorced women. In this respect, one man in K2 village mentioned: “Traditionally, a woman does not possess land and cattle: she owns home utensils like cooking pots and her clothes. If she gets divorced or becomes a widow and returns home, she cannot make decisions about the use of food that is grown at home.” Widows who do not leave the household after the death of their spouse were reported to have decision-making power over the use of goods. However, widows who were too old to make decisions depended on their children to make them.

An analysis of the interaction between female gender and spouse was not carried out because the majority of spouses (97%) were females. However, the results of the analysis of the interaction between SPOUSE and AGE (SPC_AGE) showed that older spouses – which, as mentioned, in our study were mostly female – were less likely to benefit compared to young spouses. Findings from the FGD showed that decisions concerning the use of goods produced by a household were largely made by men, regardless of the age of the spouse. However, the situations may differ when husbands have more than one wife. A man who possesses a large amount of land, for example, may decide to allocate a piece of land to each of his wives. Thus, every woman then cultivates her own field with her children, although the husband remains the custodian of the crops.

The women complained that dividing the piece of land equally among all wives usually leaves the wife with many children (usually the eldest wife) in a difficult situation. As one woman from K1 explained: “The eldest wife usually has a large number of children to take care of. If this woman is given the same sized parcel of land as those who married recently, she will not be able to produce enough food for herself and the children. In such a situation, the eldest wife’s livelihood is seriously affected compared to the other wives.”

In a situation of polygamy, where all wives cultivate the same household farm, the husband may be the one who makes decisions on behalf of everybody in the household, or he may delegate that right to one of his wives. One woman in K2 village complained about this: “I am mistreated by my husband and his other wife. My husband decides everything with his youngest wife and leaves me with no decisions on the use of the goods we produce.”

Table 1: Ability to Benefit from the use of RBR: Overview of Findings⁹

	Model 1			Model 2		
	DSG	NAD	P	DSG	NAD	P
Informal social relations						
AGEE	0.05	0.03	0.05**	-0.08	-0.04	0.01**
AGE_SQ						
FEMALE	0.37	-0.68	0.00**	0.89	-1.83	0.00**
NOT_MARD						
Relationship with the head of household: HHREL						
SPOUSE	-1.31	-2.14	0.00**			
CHILD	0.46	-1.36	0.00**	-5.07	-5.07	0.00**
Interactions						
HHREL with AGEE, FEMALE or NOR_MARD						
SPOUSE						
SPC_AGE				0.01	-0.02	0.00**
CHILD						
CHL_AGE				0.28	0.11	0.00**
CHL_FEM				-2.08	1.44	0.00**
CHL_NOTMARD				-3.02	-3.02	0.02**
NOT_MARD & FEMALE & AGEE						
FMAG_NOTMARD				-0.10	-0.12	0.00

** Significant at 1% level; * Significant at 5% level. Source: Stata output/Own estimation

This study also attempted to determine whether there were differences between old and young children and between married and unmarried children in the ability to benefit from goods produced by a household. The results for CHL_AGE showed that older children are more likely to benefit compared to younger children. Furthermore, unmarried children (CHL_NOTMARD) were less likely to benefit compared to married children. As mentioned in the previous section, in

⁹ Model 1 presents results that do not include the interaction variables. Model 2 includes the effects of the interaction variables.

Sukuma tradition, all children (married and unmarried) live at their parents' house with their wives and children. The parents make all of the decisions on the use of goods produced in the household. However, when the household has a large amount of land, a married son of older age may be given a piece of land to cultivate with his wife.

For the female children, the survey findings differed from the results we found during the FGD. More specifically, the survey findings showed that female children (CHL_FEM) were more likely to benefit. However, during the FGD, we found that young unmarried women who cultivate their own crops are not free to sell their crops without seeking permission from their parents, and they particularly talk to their mothers about this. In most cases, these young women cultivate female crops with their mothers, and their mothers become custodians of the crops. The mothers may thus control the crops and ensure that the money is used to buy clothes and other things their daughters require. In K1 village, while some unmarried female children said that they had the freedom to make decisions on the use of the "female" crops they produced, the married females (daughters-in-law to the heads of the household) said that their husbands controlled the "female" goods they produced. As one woman in K1 village woman said: "When the husband sees I have the money, he takes it away from me. He even sells the crops that I harvest. If I want to buy something, I have to ask for the money from him. Sometimes he gives me less than I asked for." Thus, the situation is much worse if a woman lives with her parents-in-law, as she does not even have a say over the women's crops. Mothers-in-law are expected to be custodians of all the women's crops. In fact, young married women seem to have more difficult lives (in terms of access to money) than those who are not married. As one young married woman who lived with her parents-in-law said: "I cannot make decisions on the use of the goods that I produce with other members of the household because my mother-in-law and my husband decide everything on my behalf."

Discussion

This study analyzed intra-household differences in the ability to benefit from the use of goods produced by households living along the Simiyu River in Meatu District in Tanzania. Although men and women have different needs and goals in their lives, our findings showed that the decision-making power concerning the use of the goods produced is largely reserved for men. Furthermore, while different household members were involved in the production of goods, the findings show that the right to make decisions on the use of the goods that are produced within a household are reserved for the household head. Other household members (spouses, children and daughters-in-law) depended on the household head for decisions on the use of goods. These findings are in line with two studies conducted by Holmboe-Otteson and Wandel (1991a, 1991b), both in Tanzania, who reported conflict between household members in relation to the question of what to produce and how to use income that is earned from selling the goods produced. While men preferred the cultivation of cash crops over food crops for the purpose of income generation, women were more interested in the cultivation of food crops to provide the household with sufficient food. Income that is earned from cash crops is largely accrued by the men. Another reason why women did not favor the production of cash crops was because they had to expend more of their own labor on the crops, while being less likely to benefit from the income earned from them. Cultivation of cash crops also leaves women with little time for the production of food crops.

These findings imply that the livelihoods of women (and other members of households) are likely to be affected when men (or heads of households) make more individualistic decisions,

or decisions that do not improve the livelihoods of women (and other members of the household). Other studies have shown that, unlike women who tend to focus on the needs of entire households, men's expenditure, including in Tanzania, tends to be more individualistic, with a focus on satisfying their own needs (Feldman, 1989). This may negatively impact the livelihoods of women and other members of households, since household members might have differing preferences on the consumption of goods they produce.

Our findings confirm intersectionality theories that claim that some people face discrimination on multiple levels because they belong to multiple marginal social identity groups. Our findings revealed that older spouses and unmarried children were less likely to have the freedom to make decisions on the use of goods produced by a household. Since the majority of spouses in our sample were females, the findings imply that older married women in the Sukuma community were also denied rights to make decisions on the use of the goods they produced. These are some of the consequences of the socially constructed practices that divide people into different classes in a social hierarchy.

In addition, our finding that unmarried older females were less likely to have the freedom to determine which goods are produced by a household implies that being female, older and unmarried is even more disadvantageous in Sukuma community. The norms in Sukuma society that deny women the right to own land and other important resources such as cattle put unmarried women in a more disadvantageous situation compared to married women. Women can only access land through marriage, mainly by cultivating their husband's land. Older women who live in their parents or another sibling's household may face more discrimination in relation to the use of household goods, as the goods they produce are considered culturally not to belong to them. In line with previous research (see also Van Aelst & Holvoet, 2016), being married is more important to women compared to men in rural areas of Tanzania. If women had the right to own important productive resources, they would not have to depend on marriage to engage in activities that improve their livelihoods.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

This study analyzed intra-household differences in the ability to benefit from the use of goods produced by households living along the Simiyu River in Meatu District in Tanzania. In general, the study found that both women and men play major but different roles in the production of crops, whether cash or food crops. While both women and men are involved in the production of cash crops, women also assume substantial responsibilities for providing their households with food by engaging in subsistence farming of vegetables and legumes that are directly consumed by the household. Despite their important roles, women often have subordinate positions in decisions regarding the use of goods that have high market value. Men are held responsible and have control of cash crops and other goods that are sold in the markets, while women only have control over crops that are not sold in the markets.

The findings confirm intra-household theories by showing that members of households do not have equal decision-making powers on the use of goods that are produced by the household. Heads of households appear to have more decision-making power than other household members. This is not necessarily a bad practice, especially if the needs of other household members are well considered in the head of household's decisions. However, this is difficult to achieve in reality, as people have different goals in their lives. It is practically impossible for women to have any decision-making power because of the social norms that restrict their role. Social norms also affect

the decision-making power of male household members who do not own productive resources. In the Sukuma community, most household members do not own resources to produce their own goods: the majority of household members only have recourse to their own labor power. Furthermore, in line with intersectionality theories, this study found that some people face discrimination at multiple levels as they are assigned multiple marginal social identities. Because of their gender, marital status and age, older unmarried women were found to be positioned at the intersection of multiple social identities and their related effects: their multiple social identities put them in a more disadvantageous position in relation to the use of goods that were produced by the household.

The study findings revealed that it is important to study people's agency in terms of their abilities to gain benefits from the activities they engage in. This is particularly important in rural areas, where production and consumption decisions occur at the household level. It is therefore recommended that governmental organizations, such as the Tanzania Social Security Action Funds (TASAF), as well as other non-governmental organizations which are working on the improvement of rural people's livelihoods, consider reaching out to different groups by focusing on different levels of marginalization faced by people due to their social identity.

This study adds to the intra-household literature by quantitatively analyzing the impact of social differences on the ability of different household members to benefit from the use of goods produced by a household. In addition, the study included data that categorized household members into different groups according to their relationships with the household head. We caution that the validity of the findings may be limited to the study areas and to other communities with similar cultural backgrounds (Sukuma communities) in other districts of Tanzania. The generalization of these findings to other areas with different cultures might be impossible. However, we recommend that further research uses a larger sample that includes different ethnic groups to explore the importance of cultural and other regional differences in more depth, especially in regard to the ability to benefit from goods produced by a household.

The study also adds to the intersectionality literature by showing how different social identities related to age, gender and marital status interact to bring about different outcomes for different people in relation to their ability to benefit from goods produced by the household. The findings revealed that being older and female (an older spouse or an older unmarried female) had no advantage in terms of the freedom to make decisions on the use of household goods. It is highly likely that there are further differences related to different types of marriage (monogamy/polygamy) or different categories of unmarried women (widow/divorcee/never married). Sukuma is one of a number of ethnic groups in Tanzania that practice polygamy, which may bring even more social differences into play compared to monogamous marriages. Further study should explore whether the position of women in a marriage, being the first, older or younger wife, for example, leads to differences in the freedom to make decisions on the use of household goods. This may not only be due to cultural factors but also relate to a husband's preferences.

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