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On the Relationship between Gender Roles Attitudes, Religious Ideology and Familism in a Sample of Adults in the United States

Carlos Siordia¹

Abstract

Family and religious ideologies may influence gender role attitudes in the United States, where gender inequality persists. Research suggests that family and religious ideologies shape beliefs of how men and women should behave—where gender egalitarianism is lowest amongst those with strong family orientations and/or strong patriarchal religious ideologies. This article investigated if and how family and religious ideologies are related to gender role attitudes by using cross-sectional data from the Longitudinal Study of Generations (n=1,615; mean age=50; 61% female; 32% racial minorities). Results indicate a direct relationship between gender role ideology and the following: religious ideology and familism. Because gender equality is important, future studies should investigate the causal mechanisms by which religious ideologies and familistic beliefs influence social stratification through gender role attitudes.

Keywords: Aging, Gender Equality, Ideology, Attitudes, Family

Introduction

In the United States (US), women began to demand fair treatment during more than half a century ago (Chisamya et al., 2012), with the Women's Movement during the 1970s achieving the passage of the Women's Educational Equity Act of 1974 (Conrad et al., 2014). Long before these events took place, Gordon W. Allport (1954) explained that the most important categories a woman or man has are their own personal set of values—which be obtained from society, family, and religious beliefs. Allport explained that personal values are seldom thought of and frequently felt, affirmed, and defended. In his discourse, he concluded that because our core beliefs are deeply imbedded with our identity and self-being—as they affirm our way of life—they often lead us to the brink of prejudice and discrimination.

For example, our personal beliefs of how individuals from different sexes should behave (i.e., our gender role attitudes) serve to create stratification systems by distinguishing individuals into different social statuses, assigning them different rights, and divergent responsibilities (Lorber 1994). It may be that our personal values are deposited, maintained, and morph in us through social interactions. As a result, gender role attitudes may be deeply intertwined with all aspects of life—potentially being influenced and influencing the creation and maintenance of unjust social

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stratification. Fortunately, gender role attitudes may shift toward egalitarianism over time and place: between birth cohorts; over the life-course; and between nations.

Although progress continues (Davis and Greenstein 2009), and argument could be made that gender inequality in the United States (US) persists. For example, a study found that in the US, people are no longer becoming more egalitarian with regards to gender role attitudes (Cotter et al. 2011). Research continues to investigate how social institutions, like the family and religion, influence social stratification through gender role ideology (Guiso et al. 2003; Morrisson and Jutting 2005; Sen 2007). Interest in what affects gender role attitudes is in part due to findings linking said attitudes to fertility (Cunningham et al. 2005), post-secondary education aspirations (Davis and Pearce 2007), and other outcomes (Whitehead 2012; Silverstein and Giarrusso 2012). Investigating the statistical relationship between social ideologies and gender equity with quantities techniques is important for women studies as it helps identify potential targets for interventions (e.g., education) aimed at improving equality between sexes.

From a review of the literature, investigations indicate that gender inequitable attitudes contribute to unequal outcomes for women (Seguino 2011). For example, economists have found at the international level that about one-third of the male-female wage gap could be attributed to gender discrimination (Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer 2005). Because gender hierarchical attitudes are a reflection of power relations in a society, they merit research attention. This study used an empirical model to explore how gender role attitudes were associated with family and religious ideology in a sample of adults in the US.

The study contributes to gender studies literature by investigating how gender role attitudes are quantitatively associated with religious and family ideology in a large group of southern California residents. Although it is assumed that gender role ideology has the potential for creating social and economic gender inequality, the project does not determine if female study subjects “suffer” as a result of gender inequitable attitudes. Instead, the investigation focuses on determining if proxy measures of religious and family ideologies are associated with traditional gender role attitudes—where “traditional” beliefs are framed as less egalitarian.

Gender Roles Attitudes

Previous work has argued that the institutions of family, religion, and gender intersect (Edgell and Docka 2007) in a bidirectional interaction that can be mutually reinforcing and/or contradictory (Martin 2004). Through human interaction, both family and religion influence the social construction of gender role attitudes (West and Zimmerman 1987). In turn, gender role attitudes may influence how individuals’ belief females and males should behave in their between- and within-gender interactions. As a result, beliefs about gender have the ability to influence behaviors and lead to systematic reproduction of female disadvantage—an undeserved inferiorization.

There are two main theoretical approaches for framing gender role attitude investigations. In the first, micro-level explanations are used to explain that if an individual benefits from gender equality, they will be motivated to abandon traditional gender attitudes. Research strongly supports the idea that females support more egalitarian gender ideologies (e.g., Bolzendahl and Myers 2004). The second theoretical approach, at a macro-level, uses socialization to explanation gender attitudes (Corrigan and Konrad 2007). Using this approach, researchers have found that religious practices and ideologies are linked with gender role attitudes (Abouchdid and Nasser 2007).

Religiosity is commonly measured with religious affiliation (Bang et al. 2005), religious service attendance (Ammons and Edgell 2007), and biblical literalism (Read 2003). This study is

in the realm of the latter category. Regardless of religious affiliation and degree of interaction with like-minded individuals, the intensity with which a person regards his/her biblical beliefs has been found to relate with gender role ideology—where more biblical literalism is related with more less gender egalitarian ideologies (Chaves 1997; Davidman, 1991; Denton 2004; Hoffman and Bartkowski 2008). It should be noted that both religious and familistic ideologies are themselves produced by other social factors (e.g., historical conditions) that may lead said ideologies to play a key role in forming group solidarity (Verweij, Ester, and Nauta 1997). More technically, it may be argued that feedback loops between cultural, economic, and social macro-conditions are manifested in the formation of familistic and religious ideologies (Seguino 2011).

Religion and Gender Role Attitudes

Formal religious institutions, although not monolithic, may influence the religious ideology that impacts gender role attitudes (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Although religious ideology may help support the psycho-emotional wellbeing of individuals, they may also inculcate gender inequitable norms. In the US, religious ideology and gender role attitudes are deeply intertwined and interdependent institutions (Christiano 2000; Edgell 2006; Sherkat and Ellison 1999). Some have argued that religious institutions in the US have been primarily concerned with the production of familism (Christiano 2000; Edgell 2006)—and thus the formation of gender role attitudes. Religious ideology on familism, and thus gender roles, has defined which behaviors and beliefs are legitimate, valuable, and even essential for a healthy social order (Bellah et al. 1991; Bendroth 2002; Christiano 2000; Cott 2002).

For example, some have argued that most mainstream religious institutions in the US promote monogamous, reproductive heterosexual marriages (Sherkat and Ellison 1999; Siordia 2014). Others have explained that religious ideologies help promoted ideas that interpret women and men as fundamentally different (Edgell and Docka 2007)—where the genders develop in separate spheres: males in the public sphere (e.g. work); and females in the private sphere (e.g. home) (Bendroth 2002; Christiano 2000; Cott 2002; Sherkat and Ellison 1999). The "traditional" belief of what a family is and should be—as informed by religious ideology—could then be said to promote the reproduction of gender inequitable attitudes, where men and women are seen as fundamentally different and where females assume a subordinate role. Some have argued that these traditional family ideals, born out of religious ideology, are founded on androcentrism, gender polarization, and biological essentialism (Bern 1993). If the religious institutions, shaping religious ideology, could be said to reflect patriarchal values, then it could be argued that males benefit from the system at the disadvantage of females (Norris and Inglehar 2004; Sen 2007).

If religious ideologies in their current state help perpetuate gender inequitable attitudes, then we could expect those who exhibit stronger religious opinions to hold more traditional gender attitudes. In this study, strong religious ideology is cast as being related to traditional gender role attitudes. This framing is not intended as a value judgment. Instead, when it is said that an individual differs in the degree to which they hold traditional gender role ideology as a function of their religious ideology, the statement simply points out the fact that the two are related in a detectable way: high religious ideology is associated with more traditional gender role attitudes. As has been done before, social scientific tools are applied to investigate the quantitative relationship between religious ideology and gender role attitudes (Stark and Finke 2000).

Family and Gender Role Attitudes

The family, as a cultural schema (Sewell 1992) is a powerful and life-shaping institution. A person's family ideology is her/his internal template for understanding the public and private nature of gender roles (Cott 2002; Eichler 1997; Hareven 1991). Ideas about what a family is (and should be) create the cultural repertoire through which men and women shape their personal beliefs as they form their own families (Gillis 1997). For example, some have argued that the ideal family in the US is commonly taught of as being comprised of married female-male couples raising biological children (Smith 1993). In the US, where social norms commonly embody gender hierarchy, the heterosexual family with an unpaid female caretaker is emphasized. The female, whether as a mother or daughter, is then relegated to a lower social stratum—making fathers and sons the most socially and economically valued family members. These historically held social norms on gender hierarchy may have begun shifting as females began to enter labor force participation in large scale during the (Siordia & Leyser-Whalen, 2014) and as same-sex family units increase in the population (Siordia, 2015).

Individual views on “family” ultimately coalescent to influence society by informing institutional routines (Edgell 2006)—formal (e.g. legal) and informal (e.g. who should raise the children). In this study, “familism” was roughly conceptualized as a method for social organization in which the interests of the individual are subordinated to those of the family (Heller 1970; Bermudes et al., 2010; Marin, 1993; Perez and Cruess, 2011). Familism has been conceptualized differently (Taylor et al., 2012; Keeler, Siegel, and Alvaro, 2014) and commonly includes the idea of familial obligation (Losada et al., 2008), using family unit as a referent for behaviors (Rodriguez et al., 2007), and family as a place for emotional engagement and financial cooperation (Rueschenberg and Buriel, 1995).

Reciprocated obligation is believed to help create strong attachments within the family unit and a sense of belonging (Ayon et al., 2010; Alegria, Shrout, Woo, 2007). The main idea is that a family unit has the potential to provide the foundation upon which women and men built their gender roles attitudes. An individual's family unit influences their systems of beliefs on how gender, sexuality, and reproduction are connected (Bern 1993; Smith 1993). Although beyond the goals of the current project, it should be noted that in addition to family members, strong ties within social networks may be intricately connected with the formation, maintenance, and shaping of gender role attitudes.

If familistic values in their current state perpetuate gender inequitable attitudes, then we could expect those who exhibit stronger familistic opinions to hold more traditional gender attitudes. In this study, strong familistic opinions are framed as being related to traditional gender role attitudes. The assumption is that Familism is an acceptable but proxy measure of personal beliefs related to gender inequitable attitudes. As with religious ideology, this framing is not intended as a value judgment. When it is said that an individual differs in the degree to which they hold traditional gender role ideology as a function of their family views, it simply highlights their relationship: high familistic ideology is directly connected with more traditional gender role attitudes (Stark and Finke 2000).

Research Question

The cross-sectional and exploratory quantitative research has two main research questions. The first research question was: Is *religious ideology* related to traditional gender role attitudes? From reading existing work, a direct relationship (i.e. positive correlation) between religious ideology and traditional gender role attitudes was hypothesized—where high religious ideology is

present with more traditional gender role attitudes. The second research question was: Is *familism* related to traditional gender role attitudes? From reading the literature, a direct relationship between familism and traditional gender role attitudes was hypothesized—where high family orientation is present with more traditional gender role attitudes.

Methods

Data

The analysis used Wave-7 (2000) data from the Longitudinal Study of Generations (LSOG). The LSOG is a study whose baseline cohort was derived from sampling from more than 840,000 members of a primary health maintenance organization serving Southern California at that time (Bengtson et al. 2002). Details on the sampling methodology and survey instrumentation are available elsewhere (Bengtson 2004; Silverstein and Giarrusso 2012). After excluding all those under the age of 21 and those with missing values for the variables of interest, the final analytic sample contains 1,615 subjects.

Participants of the LSOG study come from a specific geographic region in the southern part of California, are non-representative of the general population in income and education attainment (being slightly above average), and are largely made up by individuals who have a religious affiliation with the Latter-Day Saints organization (commonly refer to as Mormons). Because LSOG study participants are not randomly selected from the general US population, caution should be used to not generalize the findings to the general US population. Despite the limitation with generalization, the analytic sample and the available variables are valuable for women studies. The sample and available measures provide a unique source of information for understanding gender role attitudes.

Gender Role Ideology

The degree to which traditional Gender Role Ideology (GRI) was present was measured by creating a scale from four items. The LSOG adapted previous work (Levinson and Huffman 1954) to create the following GRI statements:

1. Some equality in marriage is a good thing, but by and large, the husband ought to have the main say in family matters
2. It goes against nature to place women in positions of authority over men
3. Women who want to remove the word obey from the marriage service don't understand what it means to be a good wife
4. The women's liberation ideas make a lot of sense to me.

Individuals were allowed to response with: strongly agree (=1); agree (=2); disagree (3); and strongly disagree (=4). Item number four was reverse coded to follow the same patten as the previous the first three items—where responding with agreement is interpreted as upholding more “traditional gender role attitudes” than those who disagree. The reliability of the scale, assessed by Cronbach's alpha, was 0.85. GRI is the dependent variable in the empirical models and had the potential for ranging from 0 to 16—where high numbers signaled the individual held more traditional gender role attitudes. A discussion on the limitations created by using this scale is given in closing.

Religious Ideology

The intensity of Religious Ideology (RI) was measured with four items. Because many of the study participants are Mormons, a religious organization typically characterized for having a patriarchal structure, RI should be interpreted with caution. The broad term of religious ideology was used because not all study participants identify as Christian and/or Mormon. Data from LSOG on religious ideology was guided by previous work (Comrey and Newmeyer 1965) to create the following statements:

1. This country would be better off if religion had a greater influence in daily life
2. Every child should have religious instruction
3. God exists in the form as described in the Bible
4. All people alive today are descendants of Adam and Eve.

Here again, survey participants were given the option to respond with: strongly agree (=1); agree (=2); disagree (3); and strongly disagree (=4). A person is said to be more religiously ideological when they agree with the statements above. The RI score had the potential for ranging from 0 to 16—where high numbers signal the individual held more traditional gender role attitudes. The reliability of the scale, assessed by Cronbach's alpha, was 0.82. This scale was the first independent variable of interest. Upon closing, the scale's limits and tendency to measure protestant fundamentalism will be discussed. Please note that a measure of religious service attendance frequency was not available.

Familism

The intensity on family ideology is measured with five items. The Familism Scale (FS) was derived from items inspired by previous work (Heller 1970). Similar to the two previous scales, respondents were given Likert scales (from strongly agree to strongly disagree) to respond to the following statements:

1. A person should talk over important life decisions (such as marriage, employment, and residence) with family members before taking action
2. If a person finds that the life-style he/she has chosen runs so against his family's values and that conflict develops, he/she should change
3. As many activities as possible should be shared by married children and their parents
4. Marriage should be regarded as extending established families, not just creating new ones
5. Family members should give more weight to each other's opinions than to the opinions of outsiders.

FS could range from 0 to 20. This was the second independent variable of interest. High values on the scale are interpreted as signaling that the individual was very family-oriented (i.e., "familistic"). The reliability of the scale, assessed by Cronbach's alpha, was 0.69. Limitations arising from the items used in the scale are discussed in closing.

Control Variables

GRI was modeled with religious ideology and familism scales along with basic demographic factors. A person's race status was considered (white versus non-white)—there is no

a priori expectation of how race will be related with GRI. Sex was coded by making males=1; since men can stand to benefit materially for gender inequality, they may be more likely to hold more traditional gender role attitudes than female. However, men may be less inclined to report gender inequitable attitudes. Consequently, there was no *a priori* hypothesis with regards to gender.

Age was measured in years and was included as a control variable because it may capture cohort effects (i.e., potential generational shifts in gender attitudes). For example, the teachings of the religious institutions influencing religious ideology may evolve over time, younger respondents may also differ in their exposure to religious ideology producing experiences that differ from their older counterparts. Inter-generational differences may also exist as woman's paid-work participation has increased and in-house socialization may be changing (Fernandez et al. 2004; Seguino 2007a). Thus, it was expected that traditional gender role attitudes would be more prevalent in older cohorts.

Marital status was also accounted for by making married=1 and all others zero. There was no *a priori* expectation of how marital status will be related with GRI. Educational attainment is coded as a binary, where those with a college degree and beyond get a "1". Education was controlled for because previous work has found it to be related to attitudes toward women (Del Boca and Locatelli, 2006; Heineck, 2004). Please note that neither household income nor employment status was used in the equations—since educational attainment may have sufficiently capture socioeconomic status.

Modeling

Three least ordinary square regressions were used to analyze the relationship between gender role attitudes and religious- and family-ideology. The equation, with all the variables of interest, was as follows:

$$GRI_j = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RI_j + \beta_2 FS_j + \beta_3 Age_j + \beta_4 Male_j + \beta_5 College_j + \beta_6 Married_j + \beta_7 White_j + \epsilon_j$$

where GRI_j was the gender role attitude score for j^{th} individual,

β_0 was the regression line intercept,

$\beta_1 RI_j$ was the religious ideology score for j^{th} individual,

$\beta_2 FS_j$ was the familism score for j^{th} individual,

$\beta_3 Age_j$ was the age of j^{th} individual,

$\beta_4 Male_j$ was a binary variable detecting the gender of j^{th} individual,

$\beta_5 College_j$ was a binary variable detecting if j^{th} individual is a college graduate,

$\beta_6 Married_j$ was a binary variable measuring if j^{th} individual is married,

$\beta_7 White_j$ was a binary variable identifying the race/ethnicity for j^{th} individual, and

ϵ_j is the error term.

The first model included both males and females. Sex-stratified models followed. To display the binary distribution of RI and FS with GRI, two spider diagrams [using Microsoft Excel 2007 (computer software: Redmond, Washington: Microsoft)] are presented. All data coding and regression was done using SAS[®] 9.2 software.

Findings

Descriptive Statistics

The characteristics of the analytic sample (n=1,615) are presented in Table 1. On average, the sample scored a 12 on their gender role ideology scale, about a 9 on the religious ideology scale, and 11 on the familism measure. The sample had an average age of 50 and 37% were college graduates, 68% married, and 68% identified as “white” as their race. In the analytic sample, 39% were male.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics for analytic sample (n=1,615)

	Mean	SD¹
Scales		
Gender Role Ideology ²	12.31	2.50
Religious Ideology ³	8.89	3.37
Familism ⁴	11.28	2.18
Demographics		
Age ⁵	50.33	17.97
Male	0.39	0.49
College graduate	0.37	0.20
Married	0.68	0.47
White	0.68	0.47

¹ Standard deviation; ² Scale ranges from 2 to 16


³ Scale ranges from 0 to 16; ⁴ Scale ranges from 2 to 20

⁵ Age ranged from 22 to 97

Spider Graphs


Figure 1 and 2 provide a visual representation of the distribution of the outcome variable (i.e., GRI) and the two predictor variables (i.e., religious ideology and familism) of interest. From the spider graph in Figure 1, we see that individuals with low GRI (gender role ideology) scores (black-squared dotted line) were most clustered in low RI (religious ideology) scores (top-right quadrant). In contrast, those with high GRI scores (black-solid line) were most concentrated in high RI scores (bottom-left quadrant). This implies that those with high religious ideology seem to uphold less egalitarian gender role attitudes. The unadjusted Pearson's correlation between GRI and RI was 0.48 ($p < 0.001$). The spider graph shows that GRI and RI were moderately associated.

Figure 1: Distribution of Gender Role Ideology (GRI) scores on Religious Ideology (RI)



From the spider graph in Figure 2, we see that individuals with low GRI scores were most clustered in low FS (familism scale) scores, compared to those with high GRI scores who were most concentrated in high FS scores (top- and bottom-right quadrants). This implies that more family-oriented individuals uphold less egalitarian gender role attitudes. The unadjusted Pearson’s correlation between GRI and FS was 0.34 ($p < 0.001$). The spider graph shows GRI and FS were mildly associated.

Figure 2: Distribution of Gender Role Ideology (GRI) scores on Familism Scale (FS)



Regression Results

Model-1 results (which include females and males) are presented in Table 2. Although the models only help explain about 30% of the between-people variance on gender role ideology, the results are as hypothesized. Religious ideology had a positive statistical association (0.32, $p < 0.01$) with gender role ideology. This means that an increase in the intensity of religious ideology is accompanied by having more traditional gender role attitudes. More technically, a one-point increase on religious ideology is associated with a 0.32 point increase on gender role ideology score.

The second hypothesis, that a direct relationship between having familism and having more traditional gender role attitudes would exist, is also supported. We see that familism had a positive statistical association (0.13, $p < 0.01$) with gender role ideology—signaling that an increase in family-oriented ideology is related to having more traditional gender role attitudes. More technically, a one-point increase on familism score is associated with a 0.13 point increase on gender role ideology score. From the regression results, it was concluded that the two hypotheses under investigation are tentatively unfalsifiable.

Table 2: Ordinary least square regression predicting gender role ideology (n=1,615)

	Model 1 ^a		Model 2 ^b		Model 3 ^c	
Scales						
Religious Ideology	0.32	**	0.31	**	0.32	**
Familism	0.13	**	0.13	**	0.13	**
Demographics						
Age	-0.01	**	-0.01	**	-0.01	**
Male	-0.71	**	n/a		n/a	
College graduate	0.47	**	0.48	**	0.48	**
Married	-0.15		-0.24		-0.09	
White	-0.01		-0.11		-0.09	
Model Fit						
Intercept	8.98	**	8.40	**	8.88	**
Model Adj-R ²	0.30		0.29		0.29	
Sample size	1,615		638		977	

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

^a Model includes both males and female

^b Model only includes males

^c Model only includes females

The two hypotheses under investigation also find support with the male-only sample (i.e., Model 2) and the female-only equation (Model 3). Although the effect is small, age is significant and in the opposite direction than had been expected. The models indicated that traditional gender role attitudes were lower at older ages—suggesting gender egalitarianism may be higher at older ages for both males and females. Having a college degree is also significant and seems to signal that those with more education within the analytic sample have more less egalitarian gender attitudes. The models suggest that in terms of demographics, only educational attainment, sex, and age help explain gender role ideology—leaving marital status and race as non-predictive factors. Although a spider graph of RI by FS is not provided, their unadjusted Pearson's correlation was

0.46 ($p < 0.001$). All inflation variance factors for the model were 1.5 or below—suggesting autocorrelation may not be a problem in the model.

The male coefficient in Model 1 validates the idea that although males stand to gain from gender inequality, they self-report more gender egalitarian attitudes. This would suggest that women in the analytic sample on average seem to identify *more* with traditional gender role ideology than males after adjusting for other factors in the model. Because gender role ideology is measured with self-reports and not observed, it may be that males are falsely reporting a higher level of egalitarianism because of interviewer effects. Equally possible is the idea that LSGO males do in fact have more gender egalitarian views than their LSGO female counterparts after adjusting for other factors. It should be noted that reporting more egalitarian gender role attitudes may not be directly associated with pro-gender equality behaviors.

Conclusions

The specific aim of the investigation was to explore the statistical relationship between gender role ideology, familism, and religious ideology in a unique sample of adults in the US. The empirical findings may be used by others seeking to implement interventions aimed at advancing gender equality. The study finds evidence that religious ideology and familism are associated with traditional gender role attitudes. In the sample under analysis, it was found that more traditional gender role attitudes were more present in those with reporting strong religious ideology. Also, it was found that more traditional gender role attitudes were present in those with reporting greater family orientation. Although simple in nature, the quantitative analysis is innovative in that it provides an unusual source of information on the statistical relationship between gender role ideology, familism, and religious ideology.

There are some limitations with the project. In particular, the various items used to create the scales could be challenged on many points. For example, the conceptual definition and thus questions for measuring GRI, RI, and FS could be questioned. The term “women’s liberation” in the GRI scale may have created issues with younger respondents if they were unaware of its meaning. RI is, on the other hand a quasi-measure of religious authority with a conservative protestant flavor. Future work in this field should seek to formally define the concepts behind these complex abstracts and create better measures for them with survey research. Perhaps, a mixed-methods or qualitative approach may be better suited for asking and answering more complex questions regarding the interaction between religious ideology, familism, and gender role ideology.

The main purpose of the current project was to measure the statistical correlation between broadly defined religious ideology, familism, and gender role ideology. Future research may seek alternate data sources to answer more complicated questions. For example, comparing patriarchal and non-patriarchal (e.g., allow female leaders) religious sects. Identifying more recent and complex datasets may allow others to advance the relative simply project undertaken in this analysis to explore if and how family structure affects gender role ideology. In addition, because attributes the social environment may influence gender attitudes, future work should also seek to account for attributes of the environment with multilevel modeling (Siordia, Smith, and Castañeda, 2014).

Notwithstanding these limitations, by investigating how religious ideology and familism are related to traditional gender role attitudes, this distinctive study contributes to the literature on woman studies. The findings lend support to the argument that there is an association between

religious ideology, familism, and traditional gender role attitudes. Discovering factors quantitatively associated with gender equity related phenomenon may be helpful in advancing impartiality between the sexes. The advancement social fairness for females is important because social stratification plays a key role in economic and physical well-being. Social scientists should continue to explore if and how gender role, religious, and familistic ideologies interact to create, eliminate, and/or maintain the formation of social equality and/or inequality for females.

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