The Undergraduate Review

A JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH AND CREATIVE WORK

Special Issue

The United States, Canada, Quebec and the Problem of the Border

2021

Morales, Joseph, Quirk, Vasquez, Wahl, Marsden, McEneaney, Choi, Rice, Cuneo, Munson, Moscato
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The United States, Canada, Quebec and the Problem of the Border
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From the Guest Editors
In April 2021, 33 undergraduate students from a variety of higher education institutions across North America gathered in the middle of a pandemic via Zoom to meet and share with one another their research and writing on current and historical subjects involving Canada, Quebec, and the United States. The one-day symposium was co-hosted by BSU’s Canadian Studies and American Studies programs and its Undergraduate Research Office, and generously supported by the Government of Canada’s Consulate for New England and the province of Quebec’s government office in Boston. Named “The United States, Canada, Quebec and the Problem of the Border,” the event featured the insights of students from BSU and other places: the University of Maine, St. Lawrence University, SUNY-Buffalo, and Western Washington in the United States; Acadia, Brock, McGill, McMaster, and York universities, as well l’Université du Québec à Montréal in Canada. These papers explored topics ranging from refugee experiences in Canada to women’s rights and suffrage in Quebec, Canadian literature and identity, Indigenous rights and Reconciliation, the effects of COVID-19 on the border, security, and trade. And more. The presenters were greeted and encouraged by both Marie-Claude Francoeur, Quebec’s Delegate to New England, and Rodger Cuzner, then newly appointed Canadian Consul General for New England. A timely luncheon keynote address was delivered by St. Lawrence University historian Dr. Neil Forkey.

Like its predecessor in 2018, this cross-border, interdisciplinary student conference produced presentations of the highest caliber. That quality and the enthusiasm they generated among participants on the day have prompted us to produce a second special issue of The Undergraduate Review, BSU’s established student research journal. The 12 essays featured in these pages reflect the hard work, the insight, and the genuine curiosity that exists among our students and their colleagues in Canada and the United States. They clearly show us how extensive research and polished writing has become a central part of undergraduate learning in many institutions across North America. For all of us in the Canadian Studies and American Studies programs at BSU, we express our thanks to all the conference participants and establish these 12 writers, whose work we proudly feature in this special issue.

Dr. Andrew C. Holman      Dr. Simone Poliandri
Director, Canadian Studies Program   Director, American Studies Program

From the Editor of The Undergraduate Review
Bridgewater State University (BSU) has built a signature program of Undergraduate Research with significant funding and opportunities for students in any major to discover new knowledge and make original contributions to their discipline or community. Undergraduate Research has been an institutional priority at BSU for nearly a quarter century because students who are mentored by professors on projects in which they are deeply invested, gain highly valued experience and skills in critical thinking, problem-solving, collaboration, and communication. The experience of conducting authentic research under faculty mentorship makes undergraduates more successful students and outstanding candidates for post-graduation competitive opportunities, thereby changing the trajectories of their lives.

Undergraduate Research includes the scholarly work from any academic field, and can take several different forms, from collaborating with professors on their scholarship to taking on long-term course assignments that go beyond traditional research papers and projects, such as by including a presentation of the results at a campus or disciplinary symposium. Dissemination of one’s findings is a key criterion of high-impact Undergraduate Research. When students share their work with an audience of peers, experts, and others in the academic and broader community, they become much more invested in the work than if they were “writing to the professor” to earn a passing course grade. They think more intentionally about the audience, purpose, and overall quality of the research and writing. They also develop deeper understanding of their areas of study as they reflect on and respond to audience members’ questions.

For all of those reasons, BSU is proud to have hosted the “The United States, Canada, Quebec and the Problem of the Border” undergraduate-research conference and to publish some of the highest quality research presented there in this, the second special issue of The Undergraduate Review.

Dr. Jenny Shanahan
Assistant Provost, Center for Transformative Learning
Organizing Against Independence: The 1995 Federal Strategy during the Quebec Referendum Campaign

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Abstract: In 1995, Canada came the closest it has ever been in its history to breaking apart. With Quebec nationalism on the rise after a failed decade of attempted constitutional reform in the 1980s, the separatist Bloc Québécois and Parti Québécois political parties sought to take Quebec out of the Canadian federation by hosting a referendum asking the infamous question: “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?” In response, the federal government of Canada organized against the nationalist Yes Campaign, hoping to prevent a Québécois bid for independence. This article outlines the four main strategies the federal government used to keep Quebec within the federation: delegitimizing the question posed by the Parti Québécois on the referendum, turning to the United States for support on Canadian unity, promising distinct society and constitutional reforms for Quebec, and hosting an energetic Unity Rally in Montreal. With these four strategies, the federal government of Canada would try its best to organize against Quebec’s independence and keep Canada whole.

Keywords: Jean Chrétien, Quebec, referendum, independence, Canada

The federal government of Canada faced a dire situation in October 1995 – the prospect of the breakup of the Confederation with the withdrawal of the province of Quebec. For much of Quebec’s independence campaign, the federal government ignored the simmering danger of a victory for the Yes vote in the upcoming October 30, 1995 sovereignty referendum. Canadian federalists had won decisively in the 1980 referendum with a 19.12% lead, and polls were showing that federalists were once again in the lead during the beginning of the referendum campaign in 1995, polling ahead by seven to eight points in early September.1 However, things soon took a turn for the worse for the No campaign when support for sovereignty surged in popularity after Lucien Bouchard, leader of the Bloc Québécois, became chief negotiator of the sovereignty movement in early October.2 This
put federal government officials in a difficult situation, where they had to scramble to keep the
Yes vote from winning in order to preserve the Confederation. In response to the rising support
for sovereignty in Quebec, the Canadian government had to come up with various strategies in its
attempt to organize against a Yes vote and deter Quebec independence. During the final stretches
of the campaign, the federal government employed the following four strategies to win the vote:
delegitimizing the referendum question and the mandate for independence; seeking support from
the United States; recognizing Quebec as a distinct society and promising constitutional change;
and holding a Unity Rally in Montreal. With these last-minute strategies employed, the federal
government made its final bid to preserve Canada and keep Quebec within the Confederation.

When Jacques Parizeau, Premier of Quebec and leader of the separatist Parti Québécois,
unveiled the referendum question to the public on September 7, 1995, the federal government was
quick to delegitimize the referendum question in order to muddy the waters in its bid to prevent an
outcome that would lead to Quebec independence. The referendum question that was posed by the
Parti Québécois to the public read as follows: “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign
after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the
scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?”
This was met with significant backlash from the No campaign – and specifically from the federal
government – because instead of a straightforward “yes or no” question, the federal government
argued that Jacques Parizeau was making the question intentionally confusing in order to try to gain
enough support for a Yes vote and drag Quebec out of the Confederation. Years later, in his memoir,
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien remarked that the question Parizeau presented was “even trickier
than the one Lévesque had presented in 1980.” Shortly after the question was revealed, Chrétien
publicly railed against the referendum question, denouncing it in Parliament on September 18 as
a “trick question” and that “If [Jacques Parizeau]…was truly intellectually honest, he would have
asked Quebecers: Do you want to separate? And Quebecers would have answered: No, never.”
Jean Chrétien certainly had polls to support him on this point: an Angus Reid Group Poll from mid-
October showed that a stunning 30% of Yes voters were only voting Yes in an attempt to strike a better deal for Quebec within Canada – as opposed to voting Yes in order to obtain independence.6

Whether or not a Yes vote automatically meant a vote for independence was further put into question by the fact that the Yes camp itself had internal splits. While Jacques Parizeau favored a path to independence as fast as possible via a unilateral declaration of independence,7 the Bloc Québécois leader Lucien Bouchard preferred separation between Quebec and the rest of Canada to follow a more orderly negotiated process that would eventually result in a Quebec independent from Canada. Bouchard wanted to maintain a tight bond with the rest of Canada, envisioning a Quebec that would keep the Canadian dollar and maintain a customs union with its former country. This difference in intentions is the reason that the question was made longer and more convoluted to begin with.8 Meanwhile, Mario Dumont, leader of the new provincial party, Action Démocratique du Québec, did not advocate for independence right away. Rather, he joined the Yes coalition because he believed that voting Yes would give Quebec the bargaining chips needed to secure more provincial power.9

Alongside Jean Chrétien, several other ministers in the federal government also criticized the referendum question in an attempt to delegitimize it. Sheila Copps, Chrétien’s Deputy Prime Minister, described the question 20 years later in an interview with Québécois journalist and political pundit Chantal Hébert as “not as clear as it could have been,”10 which was putting it mildly. Brian Tobin, federal Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, remarked in his memoir that the question had “unfair wording…[the question] was a convoluted structure that managed to avoid using the word ‘separate.’”11 All of this anger about the clarity of the referendum question was key for the federal government in its effort to organize against independence. Because of the public outrage over the question, and the evidence that a sizeable portion of Quebecers planning to vote Yes did not even want independence, the federal government had reasonable justification not to recognize a slight majority Yes vote as a mandate for Quebec independence. Montreal Gazette journalist Irwin Block alluded to this possibility early in October, writing in an article published on the 3rd that “referendums do not automatically have the force of law on their side, and that a government can just
ignore the results if they so choose.” It seems that the federal government left this strategy open as part of its effort to keep the country together should the worst-case scenario – a Yes victory – arise. Chrétien remarks in his memoir that “No matter what tricks Jacques Parizeau might have held up his sleeve, the reality was that the crooked question had not asked for a mandate to separate” and that it was “crazy to argue that one vote is enough to break up a nation.” Brian Tobin also weighed in on the credibility of the mandate given how confusing the question was, saying “If you ask a mandate for partnership and you do a [Unilateral Declaration of Independence], it’s a lie.” Chrétien’s foreign affairs minister, André Ouellet, mentioned that he believed that the federal government would host a second referendum with a clearer question in the event of a Yes victory. Even though Ouellet never proposed this idea to Chrétien, it was clearly on the federal minister’s mind and may have come into play in the event that the Yes side won on referendum night.

It is clear that part of the federal strategy to prevent Quebec’s independence was to delegitimize the question in order to prevent a potential Yes outcome. With such a confusing question, the federalists argued, how could anyone clearly say that Quebecers really voted for independence? Given the internal split in the Yes camp between Jacques Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard, and Mario Dumont over how to achieve independence, and whether independence or greater provincial power was the aim, the federal government was able to effectively exploit the confusing referendum question to argue that a 50+1 mandate was not enough for Quebec’s independence.

Receiving support from the United States was also critically important in the Canadian federal government’s war-gaming strategy against Quebec independence. As per Jacques Parizeau’s ‘great game,’ in order to achieve Quebec independence, Quebec would need the recognition of the United States as well as France. While the federal government had only so much it could do in regard to France, given that its president Jacques Chirac was sympathetic to the movement for sovereignty, there was a lot more help that could be obtained from President Bill Clinton in the United States, whose position was pro-federalist on the Canadian matter. After a surge in polls in favor of the sovereignty camp in mid-October, the federal government wasted no time in seeking American
support in order to quell the nationalist fervor in Quebec.

The federal government naturally sought support from the highest place in the American administration, the President’s office. According to James Blanchard, the U.S. Ambassador to Canada, “Clinton was well-liked and well-respected in Quebec, with a favorability rating much higher than Parizeau or Chrétien.” Since Bill Clinton was such a popular figure in Quebec, input from him was deemed crucial for changing the minds of ‘soft nationalists’ who were not really sold on the idea of an independent Quebec, but could still plan to vote Yes in order to gain more provincial powers. But the path to receiving support from Bill Clinton came in gradual steps of cooperation with the Americans.

It is evident that Canada had federal agents working closely with the United States in order to establish ways in which the U.S. could help the federalist cause. With separatists taking the lead in the polls in mid-October, the federal government sought to work through Blanchard in order to convey a message of unity, as well as to create the conditions necessary for these topics to come up and for the two governments to work together. When Blanchard pitched the idea of making a public pro-unity statement to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher on October 18, Blanchard said “Anything we say that’s positive about Canada could help, because our polling shows that Quebeckers, including French-speaking Quebeckers, value highly what Americans think… I’ve talked to the prime minister’s people, and they agree.” One of these people was Eddie Goldenberg, a senior advisor to the Prime Minister, with whom James Blanchard talked on the phone on October 17 regarding the referendum issue. Thanks to this behind-the-scenes work, the Canadian government got its first victory when Secretary Christopher publicly stated at a press conference that the U.S. placed a high value “...on the relationships that we have with a strong and united Canada,” after receiving a question from a reporter on the topic.

The federal government saw to it that the level of support from the U.S. ballooned in the days that followed. While attending the 50th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations at its Headquarters in New York City on October 21 and 22, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and President Bill Clinton encountered one another, and from this meeting Chrétien was able to directly seek U.S.
assistance. In the 2005 CBC documentary film *Breaking Point*, it is mentioned that while at the United Nations, “...Blanchard [had] set things up so that Jean Chrétien [and] Bill Clinton [would] casually run into each other at the UN.”21 It was important for the Canadian government that this meeting did not look like Chrétien was specifically meeting with Clinton in order to seek assistance, as that would backfire against the federalists. However, while speaking to Clinton privately at a reception, Chrétien explained the Quebec situation to the President. While Chrétien did not want to ask for help overtly, it is evident that a request for aid is what he was insinuating. From this conversation, in which Chrétien bemoaned the difficulties of the campaign, Chrétien successfully lured the President into offering assistance. According to Chrétien, the President said “You know what Jean… it would be a terrible tragedy for the world if a country like Canada were to disappear. Do you think it would help if I said something?”22

With Clinton on board to help, the Canadian federal government merely needed a platform for Clinton and the U.S. administration to express their appeal for a united Canada. In order to give the U.S. administration such a platform, the federal government decided to plant sympathetic reporters at important U.S. press conferences. These reporters were to ask American officials questions regarding the referendum in order to encourage a reassuring response in favor of unity from the United States. On October 25, U.S. Press Secretary Mike McCurry gave a statement in support of Canadian unity in response to a “planted question about the referendum…”23 as planned. The statement was very similar to that of Warren Christopher’s, stressing that the question was for Quebecers to decide, however, the U.S. position was that a strong and united Canada was a great ally. Mike McCurry concluded by mentioning that Bill Clinton had a news conference later that day, alluding that he would be open to being asked.24

Bill Clinton, of course, was completely prepared for the question. He had extended his hand to the Prime Minister at the United Nations, and now he was due to deliver. Jean Chrétien describes in his memoir that the question Bill Clinton answered about the referendum “had been planted with a Canadian reporter at a televised press conference in Washington.”25 As planned, the reporter asked
Clinton, “Are you concerned about the possible break up of Canada, and the impact that could have on the North American economy and Canada-U.S. trade relations?,” to which the President answered by stating:

This vote is a Canadian internal issue for the Canadian people to decide, and I would not presume to interfere with that. I can tell you that a strong and united Canada has been a wonderful partner for the United States and an incredibly important and constructive citizen throughout the entire world… I’ve seen how our partnership works, how the leadership of Canada in so many ways throughout the world works, and what it means to the rest of the world to think that there’s a country like Canada where things basically work.26

A statement in support of Canada was exactly what the Canadian government wanted. The statement was diplomatically tactful; the U.S. President did not say he was against Quebec independence, rather, he merely stated that he appreciated a strong and united Canada. It is without a doubt that the Canadian government sought out a statement in favor of federalism from Bill Clinton because of his popularity in Quebec, and what that might mean for the swing vote. Raymond Chrétien, the Canadian ambassador to the United States (and nephew of Jean Chrétien), said in an interview with the prolific journalist Chantal Hébert that “Clinton was very popular in Quebec and some analysts credit his intervention for having moved a few percentage points of support back to the No camp.”27

Whether or not Bill Clinton’s statement had the massive effect described by Raymond Chrétien cannot be determined for certain. In any case, the statement was at least effective in denying Jacques Parizeau his wish to see the U.S. recognize an independent Quebec. The statement was also helpful in allowing the United States to gently demonstrate its support for Canadian unity. Overall, through their intimate work with U.S. officials in order to craft statements in favor of Canadian unity, it is clear that the Canadian government saw gaining support from the United States as pivotal to its war-gaming strategy, especially since Bill Clinton was popular in Quebec, and many Quebecers cared
about what Americans thought about them and their situation.

In order to properly organize against independence, however, the federal government needed to do more than seek support from without – they also needed to seek support from within. Now, the federal war-gaming strategy turned toward appealing to the identity of Quebecers by recognizing Quebec as a distinct society and by promising constitutional change. This concession came at the last minute against the backdrop of surging support for the Yes campaign. As polls kept showing the federalists behind, it became clear to federal strategists that they had to change course if they wanted to keep the Confederation together.

Until this point, the federal government had distanced itself from embracing Quebec as a distinct society. This had potential to open a constitutional can of worms that Chrétien wanted to avoid. However, the government had to change course on October 21 after Daniel Johnson Jr., the provincial Quebec Liberal leader, publicly requested that Chrétien endorse Quebec’s distinct society status, as well as promise constitutional reform. Chrétien, who was in New York at the time, rejected this proposal, saying “There is no desire at this time to debate the constitution. For the next eight days we’re concentrating on the cause of keeping Canada together.” Soon afterward, Johnson rescinded his statement. This gaffe was taken advantage of by the separatists, as Lucien Bouchard rushed to invite Johnson over to the Yes campaign, because the federal government said “no” to Johnson, just as it had always said “no” to Quebec in the past.

The federal government rapidly moved to turn this mistake around. On Sunday, October 22, the day after Chrétien’s rash choice of words, Chrétien and Johnson issued a joint statement saying “We state without equivocation that Quebec is a distinct society…We note that both of us supported the inclusion of this principle in the Canadian Constitution every time Quebec asked for it.” This marked the first time in the campaign when Chrétien explicitly came out in support of the notion of a distinct society. The following day, Chrétien came back to Canada from New York ready to fight in order to keep the country together at any cost. In his memoir, Chrétien states that “At last I was going to act on my basic instincts and plunge into the campaign…It was time to speak to the hearts of
Quebecers rather than to their wallets; time to make the 20 percent of soft federalists and undecideds wake up to the fact that Canada was at risk.”32 To push these swing voters into the federalist camp, however, the government had to work hard to drive home the point that they would support Quebec as a distinct society and promise constitutional reform.

Chrétien and his team wasted no time preparing a more public platform to support their new vision. On October 23, the Prime Minister worked with his advisors Eddie Goldenberg and Patrick Parisot to draft the speech that Chrétien would give the next day at a rally in the Verdun Auditorium in suburban Montreal. In his speech to an audience of more than 12,000 supporters, Chrétien boldly proclaimed that “[Quebecers] want to see Quebec recognized as a distinct society within Canada by virtue of its language, culture and institutions… I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: I agree. I have supported that position in the past, I support it today, and I will support it in the future, whatever the circumstances.” Chrétien also opened the door for constitutional reform, stating “We will be keeping open all the other paths for change, including the administrative and constitutional paths. Any changes in constitutional jurisdiction for Quebec will be made only with the consent of Quebecers.”33

The climax of this appeal to the notion of Quebec as a distinct society and a promise for constitutional change came in the form of Chrétien’s first-ever televised address to the nation on October 25, just five days before the referendum. In this speech, broadcast in English and in French, Chrétien made it clear that “We must recognize that Quebec’s language, its culture and institutions make it a distinct society. And no constitutional change that affects the powers of Quebec should ever be made without the consent of Quebecers.” To cement his point, he added, “And that all governments – federal and provincial – must respond to the desire of Canadians – everywhere – for greater decentralization.”34

After the patriation of the constitution in 1982, Quebec was set adrift from the rest of Canada, as the Quebec government never consented to the 1982 Constitution Act. Attempts to bring Quebec into the constitutional fold, such as the 1987 Meech Lake Accord and the 1992 Charlottetown Accord, all failed to deliver, and the failure of these accords meant the failure to recognize Quebec as a distinct
society. This was much to the chagrin of many Quebecers and Quebecker politicians, and had led many of them to break away and create the sovereigntist Bloc Québécois political party, a federal counterpart to the provincial Parti Québécois. Therefore, for the federal government in 1995, it became critical to appeal to Quebecers on this front, as the constitutional wars of the 1980s and their inability to satisfactorily address Quebec as a distinct society were what had led to the resurgence in Quebec nationalism and separatism.

The U-turn in policy mid-campaign to publicly acknowledge Quebec as a distinct society and promise constitutional change was part of federal strategy to appeal to soft nationalists in Quebec and other swing voters. Whether or not Chrétien meant what he said or even liked what he said did not matter for the federal strategy – all that mattered for the federal strategists was that they could gain more votes by promising that change would happen. Jean Charest, one of only two federal Conservatives from Quebec in Parliament at the time, said that “Everyone knew that it did not come from the heart, that it was a move dictated by the difficult circumstances of the campaign.”35 Regardless, the federal government still employed this strategy as a last-ditch way to scrape together enough votes to succeed. After the referendum, Chrétien moved to have Parliament recognize Quebec as a distinct society, as well as give Quebec, among other provinces and regions, veto power over constitutional affairs.36 This was to make good on his promises made during the referendum campaign. Although the plan mostly fizzled out in the end, the federal government had received what it wanted by then – a No vote guaranteeing that Quebec would remain within the Confederation. In December 1995, the federal government went on to half-heartedly stay true to its word by passing a House of Commons resolution that recognized Quebec as a distinct society.37

In a final grand gesture to keep Quebec within the Confederation, the federal government organized against independence by arranging a rally in Montreal. This event, which would become known as the Unity Rally, was meant to make Canada highly visible within Quebec as well as to try to show Quebecers that people from the rest of Canada cared about the province and would be upset to see them go. It was hoped that this emotional plea from the rest of Canada would be enough to sway
some swing voters in the direction of federalism. Whether or not this worked, in order to preserve the country, the strategy of the federal government was to make Canada more visible within Quebec.

The Rally, which took place three days before the referendum, on October 27, started out as the pet project of federal minister Brian Tobin, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. Fed up with attending typical government meetings with other ministers as the breakup of the country seemed imminent, Tobin changed the course of his meeting with other ministers on October 23 by deciding to scrap the typical agenda of working out policy issues in favor of trying to do something that could help preserve the country.38 Turning to his deputy minister, Bill Rowat, and executive assistant, Gary Anstey, Tobin said of the situation: “Here we are facing the very least a possible constitutional crisis in a week’s time, and we’re behaving as though everything were normal. And it’s not.”39 From this meeting, Tobin and his team decided to hijack another existing rally in Montreal – a rally originally organized by businessmen in the city set to take place on Friday October 27 at the Place du Canada – and build on that event by turning it into a rally for the cause of Canadian unity.40

Tobin wanted to get as many people to the Unity Rally as possible in order to send a message loud and clear – that Canada loved Quebec and did not want separation. Tobin started small in his plans to increase attendance, but soon organized a federal effort through his contacts in order to get more people to the rally from all across Canada, as well as to have important federal and provincial figures attend the rally to further boost the visibility of Canada in Quebec. At first, Tobin gave his entire ministry the day off on October 27 so that they could attend the rally and ideally bring their families. Tobin soon got other ministers on board in shutting down their ministries for the day, so as to allow their employees to also attend the Unity Rally.41 Just including government employees was not enough to make attendance massive, however, so Tobin sought to bring average citizens from across Canada to Montreal in order to send a special message to Quebec. “Only one message, it seemed to me, could be effectively conveyed to Quebec by the rest of Canada in the time available,” Tobin stated in his memoir. “That message would be we care.”42

With the rally only four days away from when Tobin began his planning, the federal minister
needed to find a way to make the rally attractive enough for people from the rest of the country to attend on such short notice. Tobin therefore worked with his various connections in order to make it happen. Tobin's solution was simple: lower the price of transportation to Montreal to get as many people to attend as possible. He began by calling Premier Frank McKenna of New Brunswick in an attempt to enlist him in this project. McKenna agreed to the scheme, saying to Tobin, “Tell me when and where, and I’ll bring as many New Brunswickers as I can.” Tobin then turned his attention to the federal minister of employment and immigration, Lloyd Axworthy, to see if he could bring people from Manitoba to Montreal by plane, and he called officials in Vancouver asking the same thing, to which they all agreed. Tobin spent the entirety of October 23 working non-stop in order to arrange the transportation needed to get as many people to Montreal as possible, saying “I repeated the process all across Canada. I called senators, cabinet ministers, MPs, premiers, anyone I know who shared my concerns about who would agree to take action.” Tobin's requests for help were not entirely limited to the governmental sphere, however. In order to ensure the Unity Rally would have a high attendance, Tobin also turned to the private sphere. After reaching out to Air Canada and Canadian Airlines, the companies agreed to provide the planes necessary to transport people from all across Canada to Montreal in order to make it to the Unity Rally. Canadian Airlines even announced a “unity rate” which slashed the price of tickets to Montreal on October 27 up to 90% in order to entice people to attend.

One problem with this scheme was that it had not yet gained official assent – Chrétien knew nothing of the project until the next day on October 24. However, when the plan was brought up to Chrétien that day, he soon approved of it, and Tobin and other federal ministers worked tirelessly to organize the transportation necessary to build up the rally’s attendance. The Unity Rally was now properly in the federal war-gaming strategy camp, with Jean Chrétien himself planning to be there to intensify the visibility and presence of Canada within Quebec and contribute to the statement that the rest of the country cared about the province. With increasing federal influence, more companies lined up to join the scheme to get as many Canadians as possible to Montreal on October 27. This is
evidenced by VIA Rail, as well as multiple bus companies, which also began offering reduced rates to Montreal like their airline counterparts. With the intense support received from the Canadian business world, the federal government was able to orchestrate a huge success in getting people to attend the rally. The Ottawa Citizen noted on October 27 that “By noon, almost all 1,000 seats for the 6:55 and 10 a.m. VIA rail trains to Montreal had been sold. A 60-per-cent discount on the tickets helped the seats sell quickly.” In the end, the federal government was able to come up with enough support to turn what Brian Tobin initially thought would be a rally attended by only a few thousand people into a rally, as some estimates had it, was attended by more than 100,000 people. Waving Canadian and Quebec flags, holding posters to demonstrate their love for Quebec, and attending political speeches from important federal ministers, Canadian citizens swarmed Montreal to show their love for Canada and plead for Quebec to remain within the Confederation – just as the federal government wanted. Case in point: one joyful Canadian citizen on the streets of Montreal that day enthusiastically said to a reporter “I just love Quebec! We spent a lot of time during the first couple of years that we were here and we just love the people, we love the joie de vivre…and I’d really want to maintain that French without [being] outside of Canada.” Another citizen, when asked if they thought that rally would make any difference on the outcome of referendum, responded “I would certainly hope that it would make a difference…it’s certainly very important to everyone in the rest of the country and I’m sure glad to see everyone here.”

Important federal personnel also took the rally as an opportunity to score some points with Quebec voters while they were there. Jean Chrétien, in a speech to federalist supporters at the Place du Canada, declared that “We will do what is needed, we will make the changes that are needed…so that at the beginning of the next century Canada will move in the 21st century united from sea to sea proud of its two official languages!” This, of course, was to appeal to the earlier concession which had promised Quebec the status of a distinct society as well as constitutional reform. The message that the federal government orchestrated was loud and clear: “Canadians love Quebec, and they don’t want to see Quebec leave – please stay. We will do anything to keep you in the Confederation.”
Whether or not the Unity Rally was actually effective is another matter – there is great debate about that to this day, and even the people involved in orchestrating it have their doubts. “…[A]t the very least,” Tobin believed, “[the rally] heartened those who were fighting for the federalist side within Quebec and assured them that Canadians outside Quebec were not indifferent to their fate.”54 Chrétien, meanwhile, believed that the rally gave Quebecers the “opportunity to take a moment to reflect about the possibility of losing Canada.”55 Regardless of effectiveness, the federal government organized the Unity Rally because they believed it would be strategically useful in “war-gaming” against Quebec independence. The rally brought energy, hope, and pleas for a united Canada, and the federal government hoped it would be enough to keep the country together.

The federal effort to organize against independence died down after the emotional climax of the Unity Rally. The end result was a vote to remain within the Confederation – the No vote barely beat the Yes vote by 50.58% to 49.42%, a difference of about 54,000 votes out of over 4.7 million total ballots cast.56 The effectiveness of any given strategy that the federal government employed is debatable. However, it is clear that the federal government had certain strategies in place to organize against Quebec independence and keep the country from fracturing into two. By delegitimizing the question that the Parti Québécois posed to the voters of Quebec, the federal government was able to delegitimize the mandate required for secession, which would give it room to maneuver in the event of a slim Yes victory. The federal government was also able to turn to its ally – the United States – to gain support for the cause of unity, as well as deny Jacques Parizeau his goal of having the U.S. recognize an independent Quebec. In an appeal to Quebecers themselves, the federal government promised the province its desired status as a distinct society, and also promised constitutional reform in favor of Quebec so as to make up for past grievances. And in one final push towards victory for the No campaign, the federal government organized and held an energetic rally for unity in Montreal in order to appeal to the sympathies of Quebecers and demonstrate nationwide support for the province remaining a part of Canada. The Canadian federal government employed these
four strategies in combination to fight against the independence of Quebec and preserve the unity of the Canadian federation.

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Notes

13 Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, 150.
14 Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, 131.
20 Blanchard, *Behind the Embassy Door*, 238.
22 Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, 139.
25 Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, 139.
30 O’Neil, “Separatists jump on reports of split in ‘No’ camp.”
31 Ibid.
32 Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, 143.
35 Hébert and Lapierre, *The Morning After*, 76.
38 Tobin, *All in Good Time*, 142.
39 Tobin, *All in Good Time*, 143.
40 Tobin, *All in Good Time*, 145.
41 Tobin, *All in Good Time*, 143.
42 Tobin, *All in Good Time*, 144.
43 Ibid.
44 Tobin, *All in Good Time*, 145.
45 Tobin, *All in Good Time*, 146.
46 Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, 146.
47 Tobin, *All in Good Time*, 147.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
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55 Chrétien, *My Years as Prime Minister*, 148.

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Out of Place: Racialized Bodies at the USA-Canada Border

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Abstract: The United States of America and Canada have a strong bilateral relationship that spans trade and national security concerns made necessary by their geographic proximity to one another. However, this is not one that equally impacts both states. This article maps out how marketization and securitization as dual forces shape much of Canada’s immigration policy framework. This framework is in response to American post-9/11 national security discourses which resulted in the reification of racial discrimination at the border (Crocker et al. 2007). It will do so by grounding these arguments in a theoretical framework that critically examines neoliberalism as the context in which ‘biopolitics of citizenship’ at the border emerge which further constrains the mobility of racial others across the Canada-USA border (Sparke 2006). While Canada has always been framed as a safe harbor for freed slaves, we shall discuss how Black bodies have always been marked as out of place and other at the border as early as the eighteenth century through surveillance and biometric technologies like the Book of Negroes (Browne 2015). Special attention shall be brought to bear on policy documents, legislation, and agreements like the North American Free Trade Agreement, Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act, and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. This attention will situate these discussions within a regulatory framework that continues to mark racialized migrant bodies at this border site as out of place, weakening Canada’s ability to articulate a truly emancipatory vision of multiculturalism.

Keywords: Canada-US border, immigration, terrorism, biopolitics, Black Atlantic.

The border, in layman’s terms, is often conceptualized as lines on a map that demarcate territories and space. They represent a given authority to include and exclude groups and individuals, to restrict mobility, and to inscribe the limits of a community’s power and autonomy. In critical terms, however, borders are imagined sites where power relations play out in complex patterns. The US-Canada border, the longest international land border statistically, is no different. This article will attempt to delineate how dual imperatives of the market and security intersect to shape the body of policies and legislation that underpin this contested site and mark racialized bodies as out of place. Contemporarily, this is often traced back to the national security discourses transplanted from the US to Canada after 9/11 and the War on Terror that followed it. However, Simone Browne’s investigation
of the *Book of Negroes* helps disrupt this by showing how Black bodies fleeing slavery were surveilled as early as the eighteenth century. These discussions shall be grounded in an exploration of neoliberalism as the context against which the push and pull of market and security discourses are framed, and through which “biopolitics of citizenship” emerge, as is explored by Matthew B. Sparke. It will then move on to the historical case study embodied in Browne’s interrogation of the *Book of Negroes*, before teasing out concepts of marketization and securitization as theorized by Crocker, Dobrolwsy, Keeble, Moncayo, and Tatsoglou (2007) and applying these to the formation of documents such as the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). It shall conclude with Liette Gilbert’s examination (2007) of how these discourses affect Canada’s principal framework for managing difference – multiculturalism.

Matthew B. Sparke provides a useful way to frame neoliberalism by proposing to theorize it “as a contextually contingent articulation of free market governmental practices with varied and often quite illiberal forms of social and political rule.” Sparke explores how the rhetoric around national security and free trade shapes policies and practices at the border and gives us a salient starting point. For him, ‘securitized nationalism’ by which he is referring to “the cultural-political forces that lead to the imagining, surveilling, and policing of the nation-state in especially exclusionary but economically discerning ways” is invoked by public officials who advocate for stronger border control in the North American context. This advocacy is often in contrast to calls for more porous borders to allow for transnational trade. The results are the transformation of citizenship at the border and the emergence of “new transnational mobility rights for some and new exclusions for others” (Sparke 2006, 153).

For Sparke, such an approach requires looking at neoliberalism both at the macroscale as ‘governance’ and at the microscale as governmentality. He writes, “neoliberalism as a regime of governance…is organized around the twin ideas of liberalizing the capitalist market from state control and refashioning state practices in the idealized image of the free market” (while “at the level of the more micro practices that Foucault’s followers have called governmentality…at a still
more personal level, the educational and cultural cultivation of a new kind of self-promoting and self policing entrepreneurial individualism”). Neoliberalism is thus positioned as a system that interacts at the level of the state and manifests itself in what is ostensibly named the deregulation of the markets. However, Sparke posits that this is more accurately described as re-regulation, also at the level of individuals and businesses, actively shaping and constraining the behavioral tendencies of these actors within its web of relations. Sparke notes ultimately that whether at the macroscale or microscale, neoliberalism leads to transformations of state-making and rule (Sparke 2006, 154). In other words, governance and policy making for the Canadian state is affected and impacted by its positioning within a neoliberal context. Consequently, its enactment of its domestic policies, which deal with issues like citizenship, identity, immigration, and integration, do not occur in a vacuum separate and distinct from its foreign relations.

Neoliberalism, as Sparke observes, is often retroactively credited to the Thatcher and Reagan administrations but actually goes back to the efforts of critics of state control on the market from the 1940’s to the 1960’s, like Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman. Neoliberalism is enmeshed in the project of the formulation of national citizenship and the casting out from the neoliberal state others deemed unworthy of civil rights (Sparke 2006, 154). We can therefore posit that neoliberalism weakens the political agency of state subjects. Foucault’s theorizing around the ‘homo economicus’ – an individual producer-consumer, is revisited by Sparke to illustrate this. By transforming society from being organized around collective citizenship to radically individuated citizenship, “the notion of the social body as a collective subject committed to the reparation of the injuries suffered by its individual members” is replaced by one that distributes “the disciplines of the competitive world market throughout the interstices of the social body” (155). In endeavoring to achieve congruence between a responsible and moral individual, and an economic-rational actor, the social rights or citizenship are pared back where they exist, and the scope of political rights are restricted (155). Sparke takes Barry Hindess’ arguments which rely on English sociologist T.H Marshall’s conceptions of three categories of citizenship a step further, arguing that they should be rescaled from a national
and territorially enclosed definition to a transnational and territorially open-ended definition. The three categories – social citizenship “associated with the expansion of equality rights…the development of the welfare state”; political citizenship “associated with the development of the public sphere, voting”; and civil citizenship “made up of…mobility rights and rights to sell one's labour…the establishment of bourgeois property rights” – were proposed by Marshall as an evolutionist account of British national citizenship (155). Nevertheless, Sparke holds that this conception of ‘civil citizenship’ as one that unsettles more political and social forms of agency helps us investigate how neoliberalism as both governance and governmentality has led to the emergence of a new class of transnationally mobile citizens.

Sparke here is providing a new lens through which to examine how the mobility of racial others is constrained across borders, one that is tied to an understanding of power relations as mediated by the market and class structures. The question of mobility and access across borders must thus be framed through an interrogation of how capital is accumulated and distributed between groups and individuals. Specifically, post 9/11, as Sparke leads us to understand, this emergence of a transnational civil citizenship tied to property rights had to be worked out on the ground whilst being constrained simultaneously by intensified border securitization on the US-Canada border (Sparke 2006, 157). This “strategic terrain [is] where countervailing projects of statecraft come to bear on one another” (169).

However, as Browne leads us to understand by her reading of the Book of Negroes, the right of specific bodies to cross the US-Canada border has always been bound up in questions of property-ownership, and even more crucially, what can be conceptualized of as property. “The Book of Negroes,” she argues, “is the first government-issued document for state regulated migration that explicitly linked corporeal markers to the right to travel” (Browne 2015, 17). This document which accounted for Black bodies as recoverable property allowed the tracking and surveillance of Black bodies within Canada, although to this day Canada’s official discourse of multiculturalism continues to deny a any historical account of Blackness in Canada that worries the national myth of two
founding peoples (65).

The Book of Negroes emerged as a method for accounting for every Black body that was allowed to board the 200 ships leaving New York in 1783 following the Phillipsburg Proclamation which provided emancipation to every ‘negroe’ who deserted the ‘Rebel Standard’ and joined the side of the British. It was created due to a fear amongst slave owners about loss of property to serve as a record in case of claims for compensation (Browne 2015, 71). There was then a general fear that those who were not covered by the Proclamation would wield it to seek their freedom and escape to Canada, and by recording every Black body boarding the ships it became easier to track those who did and ensure that slave owners whose property had absconded with the British to Canada could be compensated. Browne goes on to posit that together with notifications of runaways, the Book of Negroes lets us understand how text served as precursors to modern forms of surveillance by “marking boundaries making borders, and defining a slave as out of place” (72).

The Book of Negroes serves to accomplish this purpose even as only Black bodies were noticeably recorded and marked in this way upon entry to Canada and not their white counterparts, implying that white property owners were the norm and in their rightful place at the border. While ships often did detail their passengers, it was unheard of for them to focus so heavily on such physical descriptors that denoted the capacity of these passengers for labor as the Book of Negroes did. These descriptors, as Browne recounts for us, included such notes as: ‘worn out’, ‘stout healthy negro’, ‘young woman’, ‘healthy negress’, ‘stout labourer’ (Browne 2015, 75). Property capital, and property rights were built heavily into the logic of who was granted or denied entry and whether or not crossing the border was a viable option for some. While the enslavement of Black bodies is often credited as an American practice, two advertisements that Browne illuminates as historical artefacts aid us in understanding that “while many travelled to Canada as emancipated people, not all those who arrived in that country did so freely” (73). Canada, or British North America as it was then known, was also complicit in the enslavement of Black bodies, and as early as the eighteenth century was enmeshed in American processes of racializing newcomers at the border.
Key to the rationale behind the *Book of Negroes*, was the need to preserve the hard-won peace following the American Revolutionary War by ensuring that the ‘property’ of the Americans remained within their control. The marking of these Black bodies as out of place at the border was thus not just about property rights but was also underpinned by discourses of national security and peace. These two entwined forces are further interrogated by Crocker, Dobrolwsky, Keeble, Moncayo, and Tatsoglou (2007) in their report funded by Status of Women Canada’s Policy Research Fund and the Department of Canadian Heritage. Their research, which sets out to explore changes and challenges in Canada’s security and immigration laws, emphasizes the contrasting imperatives put forward by Canada’s commitment to both securitization and marketization. This, they argue, in turn produces “securitization of migration, expansion of the state and reinforcement of state boundaries… perpetuate[s] racialization, and women’s invisibilization” (vii). Crocker et al. are also observant of the perception that the creation and implementation of Canadian policies are reliant on the political climate of its southern neighbor with which it shares an expansive border. This is a claim that takes on salience given the timeline around which critical Canadian policies and initiatives revolving around immigration were adopted and implemented – post 9/11.

Human security, which originally served as Canada’s foreign policy framework and pivoted around the goal of protecting the rights of citizens from the coercive structures of the state has been abandoned in favor of national security against a backdrop of the U.S. post-9/11 War on Terrorism (Crocker et al. 2007, 1). This development which has led to a new fixation with preventing and guarding against terrorism is what Crocker et al. refer to as ‘securitization’. It is against this context, that, they posit, Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) and Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) emerged: “both were passed immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks” (2). While they observe that these changes and reforms were anticipated prior to the attacks, they hold that the securitization tendencies already apparent in the IRPA were reinforced post 9/11 with laws like the ATA resulting in unforeseen impacts on Canada’s immigrants and ethnic communities, with especially gendered repercussions (2). While Crocker et al. hold that both the IRPA and the ATA
have their specific foci in addressing security: the IRPA focuses on the foreign national and the ATA focuses on the terrorist, given they both deal with immigration, it becomes apparent that they are often implemented in tandem “thus causing the foreign national and the terrorist to be understood as one in the same in government discourse…this approach implies that ‘foreign nationals want to enter Canada for terrorist purposes, they also create the outsider as target’” (14–15). Securitization can therefore be read as imposing markers of distance and danger onto racialized immigrants who wish to enter Canada, transforming them into objects that warrant focused scrutiny and surveillance – an idea that shall be delved into more fully later in this article.

Marketization, which according to Crocker et al. (2007) dovetails with securitization, is described as the continued centrality of the market. This relationship is reminiscent of Sparke’s illustration of the border as a site of conflict between countervailing forces of national security and free trade priorities embodied in the state. For Crocker et al., the IRPA’s facilitation of skilled worker admission, while at the same time introducing new security measures that tie up the movement of certain individuals and groups, shows us that the Canadian state has grown quite adept at balancing both aims. The result is that the state succeeds in divesting itself of “some of its human security priorities” while at the same time intensifying “traditional security powers and advanc[ing] the workings of the market (6).

The IRPA, it should be noted, was specifically “passed in the post-9/11 context of hysteria and fear, and under pressure from the United States to harmonize immigration standards,” and contained within in “new tools to increase the security of Canadian borders” (Crocker et al. 2007, 11). Prior to the post-9/11 adoption of securitization, by the 1990’s, in Canada “family migration which used to be the largest immigration category, slipped to second place behind economic migration” (12), signifying a shift from more normative human rights concerns to the prioritization of market concerns and economic efficiency. Neoliberalism can therefore be said to have already been brought to bear on the projected Canadian trajectory of immigration prior to the emergence of national security as a pivotal principle.
While it might be tempting to think of marketization and securitization as independent and neutral forces which have shaped Canadian policies around immigration, we must consider them in their appropriate context as a by-product of US-Canadian relations. With regard to securitization, by which we mean “the new emphasis on traditional, internal security” (Crocker et al. 2007, vii), it replaced the previous framework of human security due to an attack that did not in fact occur on Canadian soil, and was adopted in response to the American-led War on Terror. We see perhaps most clearly in the case of Maher Arar, a Canadian national who was held and tortured in Syria, how the weight of American national security concerns are borne by racialized Canadian bodies. While on the other hand it could be argued that the emphasis on markets emerged from within Canada and calls from its business stakeholders, such a development still has to be situated within the web of relations and trade treaties such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These changes and transformations of Canadian domestic policy cannot therefore be divorced from the shadow politics occurring as a result of strong US-Canada bilateral relations.

The stated objective of the IRPA was that immigrants to Canada should be welcomed and, although the stated intent of the ATA was to combat terrorism and terrorist activities at home and abroad, it was to result in the citizenry feeling a growing sense of comfort, safety and security. However, given our secondary research, and in light of the views expressed in our town hall sessions and focus groups, we see that the opposite is the case. That is to say immigrants feel more likely to be targeted than those born in Canada. Many feel as if they have been cast as political, social, cultural or religious villains, as “aliens from within” (Crocker et al. 2007, 7).

It can be surmised from Crocker et al.’s well-stated point that while the IRPA and the ATA were written and enacted to continue and extend the Canadian project of a tolerant and welcoming immigration and integration process for newcomers, they have largely failed. These perceptions of feeling more targeted emerge from the lived experiences of the study’s participants who have to
interact with the ubiquitous impacts of such policies in their day-to-day lives. Public attitudes around safety and security have the ability to influence public policy, affect individuals’ daily behavior as well as the collective vision of national identity and consequently shape who ‘fits’ within the nation and who does not (Crocker et al. 2007, 9). In reading Crocker et al., it is crucial to reflect on their further arguments about the shift from human security to national security and how it creates racial difference in the enactment of Canadian policies. The emerging goal of securitization, they note, creates a national fixation on finding a terrorist within the state who must ultimately be identified and deported (10). By abandoning human security in favor of national security, Canada has therefore failed to live up to its ostensible promise of ethnic and racial tolerance.

Having thus established neoliberalism as a larger context that impacts how Canadian policies are implemented, we shall consider in more detail how multiculturalism – Canada’s principal framework for managing racial difference – as an organizing set of principles and a policy has been affected by neoliberalism. In her article, “Legitimizing Neoliberalism Rather than Equality: Canadian Multiculturalism in the Current Reality of North America,” Liette Gilbert argues that “that in the current North American reality of economic integration and security cooperation, multiculturalism and immigration policies have been co-opted into a neoliberal rationality legitimizing security and prosperity rather than diversity and equality” (Gilbert 2007, 13). Here, again, we see the same threads of both Crocker et al.’s and Sparke’s arguments, with the transformation of immigration policies being attributed to a balancing of both national security and the market as critical objectives.

With the late 1980s demise of the welfare state and the rise of neoliberalism, Gilbert notes that the foundations of multiculturalism were challenged leading to a 1988 revision and a larger shift from collective to individual rights (Gilbert 2007, 18). Multiculturalism was thus recalibrated from being a co-existence framework and positioned rather as a path towards “productive diversity” (Gilbert 2007, 19). Just as the IRPA and the ATA were passed in the context of the emergence of post-9/11 national security rhetoric, the 1988 revision of the Multiculturalism Act was also passed in the context of Canada embracing neoliberalism. This happened just prior to the finalization of the 1989
bilateral Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (Gilbert 2007, 19). In giving continental integration and global competitiveness precedence as policy objectives, attention was deflected away from constitutional debates and cutbacks in welfare services and instead placed new emphasis on individual self-sufficiency as part of the prevalent market mentality (Gilbert 2007, 19).

Diversity thus became less of an inherent good to be striven towards in order to build a more open and tolerant society, and more of an economic value to be probed for its ability to contribute towards the new vision of a prosperous and wealthy Canada. By shifting away from more normative human rights aims towards a more efficiency-driven model of immigration and integration, it became easier to render less visible the forms of discrimination and othering on the basis of class, race, and gender that were being implemented into such policies and structures. Gilbert observes that although economic imperatives have always dominated debates surrounding immigration, “Canada reaffirmed its commitment to attracting and admitting economic immigrants with its points established in 1967, reaffirmed 1994, and made more stringent in 2001” (Gilbert 2007, 19). The years 1994 and 2001 in particular stand out as important dates, even as 1994 was the year NAFTA was signed into law (marketization) and 2001 was the year the attacks of 9/11 took place (securitization). The privileging of bodies categorized as having productive value and worth, and thus being awarded transnational mobility through immigration is echoed here. Gilbert’s comment that “well-educated professionals are more likely to speak or learn English or French, and are thus deemed likely to integrate more easily into Canadian society” (20) helps us see that even in shifting towards what might be more objective rationality of efficiency and productivity in immigration discourses, the underlying baseline was still oriented around European ideals, or what Ahmed refers to as the Occident. The bottom line, as Gilbert so aptly puts it, is that economic immigration is used as a way to manage tensions with existing citizens by emphasizing the benefits it will bring to the national economy (20).

The reality, however, is that this is never allowed to be. Although immigrants are reportedly granted access for their productive potential and ability to contribute to the economy, immigrants
once admitted to Canada are then faced with a systemic dismissal of their foreign credentials and past work experience, de-skilling them and forcing them into the ranks of the disadvantaged (Gilbert 2007, 20). Multiculturalism is thus credited as existing “at the expense of newcomers’ deception, discrimination and exploitation – the exact processes that the policy was established to eliminate” (20). While the Canadian state presents itself as a benevolent home where immigrants will be welcome and accepted while being allowed to contribute and eke out a living for themselves and their loved ones, the Canadian state fails often to recognize the credentials of racialized migrants of ‘third-world’ states. In doing so, the Canadian state is systematically creating a racial lower class that is dually discriminated against, both on the basis of race and by denying access to valuable economic opportunities. In turning to our underlying question of ‘what is within reach?’ not only are barriers being placed that problematize physical mobility, so also are they being erected to curtail social mobility.

Gilbert helps us also to historicize how American pressures were brought to bear on how Canada does multiculturalism, resulting in its transformation into its current-day incarnation. She notes that the Bush administration following the events of 9/11 put pressure on other countries to create domestic legislation to fight terrorism, with initial pressures on Canadian immigration policy and multiculturalism which were “perceived as too liberal, lax, lenient and tolerant, thus, as a security risk” (Gilbert 2007, 23). Canada was at this point more concerned with the movement of goods over its border and did not wish to risk its economy, which was heavily reliant on a porous U.S. border. The U.S. took on the task of enacting its own anti-terrorism agenda most notably through the adoption of the ATA (23). Sharing a border with the U.S through which billions of dollars’ worth in trade crossed annually meant that Canada had to willingly give up some of its sovereignty over its own domestic policies in order to harmonize practices with the U.S. This is exemplified in its creation of Public Safety Canada, which in 2003 was known as the new Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, an agency initially modelled on the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and tasked with emergency management, policing and law enforcement, corrections and conditional release,
and crime prevention (24).

Due to the strength of the bilateral relationship between the two states necessitated by their shared border, information sharing and data collection soon became a joint project. The U.S.-Canada Smart Border Declaration signed into 2001 was the culmination of such perennial efforts. Gilbert notes in reference to the IRPA that “this immigration reform was clearly influenced by security discourses and the discourse of illegal immigration as a threat prevailing in the U.S.” (Gilbert 2007, 26). While a ‘Smart Border Action Plan’ was already in development prior to 9/11, its 30-point action plan bolstered the joint work of the ATA and IRPA by adding to its original goal of economic and trade integration, technological improvements, pre-clearance programs and security actions (27). The declaration was accompanied by the implementation of the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement to more effectively manage the flow of refugee claimants (27). Given the context in which the Smart Border Declaration emerged, and while it may have initially been embarked upon to improve market imperatives, it was eventually hijacked by national security rhetoric imported from the U.S., leading Canada to abandon its earlier espoused goals of human security. The Safe Third Country Agreement in effect limited the ability of refugees who had arrived first in the U.S. to seek haven in Canada, an impact that fundamentally unravelled the policy goals of the former human security framework and limited the physical mobility of these vulnerable groups and individuals from seeking recourse within Canada.

Although Canada is well regarded for its human rights record, due in no small part to the effort of the Canadian state to massage its public image, racialized bodies at the US-Canada border and beyond it are often marked as out of place. This emerges in a neoliberal context, in which the bilateral relations between the US and Canada mean that shared priorities are often governed by interests of marketization and securitization. The enmeshed discourses have been present at the border as early as the eighteenth century, and in the contemporary world have become even more visible in light of the War on Terror, which has made them a more overt consideration in crafting policies for the regulation of the US-Canada border.
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References


The Vietnam Brain Drain: An Exodus of Educated Americans to Canada

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Abstract: This article builds upon previous claims about the nature of American emigration to Canada during the Vietnam War by analyzing its economic incentives. Special attention is paid to job opportunities offered by Canada, coupled with the lack of economic flexibility given to draft-age American males, especially those who were college educated. Both of these factors played a role in the mass emigration to Canada during the war. Primary sources convincing me of this thesis include data released by Manpower and Immigration Canada, quotes from draft-age men living during the Vietnam War, a 1969 speech given by the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, statistics from the US Census Bureau, the 1966 White Paper on Immigration, and a 1964 National Opinion Research Survey. Secondary sources include The Northern Passage by John Hagan, The Working-Class War by Christian Appy, both Strangers At Our Gates and Forging Our Legacy by Valerie Knowles, and a 1988 study published by the Research Triangle Institute. Using these sources, the article highlights how Canada was an ideal destination not only for political reasons, but for economic reasons as well. In effect, this adds complexity to the group known as “draft dodgers” by emphasizing their drive to seek financial opportunities across the border.

Keywords: Vietnam War, conscription, Canada, immigration, draft dodgers

It’s a common joke in American politics to “go North when things go South”—that is, to migrate to Canada when tensions rise. Although it’s treated facetiously every election cycle, this impulse to migrate to Canada has a strong precedent in American history during the Vietnam War. During this time, data recorded by the Canadian government show Americans made Canadian immigration history. A total of 151,437 American men and women emigrated to Canada from the end of 1966 to the end of 1972.\(^1\) John Hagan, professor of Sociology and Law at the University of Toronto, estimates that more than 50,000 of these Americans went to Canada for political reasons.\(^3\) Effectively, this constitutes the biggest politically motivated migration since the American Revolution, as Hagan states in his book The Northern Passage: American Vietnam War Resisters in Canada.

Many historians, including Hagan, point to political disillusionment with America as the
principal reason for migration to Canada. I hope to add a new perspective to that claim: the draft appears not merely to have been a political or ideological obstacle, but also an occupational one.

Thousands of skilled and educated Americans dodged the draft in order to pursue or maintain professional careers. The American government denied them the pursuit of occupations fitting their skillset, while Canada opened doors for them. As a result, this fascinating group that is typically perceived through political lenses as “anti-patriots” or “anti-war protestors” can be better understood through an additional economic lens.

To address the hindrances the Vietnam War imposed on occupational opportunities for educated Americans, it's first necessary to understand the draft as a job opportunity for the working class. Despite being “unpopular,” the Vietnam War saw high enlistment rates. Seventy percent of all Vietnam veterans had enlisted themselves, with only 11 percent doing so to avoid being drafted later.3 From this statistic, it appears that the military was a desirable occupation for many young Americans. However, most enlisted were from working-class backgrounds, using the service to expand their skillset. As Christian Appy points out in his own research, a 1964 survey from the National Opinion Research Center (N.O.R.C) reported that only 20% of enlisted men had fathers with “white-collar” backgrounds, despite 44 percent of Americans being white collar at that period in time. Meanwhile, the other 80 percent had blue-collar, fatherless, military, or agricultural backgrounds.4 These statistics reveal how enlistment wasn't generally considered an attractive job opportunity for sons of white-collar men. Conscription was even less desirable, especially to young men who were skilled and educated. When drafted during Vietnam, draftees had no choice of occupation or even military branch; they were always assigned to the Army (rather than the Navy or Air Force), and typically forced to be in the infantry. One person who embodies this experience is Ed Montgomery, a 1969 draftee. He gives a clear perspective on the lack of occupational choice when describing his arrival to basic training:

“Fort Dix: Home of the Ultimate Weapon.” And I thought: this is my chance.

This is where I’m going to excel. I’ve got the communications license, I’ve got the electronics background. I’m going to be working with missiles. Well, my view of the
ultimate weapon and Fort Dix’s view of the ultimate weapon were entirely different. You see, at Fort Dix, I was the ultimate weapon—basic training, the infantrymen, the guys who go in and do the final cleanup...as far as the U.S army was concerned, I could probably be classified as an M-46 Montgomery.  

Here, we see a clear example of how an American citizen with a marketable skillset—toting both a “communications license” and a “electronics background”—was denied an opportunity fitting to this skillset. Moreover, Montgomery felt as though he was being used as a means to an end, rather than an end in himself. Through likening himself to a “weapon,” he paints the prospect of the infantry in a negative light, insinuating that it treated its footsoldiers like objects. Through this, the army prioritized the usability of its soldiers more than the protection of their lives. In short, the unappealing nature of conscription is apparent.

Not only had the draft been undesirable to educated and skilled Americans, but it was a constant threat looming over their heads. Although there were educational and occupational deferments given to young educated Americans, one could get drafted soon after leaving college or quitting an occupation. Journalist and historian Marc Leepson remembers being drafted only two months after finishing his undergraduate degree: “I was drafted into the Army on July 11, 1967, three weeks after my 22nd birthday. Seemingly within minutes after I’d graduated from George Washington University that May, my draft board in Hillside, N.J., changed my status from II-S (student) to I-A (cannon fodder).” This demonstrates the uncertainty that the draft imposed on young men, even those who had deferments and postponements. Once a citizen graduated college, they returned to the conscription pool within months. As a result, few young men felt “safe” from the draft. With the draft age ranging up to 26 years, even married men were not exempt from conscription beginning in 1965.  

In essence, we see a tenuous situation for the future of these citizens’ careers, one which likely pushed them to make important decisions, should they desire better prospects.

This decision was often to emigrate, due to the remedies it offered to the educated American. While America gave unappealing and unavoidable job opportunities to educated, draft-age men,
Canada offered more fitting jobs to them and incentivized their migration. This incentivization began in 1966. That year, on October 1, the Canadian government formed Manpower and Immigration Canada, a department within the Cabinet. The name in itself is telling: from 1966 to 1977, Canada associated immigration with economic opportunity. The year it was founded, M.I.C cemented this association in the Immigration White Paper of 1966. It outlined the clear supply that Canada had in job opportunities for the college-educated, and advertised them transparently:

Today, Canada’s expanding industrial economy offers most of its employment opportunities to those with education, training, skill. The so-called white-collar workers are now the dominant manpower group. They are over 40% of the total. The group is expanding at about twice the rate of the Canadian labour force as a whole, and at about four times the rate of the manual group.

In the conclusion of the White Paper, Manpower and Immigration Canada publicized the need for Canada to admit skilled and educated immigrants: “Canada will need as many well-qualified immigrants as it is likely to be able to attract during the foreseeable future... On the other hand, Canada cannot expect to provide employment for increasing numbers of unskilled, semi-skilled or unadaptable workers.” Canada incentivized educated and skilled Americans even further the following year. Previously in Canadian immigration policy, the qualities measuring immigrant eligibility were inconsistent. As Valerie Knowles puts it, “To date [pre-1967], examining immigration officers had recourse to only one precise criterion when assessing an applicant’s sustainability: education.” However, in 1967, Canada implemented a “Points System” in which immigration eligibility was measured by qualitative factors: money, expected occupation, and fluency in English or French. “Points” quantified these factors: the more points, the better. The Minister of Manpower and Immigration acknowledged the most important factors of the Points System in a 1969 House of Commons speech: “As hon. members know, points are based on such things as education, trade or professional training, knowledge of English and/or French, job demand in Canada, and so on.” Clearly, the Points System was especially generous and accepting of educated Americans: with these
prioritizations, English-speaking Americans holding college degrees had soaring chances of not only being welcomed into Canada, but in prospering there.

These incentives to educated, draft-age Americans climaxed on May 22, 1969, when the House of Commons allowed deserters refuge in Canada, “both potential and actual.” Once finally given full assurance of their freedoms in Canada, educated and skilled Americans made their exodus. Knowles, in her book commissioned by the Canadian government, stated that American draft dodgers were “making up the largest, best-educated group this country had ever received.”13 This is well supported by the numbers published by the Canadian government. According to data given by Manpower and Immigration Canada, Americans made up 29.6 percent of all immigrants in 1971 who claimed to pursue what Canada classified as “professional occupations”: engineers, scientists, teachers, lawyers, and many other jobs requiring a college education. The trend continued the following year, when Americans made up 27.39 percent of all immigrants who claimed to pursue professional occupations.14 Credible surveys have also demonstrated an association between American emigrés and higher education backgrounds. John Hagan conducted a survey with 100 emigrés who fled to Toronto and discovered that 47.2% of draft resisters in the sample who settled in Toronto had parents who had been through four years of college or more, and 12.8% had some college or university. A similar survey, conducted by Kasinsky with emigrés who settled in Vancouver, found that 46.8% of the sample had parents with four years of college or more, and 14.9% “some” college.15 This is staggeringly disproportionate to the percentage of Americans who went to college for four years in 1975: a mere 28.2%. One has to infer that this generation’s percentage of parents who went to college was even less, considering the spike in college enrollment in the late 60’s. A national percentage of Americans who went to college for four years did not reach 46% until 1995.16

The first-hand accounts of American emigrés reflect this narrative. In an interview with the Canadian Museum of Immigration, American immigrant Richard Allon discussed how he’d earned his Ph.D. in Psychology in 1970, at age 26, and was looking for a place to work. His motive to go to Canada was for a job opportunity: “And I applied. And they accepted me... I was looking for a job
and the Canadians offered me one when my own countrymen didn’t... I knew Canada well from my childhood, the Canadians offered me a job. And that’s ultimately, those factors combined to get me here.”

America stifled job opportunities for educated draft-age Americans during the Vietnam War. Canada, meanwhile, not only offered educated Americans skilled work, but favored them in the immigration eligibility process. Although it is widely accepted that the mass emigration to Canada was politically motivated, it is also important to assess the movement from a social and economic standpoint: the middle and upper-middle classes had more opportunities in Canada than in the United States, and were also far more desired by the Canadian government than their working-class counterparts. This trend dispels the two prevailing perceptions of “draft-dodgers”: that they were either political heroes for avoiding an unjust war, or privileged cowards. Rather than glorifying or demonizing this group, we can instead add nuance to any implicitly moral perceptions by also considering their opportunistic attitude. This adds another layer to controversial perceptions of the “draft-dodgers,” while also giving them a complexity previously denied to them.

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Branding as Soft Power:  
How Canada’s International Image Renders Hard Borders Pliable

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Abstract: Being neither a hegemonic force nor a developing nation, Canada’s classification as a “middle power” requires its cooperation with other state actors as it otherwise lacks the necessary means to care for itself in isolation (Bickerton and Gagnon 2014). For Canada, producing and maintaining a successful international brand is paramount to operating effectively within the ambit of soft power. Delving deeper into Canada’s soft-power strategies, this article analyzes how Canada employs its economic and diplomatic arsenal to develop a reputable brand, using it to influence nations across the world and advance its policy agenda. More specifically, this article assesses the country’s commitment to deliver humanitarian aid and resolve armed conflicts at a diplomatic level through international consortia such as the United Nations Security Council (Lamy et al. 2017). Another area where Canada has earned an admirable reputation in the eyes of the global community is in international public health initiatives (Kirton 2012). Moreover, as an architect of diplomatic lobbying and cultural engineering, Canada has succeeded in capturing the hearts and minds of historic adversaries, for instance, the Russian government and nation (Potter 2009). Lastly, through its perseverance and careful branding, Canada has managed to leverage its way into the hypercompetitive Hollywood cinema scene, broadcasting its national talent for the whole world to see (Tremblay 2004). In light of these accomplishments, made possible by a brand forged through years of consistent action and tangible results, Canada has successfully rendered hard borders pliable.

Keywords: Canada, International reputation, Soft Power, branding

At the apex of the Second World War, having witnessed the destructive and dysfunctional ends of warfare, emerging states sought to empower international fora with the ability to regulate global affairs (Lamy et al. 2017, 162). Institutions such as the United Nations emerged with the underlying principle of “creating some modicum of international order” (160). However, the underlying interests that compelled states to go to war were never eradicated. The potential to wage armed conflicts through hard-power mechanisms remains a guarantee of the liberal new world order, enshrined in the axiomatic ethos of the Peace of Westphalia 1648 (32).
Yet, in the advent of demilitarization and cries of peace emanating from multilateral consortia, new strategies to exert influence on foreign nations have been developed and refined. One such strategy has been the legitimization of soft power as a technique to secure international objectives. Premised on attraction, the appeal behind this method of control is its portrayal as a cooperative opportunity that stands to benefit the actors involved. Furthermore, by eschewing the coercive apparatuses of hard-power diplomacy, soft power offers a palatable alternative that placates the liberal sensitivities of the post-war international system.

Seeking to capitalize on its benefits, Canada has long been a country which has resorted to soft power as a means of ameliorating its international standing (Copeland 1998, 1). Being neither a hegemonic force nor a developing nation, Canada’s classification as a middle power requires that it cooperate with other state actors as it otherwise lacks the necessary means to care for itself in isolation (Potter 2009, 433). Canada has recognized that producing and maintaining a successful international brand is paramount to operating effectively within the ambit of soft power. In this article, I discuss how Canada has developed a reputable brand, using it to successfully influence nations across the world and rendering their hard borders pliable.

Canada’s classification as a middle power has driven generations of Canadian governments to position their country as a peaceful yet capable state actor. Through its interventions in international affairs, Canada has become known as a protector of freedom, democracy, and human rights, and a reliable purveyor of non-renewable energy, all while receiving praise for being one of the world’s most stable democracies (Kirton 2012, 137). To earn this reputation, Canada took deliberate action in weaponizing its public relations assets and minimizing instances of misrepresentation (Copeland 1998, 2). In doing so, Canada successfully managed to grow its economy and capture the unwavering attention of an international audience. Through its strategy to employ rhetoric, Canada has resorted to using two primary methods to communicate its brand: the strategic use of its political economy and directing foreign diplomatic assets to spread cultural awareness. While the former may appear to be unrelated to the use of rhetoric, a country’s identity is shaped by the actions state actors take in the
global political economy (Potter 2009, 4). This makes a country’s political economy a vital asset to its international branding campaigns.

In order to keep up appearances and present Canada as a country committed to the welfare of the developing world, the recent Harper administration committed itself to raising its Official Development Assistance (ODA) fund by 8% annually, a decision made in the midst of the economic contractions affluent states experienced in the early 2000s. These consistent annual increases allowed Canada to grow its ODA budget to $5 billion (Kirton 2012, 138), a sum that served to communicate two valuable messages: First, Canada was committed to supporting impoverished nations; secondly, Canada had the means to support these communities. More than a promise spoken from rarefied air, Canada’s strategic expansion of its ODA budget was definitive proof that the country could uphold its international commitments.

Without loss of momentum, it was throughout this period that Canada also sought to direct the focus of the G8 (now G7) summits and use its modest but emphatic voice to solidify its international brand. In preparation for the 2010 G8 summit, Canada’s priority themes were economic growth, climate change, freedom, democracy, rule of law, human rights and, most significantly, healthcare. While many of them have been commonplace in these forums, the decisions taken at these summits have been criticized for addressing distant issues that have little impact on regular affairs of member citizens. However, Canada’s unique approach to healthcare transformed the 2010 summit into a contemporary use of power that resonated well within the group and the general public (Kirton 2012, 139).

The importance of Canada’s actions were due to a marginal departure from dedicating healthcare resources to combating infectious diseases to the prioritization of “maternal, newborn, and child health” in developing nations (Kirton 2012, 139). This decision also had the added benefit of contributing directly to two of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, raising the profile of Canada’s actions and characterizing them not as acts of charity from a developed country, but as dutiful service to the betterment of humanity. Compounding this initiative, Canada took advantage
of the 2010 summit to implement the Muskoka Accountability report. This was a subtle but actionable accountability measure that would help enforce G8 members’ “compliance with commitments on development and health” (139).

Another area where Canada has taken advantage of political economy is in military and defense initiatives. While military operations typically fall within the scope of hard power, Canada’s contributions to armed conflicts are used to enhance its relationships with other countries, particularly its allies. The necessity of such actions is driven by historic reminders such as the branding crisis which came in the aftermath of 9/11. In the months that followed, Canada was accused of housing terrorists by the United States, its closest trade partner and ally (Potter 2009, 208). To prevent the deterioration of a longstanding and highly lucrative relationship, Canada knew it had to participate in the intervention. However, the caveat to taking part in this deployment was the risk of compromising Canada’s brand as peacemaker. In 2003, this was precisely the reason why Canada did not join the coalition of the willing in the war against Iraq (Bickerton and Gagnon 2014, 423).

However, NATO’s sanction of this operation granted Canada the political cover it needed to keep its brand unscathed (Kirton 2012, 138). In ten years’ time, Canada’s loyalty to its NATO allies and the venerable brand it had crafted would be tested once again. In 2011, amidst the backdrop of civil slaughter by the Khaddafi regime in Libya, Canada was asked to participate in a fight for liberation. Green lit by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and legitimized under Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Canada took part in this war, as well. However, the lessons it learned from Afghanistan emboldened Canada to approach this conflict more proactively. When domestic political consequences in the U.S. precluded it from utilizing its aerial assets to deliver ordinance, Canada committed its own aircraft as a gesture of good will. In doing so, Canada successfully satisfied an operational deficit, confirmed that it was mission ready, and earned the appreciation and respect of the U.S. Lastly, as a strategy to reaffirm its brand, Canada also intervened in Libya through non-military means. Through the UNSC, Canada advocated for a no-fly zone to prevent insurgents from using the airspace above, and to support a Libyan citizenry in chaos, Canada
offered humanitarian aid (Kirton 2012, 142).

Non-conflictual activity has the added effect of being better received by broader segments of the international community (Potter 2009, 9). Whereas defending foreign nationals from calamity through violent means could still be perceived as doing more harm than good, exercising restraint and supplying vital resources offers greater protection from scrutiny. Nevertheless, to ensure that its philanthropy is well received, Canada must first ensure that it is seen. Indeed, whenever the world takes notice of Canada’s laudable actions, be it through foreign media or interpersonal interactions with Canadian dignitaries, Canada benefits disproportionately.

Mannheim and Albritton (in Potter 2009, 23) discuss how states compete for both visibility and valence (estimable standing) in the international arena. They place the United States as the most visible state on the international stage, however its valence is the lowest of any liberal democracy in their ranking. Less visible but possessing a significantly higher valence is the United Kingdom. Canada has an equally high valence, but its visibility is much lower, even falling behind another unfamiliar but well-regarded country, Australia (Potter 2009, 24).

To protect its brand, Canada must ensure it has both visibility and valence. To address its dearth in the former, Canada has weaponized its diplomatic assets to ensure that all activities performed in its name return favorable social capital. However, the purpose of the staff and institutions funded by the public purse is not simply to deliver fanfare, but to export Canada’s brand through cultural initiatives. While projecting decorum remains a necessity when conducting state affairs, cultural expositions – be they film festivals, art shows, or lectures on Canadian heritage – are much more impressionable on foreign audiences the world over. As Canada’s High Commission in London reported, of all the news coverage mentioning Canada in the UK “60% [...] dealt with culture” (Potter 2009, 101). Realizing this, Canada has made it a priority to provide the international public with cultural programming since 1995 (105). To this purpose, cultural centers remain one of the mediums through which Canada enhances its international identity. Highly visible institutions and open to the public, these buildings are meant to provide a welcoming environment for the citizens
of the countries in which they are located. Two of the most notable examples are Canada House in London and Le Centre Culturel Canadien in Paris (Potter 2009, 106). Their purpose is to offer performers and scholars a platform where they may host lectures, concerts, exhibits, and screen films that reflect positively on Canada (107).

Another tool in Canada’s repository is the Governor General. State visits remain a powerful branding strategy as their authoritative presence as the heads of delegations lends the visit legitimacy. Being the official head of state of Canada, when a Governor General is sent on a foreign excursion, their purpose is to raise Canada’s profile and enhance its reputation (Potter 2009, 108). Notable examples include her Excellency Adrienne Clarkson’s 2001 visit to Argentina and Chile. There, she and 39 Canadian dignitaries participated in public debates and discussed with Argentine and Chilean officials about the arts, peacekeeping, and aboriginal issues (109). Madam Clarkson used her visits to draw attention to Canada’s contributions to these areas and demonstrate that Canada was a valuable ally to both nations.

On her subsequent trip to Germany, her diplomatic efforts led to delegation member Atom Egoyan being appointed President of the jury at the Berlin Film festival, a development that strengthened diplomatic ties and “German-Canadian bilateral cooperation” (Potter 2009, 110). In 2003, the Governor General led state visits to Russia, Finland, and Iceland where agenda items ranged from salvaging decommissioned submarines to exploring prosperous futures in geothermal energy production. To support its efforts, the delegation brought with it Canadian artists to engage the cultural predilections of each nation. In Russia, dancers and theater performers catered to local preferences. In Finland, musicians and visual artists were selected to impress the domestic high society. Lastly, in Iceland, writers and musicians were recruited to make a lasting impression. These initiatives generated more than 400 total media reports of “real importance,” which equated approximately $9 million in advertising for what amounted to be $5.3 million in state visit costs (111).

On the consular front, embassies and consulates general also provide twin services in cultural promotion and interpersonal brand awareness; the efforts of Colin Robertson, Consul General for
California from 2000 to 2004, help illustrate this duality. To support the Oscar nomination of *Les Invasions Barbares*, a Québécois film, Robertson engaged in a five-month campaign to help the nomination board become acquainted with the movie. His strategy? Cocktail parties, private movie screenings, and mailing personally written letters to Canadian Hollywood actors to help secure the nomination. At the zenith of his operation, he invited a myriad of influential Hollywood personalities to his official residence for a final gala (Potter 2009, 202). To reward his efforts, in 2004, *Les Invasions Barbares* won the Oscar for best foreign-language film (Tremblay 2004). What this exercise accomplished was not simply securing a victory for Canada but sending a broader message to film enthusiasts and the public alike that Canada had “a deep pool of cinematic talent” (Potter 2009, 202).

In addition to paving Canada’s path to victory, Consuls and Ambassadors serve a valuable purpose as patriotic symbols. In times of crisis, these individuals are looked upon to provide safety and support. Nowhere was this more evident than in Indonesia in 2004. In the wake of the tsunami that devastated South Asia, Ambassador Randolph Mank proactively established a field office to conduct relief operations. Serving as a hub for the Canadian International Development Agency, Indonesian officials, NGOs, and donors, Mank’s strategy revolutionized Canada’s brand in the region. While simple in form, a nation saturated by reporters covering the disaster amplified the narrative of Canada acting as a beacon of hope (Potter 2009, 204).

Through these examples, one can see how soft-power strategies such as a targeted use of public funds and the proliferation of embellishing stories can transform a country’s brand into an international icon. While relatively small in scope, Canada’s tactful initiatives have allowed it to reap benefits it could never hope to gain through direct military, financial, or political efforts. Through the strategic use of economic tools, hard-power resources, and diplomatic assets, Canada has been able to create a perennial narrative that it is a country with which other states should conduct business, trust as an ally, and hold in high esteem as an invaluable member of the international community. The strength of Canada’s soft power is not limited to the immediate success of its international
projects; rather, and most importantly, it lays in the stable trust that countries have developed toward Canada. Through the confidence it has earned on the battlefield, Canada has maintained favorable trade relations with its powerful southern neighbor for decades. Moreover, its commitment to deliver humanitarian aid and resolve armed conflicts at a diplomatic level through the UNSC has helped forge Canada’s glowing valence. Compounded by its fervent support of international public health, Canada has earned an admirable reputation in the eyes of the global community. As an architect of diplomatic lobbying and cultural engineering, Canada has even succeeded in capturing the hearts and minds of traditional adversaries, such as Russia. Lastly, its perseverance and careful branding have given Canada the leverage it needed to pierce the hypercompetitive Hollywood cinema scene. In light of all these accomplishments, made possible by a brand forged through years of consistent initiatives, Canada has indeed succeeded in rendering hard borders pliable.

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References


A Lost Cause Renewed: Quebec, the Civil War, and Canadian Confederation

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Abstract: Discussion surrounding Canadian Confederation often centers around whether the Dominion of Canada was built on an act or a pact. There are valid points to be made for each argument, but it just may be that both are incomplete. The act or pact debate often fails to fully consider the unique experience of French Canadians in the years leading up to Confederation in 1867, which means that a third argument has largely been overlooked. For French Canadians, the years leading up to the passage of the British North America Act of 1867 saw a renewal of the Conquest and revival of national myth. Throughout the early 1860s, the American Civil War reminded them of their past struggles against the British. They remembered how their farms and villages burned as the British captured Quebec in 1759, and as they watched their French Louisianan brethren succumb to the Union Army and Americanization, they remembered how they had been abandoned by France a century earlier. By 1867 French Canadians felt they were alone on a continent full of anglophones and Protestants who were committed to assimilating them and extinguishing the last light of true Catholicism in North America. Rather than share the fate of Louisiana’s French, they sought a ceasefire. They desired a means to prolong their struggle for cultural survival, and Confederation offered this. By building on established historiography and examining contemporary newspaper sources, this article reveals that for French Canadians, Confederation represented an armistice more than an act or pact.

Keywords: Canadian Confederation, American Civil War, the Conquest, Quebec-Louisiana relations, national myth

Act or pact? These three simple yet profoundly important words are often found at the heart of the sometimes intense conversation surrounding Canadian Confederation and Quebec’s national question; taken together they pose a question that asks what it fundamentally means to be Canadian. Scholars and political scientists have debated the question for more than a century without forming a solid consensus on the matter.¹ There are no easy answers to this issue. Perhaps to some extent, both the act and pact arguments are true. There are, indeed, legitimate arguments to be made for each case; however, there is a third argument that should also be a part of the debate. More than an act or a pact, this argument contends that in 1867 Confederation marked a ceasefire in a battle that had begun
more than a hundred years earlier. French Canadians knew this battle as the Conquest, and although it had taken various forms over the course of a century, the 1860s saw this lost cause renewed with a violence, intensity, and urgency that had not been present since the Seven Years’ War. New combatants were introduced, and the hostilities played out in a new, more southern theater of war. The struggle, however, remained the same; for French Canadians this struggle could summarily be described as English-speaking Protestants attempting to impose their godless, industrial, vulgar way of life on a beleaguered, agrarian minority. In this sense, French Canadians experienced the American Civil War as a continuation of the Conquest. The war reopened old wounds from which national myth, tradition, and religious duty poured out, thus imbuing the conflict with a profound meaning that was felt uniquely by Canadiens. Consequently, to a great number of francophones, the British North America Act of 1867 represented an armistice as much as it did a union.

Examination of the French-Canadian experience of the American Civil War must first begin by recognizing the importance of national myth. In his book, Love in the Western World, cultural theorist Denis de Rougemont provides useful insights into the formation and power of myth. He writes, “A myth makes it possible to become aware at a glance of certain types of constant relations… A myth expresses the rules of conduct of a given social or religious group. It issues accordingly from whatever sacred principle has presided over the formation of this group.” In short, myths describe and prescribe constant relations, rules of conduct, and sacred principles. They provide a lens through which a group of people view the world around them; in the case of national myths, they can define entire peoples as they influence interpretations of history, color opinions of current events, and inform ideas about the future. Furthermore, de Rougemont’s use of the phrase “to become aware at a glance” suggests that myths do not necessarily encourage deep analysis. They simply reveal the way things are and always have been. Constant relations and sacred principles are eternal concepts. They are matters that do not require constant reevaluation, and as such they exert a certain hold on people that becomes deeply, perhaps unconsciously, ingrained over time. These ideas are of crucial importance as one proceeds with an analysis of French Canadians and the Civil War as they provide
a framework for understanding how myth and national consciousness are very much intertwined.

As the Civil War laid the foundations of the American South’s Lost Cause, French Canadians’ own national myth, the Conquest, was brought to the forefront of their collective memory. With the importance of myth already established, it is vital to also come to a complete understanding of the Conquest itself. In its simplest sense, the Conquest refers to Great Britain’s acquisition of New France at the end of the Seven Years’ War. However, as a national myth it is much more complex. In addition to being conquered by the British, French Canadians understood their abandonment to also be a part of the Conquest. They felt that France, their mother country, had rejected them and traded them away for the apparently more valuable islands of Guadalupe and Martinique. With this in mind, historian Daniel Francis refers to the Conquest as a “neurosis-making event” that was at once both a humiliation and a tragedy for Canadiens, and he suggests that for French Canadians, the Conquest was the defining moment in their national history.3 Being a defining moment, one can understand that it was through this traumatic event that French Canadians, now alone and defeated on a continent dominated by their adversaries, were made a distinct people. It was from this painful memory that they drew conclusions about the constant relations, rules of conduct, and sacred principles that defined who they were and what their purpose was. Therefore, it must be recognized that the French-Canadian nation, steeped as it was in myth, was born out of the Conquest.

The Conquest was more than just a singular event, however, and French Canadians relied on national myth to explain their regrettable situation after the Seven Years’ War ended. After the war, the British made continued attempts at assimilation in their new colony, and it appeared to French Canadians that the British were wholly committed to ensuring the complete amalgamation of their people into British society. The Conquest, therefore, was an ongoing process. Perhaps more importantly, as a national myth it revealed to francophones that the British commitment to assimilation was a constant relation, and each measure taken by the British reinforced what had become a defining belief among French Canadians. Whether it be by the sword or by the pen, they believed the British were committed to destroying the French-Canadian way of life. The Royal
Proclamation of 1763, for example, made it clear that the Conquest, now being continued through the passage of legislation, was about more than territory. The institution of English law, the oath of allegiance that prevented Catholics from holding public office, and the western settlement boundary meant to push English-speakers into Quebec demonstrated that the French-Canadian nation, its culture, and its religion were to be conquered as well. With a relatively small English population and a lack of new anglophone arrivals, however, authorities soon found that it was vital to retain the loyalty of the French Canadians, who formed the bulk of the population. The Quebec Act of 1774 was passed with the aim of undoing many of the assimilative measures the British had taken since 1763, but the national myth was already firmly established. French Canadians knew that the British would continue trying to assimilate them, and now understood that their numerical superiority in Quebec offered them a means of defending their identity. It is also important to mention, as Laurier LaPierre carefully points out in his work on French-Canadian nationalism, that the Quebec Act granted a “whole series of privileges and concessions” to Quebec’s Catholic clergy. These privileges and concessions were attempts at appeasing French Canadians, certainly, but more importantly they solidified the Church’s perceived role as the protector of French Canada and as the most effective institution French Canadians had for dealing with British authorities. Thus, more rules and relations of the national myth became entrenched. The Church would defend French Canadians, and French Canadians would in turn defend the Church. Their condition was simple. The British would continue trying to assimilate them, and they would rely on their numerical superiority in Quebec and the power of the Church to defend their French-Canadian identity. Clearly then, it was through the lens of the Conquest that French Canadians understood the rules and relations that governed their situation in North America.

Nearly a century later, on the eve of the U.S. Civil War, the Conquest still loomed large in the hearts and minds of Canadiens. As they had done previously with the Quebec Act, British authorities continued to shift the official position toward French Canadians to a more conciliatory posture. Parliament revoked Section 41 of the *Act of Union*, for example, which had declared English
to be the only official language of Canada. However, it was apparent to French Canadians that regardless of whatever steps officials may have taken toward appeasement, the larger population of ordinary anglophones still viewed the assimilation of francophones as inevitable. Evidence of this can be found in an 1860 article from the Montreal Witness, in which an English Canadian explains his understanding of the French in North America. The author writes, “The small French population of America is…destined in all probability to be absorbed by the dominant population by which they find themselves surrounded.” He goes on to give specific statistics to show just how small and scattered the French population of North America was, and concludes that only Lower Canada and Louisiana had any chance of preserving pieces of their French identity. This emphasis on French Canadians’ minority status had extreme significance at a time when English Canadians were calling for representation based on population. Moreover, pointing out how small and scattered francophones were in North America was a direct attack on the traditional defenses French Canadians had understood to be part of the constant relations and rules of conduct established by their national myth. Their founding myth had established that a numerical superiority would protect them. According to this article, however, that protection was quickly vanishing. The realities of British rule that had been explained by French Canadians’ national myth were reaffirmed by articles like this, which effectively kept the fires of the Conquest burning in the hearts of francophones. It appeared that anglophones would relentlessly seek to conquer, and the only hope for survival rested on holding on to small pockets of influence in places like Quebec and Louisiana.

Along with predicting the destruction of North America’s French societies, the Montreal Witness article goes on to completely disparage the French role in colonizing North America. The author declares, “The French had an amazing aptitude for running over immense tracts of wilderness, but this is something very different from colonization.” This dismissal of French Canadians’ history is significant. Canadiens had a great deal of pride in their origins and ancestry. For instance, in 1815 Parti Canadien leader Louis-Joseph Papineau argued that Canadiens should be proud of their French origins because France had contributed as much to the development of civilization, science,
literature, art, liberty, and government as Britain. Historian Katherine Morrison’s work suggests that Papineau was not alone in his French-Canadian pride. She lists “the founding of Quebec City in 1608, the courage and ingenuity of the early settlers, and their creative relations with many native tribes who helped them survive in a northern wilderness… [And the exploration of] the heartland of the continent before the English had ventured beyond the Alleghenies” as accomplishments that nineteenth-century French Canadians celebrated. Anglophones’ attempts to dismiss these accomplishments were essentially assaults on French-Canadian heritage and identity. Thus, one of the most important aspects of the Conquest’s power as a myth is revealed. More than land or even power, in the eyes of French Canadians, the British strove to conquer their entire history and identity. Assimilation did not mean simply integrating or mixing into British society, it meant killing their ancestors and erasing their legacy. After a century of British rule, their language, religion, traditions, accomplishments, and their entire history as a people were still at risk of being wiped away from the historical record.

As they looked through the lens of the Conquest, French Canadians saw that their entire way of life was facing destruction in the 1860s. The particularities of that way of life must now be examined if one is to understand the French-Canadian experience of the Civil War. The French-Canadian way of life in the Civil War era can succinctly be described as traditional. The noted historian Jacques Monet explained that the essentials of French-Canadian life in the nineteenth century were “their ancestral land, their French language, their Catholic Faith, their time-honoured, and peculiar jurisprudence, and their long family traditions.” These pillars formed the basis of a life that was most often lived in a rural area while practicing traditional agriculture; the land and traditional farming seemed to offer French Canadians the most effective resistance against any change that might weaken one of these pillars. LaPierre expands on this fact, and his work supports the idea that the land of Quebec and the traditional agriculture practiced there held a significant, perhaps mythic, importance to French Canadians. According to LaPierre, francophones refused to leave Quebec even though better farmland existed elsewhere and refused to adopt the more advanced
farming techniques that were allowing English-speakers to become much more profitable in agriculture because of a certain mystique de la terre that suggested the land of Quebec was essentially the lifeblood of French Canada. This mystique de la terre, one could argue, was grafted onto the myth of the Conquest as a sort of sacred principle that dictated that francophones would survive only if they remained on their ancestral land and remained engaged in their traditional vocation. Traditional farming in Quebec was believed to be what francophones were meant to do. To defy this, was to bleed French Canada. This principle was reaffirmed by the fact that the British dominated virtually all other areas of the economy, which was yet another reality of the Conquest.

With this attachment to the land in mind, one can see that any force that pulled francophones away from Quebec and traditional agriculture would have been viewed as imperiling the survival of French Canada. The Civil War was exactly this kind of force. While historians have been unable to settle on a precise statistic regarding Canadian participation in the Civil War, the commonly agreed upon numbers range from 20,000 to 40,000, with the highest estimate at around 53,000. The exact numbers, however, are less important than the French-Canadian perceptions of their participation in the conflict. Abbé Hercule Beaudry of Quebec is well known by Civil War historians for his claims made in early 1865 that 40,000 French Canadians had fought in the American war and that 14,000 of them had lost their lives as a result. These strikingly high, most likely exaggerated numbers reveal a perceived crisis in Quebec. The high death rate communicated by the Church served as a warning to French Canadians that leaving their ancestral land would only bring trouble. Research done by American historian Preston Jones demonstrates that numerous French-Canadian newspapers echoed the Abbé’s concerns about Canadiens being pulled away from their land and their farms. In March 1865, the Gazette des Campagnes, for example, published a letter from a French-Canadian soldier who claimed to have been one of the many “victims” of the Union Army’s deceitful recruiting agents. In the letter, originally written just outside Richmond, Virginia in June 1864, he describes the horrible plight of his French-Canadian brothers-in-arms who were made cannon fodder and makes a plea to his kin still in Quebec stating, “May they eat what little they can scrounge from working the
land rather then come here to enlist in the Northern army.”17 The message here is clear. Quebec was where French Canadians were meant to be, and traditional life, regardless of its challenges, was far superior to any alternative. The forces causing French Canadians to ignore the mystique de la terre, to defy their traditional vocation, and to forget the rules and principles laid out by their national myth were widely seen as forces of evil; they attacked the pillars of French-Canadian life and threatened the numerical advantage that francophones maintained in Quebec. As such a force, the Civil War marked a renewed attempt at conquest by anglophones.

More important than their attachment to the land was French Canadians’ attachment to their Catholic religion. In his work on French Canadians and Confederation, historian David Kwavnick writes of the nineteenth-century French Canadian: “His religion was the central fact of his existence and every other aspect of his life was interpreted in terms of… his membership in the Church.”18 The nineteenth-century French Canadian understood the world and his place in it through his relationship with God more than anything else. Moreover, French Canadians believed themselves to be a people chosen by God. After the French Revolution’s attacks on Catholicism, it seemed to many Canadiens that they had become the rightful heirs of the legacy of Catholic France, the so-called first daughter of the Catholic Church. As such, they understood themselves to be the protectors of the Catholic religion, and believed that they had a divine mission to build a French-Catholic model of civilization in North America. They were tasked with a sacred duty to be a beacon of godliness on a continent full of Protestant anglophones. According to historian Beverly Rasporich, in 1866 the Bishop of Trois-Rivières, L.F.R. Lafleche likened the land of Quebec “to that which God promised Abraham, a land that will endure everlastingly for those yet unborn,” and he declared that the establishment of a Catholic nation on such a promised land was the providential mission of French Canada.19 Once again, it becomes clear that the French-Canadian identity was wrapped up in national myth. The land, religion, and future of the French “race” all were interdependent on one another. The stakes were impossibly high, and the Conquest greatly endangered their success.

The Civil War, as a continuation of the Conquest, presented a major threat to French
Canadians’ divine mission. Catholics across North America universally condemned Protestantism as the cause of the war. A Boston-based Catholic newspaper, the Pilot, for example, attributed the war to “violent, vulgar Saxonism.” Meanwhile, Le Propagateur Catholique of New Orleans spoke of Protestants’ inability to distinguish good from evil, which ultimately led them foolishly to seek a “liberté du mal.” French-Canadian newspapers held similar views. Preston Jones explains that the Gazette des Campagnes declared America, with its relatively high crime rate and its toleration of Mormonism’s polygamy, to be the “most immoral country in the world” and proclaimed to readers that the Civil War was just one battle in a larger, global war against Catholicism. If French Canadians had dreams of a Catholic North America, the power of the Union Army and its largely Protestant and industrialized society was a more than formidable opponent whose incredible ability to wage war was put on full display in the early 1860s. Worse yet for French Canadians was that this apparently religious war threatened to spill into Quebec. In 1858, the famous abolitionist John Brown had declared in Canada West (Ontario) that after the Union Army dealt with the “Slavocracy” in the South, they should conquer the “French Priestocracy” in Quebec. Facing threats such as this, the Courrier du Canada referred to the Yankees as part of a “race malfaisant.” At a time when language, religion, ethnicity, and “race” all blended together, the weight of this commentary cannot be overstated; it had clear implications for English-speaking, Protestant, British Canadians.

Although there was certainly a feeling of animosity toward all Protestants, the Northern states, with their industry and vulgar materialism, were seen as particularly detestable by some French Canadians, who viewed them as being the war’s aggressors. Many Canadiens would have agreed that the war was truly one of Northern aggression. On May 27, 1861, Le Canadien told readers, “Mais on sait fort bien que ce n’est pas l’abolition de l’esclavage que veut et Nord, mais subjugation et l’exploitation du Sud.” French Canadians tended not to see slavery as being central to the war, and more often believed the war was really about the North trying to dominate and exploit the South. As another largely agrarian minority that resisted domination, many French Canadians were sympathetic to the Southerners’ cause and their attempt at autonomy. This was a very different view of the war than
British Canadians held. While they had grievances with the Northern states, most British Canadians viewed the South as backward and slavery as a great evil. A May 1861 article from *The Montreal Herald and Daily Commercial Gazette* explained to readers that although they might not be able to expect the same treatment from Americans, Canadians had to support the American Union because of its antislavery stance and because the Southern states’ rebellion represented a threat to constitutional governments all over the world.26 Similarly, an Eastern Townships newspaper, the *Stanstead Journal*, wrote that the Southern states had seceded only because their inferior agricultural way of life had caused them to fall behind the industrialized North, and even explicitly shamed Canadian newspapers that propagated different opinions.27 In this view, the destruction of the Southern way of life was seen as progress, much as British Canadians understood the Conquest to be progressive and beneficial for the French. This connection would not have been lost on French Canadians who were often cited as being inferior to British Canadians.28

This disagreement between French Canadians and British Canadians about what was progress and what was exploitative, wanton destruction had its roots in the Conquest. In his book, *The People of New France*, Allan Greer describes the events that led to the capture of Quebec and Montreal by British forces in 1759 and 1760, and he explains that French Canadians remember these events as especially dramatic and meaningful. He writes of the siege of Quebec, “Week after week in the summer of 1759, British batteries bombarded the capital without mercy, while raiding parties burned villages all up and down the St. Lawrence in defiance of then current rules of civilized warfare.”29 French Canadians’ memory of the loss of Quebec and the barbaric, unjustifiable, merciless burning of their ancestors’ homes was deeply ingrained by their national myth. The destruction of New France took on an even greater significance in the context of the Civil War. In November of 1864 the *Morning Chronicle and Commercial and Shipping Gazette*, a Quebec newspaper, gave readers an update concerning the war. General W.T. Sherman’s infamous scorched-earth march was just beginning at this time, and was a topic of particular interest. The newspaper relates information from American newspapers stating, “His [Sherman’s] army will now leave such a swath of desolated
country behind it as shall give Georgia and South Carolina a lasting lesson in war.”[30] The article goes on to quote a New York-based newspaper that described Sherman’s burning of Atlanta as the work of a military genius. It must be noted that the writers at the *Morning Chronicle and Commercial and Shipping Gazette* did not agree that Sherman’s actions were those of a genius, and they even characterized his scorched-earth policy as bloodthirsty; however, the newspaper still stated its support for the Union and expressed satisfaction in Abraham Lincoln’s reelection. It seems British Canadians were not overly enthusiastic about the unsavory policies of Union Army generals, but were willing to look past them in the name of progress.

For French Canadians, the parallels to the Conquest were harder to ignore. According to Preston Jones, the French-Canadian newspaper *L’Ordre* wrote in April 1865, “History will surely be stained by the inhuman conduct of Northern generals,” and likened the Union Army to Vandals rather than Christians. Jones also cites articles from the *Gazette des Campagnes* that told readers that Southerners were more honorable than Northerners and that Lincoln was a tyrant whose assassination may have been divine intervention.[31] For French Canadians, the destruction of the South was reminiscent of the destruction of Quebec at the time of the Conquest. The lack of healing since the eighteenth century became apparent as old wounds were reopened, and myth and memory bled from the French-Canadian national consciousness. Francophones were reminded of the British message of progress that had accompanied the Conquest. This progress had led to economic domination and political domination. British Canadians still resisted giving the French language official recognition,[32] after all. As this constant relation revealed itself time and time again, it seemed to French Canadians that “progress” was the anglophones’ codeword for domination and subjugation; thus, the war in the South appeared to be just another front in the larger struggle that was the Conquest.

Given this background, the American Civil War carried the highest of stakes for French Canadians. The entire French identity was under attack. Promises of money and adventure lured francophones away from their homeland to die for the godless Union Army; their divine mission
seemed less achievable as opposition grew in the form of the aggressive and industrialized Northern states; the Catholic faith and French culture in Quebec were directly threatened by America’s manifest destiny; and industry was being exported from the American North into Canada. At the same time, their British Canadian counterparts identified with a completely different experience. British Canadians may have feared American expansion, and may have had issues with the United States, but ultimately their view of the war was that a superior culture was imposing its will on an inferior, backward people. The war was seen as progress. Therefore, a clear minority on a continent full of English-speaking Protestants who were bent on ending their traditional way of life, French Canadians found themselves engaged in a multi-fronted cultural war that threatened the rules and sacred principles they so deeply valued. In this sense, the Civil War was a renewal and even an intensification of French Canada’s lost cause.

It must be noted that the French, Catholic model of civilization that French Canadians hoped to build in North America was not necessarily limited by national borders. Newspaper articles show that French Canadians felt very much connected to Franco-American populations. In June 1862, the Morning Chronicle and Commercial and Shipping Gazette published a brief article titled “Whom Shall We Believe.” The article presents two opposing reports from the United States that offer conflicting accounts of the French makeup of the Confederate Army. One report claims that there are no French in the Southern armies, while the other observes that many in the Southern armies are often seen speaking fluent French. Although the article provides no clear answers to its readers, it establishes the fact that Quebeckers had a deep interest in their Franco-American counterparts’ participation in the war. The previously cited article from Le Canadien titled “Adresse des Français de la Louisiane” reveals the same interest by publishing letters from French Louisianans. This fraternal connection between the former French North American colonies is one of the most important aspects of the French-Canadian experience of the Civil War.

Louisiana was seen as an especially important place by French Canadians. French Canadians maintained a very romanticized view of Louisiana’s French during the war years, and New Orleans
held particular significance as it had been home to the largest population of francophones of any city in North America well into the 1860s. Many Canadiens believed that Louisiana had a better chance of preserving French heritage than Quebec did. Research done by Preston Jones has revealed statements from French Canadians such as Louis-Antoine Dessaulles saying that the Louisianans were “plus français que nous,” and “the Louisianais had preserved a French civilization superior to that of Quebec.” More than just admiring them, French Canadians saw themselves in Louisiana’s French and easily identified with their struggle against an oppressive majority. Quebec newspapers such as the Courrier du Canada lamented the French blood that would be spilled in the Louisiana regiments. Le Canadien simultaneously called for support for francophones fighting for their rights in the Southern armies, while condemning francophones who fought for the North as traitors to their heritage. Moreover, because they saw the Protestant Northerners as anti-Catholic and even atheistic, they saw French Louisianans as noble defenders of God. Thus, they were seen as partners in the divine French mission. Abandoned by France, separated by a national border, and some 1,500 miles apart, the two societies were united in their resistance against would-be conquerors, and in this sense, the Louisianans’ fight opened a new front in French Canadians’ own war; that is to say, it was an extension of the Conquest.

It is interesting to consider that French Canadians’ romanticized views of Louisiana’s French were not exactly reflective of reality. In truth, French Louisianans had begun Americanizing long before the war began, and the conflict only accelerated this process. Louisianans were behaving in ways that French Canadians would have found deeply troubling long before Union General Benjamin Butler occupied New Orleans. For instance, an interesting study conducted by historian Gabriel Audisio reveals that several French Catholic congregations in Louisiana had begun choosing English as their preferred language for mass and that several French newspapers progressed from printing in French only, to French and English, and finally to English only between the 1840s and 1860s. English even became Louisiana’s official language of instruction in 1864. In contrast, Louis-Joseph Papineau had declared in the 1830s that French Canadians would under no circumstances give up their
language or culture. Furthermore, intermarriage was occurring much more frequently between francophones and anglophones in the state. Historian Marise Bachand notes that intermarriage actually became common practice in Louisiana during the second half of the nineteenth century, while Catholic priests presiding over weddings in Quebec reminded new husbands and wives “they were both called to serve the glory of God and to safeguard the good of the homeland.” The contrast between the two societies is stark. Certainly, marrying anglophones would have been viewed as conflicting with the French-Catholic mission. Additionally, Preston Jones cites a letter written by a French Canadian from Quebec living in New Orleans. The letter, sent home to his parents, explained that he was making a living in business and also that his young son spoke a mixture of French and English. The letter represents everything French Canadians feared about losing their identity. It depicts a French Canadian who has left the family farm, traveled to America where he has become involved in materialistic, stereotypically Protestant business pursuits, and is raising a son who corruptions the French language with English. As the war came to its conclusion, French Canadians had to confront the growing discrepancies between their romanticized views of Louisianans and reality.

The Americanization of Louisiana must have been shocking to French Canadians. In 1862, shortly after the Union Army captured New Orleans, French-Canadian newspapers had reassured Quebeckers that the city’s francophones would never allow the Northerners to impose their government there. French Canadians understood resistance to conquest as part of their identity, and they clearly believed Louisianans would also resist. In 1863, Philippe-Joseph Aubert de Gaspé cemented the commitment to resistance as an essential French-Canadian characteristic with his novel, les Anciens Canadiens. In the novel, the French-Canadian protagonist refuses to marry the British man she loves out of a duty to her heritage, and proclaims that to marry him would be to be “twice conquered.” Here, de Gaspé essentially reminds his francophone audience that their ancestors had been willing to sacrifice their personal happiness for the good of the French-Canadian nation, and his choice of words is significant. By Americanizing, the Louisianans had been conquered. Worse yet, it seemed they embraced a new American identity without looking back. A Louisiana woman
wrote in the postwar years, “Now our city, like a woman who had been won to love her conqueror, began to assume the reconstruction that she had shed blood to resist.” The differences between this letter and de Gaspé’s novel are telling. French Canadians remained faithful to their mission. No sacrifice was too great if it meant ensuring the survival of the nation. Meanwhile, Louisianans were more open to change. Americanization seemed to offer French Louisianans a path toward success, material wealth, and personal happiness at the cost of their French identity, a price many were willing to pay. As the two French societies identified more and more with different causes, the fraternal bond that French Canadians had believed to be so strong was significantly strained.

As Louisianans embraced the South’s own lost cause, their French identity was lost. With the racial aspects of the American Civil War, it seemed for Louisianans a “white” identity became more important than a French identity. In response, Canada’s French tried to distance themselves from their American counterparts. As Southerners began to deny the role slavery had in the war, more French-Canadian veterans began claiming they had joined the Union Army to end slavery. The parallels between this phenomenon and the Conquest must be acknowledged. After the Conquest, the French Revolution had revealed France to be less devoted to Catholicism than French Canadians were. Similarly, the Civil War had revealed Louisianans to be less committed to preserving their French identity. With the fall of French Louisiana, it was clear to French Canadians that there was no society more French than that of Quebec. Much as in 1763, when France had abandoned its North American colonies by agreeing to the Treaty of Paris, French Louisianans had agreed to terms with their American conquerors, and French Canadians once again found themselves alone; once again the humiliation was a double one. Not only had the agrarian, chivalrous, traditional Southerners been physically conquered by the industrialized Northern aggressors, but perhaps more importantly the “most French” civilization in North America had also been socially conquered by lost-cause-Southerners and was assimilating quite readily. In the tumultuous postwar years, French Louisianans found themselves in a society where slavery no longer provided the foundation of everyday life. The social position of white Southerners appeared to be in jeopardy as former slaves became freedmen,
and Reconstruction governments sought to transform the American South. The South’s Lost Cause seemed to offer some stability to French Louisianans amid these changes. The idea that lost-cause-Southerners had fought heroically to preserve an honorable, chivalrous way of life against Northern invaders rather than to defend an evil, exploitive institution was quickly adopted by many of Louisiana’s French, and according to Marise Bachand, for French Louisianans, “The courage [the lost-cause-Southerner] displayed during the Civil War to defend the ‘superior race’ smoothed differences and sealed their alliance.”

As French Louisianans allied themselves with lost-cause-Southerners, their alliance with French Canada was broken. In all wars, the loss of an ally requires a reevaluation of circumstances, and that is precisely what French Canadians did after French Louisiana fell victim to the renewed Conquest.

Scholars would be wise to keep all of this in mind when studying Canadian Confederation. Many historians, like Phillip Buckner for example, rightly point out that the chaos of the Civil War demonstrated to Canadians the need to unite. The United States had just demonstrated its military and economic power by waging a war against itself for four years. All Canadians had reason to worry about American expansion, and Buckner argues that Confederation represented Canadians choosing to be British rather than American. Other scholars point out the economic benefits a united Canada promised to bring. These arguments have validity, of course, but they ignore the fact that for French Canadians, the Civil War went beyond matters of practical politics and entered the realm of myth. The relations, rules, and sacred principles rooted in the Conquest imbued the war with a profound meaning that was uniquely felt by French Canadians. They saw the Civil War as another front in their own long struggle, a struggle for God, tradition, and identity. The fall of Louisiana, a supposed bastion of French heritage, dealt a heavy blow to the French-Canadian mission. After 1865, it was clear that if a Catholic nation was to be built in North America, it would have its locus in Quebec. If the French identity was to survive, it would do so from Quebec. If Quebec failed, the French-Canadian-Catholic light to the world would be extinguished, and the Conquest would be complete.

With this in mind, one can more closely inspect the British North America Act of 1867,
and how it was perceived by French Canadians. Robert Vipond’s study on Confederation explains that scholars must not conflate sovereignty and legislative power when studying the British North America Act. He demonstrates that a popular understanding of the Act in the 1860s was that although significant power would be granted to the federal government in Ottawa, it would not create the provincial governments and, therefore, could not dominate or destroy them. Furthermore, the act made French an official language for the first time, which was a major victory for Canadiens. With this understanding the provinces would largely be free to govern themselves in their own spheres, and francophones would retain their language. After witnessing the fall of French Louisiana, this was about all French Canadians could hope for in 1867. Concerning Confederation, the Journal de Québec wrote, “We want to be a nation one day, and that is our necessary destiny…we prefer the political condition of which we will be a vital element, in which we will still be in existence.” This shows that the goal of nationhood was still very much alive, which suggests that French Canadians’ struggle was not over. The Courrier du Canada expressed a similar sentiment when Confederation was made official stating:

One hundred and six years, eight months and eighteen days ago yesterday…the last of the French governors of New France concluded a capitulation which delivered forever to his secular enemies ‘the most beautiful, the most French, and the most neglected’ of the colonies France possessed…Who would have been able to foresee…that the cradle of French-Canadian nationalism, would be…governed by a French-Canadian Catholic.

The imagery of Quebec as the cradle of French-Canadian nationalism suggests that this nationalism would eventually grow from its youthful state into a mature entity in the future. While this goal had not yet been accomplished, French Canadians could celebrate their small victories. With Confederation, provincial borders essentially became lines of demarcation within which the French language and Catholic religion would be free from further assault, and where French Canadians could govern themselves. French Canadians were given a sanctuary from which they had means to
prolong their struggle, to regroup, to consolidate, and to live to fight another day. Significant power was given to Ottawa, to be sure, but the traditional French-Canadian way of life did not require an active provincial government. It just required that the French be left alone, and Confederation granted this. Moreover, the French Canadians did not fear a long struggle. In fact, struggle was part of their Catholic identity. Suffering and salvation went hand in hand. Quebec would bear its cross until it could fulfill its mission. If they had their language, their religion, and their land, French Canadians would have their identity. As long as they had their identity, the Conquest was not complete.

The official motto of Quebec is Je me souviens. “I remember.” It may just be that remembrance is the most defining characteristic of French-Canadian society. This is the case presently and may very well have been the case in the 1860s. When the American North went to war with the South in 1861 to keep them in a union they no longer wished to be in, French Canadians remembered how they had come to be in a union with the British. When General Sherman left a path of destruction across the American South, French Canadians remembered how the British had burned their villages as they laid siege to Quebec. When the Southern states were said to be backward, they remembered how British rule was said to be progress. As a national myth, the Conquest has always been remembered by French Canadians. It inflicted wounds that traditionally have not been able to, or perhaps not allowed to, heal. Certain events irritate it from time to time so that it is kept raw and vulnerable, and every now and then it gets torn open. The Civil War was one such event. It reopened old wounds that the Conquest had inflicted upon the French-Canadian national consciousness, and myth, memory, tradition, and religious duty bled out. As French Canadians watched their French Louisiana brethren fight would-be conquerors, they were reminded that their own survival was also still very much at risk. By the end of the war, they had lost an important ally, and were forced to seek terms with their adversaries. The battle was not over, but a ceasefire was needed. In this sense, as much as it may have been an act or pact, The British North America Act of 1867 represented an armistice in the long battle known as the Conquest.
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Notes


7 Although it is not clear who the author of the article was, it is known that John Dougall was the editor, publisher, and proprietor of the newspaper. Dougall was an English-speaking Protestant who had immigrated to Montreal from Scotland in 1826 at the age of sixteen. His newspaper, *The Montreal Witness*, ran from 1845 until 1938 and consistently provided the public with a Christian, often anti-Catholic perspective of social and economic issues in Canada and abroad. It is possible that he wrote the article referenced here.


than colonizing, it is important to note that popular pseudoscience of the time often linked a race’s “whiteness” to their ability to “improve” the wilderness. Newton writes about this pseudoscience in his work cited here. By making the distinction between running over tracts of wilderness and colonization, the newspaper article implies that French Canadians had failed to fully improve or civilize the wilderness and effectively casts them as inferior to their colonizing English counterparts. With this in mind, one can see how French Canadians would have seen the article as insulting and dismissive, and the accuracy of the statement itself becomes less important than the reduction of Canadiens’ history to such terms.


24 Jones, “Quebec and Louisiana,” 75. [“evil race”]

25 E.R. Frichette, ed., “Adresse des Français de la Louisiane,” Le Canadien, May 27, 1861, p. 2, https://collections.banq.qc.ca/ark:/52327/3458498. [“But we know very well that it is not the abolition of slavery that the North wants, but the subjugation and exploitation of the South.”]


that in early American literature French Canadians were portrayed as a people “meant to be governed, not to govern themselves.”

29 Allan Greer, *The People of New France* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 110.


31 Jones, “Civil War, Culture War,” 64.

32 Hillinger, “Status of the French Language,” 24-26. The Act of Union in 1840 is a great example of this resistance. Section 41 of the act established English as Canada’s only official language, thereby it effectively banned the official use of French. This provision was met with tremendous resistance from francophones, and in 1848 it was revoked. The fact that it was revoked and not amended is important. Instead of amending Section 41 to extend official status to the French language, Canadian lawmakers chose to get rid of it all together. An opportunity to protect and recognize the French language was therefore passed over, and francophones’ mother tongue was left in a rather precarious position.


34 Weir, “British Feeling On The American Civil War,” p. 2. This article states that the American government provided nothing but “ill offices” to Canada during the Rebellions of 1837-1838, that Americans would have celebrated any disasters suffered in Britain during the revolutions of 1848, and that the American government sought to humiliate Britain through their enforcement of laws against enlistment and strict neutrality during the Crimean War. See also: Little, “Borderland to Bordered Land,” 6, 8, 19-20. Little provides English-language newspaper articles from the Eastern Townships that condemn the American government’s handling of the Trent Affair, American Secretary of State William Seward’s discussions of manifest destiny, draft dodgers from the Northern states coming across the border into Canada, and a perceived lack of strong action taken by the American government against Fenian raiders. See also: Phillip Buckner, “British North America and a Continent in Dissolution: The American Civil War in the Making of Canadian Confederation,” *Journal of the Civil War Era* 7, no. 4 (December 1, 2017): 525, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26381475. Buckner cites the cancellation of the reciprocity agreement as another cause of antagonism between British Canadians and the Northern states.


37 Jones, “Quebec and Louisiana,” 76. [“more French than us”]

38 Jones, “Quebec and Louisiana,” 75.


44 Jones, “Quebec and Louisiana,” 78.

45 Jones, “Civil War, Culture War,” 65.


49 Preston Jones uses Remy Tremblay’s autobiographical novel, Un revenant: episode de la guerre de secession, to illustrate this fact. See: Jones, “Quebec and Louisiana,” 76–77.


51 Buckner, “British North America and a Continent in Dissolution,” 529.


53 Hillinger, “Status of the French Language,” 20–26. Until the Act of Confederation in 1867, both the French and English languages held non-legislative statuses. The French language had been traditionally protected, though. By recognizing Canadians’ right to practice Catholicism and restoring French civil law, the Quebec Act of 1774 had provided some unofficial protection for the French language as it was attached to religious life and civil courts. The Constitutional Act of 1791 also permitted voters and members of the Legislative Council and Assembly of Lower Canada to take oaths in French or English, thereby officially recognizing the use of the French language. No law explicitly gave the French language official status until 1867, however, when the British North America Act officially allowed for the use of French in the Parliament of Canada, in the Legislative Assembly of Quebec, in all federal courts, and in the courts of Quebec.


55 Quoted in Bonenfant, “French Canadians and Birth of Confederation,” 11.

Bibliography


Burying the Hatchet: Addressing Disproportionate Media Representations of Indigenous Missing and Murdered Peoples

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Abstract: Television and newspapers possess a strong influence not only on the public perception of Indigenous marginalization, but also on the bi-directional relationship that the government possesses regarding policies that address the causes of inequity, racism, and the stereotyping of Indigenous groups in Canada. The foundations of oppressive action are established via the creation of social hierarchies that seek to label marginalized populations such as Indigenous peoples as “others.” The othering of Indigenous groups in Canada has been shown to lead to the perpetuation of structuralized racism and discrimination as an extension of underlying settler-colonialist ideologies. The concept of media framing is used in this article to interpret representations of Indigenous peoples on the national stage. Here, we explore the media’s justification when it makes decisions about the content of its news stories, and how Indigenous peoples involved in these reports have been presented to the public. These constructions have negatively skewed the perception of missing and murdered Indigenous peoples as they ignore or minimize Indigenous male victimization. This has led to their devaluation within mainstream media discourses. As members of families, men and boys play a pivotal role in the maintenance of family structures, and thus, investigating the causes for missing and murdered Indigenous men and boys (MMIMB) will offer greater insight into not only the framing of Indigenous issues in mainstream media but also into the ever-increasing incidence of missing and murdered Indigenous women and girls (MMIWG).

Keywords: MMIWG, MMIMB, framing, representation, Indigenous.

Media attention toward Canada’s national crisis of missing and murdered Indigenous peoples continues to be lacking on the national stage despite being deemed a critical socio-structural issue. Increasingly, there has been an emphasis on the inequitable conditions in which many Indigenous peoples live, which has highlighted that Indigenous communities have not been afforded the same healthy standard of living as their non-Indigenous counterparts. Synonymous with the experiences of developing nations, many Indigenous communities in Canada are continually evidenced to be living in what would be deemed third-world conditions. This includes conditions such as substandard
housing, few opportunities for meaningful employment, and access to necessary resources such as clean water, food, and health and social services (De Leeuw, Greenwood, and Cameron 2010). The foundations of oppressive action are established via the creation of social hierarchies that seek to label marginalized populations such as Indigenous peoples as “others.” This practice is enforced throughout various channels due to the relative lack of understanding and acceptance of Indigenous viewpoints, cultural practices, beliefs, and experiences of life in Canada. Thus, the othering of Indigenous groups has been evidenced to lead to the perpetuation of structuralized racism and discrimination as an extension of underlying settler-colonialist ideology (Reading and de Leeuw 2014). It is an accepted scholarly notion that Indigenous peoples in Canada and abroad are highly diverse. However, Indigenous peoples globally often share similar challenges when related to their representations in the media. These representations have been skewed to present Indigenous peoples from a one-sided “us versus them” perspective which emphasizes helplessness and conflict, and ties directly into lopsided power dynamics favoring the suppression of self-representative images (Nagy and Gillespie 2015).¹

Though steps have been taken to promote equality for and reconciliation with Indigenous groups in Canada, media representations of Indigenous peoples usually remain limited to issues related to systemic racism, stereotypes, assumptions, disorder, and emphasis on non-normative behaviors (Leavitt et al. 2015). These include involvement in the sex trade, criminal activities, interpersonal violence, poverty, homelessness, and substance abuse. As such, this article seeks to explore how mainstream media representations of Indigenous peoples are built upon profound constructions of colonialist undertones through the concept of media framing. It also explores how these constructions have negatively skewed the perception of Indigenous peoples who have gone missing or been murdered, specifically focusing on the lack of representation given to male Indigenous victims and their absence in mainstream media discourses.
Media Representations

Representations through mass media such as television and newspapers have a strong influence on not only the public perceptions of Indigenous marginalization but also the shaping of governmental policies to address reconciliation, inequity, racism, and stereotyping of Indigenous groups. It is important to consider that colonialist dialogues and ideologies continue to overshadow the perspectives and experiences of Indigenous peoples as a whole. These ideologies and perspectives perpetuate structural and social discrimination toward Indigenous victims who have gone missing or been murdered, which devalues their lives (Innes 2015).

It is well known that there exists a plethora of harmful stereotypes that are consistently associated with images and narratives involving Indigenous peoples. These stereotypes stretch across assumptions of Indigenous peoples being drunks, drug addicts, unemployed, unable to govern themselves, and violent. While these may exist in Indigenous communities, their overrepresentation in the media plays a key role in the shaping of external perceptions of Indigenous peoples and the normalizing of stigmatization. Though the national narrative has become more inclusive in recent times, the view of Indigenous peoples continues to be tarnished by misrepresentations, lack of social and historical context, and inherent tokenism instead of truly paying heed to the unique socio-structural barriers and challenges Indigenous groups face in comparison to their non-Indigenous counterparts (Reading and de Leeuw 2014).

Media Framing Lenses

The concept of framing can be used to interpret representations of Indigenous peoples on the national stage, as it helps to explore the media’s justification of the selection of content that is incorporated in a potential news story, and how individuals involved in the story are presented to the public. The long-term socio-structural and interpersonal effects of residential schools and assimilation act as key facets contributing to the victimization of and violence toward Indigenous peoples and have more recently been brought into the limelight by several Canadian media agencies,
including CBC, CTV, and Global News. A broad-scale systematic analysis of print news media representations of residential schools suggests that though some Canadian media outlets and their consumers might be prepared to admit that residential schools acted as sites of cultural genocide and oppression, overall, mainstream news outlets have not done great justice to link this view of reconciliation to the overall reformation of Canadian society and historical presentations (Nagy and Gillespie 2015).

To emphasize this disparity, two predominant methods of analyzing media representations – focusing on the expansive and reductionist lenses, respectively – are described in relation to the framing of Indigenous issues. On the one hand, the use of the expansive lens by the media allows residential schools and missing and murdered Indigenous peoples (MMIP) to be represented in ways that acknowledge the effect of settler colonial mandates as a form of wide-scale cultural oppression. It is not simply an aspect of the past, but rather, a part of our collective future. The expansive lens seeks to align the crisis of missing and murdered Indigenous peoples with the presence of socio-structural inequities – including disproportionate rates of incarceration, poverty, and homelessness – as being intertwined with deeply engrained colonialisit ideologies. An example of such a use of expansionist media frames in Canada is the Aboriginal Peoples Television Network (APTN), without which Indigenous presence on Canadian media networks would be “virtually non-existent” (Clark 2014, 3). In 1983, the Northern Native Broadcast Access program was created to allow Indigenous communities to broadcast “their own programming, in their own language, following their own format, on any topic they deemed important” (David 2019, 5). Following the success of the program, the APTN was launched in 1999. This brought a solution to the problem of mainstream media channels only airing news relating to Indigenous peoples when it directly affected the lives of non-Indigenous Canadians (David 2019).

Since its inception, APTN has consistently produced media stories that promote a more Indigenous-focused experience to combat existing colonialisit stereotyping and discrimination by providing a more holistic approach to Indigenous healing and reconciliation, and attention to
pertinent social issues within Indigenous communities. Despite the success of APTN in stimulating discussion on Indigenous perspectives, a recent study comparing mainstream and APTN news reporting of Indigenous content over a two-month period indicated that mainstream media attention is still lacking (Clark 2014; see Appendix A, Figure 1). This analysis revealed that while APTN included nightly coverage of Indigenous issues, mainstream media sources such as CTV, CBC, and Global News aired only a small number of Indigenous-based news stories. Furthermore, when comparing the framing of Indigenous issues, mainstream media sources were more inclined to utilize stereotypical and authoritative frames while APTN framed stories within an Indigenous context. Finally, mainstream media sources were more inclined to frame Indigenous peoples as either “passive” or “problematic.” They suggested that Indigenous peoples were passive victims not willing to help themselves and over-relying on government assistance or they were problematic and connected to drugs, crime, and violence, or they were vocally opposed to government intervention and resource development such as oil extraction and the building of pipelines (Clark 2014; see Appendix A, Table 1).

On the other hand, by using a reductionist lens the media framed the effects of residential schools and MMIP primarily around violence and abuse. Though the reductionist lens makes mention of intergenerational harm and cultural oppression, it nonetheless reduces these effects to poorly made decisions and mistakes situated in the past. The reductionist lens seeks to pathologize survivors of abuse and suggests that the effects of residential schools on the Indigenous population are not a socio-structural issue but, rather, a condition that is distinctly an “Indigenous problem.” In this perspective, these problems can be cured through closure and making amends because Indigenous peoples are seen as emotionally weak and passive recipients of these injustices (Nagy and Gillespie 2015). Brad Clark’s analysis of the coverage of missing and murdered Indigenous women (MMIW) by Global News, CBC, and CTV from September 1 to October 31, 2011 explored the use of reductionist lenses in mainstream media. It was found that depictions of MMIW emphasized the notion that these women placed themselves in situations that led to their victimization due to
being frequently seen as prostitutes, addicted to drugs, and impoverished (Clark 2014). This negative framing was further highlighted by Gilchrist (2010) who sought to compare the representations of three Indigenous and three non-Indigenous missing and murdered women who were deemed non-deviant and, what would be termed, good women. Her analysis illustrates that news reports of missing and murdered non-Indigenous women were placed more frequently in favorable positions, such as on the front page (37% of the time compared to 25% of the time for Indigenous women), of newspapers, and non-Indigenous women were on average six times more likely to be featured. In addition, the stories of non-Indigenous victims were more likely to offer vivid and detailed descriptions of the women’s lives, which were portrayed more intimately and compassionately (Gilchrist 2010).

The overwhelming focus of news reports on the social and economic challenges faced by Indigenous peoples has led to public ignorance about discrimination and undue harm (Reading and de Leeuw 2014). Often, many of these news reports have implicitly promoted the idea that if an Indigenous person engages in what is determined to be a socially unacceptable behavior, such as prostitution or drug and alcohol use, then they are to be blamed for their victimization. This draws attention away from the socio-structural problems in their environment, which have led to their victimization in the first place. Intimately entwined in these narratives is the notion that due to the continued stigmatization, discrimination, and stereotyping of Indigenous peoples in the media, these groups will undoubtedly continue to experience greater discrimination in other socio-structural areas including the legal, health, and social systems (Bourassa et al. 2005). This leads to Indigenous voices being effectively silenced in the social justice system (Nagy and Gillespie 2015). It is this perpetuation of oppression that contributes to socio-structural inequities in Indigenous communities that further exacerbate the current crisis of MMIP.

**Efforts of Indigenous Advocates to Combat Misrepresentation in the Media**

Advocates and members of Indigenous communities have sought to utilize media outlets to increase public knowledge of the endurance of colonizing rule as perpetuated by the (in)actions of the
Canadian government and media. An article featured on APTN detailed the lack of attention the mainstream Canadian media has paid to the Missing and Murdered Women and Girls (MMIWG) inquiry report as issued by independent commissioners Marian Buller, Michèle Audette, Qajaq Robinson, Marilyn Poitras, and Brian Eyolfson, which they conducted from May 2017 to December 2018 (McDougall 2020). Numerous media outlets such as The Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, CBC, and the National Post have defied the notion that the crisis of MMIWG is a form of cultural genocide. This was noted in such excerpts from Michael Enright of CBC who questioned the notion of genocide stating that “The problem with the term is complex and goes beyond mere pedantry. Its utterance has now become the most telling element in the fabric of the report. It has become a distraction. We might not be able to cite three recommendations of the report, but we have come to recognize that what happened to these women was supposedly genocide” (McDougall 2020, para. 5, italics added). Even more callously, the editorial board at the Globe and Mail stated that the notion of MMIWG being declared a genocide was “absurd” and “simply does not bear scrutiny” further reinforcing the disconnection that mainstream media has when approaching Indigenous reconciliation and victimization (McDougall 2020, para 4).

There have been efforts by Indigenous and non-Indigenous advocates to open a discussion on how to combat the effects of colonialism within media discourses. The Indigenous 150+ training program has developed from a film and conversation series of the same name and was initiated in order to react to the TRC’s established calls to action (Lisk 2020b, para. 2). The initiative was created to increase attention to and education of Indigenous perspectives to inform current and future journalists of how to engage in cross-cultural interviewing while maintaining respect and reducing stereotypes. The program does not focus exclusively on Indigenous youth, but rather it seeks to establish meaningful connections among people of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds. The goal of the program is to identify stereotypes in mainstream media, decolonize the notion of Indigenous sexuality and intergenerational trauma, and bring light to the long-standing effects of systematic racism and discrimination faced by Indigenous peoples in Canada (Lisk 2020b). A TVO interview
with Indigenous journalist Kelly Boutsalis has also brought to light the feelings of voicelessness within mainstream media discourses and how as an Indigenous journalist she has sought to establish a greater voice and attention to Indigenous issues using a culturally appropriate lens (Lisk 2020a). Detailing one of her first experiences with Indigeneity, Boutsalis reminisced watching a news report mentioning “people versus the Natives” suggesting that as an Indigenous female she was “not a person.” (Lisk 2020a) She mentioned that this experience highlighted the inherent disproportionality of whiteness which is imbued in most news outlets, and led to her career mission to increase the presence of Indigenous stories and individuals. Perspectives such as these are key to effectively combating colonialist undertones in mainstream media by encouraging Indigenous individuals to engage and join the ranks of what is currently a predominantly Eurocentric approach to media presentations (Lisk 2020a).

**Spotlighting Missing and Murdered Indigenous Men and Boys**

Since the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the publication of such documents as the MMIWG Inquiry, there has been increased attention to the disproportionate number of missing and murdered Indigenous women in Canada, in large part due to their vulnerable position in society. Although this is indeed an important step toward reconciliation with Indigenous groups, there still exists a startling lack of media representation of missing and murdered Indigenous men and boys (MMIMB). As members of families, men and boys play a pivotal role in the maintenance of family structures. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that investigating the causes for MMIMB will offer greater insights into not only the framing of Indigenous issues in mainstream media but also the ever-increasing incidence of cases of MMIWG. Investigations of the victimization of Indigenous men and boys will offer an avenue for discussion as to why stories of Indigenous male victimization are largely left out of virtually all media discourses.

It can be theorized that the socio-structural elements contributing to interpersonal and self-inflicted violence among Indigenous peoples of any gender likely root from similar causes. It would
be unwise to exclude Indigenous men and boys from public inquiries as they too are an important part of the Indigenous population who have been overlooked even more so than Indigenous women and girls (Hansen and Dim 2019). Data obtained from Statistics Canada suggests that of the 2,500 reported murders of Indigenous peoples in Canada within the last 30 years, more than 70% were male, which is two times the number of Indigenous females murdered and speaks directly to the problematic issue of excluding men and boys from inquiries into Indigenous victimization (National Post 2015, para. 5). Further, recent data from Statistics Canada indicates that Indigenous men are murdered nearly three times as often as Indigenous females, and six times more often than non-Indigenous males (Statistics Canada 2020; See Appendix B, Fig. 2 and 3).

There has been little evidence to suggest that the public call for an inquiry into the incidence of MMIMB has been in the primary interest of the media, government, and the police. Seemingly, the only basis for the inclusion of men and boys in these inquiries has been to examine male victimization of Indigenous women and girls and not the victimization of Indigenous men by other men. The police often view Indigenous males as criminals and deviants and see them as the main perpetrators of violence in Indigenous communities (Innes 2015). Though interpersonal violence within Indigenous communities is a fathomable truth, stereotyping of Indigenous males as violent criminals may well explain why, when of violence against Indigenous men and boys is represented, their victimization obtains a minute amount of media exposure or investigation by the authorities (VanEvery 2019). Despite the fact that the majority of violence against Indigenous women is perpetrated by Indigenous males, we tend to see them only as victimizers, which obscures the understanding that men and boys can be equally vulnerable to becoming victims of violence from other men. Even though the trauma suffered by Indigenous women and girls may well be experienced and perpetrated in different ways, the origins of these acts of violence are comparable to the causes of violence towards Indigenous men and boys (Menzies 2009).

More recently, impassioned grassroots movements calling for inquiries into missing and murdered Indigenous peoples, including Indigenous men and boys, have begun to spring up across
Canada. Families of MMIBM have mirrored movements focused on hanging red dresses and red ribbons to symbolize the loss of MMIWG by hanging red ties to symbolize increased awareness for MMIMIB. Causes such as these emphasize the need for equity by increasing pressure on government authorities to officially include men and boys in inquiries into Indigenous victimization and, at the same time, the necessity to provide families of MMIMIB with the same level of attention that has been offered to families of MMIWG. The necktie campaign was envisioned by Lydia Daniels, whose son Colten went missing from downtown Winnipeg in November of 2014, and began in Manitoba in response to the Red Cloth Ribbons Memorial for MMIW. The goal of the movement is to raise awareness of MMIMIB, and Daniels has emphasized that the symbolic ties “signify our hope and faith” in never giving up their search for justice (Flett 2016, para. 4; CTVNews 2016). Following up on the necktie campaign, the Canadian Association for Equality (CAFE) has expanded the initiative across most major cities in Canada and has invited Canadians to not only hang symbolic neckties, but to also reach out to local, provincial, and federal members of parliament to officially request an expansion of the scope of inquiry into MMIW to include Indigenous men and boys (Canadian Association for Equality 2016).

Insights toward Mainstream Media Representations of Indigenous Peoples

Colonial constructions expressed in the news media reinforce an imagined Indigenous inferiority that contributes greatly to the marginalization of Indigenous people in Canada. That such imagery continues to this day clearly indicates that our country remains far from a cultural mosaic where all ethnicities and cultures coexist (De Leeuw, Greenwood, and Cameron 2010). Research has shown that the Canadian media not only present issues from a predominately Eurocentric lens, but that the majority of reporters and journalists are largely Caucasian regardless of the fact that Canada's Indigenous population continues to grow (Taneja 2020). Though media coverage may present issues pertinent to these populations, they do not necessarily represent the communities that they purport to serve. Thus, it is critical to incorporate a deeper context to Indigenous media stories which moves beyond an initial flashpoint and stimulates ongoing coverage, conversations, and discussions within
affected communities. Action-oriented perspectives toward media stories empower readers and presenters to take action by informing the populace that they have the power to tackle systemic issues. Thus, there is a defined need for Indigenous people to be properly represented in Canadian media discourses “so that they can tell their own stories and have their own voices” (Taneja 2020).

Conclusion
To address effectively the crisis of missing and murdered Indigenous peoples and the inequities which are continually perpetrated against them, we must seek to establish our understanding of these issues through an anti-colonialist lens (Jones 2015). It is this colonialist discourse that inherently tailors the presentation of particular ideas, the perceptions of people, and the actions and inactions of institutions especially in relation to the victimization of Indigenous men and boys. It is the summative effect of these intersections that continues to reproduce inequalities that, in turn, foster the conditions for media representations to ineffectively address the crisis of missing and murdered Indigenous peoples. It is only through the understanding and dissemination of these conversations that we may be able to establish connections between ideological biases and the unique struggles of Indigenous peoples in Canada. Therefore, the media and government must take on the responsibility to ensure that media narratives and representations are led by Indigenous voices to promote accurate and culturally relevant discourses as an important tool for disseminating the complexity of factors that affect Indigenous people’s health, wellbeing, and safety.

Beverly Marsden is a fourth-year Public Health Honours student at Brock University minoring in Canadian Studies. She has a defined passion for social equity, and studies the socio-structural determinants which disadvantage marginalized populations, especially Indigenous and racialized communities. She strives to bring light to systematic injustices present in our current social system, and will soon be engaged in nursing in order to fulfill a personal, professional, and academic interest in caring for geriatric patients on the front-line as a result of a deep-set passion for increasing the current status of patient-centered care.
Appendix A. Figures and Tables Related to Indigenous News Framing

Figure 1: Framing of News Stories APTN Compared to Mainstream Media


Table 1: Types of Media Frames

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRAME</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Frame</td>
<td>Aboriginal people as taking action in their own interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive Frame</td>
<td>Aboriginal people as not working to help themselves, or as passive victims; Waiting for mainstream authorities to assist with funding, housing, address criminal activity or corruption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Problem people” frame</td>
<td>Aboriginal people as connected to drugs and alcohol abuse, criminal activity, corruption, opposition to government policy and/or resource development.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Figure 2: Male Homicide Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of homicide victims</th>
<th>Percent of homicide victims</th>
<th>Homicide rates per 100,000 population</th>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Aboriginal identity</td>
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<td>1.90</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>343</td>
<td>74.40</td>
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<td>366</td>
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<td>393</td>
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<td></td>
<td>359</td>
<td>73.87</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginal identity</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>74.31</td>
<td>1.90</td>
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<td>343</td>
<td>74.40</td>
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<td></td>
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**Figure 3: Female Homicide Statistics**

<table>
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<th>Percent of homicide victims</th>
<th>Homicide rates per 100,000 population</th>
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<td></td>
<td>99</td>
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<td>0.55</td>
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Endnote

I understand my positionality related to the topic. I do not, and cannot, speak on behalf of Indigenous peoples. Despite my grandmother hailing from the (Siksika) Blackfoot nation of Southern Alberta, I do not claim myself to have an Indigenous identity. As a non-Indigenous female, I hope to speak to socio-structural issues that have disproportionately disadvantaged many Indigenous communities in Canada, especially relating to the care for their wellbeing, safety, and representation on the national stage. In exploring these critical issues, I am motivated to examine, increase accountability, confront, and remove hierarchies and inequities. This notion originates from the basis, whether in justice or law, that there is no excuse for the devaluation of any individual, nor is there an excuse for individuals to engage in domination and marginalization. It is this structure of inequitable and marginalizing human hierarchies that drives my intention to emphasize that these unequal power structures are unjustifiable. Furthermore, I acknowledge my privileged status as a non-Indigenous white female within the colonialist structures of this nation, and thus fully recognize the accountability I hold to the Indigenous communities I write about. Though non-Indigenous researchers and activists cannot speak on behalf of Indigenous communities, it is my hope that drawing attention to socio-structural inequity can create a dialogue to limit the influences of colonialism imbued in our society. I believe this aspiration is only possible when national stakeholders and observers are willing to examine the actions and (in)actions on behalf of government and media establishments, and are further, willing to engage in more reflexive approaches to listening and understanding when engaging with the experiences of Indigenous citizens in Canada.

References


Changing Attitudes toward Irish Canadians:
The Impact of the 1847 Famine Influx in the Province of Canada

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Abstract: Throughout the nineteenth century, Canada regularly received Irish immigrants who became a tolerated and important part of Canadian society. However, between 1845 and 1852, Ireland endured a dreadful famine which saw more than two million Irish paupers emigrate, with their destinations varying across the world. A large portion of Irish famine immigrants travelled to the comparatively empty British North American colony in Canada, passing almost entirely through Quebec. Canadians at first welcomed the idea of large numbers of immigrants to help expand the western frontier, but with a massive exodus of Irish paupers fleeing Ireland in 1847, what arrived in the ports of Quebec ended up terrifying the people of Canada. The deplorable condition of the immigrants strained the Canadian social institutions beyond their means, and shifted the view of Irish Canadians into a negative light. Although quarantined at Grosse Isle, and various other makeshift quarantine stations throughout the St. Lawrence River valley, the unexpectedly disease-ridden immigrants caused typhus, cholera, and dysentery to run rampant wherever they arrived, claiming the lives of thousands of Canadians, as well as many of their own. Societal conditions set in place by previous generations of Irish immigrants to Canada, which allowed them to be a welcomed part of Canadian communities, were broken by this new wave of Irish exiles, and caused public opinion to turn against the Irish immigrants. The betrayal of social norms caused a violent Protestant-Canadian nativist response that lasted for decades after their arrival.

Keywords: famine, immigration, Irish Canadians, Quebec, nativism

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Irish regularly immigrated to Canada; prior to the famine period in Ireland (1845-52) more than 250,000 Irish immigrants traveled to a welcoming Canada.¹ These Irish Canadians created distinct communities within cities throughout the St. Lawrence River valley and beyond, helping expand Canadian institutions and infrastructure. However, during the famine period Irish immigration increased significantly, with the largest influx occurring during 1847, and pushing well past the limits Canadian institutions established for the occasion. As thousands of Irish fleeing famine in their homeland flooded into Canadian cities and
towns, they betrayed the acceptable social standards set for them by their forebears.

The reason the Irish left their homeland is indicative of why the 1847 immigrants differed so widely from previous decades, and why exactly Canada became the primary destination for the famine immigrants explains how this societal betrayal came to fruition. Examination of various first-person experiences of those who endured the immigration season of 1847 shows how the Canadian view toward Irish immigrants drastically changed, as Irish of a different stock than what most Canadians expected or wanted began to arrive. This caused a nativist response to the frightening, and largely Catholic, Irish immigrants broadly in Canada, demonstrated by the Protestant populations of Montreal and Quebec City post-1847.

Irish emigration has a longer history than most think, predating what is typically thought to have started with the famine. Ireland produced many Canadian-bound emigrants pre-famine, and though many Irish moved south into the United States upon arrival, a majority of those disembarking stayed in Upper and Lower Canada. These Irish tended to be wealthier Protestants from the Ulster province, who blended in well with the British Protestant majority already present in Canada. During the 1830s, more proletariat Catholic Irish immigrants arrived in Canada, with higher volumes of unskilled workers and domestic servants disembarking in Quebec. These able-bodied and willing immigrants worked to make a fruitful life for themselves in their new home, contributing to expanding Canadian infrastructure in the process.

While tensions between Protestant and Catholic populations globally ran high throughout the nineteenth century, Canadian Protestants tolerated the early Irish Catholic immigrants in communities along the St. Lawrence. Irish Catholics typically occupied the lowest rungs of society in Canada, living in the poorest areas and working low-paying jobs such as farming and general labor. Catholic Irish Canadians found work on public works and are largely responsible for building many bridges and canals during the pre-famine period in Canada. Canadian historian Andrew Holman explains the social conditions that led pre-famine Catholic Irish in Hamilton to be a tolerated part of society: most importantly an efficient use of the space they occupied, a sense of self-sufficiency, and
economic usefulness.\(^7\) The pre-famine Irish immigrants typically met these criteria in Hamilton and other areas of early nineteenth-century Irish immigration in Canada. Catholic Irish largely stayed out of the way of the Protestant majority, which helped set the acceptable standard by which Canadians viewed the Irish immigrants in Canada, until the Irish Famine.

Beginning in 1842, a devastating potato blight ravaged Ireland, causing more than one million deaths due to starvation and fever, with another two million people escaping the blight through emigration by 1852. Emigration from Ireland steadily grew throughout the 1840s, peaking in 1847, which saw the highest levels of emigration with an estimated 400,000 Irish emigrating, more than 100,000 of whom fled to Canada.\(^8\) The ongoing famine in Ireland, in combination with inefficient Poor Relief laws reluctantly funded by profiteering Irish landlords, caused the mass exodus by which Canada became inundated with destitute immigrants.

With Irish workhouses overflowing and degrading soup kitchens closing, the newly amended Poor Relief Laws levied rates from landlords to fund these failing relief schemes, which inadvertently assisted in a mass exodus of Irish paupers. Under the new laws, landlords became liable to pay for new poor relief schemes through increased taxes based on how many tenants resided on their lands.\(^9\) These changes prompted landlords to assist their tenants in emigrating, as buying the trans-Atlantic passage, to Canada in particular, became cheaper than paying for relief that sustained their tenants.\(^10\)

Irish historians unequivocally determine 1847 to be the worst year of the famine in Ireland, being colloquially referred to as “Black ‘47.” After enduring multiple years of a worsening potato crop failure, food prices continued to soar, becoming increasingly unaffordable to the overpopulated pauper class, while a surge in diseases ravaged the swollen Irish population. As relief efforts largely halted by the winter of 1846-47, Ireland saw the largest increase in mortality caused by starvation and fever during the famine period.\(^11\) The grim outlook of the 1847 harvest helped convince those unsure of their fate in Ireland to abandon their homeland in search of a better life as their staple food source, and the ruling class, betrayed them. The spring of 1847 saw the largest increase in emigration than ever before, only that they did not leave Ireland, as historian John Kelly explains, “they were fleeing, the
way a crowd flees a burning building: heedlessly, recklessly, with no thought other than to get out.”

With the outward flow of Irish paupers increasing significantly from famine fatigue and given the dire expectations of the coming year, hundreds of thousands prepared to flee their homes, willingly or through assisted immigration. Conditions had grown so terrible in Ireland that the consensus among the Irish peasantry was that anywhere was better than there.

Canadians readied themselves to receive the expected outflow of famine-stricken from Ireland by setting up resolutions to bring the Irish immigrants of 1847 directly to Canada. They rationalized this by expecting to use the influx of immigrants to populate and expand the western Canadian frontiers, as had been done in previous years. Former British Prime Minister Earl Grey, in a speech to the House of Lords on 15 May 1847, perfectly summed up the prevailing mentality of sending great quantities of emigrants to Canada:

…the development of the facilities which Canada possessed for the absorption of [immigrant] labour…was increasing almost in a geometrical ratio, because many of the labourers who went out there became, after a few years, settlers on the land, and able to give assistance in work to new comers, so forming a constantly widening circle…the systematic distribution of emigrants, would operate very advantageously upon the very large emigration of the present year, which…exceeded threefold the emigration of last year, and that the persons now going out would be able to establish themselves successfully and with advantage in the colonies.

The British would send Irish emigrants to Canada in large quantities throughout 1847 to supply Canada with labor, which would create a self-perpetuating, frontier-expanding labor market that could constantly bring more immigrants to Canada. The Government of the Province of Canada agreed with this view, and prepared to gladly accept up to 100,000 Irish immigrants over the course of the year. Both the British and Canadian governments based these assumptions about able-bodied immigrants improving the Canadian frontier on the previous decades of wealthier Irish immigration,
who did actually strengthen Canadian institutions. This time, however, they largely overlooked the deplorable circumstances in Ireland during the famine, which resulted in a different kind of immigrant to Canada, more akin to an exile.

The condition of Irish paupers only strengthened the want for immigrants in Canada out of sympathy, desiring to take in those afflicted so as to ease the Imperial burden the famine caused in Ireland. Throughout 1846, Canadian newspapers frequently published and reprinted articles on the Irish famine in a very compassionate tone. The *Montreal Gazette* reprinted a sympathetic *Manchester Guardian* article on 26 September 1846 detailing the deplorable conditions of the Irish, and outlining the charitable donations generated since 1845. The article highlights the mismanagement of Ireland as the main cause for the Irish plight and predicted the mass exodus of 1847. By the early spring of 1847, the realistic conditions of the large numbers of expected immigrants became more apparent, and began to worry some Canadians.

On 16 April 1847, *Le Canadien* warned the people of Quebec City that the impending influx of “emigration from the British Isles, and from Ireland in particular, toward this continent is readying on a vast scale.” Compounding these anxieties, Canadian institutions suddenly expected a larger-than-normal portion of paupers as the United States continued to impose restrictive measures on immigration. Seeing the deplorable condition of arriving immigrants in early 1847, the United States charged ship captains ten dollars per immigrant onboard, and placed a 1,000-dollar levy on immigrants deemed too old or too sick. These measures shifted the tide of famine Irish across the Atlantic towards Canada, and helped to ensure only the most destitute Irish immigrants arrived in Canadian ports. On 28 April 1847, *Le Canadien* denounced these “strict and isolationist precautionary measures” taken by the United States and claimed, “God forbid that we should wish to close the doors of Canada to the unfortunate immigrants of Ireland.” The United States possessed the luxury of denying entry to any undesirable immigrants, but as a British colony, Canada could use no such measures.

On 5 May 1847, the *Montreal Gazette* reported with a sigh of relief that John Easton Mills,
the Quebec City mayor, planned a meeting for the following week to form a Board of Health to set up sanitation procedures for the expected Irish immigrants. Diseases such as typhus, dysentery, and cholera (then known simply as “fever” or “ship fever”) became the biggest killers among the Irish during the famine, and the emigrants brought these diseases with them to their destinations around the world. The local concern about the inbound sickness continued to grow while cities along the St. Lawrence worked to set up similar Boards of Health. In June, multiple local Boards of Health in major cities along the St. Lawrence set sanitation and relief standards for incoming immigrants, but by October most had shut down due to lack of funding and oversight.

On 12 May Le Canadien at the last minute protested “with the utmost energy the idea that certain politicians in Ireland and England have to swamp Canada with the indigent population of Ireland… The conditions in Ireland are the result of poor administration of the miserable country; are we to be the ones to bear the distress?” But the expectations of using the immigrants to expand the frontier prevailed over the dire warnings. Emigrant societies were set up to help the immigrants find work out west, hoping to bolster and develop the western frontier. As the immigration season kicked off on 12 May, the Montreal Gazette published a notice to all labor contractors to contact agents of the Department of Labour for immigrant laborers to hire for work on the frontier. The same day, in a letter to the editor of the Ottawa Daily Citizen, Nova Scotian J. B. Uniacke welcomed the famine Irish, claiming the immigration schemes set forth in Canada were, “pregnant with advantages for both countries [Canada and Ireland]” and that “the population of Ireland can find happy homes in the British Provinces [of Canada].” However, the immigrants who arrived throughout 1847 were largely sustenance tenant farmers or unskilled workers who could not provide for themselves upon arrival.

Through assisted immigration schemes in Ireland, landlords shipped their tenants wholesale across the Atlantic in an effort to save money rather than ensure their safety at home in Ireland. Many had never been five miles from their homes in Connaught or West Munster and spoke almost entirely Gaelic. They left their homes with little more than the clothes on their back, and the money their landlords provided them for passage. A Limerick landowner, Stephen de Vere, bought his tenants
passage to Canada from London in late April 1847, and traveled with them in steerage the entire two-month voyage in order to document the conditions. Traveling in what he described as one of the better regulated ships, de Vere witnessed the horrors of the passage firsthand. He recorded his entire experience in a letter to the Agent-General of Emigration T. F. Elliot, who passed it on to Earl Grey to read aloud in the House of Lords. De Vere wrote:

Before the emigrant has been at sea a week, he is an altered man…hundreds of poor people, men, women and children, of all ages from the drivelling idiot of 90 to the babe just born, huddled together, without light, without air, wallowing in filth and breathing a fetid atmosphere, sick in body, dispirited in heart; the fevered patients lying between the sound, in sleeping places so narrow as almost to deny them the power of indulging…their agonized ravings disturbing those around and predisposing them…living without food or medicine…dying without the voice of spiritual consolation and buried in the deep without the rites of the Church.

The food is generally ill-selected and seldom sufficiently cooked…the supply of water, hardly enough for cooking and drinking, does not allow washing…the filthy beds, teeming with all abominations, are never required to be brought on deck and aired: the narrow space between the sleeping berths and the piles of boxes is never washed or scraped, but breathes up a damp and fetid stench, until the day before arrival at quarantine, when all hands are required to ‘scrub up’ and put on a fair face for the doctor and Government inspector.

The appalling conditions de Vere described during his experience aboard a Canadian-bound ship provided the perfect environment for disease to proliferate. Ship captains packed their holds full of Irish paupers well past the legal limits, leading to overcrowding. Compounded with a serious lack of sanitation, these colloquially known “coffin ships” ran rampant with typhus, dysentery, and cholera. The entire passage, these ships festered until unloading their human cargo in Canada, with the mortality rate onboard Canadian-bound ships in 1847 calculated to be around 20 percent. Many
historians liken the harrowing passage to Canada to the middle passage of the Atlantic slave trade, and the “fair face” put on by the ship’s crew did not fool the inspectors as the journey to Canada worsened upon arrival.

Every foreign vessel entering the St. Lawrence was required to be inspected for any signs of disease at Grosse Isle before continuing on to Quebec or Montreal. All immigrants who arrived at Grosse Isle quarantined on the island for two weeks to ensure no hidden infection surfaced in them. Those deemed a health risk because of their diseased state were kept in the sanitation hospital until their convalescence or their demise. The Canadian immigration season in the 1840s started in May when the St. Lawrence was largely free of ice, and ended in October when the river began to freeze over again. However, unseasonable weather in 1847 caused the St. Lawrence to remain frozen longer into the spring, delaying the start of the immigration season by two weeks.

The first immigrant ship, the *Syria* out of Liverpool carrying 192 steerage passengers, all emigrating from Ireland, arrived on 14 May. Upon inspection at the quarantine station, the *Syria* was found to have 52 fever-stricken immigrants aboard with nine already dead, and after four days at Grosse Isle the number of sick people jumped to 125. The more ships that arrived at Grosse Isle, the higher the number of dead and dying climbed and the Canadian institutions were simply unprepared. By 23 May the hospital on Grosse Isle, set up with 250 beds, was inundated with 695 sick and dying individuals, most of whom were laid upon straw mats on the shore or in hastily constructed fever sheds. As the immigration season continued, the numbers did not abate, and disease continued to spread unchecked on the island and beyond as Irish immigrants were shipped to the mainland in order to relieve the overcrowding in quarantine stations. Disease reached the shores of Quebec and Montreal by June as sanitation regulations buckled under the pressure of such a disease-ridden population of immigrants.

Previously, the *Montreal Gazette* considered the city to be well prepared for the influx, claiming that 125,000 immigrants arrived during the 1846 immigration season with no issues, proving the system worked. Likewise, the Government of the Province of Canada had been
prepared to take in a large number of immigrants ready to work on the frontier, and did not account for the amount of sick and dying who came instead. During the winter of 1846-47, Dr. Stephen Douglas, the journeyman medical officer in charge of sanitary preparations on Grosse Isle, with adept foresight requested additional funding of 3,000 pounds from the city of Quebec to adequately prepare for the arriving immigrants, but received only 300.36 For this reason, Douglas lacked the proper equipment and staff to handle such an unprecedented collection of diseased and dying paupers.

On 10 May 1847, the Emigration Committee of Montreal called a meeting to consider what precautions should be taken to prepare the city, but quickly adjourned the meeting due to a lack of attendance.37 Some Canadians became anxious over the lack of preparedness in the city, and started to panic seeing the steady stream of sickly people building up on the banks of the St. Lawrence. On 21 May, in a letter to the editor of the Montreal Gazette titled “The Health of The City,” the author, who signed the letter as “CAUTION” warned that the Government of the Province of Canada had yet to take any serious precautionary measures to protect the inhabitants of Montreal. The author urged the importance of enacting sanitary measures for the incoming immigrants and called for, “the immediate attention…of the up and coming Session of the Legislature,” hoping that “the city’s authorities will give the subject that consideration which its importance demands, ere it too late.”38 But by mid-July, ads frequented the Montreal Gazette looking for great quantities of nurses and medical practitioners to tend the sick immigrants in the fever hospitals.39 It is clear that Canadians expected some famine-stricken Irish paupers to arrive in a diseased state, just not in the startling numbers that did come ashore, and despite warning from “CAUTION,” acted too late.

During the onset of the famine, Canadians contributed to famine relief in Ireland by forming Christian communities in tandem with Irish societies already established in Canada by earlier immigrants, to gather aid in the form of money, clothing, and food.40 One such Irish immigrant, Frances Stewart, a Protestant Irish immigrant who settled in the Peterborough area in 1822, explained in a letter to her friend back in Ireland how she feared her homeland would be “polluted by the masses of putrefying bodies of animals and decayed vegetables.”41 Stewart sympathized deeply with
those affected by the famine in Ireland, and by May 1847 raised a total of 364 pounds to send over in famine relief.\textsuperscript{42}

Sympathies turned to anxieties as a seemingly endless stream of famine immigrants arrived, and disease began sweeping across the St. Lawrence River valley in their wake. Stewart mentions her building concern as she noted “many poor people…in a state of starvation and bringing with them a malignant type of [Typhus] was the cause of much anxiety and trouble.”\textsuperscript{43} Once the wave of diseased immigrants reached Peterborough later in May, Stewart’s attitude towards the incoming immigrants, like that of most other Canadians, changed to a more dreadful tone.

Enduring this ordeal, Stewart lamented to her Irish cousin in June that her sister-in-law contracted fever, along with all five of her children, the former succumbing to the disease.\textsuperscript{44} A month passed before Stewart could find the time to write again due to her role as acting nurse when her close friend, and three doctors in the town, also contracted fever.\textsuperscript{45} On 9 August, she wrote to her friend: “this was our [family’s] first trial with affliction in long years…wherever those wretched immigrants came they brought with them sickness and death.”\textsuperscript{46} Her troubles continued into the following month when her husband later died of Typhus within a week of contracting the disease, sending her into a resentful depression for some time following.\textsuperscript{47}

Wherever the famine Irish arrived, the local population reeled with fear, drastically changing Canadian attitudes towards Irish immigrants for the worse. Canadians came to fear and resent the Irish. Immigrants congregated in the cities in huge numbers, which the populations did not expect to see, and although many immigrants ventured from the cities in search of work, they ultimately returned when they could not secure rural work out west.\textsuperscript{48} The fear of disease caused those who previously wanted to hire the new immigrants to quickly rescind their offers, leaving a majority of immigrants without work, and crowding the slums of Quebec City, Montreal, and Toronto. What little work the immigrants could procure, they often could not perform due to the physical toll taken by their passage to North America, and subsequent disease.\textsuperscript{49} The year 1847 saw more than 20,000 people die, both Irish immigrants and Canadians alike, due to disease brought by the immigrants.\textsuperscript{50} At Grosse
Isle alone, the Irish left nearly 6,000 dead buried on the island, and later a bitter cry of resentment in Gaelic inscribed upon a Celtic cross of granite:

> On this island Irish people in their thousands died, having fled from the laws of foreign oppressors and from treacherous starvation in the years 1847-48. May the blessings of God be with them. This memorial stone is a symbol of the honor due to them from the Irish community in America. God save Ireland.\(^{51}\)

The famine Irish broke from the societal conditions which allowed Irish Catholics to be a tolerated part of Canadian society.\(^{52}\) Inadvertently, they had made an offensive use of the land they occupied, mainly quarantine stations, hospitals, and cities (in that order), directly threatening individual Canadians and their social space. The poor sustenance and tenant farmers of Connaught and West Munster stood no chance of providing for themselves, especially in the state in which they arrived after suffering the ocean journey on coffin ships. Upon arrival, they immediately became dependent on Canadian social institutions, and the influx of 1847 overwhelmed municipalities with the sick and the dying. Providing aid for the famine immigrants put the Provincial Government roughly 35,000 pounds in debt, which it directly blamed the Imperial government in Westminster for causing. The Provincial Government petitioned the Imperial government to eventually cover the expense, and bring them out of the crippling debt.\(^{53}\) According to Holman, the impression left by the 1847 famine immigrants “betrayed the real experiences of pre-famine Irish in Hamilton,”\(^{54}\) and so too similar towns across Canada, causing a nativist response against the Catholic Irish immigrants.

After the original, genuine concern for the famine immigrants turned to fear, Canada witnessed a surge in nativism as Canadian-born and immigrant Protestants resented the quickly growing number of Catholics.\(^{55}\) Loyalty to the British Crown constituted the core element of Canadian nativism, and Protestantism a key concept of that loyalty, meaning Catholics inherently could not be loyal subjects, or at best were considered “suspect.” The famine influx, consisting of roughly 90 percent Catholic paupers, caused an anti-Catholic reaction in Canada which lasted for the remainder of the century.\(^{56}\) In the historically Catholic Quebec City, Protestants constituted 29
percent of households in 1841, but by 1852 the number decreased to 14.5 percent as Protestants fled from a no-longer tolerable Catholic population. The Irish became characterized as the “ignorant masses,” and “untameable barbarians” because of their breaking custom with the social norms of the early nineteenth century set for them by their forebears.

One example of the nativist response and anti-Catholic sentiments occurred in June 1853 when the Italian anti-Catholic monk Alessandro Gavazzi traveled to Quebec City and Montreal to hold anti-Catholic speeches. His anti-Catholic speeches at the Free Presbyterian Church in Quebec City, and the Zionist Church in Montreal provoked the Catholic Irish inhabitants of those cities to react violently on 6 and 9 June respectively. Catholic Irish responded by hurling stones through the church windows and storming the pulpit in Quebec City, while in Montreal Catholic Irish brawled with the soldiers stationed outside Gavazzi’s speech, resulting in soldiers killing five Irishmen, and denying Gavazzi a third speech planned for the following week. Similar disturbances between Catholics and Protestants periodically occurred in cities for the remainder of the century, and even between other Catholics.

Quebec City almost always possessed a Catholic majority, thus making it the ideal destination for Catholic Irish immigrants. By 1852, 6,344 out of 23,238 (27.3 percent) of Quebec City’s population identified Ireland as their place of birth. Famine immigrants did not expand far beyond the limits of many cities, Quebec City included, and this caused friction between the two large nationalities of Catholics. Due to a lack of employment on the frontier, Catholic Irish immigrants began taking employment in the shipyards and lumber industries typically held by Catholic French Canadians. Though the common link of Catholicism likely mitigated tensions, labor disturbances happened occasionally between French-Canadian and Irish laborers, even where the Irish were most accepted.

At first, Canadians welcomed the thought of a large influx of Irish immigrants because of the identity the pre-famine Irish created for themselves in the years leading up to the famine. The Imperial Government convinced the Government of the Province of Canada that immigrants from the famine-stricken island would prosper and improve Canada, just as the Irish immigrants of
decades past had done. Out of a perceived economic benefit and genuine philanthropy, Canadians welcomed the thought. Once the famine Irish of 1847 arrived, Canadians’ tone quickly changed, and the perspective towards the Irish Canadians shifted to a more negative one as this new type of Irish immigrant broke down pre-established societal tolerances. The quantity and quality of the 1847 influx quickly changed how the native Canadian population viewed the Irish, as an entire nationality became defined by the immigrants who arrived in later years. The famine in Ireland caused profit-concerned landlords to pass off the responsibility of poor relief to Canadians out of frugality, while Canadian institutions emplaced to handle the expected influx buckled under the pressure of trying to properly assist the vast numbers of sick and emaciated immigrants. The 1847 immigration season terrified Canadians because of the damage the Irish newcomers caused upon arrival, inadvertently spreading disease and death in their wake. This fear, combined with the Protestant nativist response to the sharp increase in Catholic Irish immigrants, negatively branded Irish Canadians for the remainder of the nineteenth century.

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Preferential Refugee Policies in Postwar Canada

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Abstract: Canada is widely known today to accept migrants seeking refuge, however, some groups received preferential treatment when entering Canada after the Second World War. The purpose of this study is to examine the political, economic, and social reasons behind why the Canadian government wrote preferential refugee policies for specific groups seeking refuge. Utilizing government correspondence written between 1948 and 1957 and literature that reviews the implementation of public policy and its effects, this study analyzes the motivations and factors that led to the government’s policy decisions on American draft dodgers fleeing the draft, Baltic refugees fleeking Soviet repatriation and rule, and Hungarian refugees who fled communism. This reveals that the Government of Canada established preferential policies for refugees based on race, religion, and assimilationist principles. It proves that although Canada embraces multiculturalism and humanitarian refugee policies today, in its past, it chose to selectively accept refugees and provide preferential avenues for refugees seeking safety in Canada.

Keywords: multiculturalism, refugees, Canadian immigration, refugee policy, public policy

Canada has long been considered a safe haven for refugees. Its institutions, immigration laws, and citizens have historically welcomed many newcomers with open arms. However, from the onset of the twentieth century, race and political beliefs guided the federal government in its choice of refugees. Refugees from preferred countries that had Canadian public support and positive perceptions toward them bypassed standard procedures and were permitted entry, while refugees coming from countries perceived as less desirable were subject to stricter refugee policies. In light of this, this article asks: what factors led Canada to enact exceptional policy for specific refugees? It proposes that race, political and economic factors, and local organizations influenced the government to bypass standard procedures for refugees among specific groups. This claim will be supported by three case studies: draft dodgers from the United States of America, Baltic refugees fleeking Soviet annexation, and Hungarian refugees arriving after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Draft dodgers sought refuge in Canada as they fled the draft into the American forces at war in Vietnam. Baltic refugees, facing Soviet threat and repatriation took it upon themselves to arrive in Canada by boat.
without proper papers. Hungarian refugees largely took refuge in neighboring Austria but as Austria could not support them, Canada intervened and took in the Hungarian refugees.

**Draft Dodgers of the Vietnam War**

America held a draft lottery for Vietnam in 1969 and though the US appealed to Canada for help, Canada refused to join the war. With Canada’s neutrality and lack of extradition agreement with the US, some American men who did not want to serve in the war sought refuge in Canada. Once in Canada, it was very hard to tell if one was an American draft dodger. Draft dodgers arriving in Canada were invisible refugees as they were white, had similar customs and practices, and spoke the English language; thus they fit into Canadian society very easily.

Political belief and the desire of the government influenced preferential policy for American draft dodgers. In the 1960s, Canadian nationalism grew and attempted to differentiate itself from the USA. This sentiment led to the protest against the growing influence of foreign corporations, especially American corporations operating branch plants in Canada. It also led to a growing influence on Canadians wanting to separate and distance themselves from American ideologies, policies, and beliefs. When the USA called on Canada to aid in the war, Canada refused conscription and allowed only volunteer troops to go to Vietnam. Increasingly, Canada began establishing its policies and differentiating itself from the USA. While at the beginning of the draft, the government deported some draft dodgers, after a series of modifications to immigration policies, this changed. On 22 May 1969, the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, Allan MacEachen declared that border agents would not ask about or require military status even if the individual at a port-of-entry voluntarily provided the information. Without explicitly mentioning draft dodgers, the Minister declared that if individuals entered Canada under the then-current requirements for entry, anyone, including the draft dodgers, could enter. The rise of Canadian nationalism and the aim to differentiate Canada from the USA shaped Canadian immigration policy to support the entry of draft dodgers into Canada.
Draft dodgers also benefited from the economic goals of the Canadian government. During the late 1960s, Canada had an increasing labor shortage rate: in 1966, it was 3% to 4% and in 1969, it was 5% to 6%. Canada lacked skilled laborers in the workforce, therefore, the Department of Immigration proposed to create a preferential treatment policy for American immigrants entering Canada. The government favored American immigrants because they spoke English and had a similar culture. This preferential treatment also made its way into Canadian immigration policy. Draft dodgers fulfilled the education, work experience, and language requirements of the points system. Their prior postsecondary education from the US meant that they would not need to undergo further training and delay their entry into the workforce and their young age meant that they would contribute to the Canadian economy for a longer duration. In addition, many draft dodgers also did not have families because of their young age and could focus on working. As draft dodgers were invisible immigrants, they integrated easily into the Canadian workplace.

Local organizations in Canada played an important role in assisting American draft dodgers to come to Canada. Their actions also persuaded additional American young men drafted who had thought of seeking refuge in Canada to act on that thought. Almost all the major cities in Canada had support organizations in place, namely the Vancouver Committee to Aid American War Objectors (VCAAWO), the Toronto American Exiles Association, Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA), and the National Council for Universal and Unconditional Amnesty (NCUUA). These organizations assisted American draft dodgers seeking to enter Canada, finding housing and employment once in Canada, and lobbied the government for better policy and regulations that paved the way for American draft dodgers to enter Canada easily. The VCAAWO, for example, released a brief in disagreement with the government’s 1966 White Paper. One of the Paper’s policies, which prohibited the entry of “fugitives from justice,” did not sit well with the organization. The VCAAWO believed that this clause would explicitly target draft dodgers. In addition to lobbying efforts, local organizations provided services to draft dodgers, such as immigration counseling, housing, and employment services. The organizations made sure to publicize the services offered to the draft dodgers to the
American public via popular American magazines.

American draft dodgers sought refuge in Canada from the brutal and immoral idea of going to war in Vietnam. Canada was the closest country that would accept American draft dodgers and a place where draft dodgers could live a very similar lifestyle. From the Canadian government's standpoint, the arrival of American draft dodgers was beneficial to the Canadian government as Canada was in a critical shortage of laborers, especially skilled workers. Draft dodgers, most of whom had post-secondary education and could easily integrate into the Canadian workforce were ideal, if not the preferred candidates for entry into Canada and the Canadian government made sure that government policies made way for their entry into Canada.

Baltic Refugees after the Second World War

Beginning in 1948, Baltic refugees came to Canada, some of whom were under threat of expatriation to the Soviet Union after the Yalta Agreement. Frustrated at the long delays in processing their applications, the refugees purchased wooden boats and fled to Canada even though the official government position was that “…no assurances can be given that persons, who come to Canada under circumstances which in effect violate the immigration regulations, will be granted a landing.”7 Immigration regulations prohibited these individuals from entering Canada because Canadian officials had to process their applications in their places of residence, before arriving. Nonetheless, these refugees arrived illegally in Canada at Pier 21 in Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Once they arrived in Canada, however, the government supported the arrival of the Baltic refugees based on their race and the threat of the Cold War to these populations. Especially with Baltic refugees, the idea of the northern European race as favorable immigrants significantly influenced Canadian immigration policy. The northern European race belief held that groups in northern Europe and Canadians in the Western Hemisphere adapted to the cold climatic conditions based on Canadian geography; these conditions supposedly made northern Europeans stronger in both mental and physical capacities.8 Within the government, strong attachment to the Baltic refugees
through these ideologies influenced the relaxation of government policy. The Vice-Consul of the Canadian Consulate General in New York, A.E.L. Cannon, wrote, “I do not know the policy of the Immigration authorities, but it would seem to me that the Baltic immigrants would be most desirable settlers and would become easily acclimatized to Canadian conditions.”

The Canadian government also used Baltic refugees as a mechanism in the fight against Communism. Sweden had a history of forcefully repatriating hundreds of Baltic refugees back to the Soviet Union. Individuals within the government believed that they could use Baltic refugees as a tool against Communism. One Canadian immigration officer in Sweden wrote to the immigration department in Ottawa, explicitly claiming that “In my opinion, Canada will never be sorry for taking Baltic people as every last one of them are the best advertisement we will get in our country against Communism.” Accepting Baltic refugees, who were threatened with forced repatriation, would show Canada’s indirect success in combatting the growing influence of the Soviet Union’s communism, sparked in the postwar era.

Many of the Baltic refugees were well-educated people. Before the war, the Baltic people’s commercial probity, well-educated status, and skilled workforce were widely known in Europe. This was a favorable aspect for Canadian immigration officials looking for desirable immigrants who fell under the categories of “General Labourers, Cabinet Makers, Domestics, nurses and nurses’ aides, unattached single farm workers, farming families, stonemasons, bricklayers, plasterers, and families who can transfer $2 000.” While in Sweden, Baltic refugees who had been professionals took employment as manual laborers. Therefore, upon arrival in Canada, they made excellent immigration candidates, as there was an abundance of manufacturing work in Canada. Because of this, it was easy for immigration officials to help Baltic refugees find work in Canada. In the example of Estonian refugees in Canada, the government paired 60 Estonian men with a company in Rolphoton, Ontario, at a hydro-electric power construction site. Previously, the Estonian men held professional occupations, among them a “physician, a senior army officer, a judge, an economist, an architect, a lawyer.” Nonetheless, it was reported that they adapted well to manual labor roles.”
employers believed that with good character, Baltic refugees were well suited to work as laborers in Canada, thereby influencing government policy to accept Baltic refugees.

Local churches in Canada also played a significant role in changing the government perception toward Baltic refugees. When the SS Walnut arrived in Halifax in December 1948 with undocumented refugees, the United Lutheran Church in America (ULCA) Canada Synod lobbied for the entry of the passengers. In the first of a series of letters, Pastor S.F.M. Friedrichsen of the ULCA pleaded to the government for the entry of those aboard the SS Walnut, explicitly mentioning that those onboard the ship were Lutherans. The Pastor supported his plea by adding that the Lutherans were good people, but desperate circumstances had led them to take the illegal route to arrive in Canada. Eventually, the lobbying efforts of the Church paid off as the government allowed the entry of the refugees. In addition to lobbying the government, the Lutheran Church in Canada sponsored many Estonian refugees, provided aid, and helped them find jobs once they arrived in Canada. The Canadian Lutheran World Relief organization (CLWR) also aided in painting the image of Lutherans entering Canada by boat as “hard-workers, democratic, intelligent, and loyal,” hoping to create an image that fit what the government officials sought when selecting refugees – their loyalty to Canada, ability to work as laborers, and their support for democracy.

According to immigration regulations at the time, the government should not have allowed Baltic refugees entry into Canada as they would have had to enter with already confirmed immigration papers. This practice, of course, changed with the arrival of the nine vessels with hundreds of Baltic refugees. Even with the strict immigration regulations in place, of the 987 Baltic refugees who arrived in Canada, between August 1948 and December 1949, the government denied entry to only 12 passengers. The northern European race belief and political desire to use Baltic refugees as tools against Soviet Communism guided the government in its relaxation of strict policy. The government also recognized that it could not ignore the economic benefits that Baltic refugees promised as they settled in Canada and the strong influences of the churches, therefore, led to preferential treatment and leniency of immigration policy for Baltic refugees.
Hungarian Refugees after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956

In October 1956, dissatisfied with the Communist government, Hungarian students took to the streets in protest. However, in less than a month, the Soviet forces crushed the rebellion and installed a new Soviet-influenced government.16 About 200,000 Hungarians fled the country due to violence, with many arriving in Austria. With Austria overburdened with refugees and requesting assistance, the Canadian government stepped in to resettle Hungarian refugees because of the desired technical skills and the ability to use them as a tool against Communism.

While there were negative perceptions towards Central Europeans at this time, Hungarians bypassed the race question because they were considered white Europeans. Further, the fact that a majority of Hungarians were Christian reinforced the belief that Hungarians would easily integrate into Canadian society, which Canadian officials thought of as a priority for refugees.17 When Member of Provincial Parliament (MPP) in Ontario Donald Cameron MacDonald spoke about how he had brought in one Hungarian student into his home, the MPP claimed that though the student was foreign to the customs and practices in Canada, he had no problem fitting into the Canadian society.18 Integration into society plays a large role when the Canadian government decides if a refugee group is permissible in Canada. In the case of Hungarian refugees, their whiteness, similar religion, and their ability to integrate easily into Canadian society proved them as favorable refugees to Canada.

Labelled “freedom fighters,” the refugees were an effective tool for the Canadian government in its fight against Communism. A letter written within the Department of External Affairs Canada mentions that the Headquarters of the World Federation of Democratic Youth was in Budapest and the use of Hungarian student refugees as “counter-propaganda” would be effective for the upcoming World Youth Festival in Moscow.19 Similarly, the American delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) thought that spreading information about the good deeds that countries, including Canada, were doing in assisting to Hungary would benefit the public’s opinion of NATO, especially with the eruption of the Suez Crisis three months before and the less-than-formidable image of the international organization.20
Largely, the Canadian government looked at the economic benefits of the Hungarian refugees. J.W. Pickersgill, then Minister of Immigration explicitly claimed that Canada was expecting a labor shortage due to the strong postwar economy and that it desperately needed laborers to fill those vacancies. Moreover, the strong postwar economy at the time meant that to the government, there was no reason to deny the refugees entry into Canada as laborers, thus, the motivation to search for laborers heavily influenced refugee policy during the Hungarian refugee crisis of 1956. Among Hungarian refugee applicants, 70% of the men processed were under the age of 40 and preferences were made to refugees capable of working as laborers in Canada rather than the elderly and the sick.

The Hungarian refugee crisis was sparked by the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, a movement largely led by students, thus the refugee population included many students as well. Once the Canadian universities and government officials became aware of this, many scrambled to accommodate different faculty and students into their universities. For Canadian universities, it meant government funding as Ottawa paid for all refugee students’ boarding and education, and reputable faculty from Hungary could be recruited to teach at their institutions. For government officials, it meant technical laborers who would graduate and contribute to the Canadian economy. The University of British Columbia (UBC) recruited students and faculty from Hungary’s Sopron University Faculty of Forestry and permitted them to run autonomously within the UBC campus and provided degrees to Sopron students. UBC’s support for the Sopron University’s Faculty of Forestry led to financial assistance from the Powell River Logging Company. Upon graduation from the Forestry program, students then joined the British Columbia logging industry, an industry that lacked laborers.

Canada had a vibrant postwar economy with growth seen especially in the manufacturing sector. The country, however, lacked skilled workers and unskilled laborers. To Canadian officials, the Hungarian refugee crisis was an opportunity to increase the workforce. In addition, the fact that they were white and mainly Christian and were students who fought against Communism as “freedom fighters” made them favorable refugee candidates. Moreover, universities increasingly saw Hungarian
refugees as an asset to their institutions. Seeing these benefits, government officials made it easier for Hungarian refugees to apply for refuge in Canada.

Conclusion

The Government of Canada accepted the three groups of refugees based on political beliefs and preferential race, the economic situation, and the influence of local organizations in Canada. However, in years following the establishment of multiculturalism and rights-based liberalism in Canada, the government reversed its foreign policy to accept an increasing number of refugees and embrace humanitarianism. Nonetheless, for other refugee groups that attempted to arrive in Canada, such as the Chilean refugees, the government limited the number of refugees who could arrive in Canada because as non-white refugees who did not speak English, the government considered them as “unfavourable” refugees from “non-preferred” countries.

By contrast, American draft dodgers seeking refuge from mandatory calls to serve in the armed forces, Baltic refugees fleeing repatriation to the Soviet Union, and Hungarian refugees seeking refuge from Communism all found a place in Canada to call home, safely and easily. It was evident that the government refugee policy became relaxed when it came to preferred refugee groups. Based on the group's race, the government's political beliefs, economic desires, and the influences of local groups in Canada, preferential treatment would be given to different groups of refugees, especially those who were white, Christian, and with the skills necessary to integrate into Canadian society.

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Notes


4 Ibid., 139.


12 Ibid.


20 Ibid.

22 Library and Archives Canada, “Memorandum from Joseph L. Bottlik to Leslie M. Frost, QC. Prime Minister of the Province of ON regarding the visit of John Yaremko MPP, QC and Joseph L. Bottlik to Hungarian Refugees in Europe” (Ottawa), n.d., 12; Ontario, Legislative Assembly of Ontario, Debates, 25-3 (February 4, 1957), 119.


24 Ibid., 257.

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Setting the Expectation: How American Success at the World Junior Hockey Championships is a Canadian Product

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Abstract: This article investigates the World Junior Hockey Championships, an international hockey tournament first held in 1974 and commonly associated with Canada as Canadian players have traditionally dominated the tournament, winning the most gold medals of any participating nation with 18. In contrast, the United States have won five gold medals. The last two decades have seen the rise of American success at the World Junior Hockey Championships, and since 2010 the Americans have won the same number of medals as the Canadians, including one more gold medal. Hockey is a large part of Canadian national identity and Canadians have felt threatened by the American influence on hockey since the 1970s. However, American dominance is on the rise and they have solidified themselves as Canada’s newest and now greatest rival in hockey. Canada is responsible for the recent American success at the World Junior Hockey Championships because it was Canada that set the bar of hockey excellence, forcing the Americans to create new development programs to succeed at the international level. Most notable of the development programs is USA Hockey’s National Team Development Program which was created in 1996 as an answer to the Canadian development programs of the Canadian Hockey League and the Program of Excellence. Consequently, Canada being responsible for the recent American success at the World Junior Hockey Championships signifies that Canada is still prevailing as a hockey nation even if they are not dominating the podium, something that is critical to a sometimes fragile Canadian national identity.

Keywords: hockey, World Junior Hockey Championships, USA Hockey National Team Development Program, Program of Excellence, Canadian identity.

The World Junior Hockey Championships (WJC) is a Canadian phenomenon. Canadian junior players have traditionally dominated at the tournament, winning the most gold medals of any participating nation (18). In contrast, the United States won its first gold medal in 2004 after defeating Canada. Since 2010, however, the Canadians have won the same number of medals as the Americans, including one less gold medal. Despite it being a Canadian tradition, the last two decades have seen the rise of American success at the WJC. This article first investigates how the
WJC became a Canadian tradition. It then considers how Canada set the bar of hockey excellence and the standard of success at the WJC. Next, it examines USA Hockey's National Team Development Program (NTDP) in comparison to the Canadian Hockey League (CHL), the top junior hockey program in the world, and Hockey Canada's Program of Excellence (POE), which the NTDP was created to counter. Finally, it explores the NTDP's triumph at the WJC and why its players have found greater success at the WJC compared to previous American WJC teams. Canada is responsible for the recent American success at the WJC because it was Canada that set the bar of hockey excellence, forcing the Americans to create new development programs to succeed at the international level. Most notable among the development programs is the USA Hockey’s National Team Development Program, which was created in 1996 as an answer to the Canadian development program of the Canadian Hockey League and the Program of Excellence.

The Beginning: The Creation of the POE

The WJC began unofficially in 1974 and officially in 1977.² The POE was created in 1982 because one man, Murray Costello, believed that Canada was the best hockey nation in the world.³ The idea of Canada as the best hockey nation in the world is deeply embedded in Canadian national identity. It is a notion of which Canadians are proud.⁴ Yet, the performance the Canadians were giving in international competitions at that point was lackluster. Costello, then the head of the Canadian Amateur Hockey Association (CAHA), the predecessor of Hockey Canada, was distressed with Canada continually losing to the Soviet Union, so he decided to change how Canada would approach the WJC through the implementation of the POE.⁵

Launched in 1982, the POE found overwhelming success. The POE is a four-step program of development: the U17 World Championships, the U18 World Championships, WJC (U20), and the Olympics.⁶ The Olympics, however, were held every four years whereas the WJC (and later the U18s) was held every year. Like at the WJC, Canada’s national hockey team continually failed to win gold at the Olympics.⁷ Hockey Canada believed that if they could create a development program that found
success at the junior level, the players would be better prepared for the Olympic level. This would mean that Canada could dominate at hockey at both the junior and senior level, something they had failed to do at either. This idea was a success. The players who helped Canada to two decades of dominance in the 1990s and 2000s for the WJC would also find success at the Olympic level: the 2002 gold medal in Salt Lake City, 2010 gold in Vancouver, and 2014 gold in Sochi.

Building A Canadian Tradition

(A) 1982 Gold

There is no one reason why the WJC became a Canadian tradition. To say otherwise would be false. Nevertheless, the success found by Team Canada in the first year of the POE in 1982 was instrumental in the process. Playing some games in Canada and then winning gold in Minnesota, close enough to the Canadian border that the rink was painted red with Canadian fans, was monumental. If they had failed there, in front of Canada, after all that was done to produce the best junior team, it is possible that the WJC would not matter to Canadians as much as it does. The gold in 1982 gave the POE “instant credibility” and it was the first of many steps towards the tournament becoming synonymous with Canada.

(B) The Summit Series

Also, in 1982 the Summit Series was only a decade old. It was still fresh in the minds of Canadians. The Summit Series is very important for two large reasons: one, it became embedded within Canadian national identity, giving Canadians across the country moments by which they could mark their participation in a collective culture; and two, it raised the question of whether Canada was truly the best hockey nation in the world. With the Summit Series, Team Canada had proven they could beat the Russians, and beating the Russians was a huge deal to Canadians, especially during the Cold War; yet, beating the Russians at the junior level remained elusive to the Canadians until 1982. In 1982, the Canadians finally beat Russia, and they did so in dramatic fashion. Canada
handed the Russians a 7-0 defeat, the worst ever loss for the Russians at the WJC.\textsuperscript{13} This game at the WJC was more than a win for the team, it was a victory for all of Canada. Any moment Canada bested Russia, especially at hockey, became an important moment.

(C) Two Decades of Dominance

More significant elements factoring into the WJC becoming a Canadian tradition are the National Hockey League (NHL) draft classes of 2003-2007, arguably some of the best NHL draft classes of all time, which produced the likes of Marc-André Fleury, Sidney Crosby, and Jonathan Toews. They would have played at the WJC between 2000-2009, the second decade of dominance for the Canadians. Canada medaled every year of the 2000-2009 decade, winning five straight gold.\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore, these players grew up during the first decade of dominance between 1988 and 1997, when the Canadians won gold in eight of ten tournaments.\textsuperscript{15} Seeing Canada dominate at the junior level as children, these players grew up wanting to play in the tournament so they could continue the Canadian success. As Team Canada star Jordan Eberle said, “you have two dreams growing up playing hockey in Canada: to play in the NHL and win a Stanley Cup, and to play for Canada at the World Juniors.”\textsuperscript{16} This generation of players would be the first to grow up watching Canada succeed at the tournament and see it grow in popularity.

(D) The “Dream Team”

Also coming out of the 2003-2007 tournaments was the 2005 “Dream Team.” The 2005 team is cemented within Canada and Canadian culture. The WJC is nearly 50 years old, and the team produced by every nation changes year to year, but the 2005 team from Canada is unanimously regarded as the best team to ever skate at the tournament.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, hockey historian Ed Willes argues that the 2005 team best exemplified the objectives of the POE: win the WJC and prepare the players for the Olympics. Six players from the 2005 team went on to win Olympic gold on home ice in 2010.\textsuperscript{18} (It is also notable that of the 23 players on the 2010 Olympic roster for Canada, 18 represented Canada at the WJC at least once). But the fact that Canada put forward the best team helped entrench
and reaffirm the WJC within the context of Canadian identity. Canada is the best hockey nation and put forth the all-time best team.

(E) The Value of a Moment

One must also consider the mythicization of specific events, in which individual moments supersede their initial importance through the creation of a collective memory. Three examples of individual moments superseding their initial value at the WJC are the battle of Piestany in 1987, Jonathan Toews’ shootout performance in 2007, and Jordan Eberle’s semi-final goal in 2009.

In 1987, when Team Canada played the Soviet Union, they were in a position to win gold and would walk away with bronze if they lost. They had everything to lose. The game lasted 33 minutes and 53 seconds before ending in a bench-clearing brawl for which both Canada and the Soviet Union were disqualified. The game became so much more than the almost 34 minutes that were played. The event polarized Canada as it raised questions about violence in hockey, something that had become so vital to Canadian hockey in the previous decades. Today, the “Punch-up in Piestany” remains controversial, with some believing the team was a “black spot” on hockey, and others believing they embodied ideas of loyalty and sacrifice.

The semi-final game between Canada and the USA at the 2007 tournament was one of the most suspenseful ever played by either team. Tied 1-1 at the end of regulation, and through ten minutes of overtime, the game went to a shootout where 19-year-old Jonathan Toews was called on three times in the seven rounds of the shootout. Toews scored on all three shots to send Canada to the gold medal game where they would win gold. Unlike regulation or overtime goals, the goals scored in the shootout are not counted towards point totals. On the scoresheet, Toews’ three goals on three different shots were not, technically, a “hat trick.” Yet, Toews’ heroics are played back on film every year. The 2007 semi-final game and Toews’ three shootout goals have come to represent the Canada-USA rivalry at the tournament, and the will of Canadian players.
In 2009, Canada found itself down 5–4 against the Russians in the semifinals with the seconds ticking down. Jordan Eberle scored the game tying goal with 5.4 seconds left in regulation. Like the 2007 semifinals, the game went to overtime and then to a shootout where Canada claimed victory to advance to the finals, where it defeated Sweden to win its fifth straight gold medal at the tournament.23 Eberle’s goal has since been considered one of the three biggest international goals for Canada, alongside Crosby’s goal at the 2010 Olympics and Paul Henderson’s goal at the Summit Series in 1972,24 and the biggest goal ever scored at the WJC,25 becoming for many Canadians synonymous with the tournament and with Canadian hockey. Yet, unlike Crosby’s and Henderson’s goals, Eberle’s goal did not win the game, it simply kept the game alive. In these moments, the contest became more than just a hockey game, it became a moment of national pride and superiority that the population can reflect on and revel in, working to embed the WJC in Canadian culture.

(F) Connecting Canadians Across the Country

Beyond rosters and medals, the WJC connects Canadians across Canada. Canada has drastically different landscapes across the country. The Rockies, the Prairies, the tundra, and the Maritimes are nothing like each other. Regional differences can serve to disconnect Canadians from each other. However, every year, without fail, the WJC produces a team comprised of players from three different leagues coming from multiple provinces and territories. Representing Canada at the 2020 and 2021 tournaments, Yukon-born Dylan Cozens became the first player from the Territories to play at the WJC.26 Boys from Newfoundland play with boys from British Columbia, and from the provinces in between. These players, having come from different backgrounds, bond together for two weeks over their similar pasts on outdoor rinks and frozen ponds.27 The team that represents Canada is representative of Canada, and Canadians across Canada are able to sit down every year to cheer them on, bringing people together and helping tie the WJC to Canadian identity and truly become a Canadian tradition.
The Standard of Success

The standard of success was set between 1988 and 1997 when the Canadians won gold at eight of ten tournaments. This golden decade was then followed up by the Canadians medalling at 14 of the next 15 WJCs, including another stretch of five straight gold medals. Excluding the unofficial tournaments, Canada is the only nation to have won five straight championships, and its teams managed to accomplish this feat twice. During the 25 years between 1988 and 2012, in order to medal at the WJC, a country would have had to face Canada. Whether it was for gold or bronze, Canada was the nation to beat, and in 16 of 25 games, they won. While today Canada struggles to meet the very standard they set, Canada remains the nation to beat. Canada paved the way to success at the WJC, leading by example to show other nations what was needed in order to succeed.

Hockey writer Roy MacGregor has argued that, at the WJC, Team Canada’s winning had been so consistent that, for the Canadians watching, nothing short of a gold medal was acceptable. Canadians expected the team wearing the maple leaf to be the best team in the world. In an interview done after being named captain for the 2021 tournament, Kirby Dach stressed the importance of gold for Canada and the weight that comes with it. WJC and Olympic gold medalist and Hockey Hall of Famer Jarome Iginla believes that the pressure produced by the “gold or bust” mentality is good for the development of the players. Will a player triumph under pressure, or will he crumble? The past record of the Canadians suggests that the mentality and the pressure accompanying it does in fact produce great players. This mentality is not found in any other nation.

Furthermore, former president of Hockey Canada Bob Nicholson said “good isn’t enough. Excellence is what we aspire to but will never settle for because we believe we can be even better next year. And we know we have to be better every year.” This mentality not only drove Team Canada to be better, but other countries as well. Canada strove to be better in 1982, changing the way they approached the WJC and others followed suit. Canadian players’ inner drive to better themselves pushed other nations to better their teams. And while the goal was more about beating Canada than bettering themselves, the other nations ultimately bettered themselves.
The States in a State of Disappointment

The United States was part of the initial WJC in 1977. The team finished the tournament in seventh place out of eight with only one win. The Americans won their first bronze in 1986. Their first silver came in 1997 after they lost to Canada in the gold medal game. This would be the last of five straight golds for the Canadians. The United States won its first gold in 2004, conquering their demons and defeating Canada. It took Canada six tournaments to win gold, whereas it took the Americans 28.33 years. Reviewing the history of the United States at the WJC, a narrative of “finally over the hump” emerges after they won gold in 2004. The Americans were finally able to defeat Canada. This narrative would be flipped in the 2010s with the Canadians continually searching to defeat the Americans.

Before the birth of the NTDP in 1996, the Americans had two medals, both bronzes, for their efforts at the WJC. That was insufficient for the nation that was proving to the world that it, too, could be a hockey nation with both Olympic and WJC success. The improbable upset at the 1980 Olympics, the “Miracle on Ice,” the American equivalent to the Summit Series, was less than 20 years old. The average age of Team USA at the 1980 Olympics was 22, just over the cut off for the WJC. Yet, much like the Canadians 20 years earlier, the WJC gold remained elusive.

USA Hockey’s National Team Development Program

In 1996, USA Hockey launched its own version of the POE: the NTDP. As its name suggests, the NTDP focused primarily on developing players. The success of the NTDP is not measured in wins or points, like other hockey leagues. Rather, the success of the NTDP is measured by the success of its players and the development of their skills. The NTDP plays against highly skilled teams, some of whom play in an age group above them, and the players who graduate from the NTDP are impressively talented and have gone on to become hockey superstars synonymous with USA Hockey and the sport itself, such as Patrick Kane, Jack Eichel, and Auston Matthews. This is in contrast to the CHL which develops more than just raw skill.
The CHL, comprised of 60 teams in three leagues (the Western Hockey League [WHL], the Ontario Hockey League [OHL], and the Quebec Major Junior Hockey League [QMJHL]), is the largest junior hockey league in the world. The CHL develops the best players between the ages of 16-21. Most players are Canadian, though American and European players also play in the league. The majority of NHL players have played in the CHL at some point in their careers. The CHL creates more well-rounded players that can play the physical side of hockey as well as “role players.” For this reason, the players who come out of the NTDP in the recent years are, arguably, more effective players than the Canadians playing in the NHL. The 2001-born NTDP group is perhaps the best class yet as 17 players from the 2019 U18 NTDP team were drafted in the 2019 NHL entry draft, including eight in the first round, a record for most first-round selections from one team.

(A) The NTDP, CHL, and POE

The NTDP is based largely on both the CHL and the POE. The NTDP plays as a team year-round in the United States Hockey League (USHL), the American version of the CHL. The USHL is an American junior level hockey league for elite players between the ages of 16 and 20, similar to the CHL. However, the CHL is comprised of three separate leagues and the POE selects the best players for the program to represent Canada at the WJC in the summer with a final selection in camp in December. The players on Team Canada play together for two weeks before returning home. This is a distinct difference, and arguably an improvement that the United States has made regarding its development program. Where Canada does not have a permanent national team, the NTDP is the official U18 national team for the United States. They are the permanent American POE team, comprised of the best 46 American players who play together year-round and are dedicated to developing their skills and improving USA Hockey’s standing on an international level.

As previously stated, the CHL is separated into three leagues. Junior players play in a branch of the CHL based on where they live. Thus, geographically, the players on any given team are from
the same area. The only time the best players from these junior teams across the country are brought together are for junior international competitions such as the U17s, U18s, and the WJC. Playing together year-round builds chemistry that would make a team much harder to beat compared to a team that spends only a handful of days together before the start of the tournament.

At the 2021 WJC, the Canadian players were together for 58 days, significantly longer than any other Canadian team had been. The chemistry between them through their nearly two months together was undeniable as they walked through the tournament undefeated and posted some of the best offensive and defensive statistics in Canadian WJC history; that is, until they faced the Americans in the gold medal game. There were 15 NTDP players on the American roster this year, most of them teammates from the prestigious 2019 U18 NTDP team. The Canadians were shut out in the gold medal game. Both goals scored by the Americans in the game were scored by 2019 NTDP graduates, and the three players who connected for the gold-medal-winning goal, Alex Turcotte, Drew Helleson, and Trevor Zegras, were all teammates on the 2019 U18 NTDP team, demonstrating the power of chemistry and how it can be the difference between silver and gold.

(B) U18 World Championships

The most significant difference between the CHL and the NTDP is how the teams end their seasons. The CHL ends its season with the Memorial Cup, the hardest trophy to win in junior sports, whereas the NTDP ends its season representing the United States at the U18s. The focus on the U18s is key to the success of the NTDP. Where Canada places the value in the WJC, the Americans focus on the U18s. The U18s is a newer international competition; the first tournament was held in 1999, three years after the creation of the NTDP. However, the United States would not win a medal at the U18s until 2002. They won gold. Nevertheless, they medaled, and won gold, quicker than the Canadians did. Moreover, of the 21 U18 tournaments, the Americans lead all countries with 17 medals, 10 of them being gold. Canada has seven medals at the U18s, three of them being gold. If the Americans could succeed at the U18 level, their players would, in the short run, be ready to compete over the
next two years at the WJC, and, in the long run, be prepared for the Olympics and other senior international competitions.

(C) NTDP Graduates and the WJC

After graduating from the NTDP and representing the United States at the U18s, NTDP graduates make up approximately 50% of the United States’ WJC roster. This is a remarkable feat, as each year the NTDP is comprised of only 46 players separated into two 23-player teams: U17 and U18. Winning gold in 2021, 15 of the 25 players representing the United States graduated from the NTDP. When the United States won its first gold in 2004, 15 of the 23 players on Team USA had graduated from the NTDP. On the 2010 gold-medal winners, 12 of the American players had graduated from the NTDP. For the 2013 gold, 13 players were NTDP graduates, and when they won their fourth gold in 2017, 16 of the players were NTDP graduates. Furthermore, the winners of the tournament’s Most Valuable Player award in last five years have come from either Team USA or Team Canada. The three MVPs for Team USA were all NTDP graduates.

The focus on just 46 players rather than a fully fleshed-out league based on the same principles of the NTDP is a flaw of the program and perhaps the reason the Americans have not fully found the international success at the WJC that they desire. As only 50% of the American WJC team graduates from the NTDP, only half the team receives the skill development of USA Hockey’s prized program. If the remaining 50%, or at least another 20-30% of the roster received the same pedigree training provided by the NTDP, it is conceivable that the Americans would find even more success than they are already finding.

Every year, USA Hockey loses its best players to the NHL while they are still eligible to play in the WJC. Jack Hughes (an NTDP graduate) was selected first overall in the 2019 NHL draft. Hughes became the first player to jump straight from the NTDP to the NHL. The New Jersey Devils, who drafted Hughes first overall, did not release him to play in the WJC for the 2020 tournament. Despite the delayed start to the NHL season, the Devils again did not release Hughes for the 2021 WJC.
even though Hughes, at 19 years old, was still eligible for the tournament. This is a frequent story for programs developing the best of the best.

The graduates of the NTDP are breaking into professional leagues (and particularly the NHL) while they are still teenagers. This forces USA Hockey to compose WJC rosters without some key players. While this hurts WJC teams, it also displays the exceptional development of the NTDP in two ways. Firstly, NTDP players are breaking into the NHL at younger ages, and secondly, despite losing some of their best players, the United States is still winning at the WJC much more frequently, and winning gold more often than their Canadian counterparts. If the NHL teams possessing rights to the NTDP players chose to release them for the WJC, the United States would have more star players on its team and would become that much more difficult to beat.

The United States won its first silver medal in 1997,\textsuperscript{64} in the second year of the NTDP’s existence. While it is not the immediate and dramatic success the Canadians found after the creation of the POE, it was, nonetheless, a big step for the Americans and demonstrates the success of the NTDP. Every program, especially development programs, has bumps to work out. The POE itself has made adjustments over the years. The NTDP is no different, and, after trial and error, the last decade has seen the best production by the NTDP. In 2010, the United States won its second gold medal (by defeating Canada), and followed it up by winning a bronze in 2011. This was the first time the United States won consecutive medals at the WJC.\textsuperscript{65} Between 1977 and 2009, the Americans won a total of five medals at the WJC.\textsuperscript{66} From 2010 onwards, Team USA has won eight medals.\textsuperscript{67}

\textbf{(D) Summary}

Whereas the POE exists because Canada was tired of losing to the Russians, the NTDP exists because Americans were tired of losing to the Canadians. USA Hockey took the two most successful hockey development programs in the world and combined them, adding in their own distinct American ideals and created the NTDP. It has been markedly successful and the program not only continues to help grow the development of junior hockey within the United States, but also raise the standing
of the Americans on the international level.68

Who is the Dominant Force?
Hockey is a large part of Canadian national identity. The continued success at international competitions has helped to solidify that notion.69 Roy MacGregor calls it an understatement to say hockey is the national religion of the country.70 If hockey is the national religion, then the WJC would be a place of worship. The WJC is enshrined in Canadian national identity, yet Canada is no longer the commanding team at the tournament. Since 2010, the Canadians have won the same number of medals as the Americans (8), while the Americans have won more gold medals.71

After losing in the semi-finals at the 2014 WJC, Canadian coach Brent Sutter said that the WJC was “not just our [Canada’s] game” and that “[other] countries have caught up to Canada.”72 Not being the commanding team at the tournament is unsettling to Canadians who understand their national identity in relation to hockey. Hockey and the persistent gold medals at any international level is a national pride. The sport and its importance to Canada is how Canadians understand their national identity.73

Going into the 2020 WJC, the United States had won four straight and six of the last 11 games against Canada, including winning the gold medal over Canada in 2017. This is in contrast to the United States being able to beat Canada only twice in the previous ten meetings at the tournament.74 December 26, 2019 was the first time Canada was able to defeat the Americans at the WJC since December 31, 2014,75 and the American win streak over the Canadians has begun again as they defeated the Canadians for gold in 2021. Of the 48 all-time head-to-head games at the world juniors, Canada has won 33.76 However, in the 13 head-to-head games since 2010, the US has won seven.77 Canadians have felt threatened by the American influence on hockey since the 1970s,78 and they do not want to admit that hockey is not just “Canada’s game,” it is a sport that other countries can excel at as well.79 However, American dominance is on the rise and they have solidified themselves as Canada's newest and now greatest rival in hockey.
This is not to say that Canada is a weaker team now than they previously had been. Rather, all of this signifies that Canada has raised the bar of what is needed to succeed and the other countries have finally caught Canada, just as Canada caught Russia in the 1980s. So, where does that leave Canada and Canadian identity if its teams are no longer the best in the tournament? Canada being responsible for the recent American success at the tournament signifies that Canada is still prevailing as a hockey nation even if they are not dominating the podium, something that is critical to a sometimes fragile national identity.

**Conclusion**

The success that the United States has found at the WJC is a direct result of Canada setting the bar of excellence and the standard of success. This standard forced the Americans to create a new development program, the NTDP, based on both the POE and the CHL to find success at the international level. This notion was supported through examining how Canada set the bar of hockey excellence and the standard of success at the WJC when its teams won gold in eight of ten tournaments between 1988 and 1997, how the NTDP was the American answer to the CHL and POE, and why the NTDP players found greater success at the WJC compared to previous American WJC teams. In 1982, in Rochester, Minnesota, no one thought that Canada could win. The tape of the Canadian national anthem was not even brought to the game in which Canada won its first gold. A great deal changed between that time, when Canadian players gathered on the blue line to sing “O Canada,” and 2009, when Eberle’s final-second goal brought Canada its last of five straight gold medals. Between 1982 and 2009, Team Canada won 23 medals, 15 of which were gold. They built a system that dominated the WJC for 27 years, making a tournament that Canadians had once seldom watched into a tournament synonymous with Canada. Nevertheless, the greatest success for the Canadians was setting the standard of hockey excellence at the junior level, forcing the other nations to rise to the expectation.
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Appendix

Medals by country
Countries in *italics* no longer compete at the World Junior Championships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gold</th>
<th>Silver</th>
<th>Bronze</th>
<th>Total Medals</th>
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<tr>
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<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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Endnotes

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Changing of the Guard:  
The Evolution of Catholic Trade Unionism 
in Quebec, 1907-1960

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Abstract: The Catholic Church was a powerful entity that manifested prominently in all levels of society in the province of Quebec, and the workplace was no exception. In 1921, the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour (C.C.C.L.) was formed not only to unite the local confessional unions, but ideally to also provide a buffer against secular syndicates making a name for themselves in Canada, such as the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The C.C.C.L’s inclination for tradition and pacifistic dispute resolution became progressively ineffectual as strikes became more frequent and as the conservative provincial government under Premier Maurice Duplessis sought to quash unionization in Quebec. The true test of Catholic unionism in Quebec came in 1949 when 5,000 workers in the province’s asbestos mines went on strike to protest inadequate pay and benefits as well as poor health conditions. Three months into the demonstrations, the C.C.C.L. nearly lost its members to the secular Congress of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.) and their charitable donations to the strikers and their families. The C.C.C.L. never fully recovered from the developments of the asbestos strikes, and in its later years it became more liberal and even allied with secular unions to save itself from oblivion. The Confederation survived into the 1950s, but it was nowhere near as powerful as it had been in its early years. From the closed shops of the 1930s to the asbestos strikes, Quebec’s unionized workers learned that classic Catholic values had no place in an ever-modernizing labor world.

Keywords: Quebec, Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour, unionism, Catholic Church, asbestos strikes.

The most dominant cultural force in Quebec in the early twentieth century was most certainly the Catholic Church. Even as Quebec experienced industrialization, with its associated modernism, urbanism, and the rise of an industrial wage-working class, the Catholic Church, with its hierarchy and conservativism, remained central to economic, political, and social thought. Thus, as Quebec workers began to organize in order to collectively meet the challenges of industrialization, it is not surprising that they did so through the Church. For half a century, the church sought to consolidate
organized labor under a Catholic banner, favoring morality and peace over militancy when resolving workplace disputes. They did so via “confessional unionism,” in which a chaplain is the head official. Proselytizing and organization were the work of the clergy, and the Church provided financial aid and public endorsement. The passive attitudes of Catholic unions, which bordered on ignorance toward labor conflicts were reflected in their general apprehension toward strikes. A few scattered episodes showed that confessional unionism had its uses, but most of the conflicts in which it was involved from inception to the 1950s called for more aggressive solutions; that is full-on strikes, which often turned violent. The 1949 strikes at Quebec’s asbestos mines were the crucible for Catholic unionism. While some individual clergymen rose to the occasion, by and large the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour (C.C.C.L.) was slow to adapt accordingly to contemporary union issues, leading to an overhaul of its leadership and greatly reduced relevance in the lives of Quebec’s organized workers. From the hundreds of “closed shops” across the province in 1937 to the asbestos mine demonstrations of the late 1940s, there is no shortage of cases that reveal the devolving prominence of Catholic labor syndicalism in Quebec from the C.C.C.L’s promising establishment in 1921 to its sidelining by the end of the 1950s.

The first official Catholic labor unions in Canada were established in 1907. By 1921, there existed enough local unions across the provinces to necessitate the formation of a national conglomerate. Such was the birth of the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour (Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada) in Hull, Quebec. Given its fierce nationalist, conservative, and religious moorings, the C.C.C.L. vehemently opposed foreign influence. Its leaders had a generally pessimistic worldview and considered the international unions like the American Federation of Labor (AFL) to be “materialistic” and “irreligious.” It was also fundamentally anti-socialist and anti-communist, thus making it hostile to more radical labor organizations like the International Workers of the World, while also opposing all English, American, and Protestant influence in Quebec. The C.C.C.L. reviled foreign capital in the province and instead advocated for popular trends of the time including corporatism, provincial autonomy, and the nostalgic idea of
the “return to the land.” The C.C.C.L. had some cause for concern over foreign encroachment. In September 1902, the Trades and Labor Congress (T.L.C.) had amended its constitution. Some unions broke away to form the Canadian Federation of Labor. Local branches of the Knights of Labor were excluded from representation, as were national Canadian unions in places where international guilds of the same craft already existed. Such a move was meant to create organized opposition to the American Federation of Labor, which had been accused of overstepping its jurisdiction in Canada rather than maintaining an equal partnership with the T.L.C.2 Even though the A.F.L. was a more moderate labor union, the Catholic confederation still feared that the working class would become the victim of the class-strife philosophy of “Bolshevistic” attitudes towards private property allegedly exhibited by some international and secular syndicates. The Church did not seek an overhaul of either the present social or the economic structures of Quebec, instead its message reiterated the notion that private property and divisions of class are the natural result of human nature. Capitalist frameworks were encouraged instead, in which “justice and charity rule(d) the relations of men.”4 By this theory, the worker happily provides his highest-quality labor in exchange for full and plentiful payment and protection from the employer.

To the C.C.C.L.’s detriment, however, its ultimate concern was maintaining civility, even if that did not align with the needs and ambitions of its constituents. The church leaders’ focus on preventing widespread strife and their emphasis on cordiality led to a cynical saying around the province: “Buy a bell for the parish church and you’ll never have any labor trouble.”5 Canadian labor historian Harold A. Logan echoed this idea in The History of Trade Union Organization in Canada. “The ultimate concern of its (the C.C.C.L.’s) founders,” he wrote in 1928, “has not been especially the economic condition of the worker, but rather the moral and spiritual condition, economic betterment being sponsored as contributing to the latter.”6 With respect to property rights, the C.C.C.L. condemned sabotage in all its forms and equally respected the rights of workers who were not involved in strikes. The use of persuasion to get others to cease working was acceptable to the point that it was not achieved by force.7 As featured on a C.C.C.L. convention program in 1922,
Gerard Tremblay of the Confederation’s Montreal Secretariat published a checklist of four conditions that needed to be met before a strike could be initiated. First, strikers could not be bound by any just contract with their employers, unless the employer violated any stipulations therein. Second, members must have exhausted all other means of conciliation first. Third, strikers must have had a justified reason for calling the strike. Fourth, strikers must have weighed all possibilities for success or failure and could not proceed with a strike unless they were absolutely certain it would result in positive change for the parties involved. Perhaps the C.C.C.L. should be commended for its emphasis on a non-violent and highly methodical discourse toward labor dispute resolution. Nevertheless, Logan’s appraisal is proved by the numerous prerequisites imposed upon Catholic workers compared to those of the secular internationals. The C.C.C.L.’s highly diplomatic and respectable moral compass grew to become the very bane of confessional unionism.

It was in the 1930s that the C.C.C.L.’s guiding ideology became even stricter, yet this was also the time in which the Confederation seriously began to face conflicts between tradition and practicality. By then, Canada was the only one of Britain’s former colonies to host labor syndicates designed specifically for Catholics. In Britain there had existed the Catholic Confederation (not to be confused with the one in Quebec) and the National Conference of Catholic Trade Unions. In theory, both were meant to confine their activities to defending Roman Catholic interests, yet they were not inclined to sever ties with the secular trade syndicates. As a result, according to a 1930 C.C.C.L. report, these two unions had died out by the end of the 1920s and were absorbed by their secular allies due to their unwillingness to adhere to a purely Catholic operation. This seemingly compelled the Quebec unions to rally to their traditionalism more than anything. Historic closeness to the provincial government, regardless of the specific governing party at the time, no doubt afforded favor to the confessional syndicates, a contradiction of one of the nine tenets of the C.C.C.L.: “The C.C.W.C (Confederation of Catholic Workers of Canada, an interchangeable name for the C.C.C.L.) can affiliate with no political party whatever.” Because of this, the international unions came to regard the C.C.C.L. as a “yellow union,” one that existed only through, according to historian Samuel Barnes,
“favoritism and neglect of the interests of the worker.”11 This troubling relationship was made even more alarming with the election of Premier Maurice Duplessis in 1936. A shrewd and fervent Quebec conservative and no friend of worker’s unions, Duplessis and the Union Nationale reigned over the province until 1939 before a short stint as an opposition party. Duplessis and the Union were reelected in 1944 and served as Quebec’s governing body for another 15 years. Within a year after his first electoral victory, Duplessis had made his opposition to labor organization quite clear. All the while, the increasingly ineffectual role of the Catholic unions had become undeniable.

In September 1937, hundreds of “closed-shops” were in effect throughout Quebec. Within the context of the Great Depression and the variety of socially radical movements across Canada (mainly in Ontario and western Canada), unionized workers in Quebec felt that they had fallen behind in securing labor rights and increasingly sought to use strikes as tool to draw attention to their demands. Duplessis’ response was blunt and ominous: “Workers have the right to organize but we will not permit the establishment of the closed shop in this province.”12 The Premier used the injunction, a court ordered stoppage to labor action, to prevent any further expansion of unionism in Quebec. In 1937, the Trades and Labor Congress hosted its fifty-third annual conference. In an executive report, the Congress denounced as perilous to the “right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” (much like the American Fourteenth Amendment, a clear indication of foreign influence) the implementation of “a number of severe and sweeping injunctions” taken against unions entrenched in “legitimate struggles to maintain and improve living standards.”13 The T.L.C.C. also expounded upon the value of the closed shop, which it regarded as a voluntary arrangement between employers and employees that is negotiated by representatives of the affiliated unions. To the T.L.C.C., the policy did not obstruct the right of any employee to continue working regardless of union status. Should any non-union employee choose to continue working in a closed shop, he must be willing to affiliate with other workers in that establishment and eventually become a member of a union himself.

The C.C.C.L. had mixed feelings toward the closed shops of 1937 and was consequentially useless to either faction in this event. While the idea of the closed shop is conformable to Christian
values as a non-violent form of dispute resolution, it also displayed some socialist undertones, according to the Confederation. To them, there were two and only two outcomes of a closed shop. The first was rather optimistic in that a closed shop may be used to raise apprenticeship, improve trades, and create an honest and competent workforce. In so doing, successful and responsible business practices would prevail, and the C.C.C.L. could rest assured that the employer’s “sacred” right to the free labor market was not obstructed. Abbé Edmund Hébert’s analysis of the closed shop suggests that the second outcome was less celebratory yet, according to history, was regrettably the more frequent of the two. Apparently, closed shops had for so long maintained such an unfavorable public reputation because workers had used them to swell numbers in union membership, ostracize non-union workers, and render employers ineffective by imposing upon them a potentially incompetent workforce. While employers do not completely lose control over the means of production under this system, they must negotiate with the unions to regain authority. To support the closed shop would have gone against the C.C.C.L.’s ideological opposition to workplace sabotage and their respect for the rights of non-union workers. Hébert underlined his point by stating that this subversive phenomenon had allegedly caused the undoing of many international unions in times past, such as the two English unions earlier in the decade. Confessional unions only ever supported the closed shop as a mode of retaliation against opposing unions for past abuses, but Catholic unionists generally considered it too harsh a weapon to be utilized extensively. The closed-shop concept was a treacherous line for the C.C.C.L. to straddle. By playing it safe and expressing greater apprehension than support for the idea, the union avoided the risk of upsetting the preexisting labor and social orders and impurifying its hallowed ideology.

To spectators of the ever-evolving labor world, it appeared that anything short of unwavering support for workers and their causes crippled the appeal of Catholic unionism. In its annual report for the fiscal year of 1938, the federal Department of Labour reported C.C.C.L. membership at 49,401, a decrease of 2,599 from the previous year. It listed just 259 local syndicates and study circles, a decline of 27 from the previous year. Meanwhile, another secular union had formed and rose to prominence
quite rapidly - the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The C.I.O. arose as a radical response to the A.F.L. until unification in 1955 as the A.F.L.-C.I.O., following years of bitter rivalry. The Congress opened in late 1935 with a membership of approximately one million. This soared to 4,037,877 across North America as of October 1938. Neutrality on the matter of the 1937 closed shops did not serve well either the image of the C.C.C.L. or the workers whose interests they claimed to represent, and statistics brought that growing divide to the forefront. Unfortunately for the C.C.C.L., this was hardly the greatest challenge it needed to overcome. The next 11 years forced the Catholic unions to face the fallout from their own dogma, and in so doing they realized their place in the history of Quebec labor. As time progressed, they discovered just how untenable their traditions were amidst the explosive cultural and economic change rising in Quebec, especially with a formidable new opponent in the C.I.O.

Canada entered World War II in 1939, and throughout the 1940s the C.C.C.L. found itself navigating an utterly foreign realm. Rapid industrialization forced the Catholic unions to expand into new war industries, virtually unknown to Quebec before then, at the risk of losing prominence to other unions. The Confederation managed to expand into the mass-production sector, albeit minimally, in which it encountered the most typical problems of contemporary labor organization for the very first time. Until the late forties, according to Quebec historian Miriam Chapin, the confessional syndicates were little better than “glorified company unions.” If not serving in organizational capacities for company formalities like annual picnics, they acted as a foil to the more radical unions. In 1942, for example, a Catholic local under the guidance of a Montreal priest was used to quell an A.F.L. strike at Arvida, an aluminum-mining town owned by and named for American industrialist Arthur Vining Davis. The tactics employed at the Arvida strike included charitable visits to the wives of strikers, emphasis on devotion to the parish, appeals to nationalism, and even anti-Semitism, all of which apparently won the day for the C.C.C.L. By upstaging the secular A.F.L., the C.C.C.L.’s actions at Arvida proved, though only temporarily, that tried-and-true Catholic mores still had a place in modern labor syndicalism.
Arvida was but a small success for the C.C.C.L., as it was the secular unions that boasted the greatest appeal across Quebec by this time. Industrial workers were generally hired with little or no regard for ethnic or religious background, which was especially true of Montreal, a city with a sizable non-French population and the one in which the province’s industry was most heavily concentrated. Quebec labor law provided certification to those unions that could enlist the broadest base of workers in a given plant. These certified unions could then bargain on behalf of all workers. This diversity did not align with traditional patterns of integral Catholicism, a belief that could not (and did not) last in modern times. While confessional unions represented a third of all organized workers in Quebec by 1940, they were virtually nonexistent in the shipyards and factories. During the tenuous summer of 1943, 401 strikes occurred in the war industries, amounting to 1,041,198 worker-days lost. The C.C.C.L. did manage to win a supervised vote against the Sorel Metal Trades Council, an A.F.L. subsidiary, securing the representation of 2,000 workers of the gun manufacturer Sorel Industries Limited. This was the extent of Catholic influence, however, as it had no presence in neighboring shipyards. The Catholic confederation had also suffered a membership deficit at the hands of Ernest Bolduc of the Boilermakers and Iron Shipbuilders Union of Canada, chartered by the Canadian Congress of Labor (C.C.L.). The use of “Canadienne” in the syndicate’s French name apparently attracted many French-Canadian workers, allowing Bolduc to beat out the confessional syndicates and even some craft-based internationals for membership.

It was not until the election of Gérard Picard as president of the C.C.C.L. in 1946 and Jean Marchand as secretary that the Confederation took on a more active operational philosophy. Picard’s platform of militant action allowed him to defeat Duplessis supporter and docile unionist Alfred Charpentier in his presidential bid. The effects of the Great Depression, anti-conscription sentiment in the interwar years, increasing international influence, and constant quarrels with the Duplessis government prove that Picard’s radical awakening had been a long time coming and was not exclusive to him. By the end of the decade, says Miriam Chapin, the confessional syndicates fought like “wildcats,” which signaled a tremendous shift in tone within a few years. By 1948, the C.C.C.L.
claimed a total membership of 78,892.\textsuperscript{27} For the 82,000 that were enlisted by the next year, their faith in the Church would be put to the ultimate test in what was perhaps the most essential labor dispute in Quebec’s history.

The Asbestos Strike began on February 13, 1949, in which 5,000 Catholic-unionized workers throughout Quebec’s Eastern Townships voted to strike against the six, Anglophone asbestos mining corporations, the American-owned Canadian Johns-Manville Company chief among them. Among the union’s 13 demands, most of which were ignored by the companies initially, were the elimination of toxic asbestos dust in and around the mills, a 15-cent-an-hour general pay increase and nine paid holidays a year.\textsuperscript{28} Deemed illegal under Quebec labor law, the strike was immediately denounced by Premier Duplessis who decried the C.C.C.L. leaders involved as “saboteurs” and “subversive agents.”\textsuperscript{29} Police intervention led to violence, such as a dynamite explosion near the railway line on March 14 and strikers overturning a company jeep that injured an official two days later. Hostility was also directed towards the strikebreakers, attacked by the union men as “scabs,” brought in to keep the mines running amidst the strike. They consisted of new and established workers from Asbestos as well as men from the nearby mining townships.\textsuperscript{30} By April 1, the Asbestos Strike had taken on definite characteristics, and public opinion swayed largely in favor of the union.

During the strike, several clergymen broke from the archaic mold of docility and inaction. Bishop Louis Camirand of Quebec City proclaimed that the workers “are not depriving themselves and their children of their wages for the sake of pleasure; they have been forced to do so because of the unqualifiedly provocative attacks.” Father Cousineau contributed two fiercely pro-labor articles to \textit{Relations}, and he hailed the strikes as a manifestation of profound social change for the making of a “new generation” in Quebec. Of the strike itself, he was clear that “social justice must be placed above legality.”\textsuperscript{31} On May 1, Joseph Charbonneau, Archbishop of Montreal, called for donations to aid the embattled workers to be collected every Sunday at each church in the diocese until the strike ended. “There is a conspiracy to destroy the working class,” the Archbishop declared, “and it is the church’s duty to intervene.”\textsuperscript{32} Charbonneau and Cousineau understood that observing from the sidelines aided
the abuser, not the abused. They understood how the Church’s doctrine was outdated and wholly incompatible with basic rights and human decency. Nevertheless, as successful as these figures were in procuring material support, and as incendiary as their speeches and writings may have been, the strikers felt the aid of the Church had been too little, too late.

By May 9, the 5,000 workers on strike had seriously begun to consider switching affiliation to the C.I.O. as a last-ditch effort to keep from losing momentum as victory apparently grew near. President Rodolphe Hamel of the Federation of Asbestos Workers reported that strikers had “enough to eat and some spending money” yet “clothes and things to make life more agreeable are lacking.” Each married couple received five dollars a week from the C.C.C.L. plus one for each child, along with food allotments when necessary. Money for food had come in large part thanks to charitable collections by churches all around the province. Other contributions had been made from sympathetic unions, Catholic and secular. The C.I.O. planted the seeds of intervention with a $200 donation by May. Even though no official approach had been made regarding a change in affiliation from the C.C.C.L. to the C.I.O., the threat thereof was apparent. President Hamel stressed that wholehearted support had been received by many union leaders in the C.C.C.L. “We must do something to keep our workers from being enslaved,” said Hamel in a May 10 column of the Montreal Gazette, “and we think such a move [to affiliate with the C.I.O.] would help us immeasurably in getting justice.” Syndicate leaders minced no words when expressing their discontent to the bishops. “If we lose this strike,” their stark warning read, “the Catholic labor movement is finished. Not only will the members desert it for the C.I.O., but we’ll (the syndicate officers) desert it ourselves—we’ll go over to the international unions in a body.” Although the mass shift to the C.I.O. never came to fruition, what is important about this event is that the ideological schism between the clergy and the workers could no longer be ignored. In the short term, the workers suffered an unnecessary obstacle to their goals. In the long term, the C.C.C.L. experienced a major blow to its authority from which it struggled to recover.

On June 24, the Thetford mining companies agreed on a return to work for June 27,
recertification of the union, arbitration for issues left unresolved within ten days, and the right of the company not to reengage men convicted of disorderly conduct. In Asbestos, the settlement of July 1 brought about a ten-cent-an-hour wage increase, seniority rights, reemployment of all workers without discrimination (except those convicted in court), four paid holidays a year, and a remaining five-cent-an-hour increase to be negotiated. The plight of those workers still unemployed was not addressed at the December 29 signing of the collective labor agreements.37

The asbestos strikes of 1949 yielded beneficial results for the C.C.C.L., but only marginal results. It is true that the Confederation was now shaken loose from its “reputation for equivocation and appeasement,” and it did mobilize the French-Canadian intellectual community to the side of the church and expose the dark nature of the Duplessis administration.38 The strikes formed the basis of the Maîtres Chez Nous campaign slogan of the Quebec Liberal Party that defeated the Union Nationale in 1960. Pierre Trudeau in his 1956 reflections on the strikes remarked that the events of 1949 would be remembered as a historical milestone for the province, the country, and the working-class movement around the world, not just one for the asbestos mining townships.39 Even then, the C.C.C.L. still exhibited some level of hubris. It appeared that some had not been quite as troubled by the developments of Asbestos and their impact on the future of the C.C.C.L. In a December 29 column in the Calgary Herald, Catholic businessmen (oddly not specified by name, however) went on record saying, “We must be convinced that the social doctrine of the church, and it alone, is able to provide all elements essential for a just solution of the social questions (of Quebec).”40 On the Confederation’s social action, Gérard Picard said simply, “It’s good…If there had been no application of social doctrine, the workers would have deserted us. They want results.”41 Picard was technically right in saying this as the confessional unionists never did switch to the C.I.O. This outcome papers over the fact that the workers threatened to leave the Confederation, thus proving that the C.C.C.L was unable to meet the demands of modern unionists. The apparent residual stubbornness of some Catholic leaders did not age well and was a major cause for the diminished presence of confessional unionism in the decade following the Asbestos strikes.
The C.C.C.L. continued as a notable union into the 1950s, though much diminished from what it had once been. As of 1959, of the 1,400,000 unionized workers in Canada, just over one million were affiliated with the Canadian Congress of Labor. Of those 275,000 organized workers in Quebec, some 100,000 were members of confessional unions. Lay leaders had taken on more and more administrative and organizational roles over the previous decade, but the chaplains had remained the supreme authority in the confessional unions during the war years. Following Asbestos, however, the more aggressive laity rose to the leadership, significantly reducing the overall authority and importance of the chaplain. In a collective Pastoral Letter published by the Church of Quebec on February 1, 1950, the wisdom, experience in labor relations, and rank of the chaplain within the Church were certainly still revered, but by now he acted primarily as an observer to union matters. Samuel Barnes further outlined the truncated role of the chaplain in a 1959 installation of the ILR Review. The chaplain is “neither leader, director, propagandist nor business agent. In the beginning there was need for the chaplain of these organizations to go now and then beyond his normal functions. Unionism today no longer requires this unusual action. The chaplain must take upon himself the noble function of educator.”

Along with a revised command structure, the C.C.C.L. experienced another milestone change in the 1950s. Once decried as “alien” and “godless,” A.F.L.-C.I.O. unions were now treated as welcomed allies by the confessional syndicates. There was now close and often fruitful cooperation between the local Catholic and secular international federations, and confessional membership was now open to all faiths. Marchand and Picard had campaigned for years on friendly cooperation with English-Canadian and international unions, and the local syndicates in Asbestos had hosted a number of English-speaking Protestants leading up to the 1949 strikes. Also in 1949, the Canadian Congress of Labor passed a resolution favoring the unification of “all bona fide labour organizations” in response to both the Union Nationale’s proposed provincial labor code and the troubling Prince Edward Island Trade Union Act of 1948 which, among other things, forbade closed-shop contracts like those seen in Quebec in 1937.
the C.C.C.L in the formation of the Joint Conference of Organized Labour in the Province of Quebec. Marked progress towards greater unity came in August 1950 when the two congresses issued two joint statements, one in support of the United Nations’ stance on Korea,\textsuperscript{48} and another supporting the railway unions of both congresses in their national strike.\textsuperscript{49}

All these changes considered, the C.C.C.L faced three major challenges by the end of the 1950s. First, uncertain attitudes towards nationalism had arisen. The C.C.C.L. would defend the rights of Quebecers to the letter, but it no longer wanted to be associated with the nationalism of the Duplessis government. Even in decades past the Confederation understood that the marriage of unionism and government was historically damning to the former, and the Catholic unions saw now more than ever that nationalism was a tool used merely to prevent the enactment of social legislation.\textsuperscript{50} Second, as indicated throughout the history of confessional unionism, there existed growing dissatisfaction with the role of the Church in Quebec daily life. Though not antireligious, some C.C.C.L. leaders had become anti-clerical, and the organization’s confessional status limited membership potential even as enlistment had been opened to anyone. There was a general feeling of defeatism among several C.C.C.L. leaders that confessional unionism in Canada was “dépassé” (meaning roughly, “its time has passed”), especially seeing as how the majority of organized labor in Quebec was now affiliated with the international, “neutral” syndicates.\textsuperscript{51} Lastly, the C.C.C.L.’s aversion to party politics allowed more radical laymen to rise and alter the future of confessional unionism. Disengagement from direct action in labor movements allowed the church to expand its freedom of action and would enable the now more-secular C.C.C.L. to expand its economic doctrines and engage in political activities outside the confines of Christian doctrine, and perhaps this was for the better given the Confederation’s record.\textsuperscript{52}

For better or worse, the C.C.C.L. had evolved far beyond what its founders had initially conceived. Perhaps such changes were too few and far between. Perhaps they had not come about fast enough to preserve the sanctity of pure Catholic unionism. Whatever the case, the times forced the confessional unions to change rather than the unions adapting on their own merit. For that
reason, Catholic labor unionism had fallen from grace in the eyes of many French Canadians, and at the dawn of the Quiet Revolution, only more modern, revolutionary spirits would prevail and bring about meaningful change in the province of Quebec.

Jake Cuneo is a proud graduate of the Bridgewater State University’s, class of 2021 and is now pursuing a career in the field of law.

Notes

3 Harold Amos Logan, Trade Union Organization in Canada (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928), 301.
4 Logan, Trade Union Organization in Canada, 336.
5 Blair Fraser, “Priests, Pickets and Politics,” Maclean’s, July 1, 1949, 50.
6 Logan, Trade Union Organization in Canada, 335.
7 Logan, Trade Union Organization in Canada, 352-353.
8 Logan, Trade Union Organization in Canada, 352.
9 Canada, Department of Labour, Twenty-Eighth Annual Report on Labour Organization in Canada (For the Calendar Year of 1938) (Ottawa, King’s Printer, 1938), 37.
10 Canada, Department of Labour, Twenty-Eighth Annual Report, 38.
14 Logan, The History of Trade Union Organization in Canada, 353.
15 An abbé (abbot) was an official within the Church who, in the context of the C.C.C.L., could be appointed by a bishop
for such tasks as the creation of a local union. Hébert was from Montreal.


To specify, this refers to confessional unionism's general apprehension of foreign and/or non-Catholic influence of any kind.


Fraser, “Priests, Pickets and Politics,” 50.

Chapin, *Quebec Now*, 69.


Fraser, “Priests, Pickets and Politics,” 9.


Fraser, “Priests, Pickets and Politics,” 9.


Isbester, “Asbestos,” 188.


Daignault, “Management ‘To Bend,’” 5.


Fraser, “Labor and the Church in Quebec,” 249.
46 Fraser, “Priests, Pickets and Politics,” 52.

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The Dieppe Raid: Avoidable Disaster or Lesson in Amphibious Assault?*

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Abstract: During World War II, the Allied forces mounted an amphibious assault on the occupied French coastal town of Dieppe. Since its execution, the raid on Dieppe has become a very controversial topic. The operation had an abundance of flaws that caused many casualties. This article analyzes both issues and who, if any one should have been held responsible.

Keywords: World War II, Canadian military, amphibious assault, Operation Jubilee, Dieppe

On August 19, 1942, Allied forces consisting of mostly Canadian troops mounted a full-scale assault on a small port in Dieppe, France. Prior to this assault, Allied forces had been forced to withdraw from the western front at Dunkirk in June 1940, which left the eastern front in the Soviet Union’s territory as the only active front against Germany. By 1941, German forces were within striking distance of Moscow.¹ This raised many concerns that the Soviet Union might fall to Hitler’s forces. Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, urged Great Britain to reopen the western front to draw some of the German forces out of Russia and give his soldiers some relief. This desperate need for assistance led the British military to devise a plan to reclaim territory in France.

The plan was premature and had many flaws including late tanks, limited air support, misplaced landing crews and the loss of the element of surprise, which doomed the Canadian forces. In total, 907 Canadian soldiers were killed, 2,460 were wounded, and 1,946 were taken prisoner.² The losses were tremendous. There is a mountain of questions still left unanswered today. What was the original plan? How was this plan approved? Was it approved through official military channels? What issues needed to be addressed prior to a successful raid? How did the military react to this disaster? Was anyone at fault? Who should have been held accountable?

It was determined by the Combined Operations Headquarters, commanded by British
Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, that a temporary assault on a seaport would display the Allied powers’ ability to mount a full-scale attack by landing craft from the English Channel. According to Bernie Anderson, a Canadian soldier who played a role in the Dieppe Raid, “The idea was for a short, sharp assault on the small French port of Dieppe to encourage the struggling Soviet Union, to boost morale on the home front, and to provide the bored, obstreperous Canadians a taste of action.” Up until this point, the Canadian forces had been stationed in Great Britain along the English Channel to protect against a German raid that would never happen. With no action yet for the Canadians, the home front was beginning to get anxious. The initial plan was simple. Historian Bill Twatio comments that “The Allied forces would seize and hold the town until sunset, destroy the defences, take prisoners and be safely home on the evening tide.” This did not work out the way they had planned it.

The plan started out as Operation Rutter. The operation was cancelled abruptly after months of planning and special training for the Canadians, when the 250 Canadian ships, ready to attack Dieppe the next day, were discovered by German bombers. This ruined all hopes of maintaining the element of surprise and contributed to the cancellation of Operation Rutter. The final decision to cancel was also due to poor weather conditions on the day of the raid. Historian Norman S. Leach notes that, “While many in the Allied headquarters wanted to permanently cancel the raid, the new Chief of Combined Operations—Louis Mountbatten—did not.” The plan was practically unchanged and renamed Operation Jubilee.

During Operation Rutter, while soldiers were in their ships preparing for the assault, they were told that Dieppe was the target. When the plan was cancelled and renamed, the target was not changed. N.M. Christie notes that this was a massive security risk: “Normally when an operation is remounted its destination was changed for security reasons.” With the risk of German spies knowing the location, it is unclear why it was not changed. If this information had been leaked to the Germans it would explain the large number of defensive obstacles placed at Dieppe, including concrete barriers along paths and multiple anti-tank guns. Were these added before Operation Rutter was planned, or after its location got out? The Canadian Encyclopedia makes it clear that there was a
“need for better intelligence on beach conditions and German defences.” Dieppe was not thought to be as fortified as it was. Could old intelligence before the location was leaked have changed this?

A total of 4,963 Canadians, 1,005 British commandos, and 50 U.S Rangers participated in Operation Jubilee. However, Alex Herd notes that “Allied commanders knew the raid was risky.” There was a major push by Canadian Officers to involve the restless Canadian troops who had not yet seen any action after three years at war. Canadian military historians J.L. Granatstein and Dean Oliver write that “Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar heard rumors that Mountbatten was planning a major raid, he demanded that the British Chiefs of Staff select Canadians for the task; it would be good for morale, he judged.” Historians also speculate that the troops were not properly prepared and lacked combat experience, which contributed to the failure of the operation. While they did lack the experience, they trained intensely in land and sea tactics for months before the raid. The Canadian government later insisted that the troops were “well trained and more prepared than ever.” The Combined Operation leaders who formulated the plan should be the ones labelled not properly prepared instead.

The plan was riddled with flaws from the start. Along with the massive security risk, the entire plan was based on the element of surprise. Not only was this risky, but during the raid, as they were crossing the English Channel, a group of ships were intercepted by a German convoy. The interception alerted the enemy on shore, which delayed the raid. Most of the landing craft reached the beaches late and dropped the troops off in full daylight. Even though the element of surprise was essentially lost the raid was not called off. Instead, command thought that additional tank and naval support would compensate for the lack of surprise.

Historian Terry Copp wrote that the Operation “seems to have been devised by men who believe that battles could be won by surprise, speed, and shock effect of landing tanks alongside the infantry.” This plan could have worked better if the tanks had been more successful on the beaches, but a series of failures led to the ineffective deployment of the armored support. First, the tanks were about 10 minutes late. This poor timing set the entire raid back and left hundreds of men vulnerable.
Second, according to Norman Leach, “out of the 58 tanks prepared to assist in the raid, only 29 were able to offload at the shore.”18 Third, most of the tanks used during the raid got stuck on the beach almost immediately. Major Allen Glen, a Canadian soldier who was involved in the raid, remembered, “You couldn't pick worse terrain for a tracked vehicle, you turn the vehicle a little bit, the stones are rolled into the track, and if you get too many going through at once you break your track.”19 This was the unfortunate reality for many tank crews. Lastly, even the tanks that made it off the beach were eventually stopped by the blockades set up by the Germans. The tanks were not able to get through and soon became sitting ducks, leading Leach to sadly conclude that, “Unable to escape in time, all of the tank crews were either killed or captured.”20 This error could have been avoided if the planners had done their research. With the terrain at Dieppe being so unique, they should have recommended training on similar ground to give a more realistic example of how the tanks would respond in action.

Instead, soldiers trained in England with slightly different terrain. Not only did this affect the tanks, but it also caused issues with the landing craft. Caroline D’Amours notes that “Boats were scattered all along the seafront because of smoke, the heavy fire and the currents.”21 While training for these situations would have been a difficult task, a systematic order with proper timing of approaching ships could have made a huge difference. Despite organization being vital for a raid of this size, it was not practiced.

During the raid, the communication was poor and unreliable. D’Amours further notes, “The faulty communication system between the beaches, the Royal Air Force, ships, and tanks during the operation had resulted in a significant number of losses.”22 Calls for more support, retreat, and other commands were hard to come by after landing. A miscommunication between the troops on shore and the British Royal Marines led to reinforcements being sent to shore. “It was believed the tanks were progressing well and the beach was in Canadian hands.”23 The moment the reinforcements reached the beach they, however, realized that this report was inaccurate. Instead of landing craft coming to pick up those who were still alive, they dropped more off, only adding to the casualties. Sadly, many soldiers did not make it onto the beach.
After both groups’ attempts to flank the enemy failed, those on the main beach were sitting ducks. The initial force was supposed to “capture the Headlands” or cliffs “overlooking the Dieppe Beach” and supply cover for the main assault. With failure on both sides, the main assault did not stand a chance. The right flank was ill fated from the start. After being dropped off to begin their assault soldiers realized they had been dropped at the wrong side of the Scie River. Leach notes: “With no other way to cross the river, the Canadians were forced to enter the town of Pourville to use the only available bridge.” The Germans foresaw this, and set up machine guns and anti-tank artillery to defend the bridge. The South Saskatchewan Regiment’s fate was sealed after they were dropped in the wrong location.

Prior to the raid, there are multiple examples of unrealistic expectations. Many thought that the raid would be simple and that casualties would be low. Even though the planners knew that it was risky, generals and other military leaders were not prepared for what was to come. The night before the raid Major-General J.H. Roberts told the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, which constituted the main infantry assault force, “Don’t worry men, it’ll be a piece of cake.” Whether this was to ease nerves or was a serious statement, it was inappropriate to lower expectations. His troops needed to be as prepared as they could be, including knowing that the plan was risky and that giving full effort was needed in order to succeed.

The final issue to address is the lack of approval. According to historians Brian Villa and Peter Henshaw, after the failure of the raid, Churchill sought answers to “when and how formal authorization for the raid was given.” This question remains unanswered and has since raised even more. During a session of the Canadian House of Commons, Tommy Douglas of Weyburn, Saskatchewan addressed confusion over the commanding roles. He stated, “We do not know whether it was carried out under General McNaughton as commander of the Canadian forces overseas, or whether it was under Lord Mountbatten who was in charge of the combined operation.” It had been months since the raid and the Canadian government still had no knowledge of formal roles, or who had command of the operation. After reviewing authorization requirements, Villa and
Henshaw found that “existing procedures required of Mountbatten were missing from the archives. Mountbatten himself admitted afterwards that he had no authority to proceed after the cancellation of Operation Rutter, except on the basis of a new request.”29 Part of the process at the time was to submit a full outline of the plan for review, but as stated by Villa and Henshaw, “It was never done.” With a lack of formal approval, the raid was bound to be full of flaws. It can be speculated that combined operations “lost” formal approval paperwork to release them from blame after the raid failed.

Days after the Raid had taken place, the media began claiming it as a heroic victory. Multiple newspapers used headlines like, “Daring Raid,”30 “Blazing Battle,”31 and “Allies Smash Nazi Defences.”32 All of these were misleading and prompted a false hope in the war effort at home. In reality, most of the German defenses remained intact and questions had already arisen about the endless list of flaws. While the raid did slightly weaken the German air force and led them to move more forces and aircraft away from the Soviet Union, it still did not make up for the avoidable casualties and issues.

After the Dieppe Raid failed, research began immediately to determine why and who was responsible. To this day, theories and speculations consume many historians who have dug into the vast documentation of first-person accounts, newspapers, government documents, and other research papers. Thousands have been affected by this disaster, and many are still emotional about the outcome. Alan Saunders, a veteran who fought in the Dieppe raid, stated that, “I think it was one of the biggest cock-ups of the Second World War and it never should have happened.” Historian Gerald Gilbert summarizes that Saunders and others viewed it as “a costly lesson, and crass stupidity to think that by frontal assault you could take an enemy-held port.”33 While many were upset and even angry at those who put Operation Jubilee into action, there were some who did not share those feelings.

Shortly after the war, some researchers became to refer to the Dieppe Raid as the dress rehearsal for the invasion of Normandy beach. Although there was a 67 percent casualty rate at Dieppe, many claimed that multiple valuable lessons were learned.34 Granatstein and Oliver, for example, note that, “Dieppe was a lesson on how not to mount an amphibious assault.”35 The Allied
forces learned that in order to attack a coastal port, tanks and the element of surprise were not enough. The Germans had heavily fortified the coast of occupied Europe during WWII and expected an invasion on the Western front. The tall cliffs along the coast of France made the German defenses even stronger. Yet, despite these impressive defenses, it was clear that if the Allies had any hopes of reopening the Western front, an attack by sea would eventually be necessary. The Allies had to acquire better intelligence of terrain and military defenses, along with improving proper communication and general planning. How to make use of tanks also came into question. With such difficult terrain, specialized landing craft and tanks would be needed.36

After all, Dieppe was only a raid. The entire goal of it was to display power and gain intelligence on performing a synchronized sea/land assault. While the casualties were tremendous, it did allow for vital gains in intelligence and brought the enemy’s focus towards the Western front to help relieve the Russians as much as possible. Both sides of the Dieppe raid debate make good points, but the flaws that surround the raid could have been avoided. With proper planning, approval, and intelligence, the casualty rate could have been drastically lower. Yet, instead of calling for early retirement resignations or imposing demotions of those in charge of the raid, the Canadian and British militaries gave out promotions and medals. Was the Dieppe Raid a failure or a success? That is still a hard question to answer.

* An earlier version of this essay was published in the University of Maine’s Armstrong Undergraduate Journal of History in 2018.

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Notes


6 Bill Twatio, “The fatal shores of Dieppe: on the 65th anniversary of the landing at Dieppe, one man who took part in that fateful landing tells his story,” Esprit de Corps (2017): 34.

7 Leach, Canadian Battles, 144.


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16 Bernie Anderson, as quoted in Granatstein, 48.

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Writing Women into History: 
Margaret Atwood’s and Dionne Brand’s 
Interrogation and Relocation of Power

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Abstract: This article analyzes the relationship between ancestral women and their arrival in a new landscape as represented in Margaret Atwood’s The Journals of Susanna Moodie (1970) and Dionne Brand’s “No Language is Neutral” (1990). Atwood’s poems focus on Susanna Moodie, an English emigrant who left behind written sketches of her life in Canada. Meanwhile, Brand’s poem centers on an emigrated speaker who weaves oral stories of her ancestor Liney, who had been enslaved in Trinidad, and the story of her own arrival in Canada. Working with Jeff Weingarten’s Sharing the Past: The Reinvention of History in Canadian Poetry (2019), this essay argues that Atwood and Brand question an uneven power dynamic of control and authority, between a formidable alien landscape and a dislocated foremother. But they relocate power in different ways. Atwood writes from a colonial perspective and relocates control to the speaker Moodie through her personification and conquering of the Canadian landscape. Contrastingly, Brand writes from an African diasporic perspective and her speaker struggles to relocate authority to Liney due to unreliable memories displacing Liney from the speaker. However, the attempted resurrection of Liney empowers Brand’s speaker on her similar journey into an alien landscape. By analyzing the relocation of power, this essay argues that Atwood and Brand disrupt historical representations of women to demonstrate Moodie’s and Liney’s strengths within histories of pioneering and enslavement. Additionally, Brand expands Weingarten’s argument to consider the challenges non-colonialists face when writing and empowering women who are exempt from history.

Keywords: power, control, history, Canada, immigration

Margaret Atwood’s poetry collection The Journals of Susanna Moodie and Dionne Brand’s poem “No Language is Neutral” both showcase a female ancestor, or “foremother,” who enters into a new landscape. Atwood’s poems focus on Susanna Moodie, a European who emigrated to Canada in 1832 and left behind written sketches of her life in Canada. Meanwhile, Brand’s poem centers on an emigrated speaker who weaves oral stories of her ancestor Liney, who had been enslaved in Trinidad, and the story of her own arrival in Canada. In Jeff Weingarten’s book Sharing the Past,
he argues that Atwood’s poems “interrogat[e] and relocat[e] power, questioning the politics of historical representation as much as the mode one adopts while writing” (180). Both Atwood and Brand question an uneven power dynamic of control between an alien landscape and a dislocated foremother, but they relocate power in different ways. Atwood writes from a colonial perspective and relocates control to the speaker Moodie through her eventual conquering of the Canadian landscape. Contrastingly, Brand writes from an African diasporic perspective, and her speaker struggles to relocate authority to Liney due to unreliable memories displacing Liney from the speaker. However, the attempted resurrection of Liney empowers Brand’s speaker on her similar journey into an alien landscape. Through differing depictions of the relocation of power, Atwood and Brand disrupt historical representations of women and expand Weingarten’s argument to consider the challenges non-colonialists face when writing and empowering women who are excluded from history.

*The Journals of Susanna Moodie’s* first poem, “Disembarking at Quebec,” reveals an uneven power dynamic between the speaker Susanna Moodie and the Canadian wilderness she has entered. The poem highlights Moodie’s isolation from the Canadian landscape almost immediately: “The moving water will not show me / my reflection” (16-17). The verb “will” personifies the water and gives it control over Moodie because the word suggests that the water chooses to ignore Moodie, rather than Moodie choosing to ignore the landscape. Moodie feels a disconnection from the landscape, but the authority of the environment’s elements reinforce this isolation and assert the landscape’s control. Additionally, line 5 resides as its own stanza between two longer stanzas in which Moodie discusses her feelings and possessions: “–a book, a bag with knitting-- / the incongruous pink of my shawl” (3-4). Not only does the landscape have the ability to accept or reject Moodie, but the physical space on the page between the line about the landscape and the stanzas about Moodie suggest that Moodie is physically isolated from the new landscape because of the pieces of European civilization that she brings with her. Moodie notes that the colour of her shawl is “incongruous” (4) and does not fit with her new environment, which suggests Moodie’s dislocation from the European landscape, where she fits in. Through the depiction of the separation between Moodie and the Canadian landscape,
“Disembarking at Quebec” questions Moodie’s relationship with the landscape and reveals the landscape’s initial power over Moodie.

Similarly, in Dionne Brand’s “No Language is Neutral,” the speaker emphasizes the isolation and social standing of enslaved foremother Liney to question the power balance between Liney and the country Trinidad and to reveal the landscape’s immediate authority over her. Liney enters Trinidad enslaved to the people and government of the country of Trinidad. Similarly, Canada holds authority over the speaker, Liney’s descendent. Although the speaker comes to Canada freely, she yields her power to Canada and the city landscape of Toronto: “saying I / coming just to holiday to the immigration officer when / me and the son-of a bitch know I have [a] labourer mark” (Brand 66-68). In the speaker’s choice not to conform to Canadian English and be honest about her move to Canada, she recognizes that the immigration officer does not want her to be at home in Canada. Thus, Canada does not appear as a place where the speaker belongs and causes the speaker to view Canada as a landscape that is “other” to her. Teresa Zackodnik argues in her essay on Brand’s work that “othering [is] involved in the racist assumption that [the speaker] is not a Canadian but an alien who belongs elsewhere” (Zackodnik 197). Since the speaker feels pressure to enter Canada with a lie, Canada ultimately has control over her because she now resides in Canada’s land as an inauthentic other. Brand’s poem interrogates the power dynamic between the foremother Liney and the country of Trinidad to reveal that when an individual enters somewhere trapped in the expectations that the country has of them, the country holds authority over them. Unlike Liney, the speaker is not enslaved and is a free individual. However, the pressure the speaker feels upon entering to hide her true self and appear as a tourist, rather than an immigrant with plans to make Canada her home, reveals that the speaker, similarly to Liney, feels trapped in the expectations that this new country has of them. Thus, Brand interrogates a relationship where the landscape holds power over a foremother, just as Atwood does.

In Atwood’s “Further Arrivals” and “The Death of a Young Son by Drowning,” wild and animalistic characteristics, along with the claiming of the landscape, allows Susanna Moodie to
move up the hierarchy of power in the relationship between the Canadian landscape and herself. “Further Arrivals” shows the fading of Moodie’s civilized life from around her. Instead of holding on to civilized distinctions, Moodie and the other European immigrants release them and lean into the Canadian landscape: “the immigrants threw off their clothes / and danced like sandflies” (Atwood, “Further Arrivals” 4-5). In “Disembarking at Quebec,” clothes were items that separated the Europeans from the landscape. Here, the immigrants willingly shed their clothes and give in to the landscape, which suggests that the immigrants, including Moodie, are becoming further surrounded by the land.

Moodie then begins to see herself in terms of the animals: “[my brain] sends out / fears hairy as bears” (15-16). This simile demonstrates that the civilized vs. wild binary that initially separates Moodie and the Canadian landscape has been blurred. The depiction of Moodie viewing aspects of herself as animalistic contrasts “Disembarking at Quebec,” where the landscape takes on human aspects. By flipping who takes on which characteristics from the landscape to Moodie, “Further Arrivals” demonstrates Moodie’s newfound connection with the landscape. The Canadian landscape in “Disembarking at Quebec” holds power over Moodie because her separation from the environment inhibits her from the power to control whether she belongs in the landscape. However, Moodie takes back the control that the landscape has over her when she chooses to accept aspects of the environment as a part of herself in “Further Arrivals.” Thus, this poem depicts a now equal power dynamic between Moodie and the Canadian landscape.

While “Further Arrivals” begins to resurrect the power dynamic between Moodie and the Canadian landscape, “Death of a Young Son by Drowning” depicts Moodie’s conquest of the land and gives Moodie authority over the landscape. “Death of a Young Son by Drowning” describes the death of Moodie’s son “in the river” (Atwood, “Death” 17). The poem opens with a reference to the son’s journey down a different river: “the dangerous river of his birth” (2). Moodie’s choice to describe the birth canal as the landscape’s river unites the aspects of the landscape with those of Moodie’s human body, which demonstrates that the Canadian landscape no longer has control over whether Moodie
and the immigrants belong in Canada. Moodie’s “river” has the ability to bring a new life into the world, whereas the landscape’s river can take a life out of the world. The comparison of Moodie’s birth canal to the landscape’s river reinforces the current power dynamic between the two. Additionally, even after it takes the life of her son, Moodie no longer views the landscape in a position of power or as a threat. In “Disembarking at Quebec,” Moodie describes the landscape as a place of desolation; however, after her son’s death, Moodie notices the “bright sun and new grass” (22). Instead of the landscape being a dark unknown place, the landscape is now bright and welcoming to new life, such as the immigrants, which suggests that Moodie no longer feels as though the landscape has control over whether she belongs in it. The poem concludes with Moodie burying her son: “I planted him in this country / like a flag” (28-29). Moodie takes possession of the landscape. The simile “like a flag” alludes to explorers marking their conquests, which suggests that Moodie has now asserted her authority and claimed the land as her own. Through her son’s burial, Moodie infuses the land with a part of her, her son, which further depicts Moodie’s newfound power over the Canadian landscape.

Conversely, in Dionne Brand’s “No Language is Neutral” the speaker draws on memories and stories of Liney in an attempt to resurrect Liney’s history to guide herself in an alien country; however, the speaker struggles to relocate authority and control to Liney due to a lack of historical information and unreliable narration. The speaker recalls Liney’s experience enslaved on a ship on the way to Trinidad from Africa and uses the experience as a guide since the speaker similarly leaves her home to travel to another country. The speaker intends to relocate power to Liney by resurrecting her in poetry: “History will only hear you if you give birth to a woman who is / a poet” (108-13). As a poet, the speaker can write Liney as a guide for herself in the poem, which should give power to Liney; however, the speaker relies on stories of Liney. Namely, Liney’s son Ben serves as her storyteller, but because Ben only knows his own experiences of Liney and word-of-mouth stories about her, he cannot speak to Liney’s own experiences. As the speaker has not lived Liney’s life either, she cannot resurrect Liney as she once was. Instead, the speaker creates an imagined version of Liney. Zackodnik agrees with my claim that the speaker’s Liney is a created version, and states that the speaker “cannot
be satisfied in an escapist flight to a past that did not exist for her, but it can be realized in her present” (Zackodnik 205). Although both Liney and the speaker travelled to a different country as an outsider, the circumstances in which they move countries are vastly different. Regardless of the speaker’s attempt, her resurrection of Liney is based on faulty narratives, which inhibits the speaker from resurrecting Liney or relocating control to her.

Although Atwood and Brand attempt to relocate power in different ways, both of them adopt a mode of writing that gives power to historically omitted and ignored women. Historians tell of emigration from Europe to Canada “predominantly, if not exclusively, [as] a history of men” (Weingarten 178). Jeff Weingarten argues that due to the disproportionately low representation of women in comparison to men, in history, female writers struggle to imagine or write a pioneering woman (178-79). Regardless of history’s relative lack of recognition of pioneering women, Atwood writes Moodie as an eventual conqueror to the land she was once threatened by. Although Moodie does not claim the land literally with a flag, the selection of poems showcase Moodie as a pioneer through the completion of a journey that ends in a landscape being claimed. Atwood manages to write into a history that ignores women through the depiction of Moodie as a pioneer and gives a voice for other unknown woman pioneers in history.

Brand’s speaker manages to find strength in her attempt to resurrect Liney, even though she does not relocate power to Liney’s historical self. The speaker hopes that through the resurrection of Liney’s history she will find the strength necessary to embark on a new life in Canada. Brand’s speaker navigates through the idea of Liney as a slave and the loving anecdotes that Ben tells of Liney. Similarly, throughout the text the speaker switches between her nation language, which is a kind of English spoken by individuals and their descendants who were brought to the Caribbean enslaved or as laborers, and Canadian English. The constant switching between the two dialects demonstrates the speaker’s struggle to find a middle. Zackodnik argues that Liney’s “history does not lie between her experience as a subject and as a colonized object; rather, it lies in her experiences as a divided subject, ‘in between’” (Zackodnik 199). Eventually, after the exploration of Liney’s history as a slave...
and mother, the speaker comes to the conclusion that “[t]his city, […] cannot tell / me what to say even if it chokes me” (Brand 205-07). The speaker does not choose her nation language or her Canadian language; instead, she chooses to live speaking both as she wants to. The navigation through the different narratives of Liney from the past allows the speaker to take control over her choices in the present. Thus, Brand’s speaker finds strength in the fractured memories of Liney, which in turn writes Liney into a history from which she was previously exempt. Brand struggles to relocate power to Liney because unlike Moodie, a colonizer, there was not a historic record of Liney; however, she and Atwood both successfully change the historical perspective of their respective foremothers. This article has worked with Jeff Weingarten’s scholarship and demonstrated how both Atwood and Brand question an uneven power dynamic of control and authority between a formidable alien landscape and a dislocated foremother, but they relocate power in different ways. In doing so, Weingarten’s argument has not only been supported, but it has also been expanded to showcase how women can be written into history, even those originally omitted from it.

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Works Cited


Zackodnik, Teresa. "'I am Blackening in My Way': Identity and Place in Dionne Brand's No Language is Neutral." Essays on Canadian Writing 57 (Winter 1995): 194-211.