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Tamar Mayer

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The Struggle over Boundary and Memory: Nation, Borders, and Gender in Jewish Israel

By Tamar Mayer¹

Abstract

The attachment of a nation to its ancestral homeland is indisputable. Yet, when the nation does not have a clear idea of the geographical parameters of its territory, the boundaries often get defined by others and through war. In the case of Israel, however, especially since 1967, the Jewish homeland has been defined and shaped not simply by war but by government policies that support the Settlement Project in the occupied territories of the West Bank. While Jewish men and women historically have had different roles in defining Israel's boundaries—men as defenders of borders and women as enablers and reproducers of the nation -- it is Jewish men who have been perceived as central to the Zionist Project, not women. But as this article suggests, such perspective is simplistic, for women, especially settlers, as leaders and always as willing practitioners in the Settlement Projects, have helped shape the geographical and, more importantly, the psychological parameters of the homeland. With each attempt to settle all parts of the West Bank, even in the most remote outposts, and refusing to compromise over what the homeland includes, these settlers have challenged the memory of a "Smaller Israel" in favor of a "Greater Israel." In their actions therefore, they have been at the forefront of the struggle over the memory of boundary and, thus, are challenging the boundary of memory.

Keywords: boundaries, memory, gender, New Zionists, settlers

Introduction

In the years since Israel gained statehood in 1948, significant resources have been directed at combating real and imagined existential threats from both Arab States and sub-state actors. These threats and the security-minded policies enacted by the Israeli government, along with the forces of globalization and Israel's policies regarding settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, have shaped Israeli society politically, economically, socially, and psychologically. The prioritization of security concerns and right-wing Zionist ideology has led to a further erosion of the already challenged Israeli social justice system and has negatively affected the relationships between the sexes, ethno-national groups (Jews and Palestinians¹), socio-economic classes, and ethnic groups (European Jews and Jews from the Arab world).

The dialectical relationship between security and democracy, on the one hand, and security and nationalist Jewish ideology, on the other, has produced serious tensions among Jews and between Jews and Palestinians in Israel. In essence, these conflicts are intimately connected with national identity, and they have focused on boundaries, the

¹ Tamar Mayer is a political geographer who specializes in the study of ethno-national identities in the Middle East, particularly of Jews and Palestinians, and recently, in Xinjiang, China, of the Uighurs. Her work focuses on the connection among gender, borders, landscapes and the nation. She is Professor of Geography and Director of both the International Studies Program and the Rohatyn Center for International Affairs at Middlebury College.

homeland, and above all on collective memory. As the focus of these conflicts changes so does national identity and so too do its agents and its representations. Changes in national identity have brought about shifts in gender identity, and these shifts reflect the relationship of gender to nation, security, and boundaries. Because gender identity is inseparable from national identity (see Mayer, 2000a; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989), in this article I examine the connection of Israel's nation and borders to Israel's democracy and to gender. My contention is that, although the national project of Zionism—defining and defending the Jewish homeland—began as a masculinist and secular project aimed at solving the predicament of European Jews,² in recent years women, primarily religious women, settlers in the West Bank and until 2005 in Gaza have contributed greatly to the core mission of Zionism. Their efforts and those of their male counterparts to settle the Palestinian occupied territories and in so doing to articulate “Greater Israel” as the homeland, have deepened the schisms within Israeli Jewish society and pushed Jewish nationalism to the political and religious right. At the same time, for the majority in Israel, the Settlement Project erased the memory of “Smaller Israel's” boundary and created a new memory, thus challenging the boundary of Jewish collective memory in Israel.

Nation and Boundaries

During the 1,900 years of the Diaspora away from the Holy Land, Jews kept alive the connection between the Jewish nation and its homeland. Yet, the specific geographical boundaries of this homeland were never clearly defined, even by Zionism's early ideologues (Mayer, 2007). Neither the massive Zionist immigration to historic Palestine, which began before the First World War, nor the active Zionist agenda precipitated discussion of the homeland's exact extent. None knew the specific parameters of the Jewish homeland: Did it extend from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea? Did it include the Negev to the south and the Galilee to the north? If so, how far north and south did the Jewish homeland reach? This lack of clarity continued even after statehood, although by that point there were some markers on the ground and on maps associated with the homeland. As Yiftachel and Kedar (2000) argue, the 1948 War of Independence enabled Israel to take over land and houses belonging to Palestinians. Indeed, in the first few years after statehood, most of the new immigrant settlements were built on these lands (Yiftachel & Kedar, 2000, p.43). Such appropriation in favor of one ethno-national group helped expand the idea of the homeland for the Jews in both theory and practice.

The new map that emerged after statehood in 1948 included a large part of Mandatory Palestine; territory was far greater and more defensible than was promised to the Jewish State in 1947 by the UN Partition Plan (Map 1 & Map 2).³ According to the 1949 Armistice Agreement, these boundaries, known as the Green Line for the color in which they were marked on maps, were not supposed to represent political borders but, rather, demarcation lines between Israel and its Arab neighbors at the end of Israel's War of Independence in 1948. The Armistice Agreement lines were contested by the Arab world and never sanctioned by the international community. Yet, they were marked in textbooks and atlases, and were used regularly by politicians and the media in Israel and abroad. They became Israel's de facto borders, within which the new state struggled to survive and a collective memory about the size and shape of the homeland developed.

This collective consciousness etched the Green Line in the minds of most Israeli Jews as the one and only border—the border that Israeli male soldiers were called to defend between 1949 and the Six Day War of 1967. Each attack on Israeli communities within the Green Line further reinforced in Israeli Jewish consciousness that the Green Line was indeed the *de jure* border.



Source: CIA World Factbook, 2012. Prepared by Milo Rhodes.

Source: CIA World Factbook, 2012. Prepared by Milo Rhodes.

At the conclusion of the Six-Day War in 1967, fought against Arab neighbors who Israeli Jews believed threatened their state’s very existence, Israel had quadrupled its size by seizing the Golan Heights (from Syria), the West Bank (from Jordan), and Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula (from Egypt) (See Map 3). The Green Line became irrelevant for a significant part of the Israeli population; beginning in the early 1970s it ceased to appear on maps produced in Israel, and by the end of that decade young Israelis and new

immigrants had little or no idea where the Green Line once was, or what it represented (Fleischmann & Salomon, 2005). As the collective memory of a “Small Israel” became the domain of the past and the now-expanded borders constructed a new collective memory, the Green Line simply disappeared.



Source: CIA World Factbook, 2012. Prepared by Milo Rhodes.

However in May 2006, to the dismay of Israel’s religious and right-wing parties the Minister of Education, Yuli Tamir, argued that the Green Line should be restored on

maps and in textbooks. Tamir asked how a real discussion with the Palestinians about Israel's borders could take place if the West Bank appeared on all maps to be inseparable from Israel. Tamir understood that the collective memory associated with these maps and with the Settlement Project has had a dialectical relationship with reality, and that a change in the maps could lead to a more nuanced reality. In other words, re-drawing the Green Line on all Israel's maps would challenge the perception that the West Bank as Judea and Samaria is part of Israel and, therefore, would reflect more accurately the complex political and social realities of the region.

Debates about the state's and the nation's⁴ boundaries have been central throughout Israel's history. In a newspaper interview only a few weeks before the 1967 war, when Israel's legendary first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was asked what he would tell his grandson if one day he were to ask where the boundaries of his homeland lay. Ben-Gurion replied that his answer *today* would be, "the boundaries of your homeland are the boundaries of the state of Israel as they are *today*, that's it" (*Maariv*, May 12, 1967, quoted in Feige, 2002, p.30, emphasis added). The ambiguity of his answer underscores the ambiguity of the borders of the state and the homeland. He might have meant that the 1949–1967 borders were indeed the boundaries both of the state and of the national homeland (and within these boundaries Israel had already successfully appropriated its homeland, as Feige 2002 argues). Or, he might have meant that these boundaries were not static and that, if he were asked another day, perhaps several weeks later, the answer might be different: That the homeland is where the expanded state is. And indeed, just a few weeks later the boundaries of the state did expand, and many Jewish men and women in Israel began to believe that the boundaries of the Jewish national homeland had expanded as well. Yet the goals for Israel's 1967 war did not include expansion as a way to free the homeland (Segev, 2001). Rather, the aim was to provide Israel with maximum security. Only later would ideas about the fit between the state and the homeland play a role in establishing Israel's boundaries.

Immediately after the 1967 War, Israel faced an internal struggle over the definition and significance of the newly drawn borders and territories within them. Should it withdraw from, or should it annex the areas occupied in the war? Should it keep the territories as a bargaining chip and a security zone? The discussion was influenced by a group of rabbis who claimed that the newly occupied territories, particularly the West Bank and Gaza, were an integral part of their homeland, their "promised" land. Calling upon their followers to settle these lands, they gave birth to the Settlers' Movement, *Gush Emunim* (in Hebrew, 'Block of Believers'). Both men and women settlers, chiefly young religious couples, made YESHA (the Hebrew for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza) their home, but they played different roles: as we will see, women members of the Settlers' Movement were central to its success. They actively fought to create a memory of a new boundary, which now included the Palestinians Occupied Territories, and then to preserve that memory. This process was informed by their deep conviction that the occupied Palestinian lands belonged to the Jewish people alone.

Although its wars should have unified the Jewish nation, they did not. The borders created in 1967 and the new territories within them further deepened the divide within Israeli society and within the Jewish nation in Israel. While these boundaries distinguished Israel from its neighbors, they also distinguished between Jewishness and Israeliness, the land and the state (Gurevitz & Aran, 1991), place and placelessness,

secular Jews and religious Jews, and ultimately between left-wing and right-wing. They also distinguished between women on both sides of the Green Line---between those who have had the power to change reality in the West Bank and Israel's politics and those who have not. Suddenly, areas that had not been considered places belonging to Jews were accepted and even naturalized as Jewish places, and "Greater Israel" became the object of yearning and a site for pilgrimage for segments of the Jewish population (Gurevitz & Aran, 1991, p.34). The Settlement Project, as reflected in the settlers' enthusiasm and commitment to the land, had a messianic fervor. Yet the effect was to split Israeli Jewish society between settlers and non-settlers, between the "New Zionists" and the original Zionists.

The debates within Israel about the future of the occupied territories have been about much more than lines on a map. They have been about the shape and character of both the state of Israel and the Jewish nation, and in large part about the collective memory of what Israel was, what it is, and where it ought to be. In many ways, the struggle has been over the essence and the shape of Israeli democracy. Both Jewish men and women have participated actively in these debates and struggles, but they have carried out the tasks of shaping the map and the collective memory differently. While men traditionally have shaped the map through their active participation in wars, women, especially women settlers, have shaped the new map both by their leadership positions among the settlers and the defiance they have exhibited when Israeli soldiers set out to dismantle their outposts. Moreover, although the issue of territorial withdrawals has consumed the Israeli public, the debate has been conducted within only one part of that public. Left out of the discussion have been the Israeli Palestinians,⁵ who comprise more than 20% of Israeli citizens and who will be affected directly by the shape of the state. Discussion of the future of the boundaries of Israel and the war on collective memory is for Jews only, and this restriction further deepens the already existing divide between Israel's Jewish and Palestinian citizens.

Democracy: A hierarchy that privileges only some

While the geographical parameters of the homeland in historic Palestine were never clearly defined, the European ideologues of the Zionist movement were very clear that their new state would be Jewish and democratic. In the spirit of British democracy, they established a social democracy (Schweid, 1995), one whose Declaration of Independence (in lieu of a constitution) would guarantee that there would be no discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or religion. Thus, Palestinian citizens of the state (at that time referred to as Israeli Arabs) were to enjoy the same rights as Jews: freedom of expression, of the press, and of political organization, for example. Yet even though the media is relatively open and the Basic Laws of Israel provide certain citizen rights, the Palestinian citizens of Israel do not enjoy the same rights and privileges as Jews and are second-class citizens.

The idea behind the creation of a Jewish state was the establishment of a nation state, although more than one nation would live within its boundaries.⁶ A characteristic of a bi- or multi-national state is that the dominant group has more political and economic power and invariably has control in these areas. In the case of Israel, which was founded with European Jewry in mind, the Palestinian citizens of the land have not had equal access to political, economic and social power. And as Yossi Yonah (2005) suggests,

neither have the Jews who came from the Arab world: “The national collective ... does not permit a full and equal inclusion of secondary groups, who are perceived by the collective as integral to it” (p.30). Thus, the divisions within Israeli society are manifold: between Jews and Arabs, between European and Arab Jews⁷, and between secular and Orthodox Jews. And, there is a further divide within each of the groups—between men and women. The result in Israel has been that Palestinians as a group, Arab Jews, women, and Orthodox Jews have been excluded from the collective.

Even though discrimination against minorities is prohibited by law, Israeli governments have found ways around this restriction. Projects and policies that aimed to distribute Israel’s population spatially, as a way to offset a possible Arab majority in certain areas of the country, have been used as an official tool to favor effectively Jews over Palestinian citizens.⁸ Certain laws, such as the Law of Return which deals with the return of Jews to their homeland, have further privileged the Jewish population. Such institutions as the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and the Jewish Agency, both of which were central in the pre-state years, have continued their missions. The JNF, for example, whose original goal was to acquire lands of the homeland for the Jewish nation, continues to control large portions of the public lands of Israel. Soon after statehood, the new Israeli government sold to the JNF land that had previously belonged to the Arabs of Palestine, now refugees. Immediately after the 1948 War, the government deemed these lands “abandoned property” (Benvenisti, 2007), and they became Israel’s national lands. Today, the JNF holds about 13 percent of Israel’s public lands (Blau, 2011). Although it periodically sells portions of it to citizens, it maintains its practice of selling only to Jews.⁹ Thus the JNF, an extra-parliamentary body, has enabled the Israeli government to practice discriminatory Judaization policies (Yiftachel, 2007, p.118) and further its “ethnocracy” (Yiftachel, 2006).

Because Israeli democracy is an ethno-republican democracy (Peled, 2006; Yonah, 2005) and because the dominant discourse since Israel’s birth has been of national security, those who have contributed most to Israel’s security have been the favored sons of the nation both directly and indirectly (Levy, 2007). This group consisted almost exclusively of Jews of European origins, whose families were members of Labor Zionism, and who were integral to what Peled and Shafir (2005) call the National Colonial Project of settling the homeland and establishing a nation-state. Settling the land required a high degree of militarism, which formed the ethos of Israel for generations to come (Ben Eliezer, 1995). Those Jews who have contributed least to Israel’s security—women, Arab Jews, and religious (Orthodox) Jews—have been marginalized. Veterans of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) have enjoyed advantages in employment and educational opportunities as well as special economic benefits. Male veterans, because they serve longer and historically have reached higher ranks in the IDF than women, are considerably more advantaged. Officers obtain key positions in the public sector, academia and the business world, even if they have little experience in such organizations. In the eyes of the Israeli public and its leadership, the IDF is an effective incubator for nurturing national leaders, and neither Jewish women nor Israeli Palestinians can compete.

In recent years the once excluded groups, particularly Arab Jews (*Mizrahim*) and religious youth, have entered the military in larger numbers. Some Jewish religious women and a few Israeli Palestinians either serve in the IDF or opt for a term of “national

service” and thus enjoy more rights. The importance of the IDF in Israel’s life is declining however, and it no longer provides the same social cachet it once did. Despite these changes, Israel has become an even more deeply divided society. The current gaps between rich and poor, Israeli Palestinians and Jews, and secular and orthodox Jews have no parallel in Israel’s history.¹⁰ As long as Israel continues to privilege certain groups and to favor the security discourse over the socio-economic, the gaps will deepen further, leading to what Yiftachel calls “hierarchy of ‘separate and unequal citizenships’” (2007, p.122).

Gender: Privileging gun and womb

Although Yiftachel (2007) did not consider Jewish women in his hierarchy of “separate and unequal citizenships,” it is important to include them when we discuss nation, boundaries and democracy, precisely because it is through the interface of these categories, and specifically between nation and boundaries, that the position of Jewish women in Israeli society is defined. Discrimination against women in Israel is more marked than in the average Western country (Peled, 2006, p.34). As Israel attempts to define its national boundaries, both internally and internationally, men and women are relegated to specific tasks and positions. They are remunerated according to the contributions that each group makes to the State and to the Jewish nation. Most favored are Jewish men, especially those of European origin (Levy, 2007), who are involved in the “real work” of defense (Mayer, 2000b; Izraeli, 1994). The social hierarchy in Jewish Israel, though, is based not simply on gender and what each contributes to nation-building, but it is based on ethnicity as well as gender. Israeli-European Jewish women, who are positioned higher on the socio-economic ladder, have greater access to economic and political power than Arab Jewish women.

Israeli women’s fight for economic, political and social equality has encountered serious difficulties. The hypermasculine ethos of the state, heavily influenced by both military concerns and the Jewish religion, has yielded a potent form of patriarchy. A woman’s contribution to Israeli society is measured by her role as a mother: the more children she produces, the more valued she is. This attitude is not new; it dates back to early Zionist ideology.¹¹ It was perfected after statehood, however, and promoted by the state (Berkovitch, 1997) through its pro-natalist policies. Women have undoubtedly been an integral part of the Israeli economy, both in pre-state years (Bernstein, 1987) and after, but in most cases they have been relegated to service jobs near their homes. Women had won the right to vote before statehood (Swirsky, 1993; Azaryahu, 1977), and they were able to vote and run for office in the newly established state. But, Jewish women in Israel remain marginalized in economic, military, religious and social arenas. Despite the images of equality – for example, tanned women in uniform holding guns -- that appear often in advertisement and pictures of Israel abroad, women’s equality in Israel is little more than an illusion (Swirski & Safir, 1993).

Women are conscripted into the IDF, but they do not fight; they carry guns, but do not shoot them. Their contribution to Israel’s national security is primarily through their service jobs in the IDF and their roles as mothers. In order to ensure a Jewish majority, to offset a relative increase in the Israeli Palestinian population, Jewish women are encouraged to reproduce. For many years, Israel presented an annual “Mother of the Year” award, for which women who had a dozen or more children could be nominated.

Invariably, women who won had fifteen to eighteen children and were Arab Jews or, more recently, ultra-Orthodox Jewish women. The award was given in a public ceremony, often in the presence of politicians and always covered in the daily press.¹² The message was clear: We, in Israel, reward Jewish women, especially those from the lower socioeconomic classes and from religious backgrounds, not for their ability to produce but rather their ability to reproduce.

Despite these inducements, the fertility rate among Jewish women, except for Orthodox women, has declined. Yet, the demographic war between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, the Womb War, has intensified, and Jewish women's demographic contribution has become more important. Since the late 1980s, Israel's government has designated public money to assist both married and unmarried women citizens of the state to realize their "dream" of motherhood (Berkovitch, 1999), which it assumes is the goal of all women. It has made in vitro fertilization (IVF), artificial insemination, and surrogate motherhood available for all women in Israel.¹³ Under Israel's National Health Care Plan, these and other medical procedures that lead to healthy pregnancies and motherhood are covered by health insurance, a further indication of the importance of motherhood to the Jewish nation. Despite the high price tag associated with these procedures, there has been critical debate neither about the wisdom of spending the largest share of the public health budget on reproductive aid nor about the ramifications of such population policy for women.

This emphasis on motherhood, or on the potential for motherhood, has been supported by the religious establishment. Religious parties have held a central position in Israeli politics since the late 1940s and historically have wielded a great deal of power.¹⁴ They have been able to propose and pass laws that have resulted in women's marginalization in Israeli society. For example, women, except for doctors and nurses, are prohibited from holding night jobs; married women are exempt from being conscripted and thus limited in their possible contribution to national security. Women in the IDF have always been relegated to roles that neither endanger them nor threaten their ability to be mothers, although in the last few years, as a result of a decline in young secular Israeli males joining elite units and a modest increase in women's demand for equal access, more military opportunities have opened up for women.¹⁵ Nevertheless, with very few exceptions, women are not found on the battlefield or among the support troops near the front lines.

Although women cannot expect to have military careers and or benefits similar to those of men, their contribution to national security, beyond their roles as reproducers, has been significant, in large part because in Israel there is no clear distinction between civilian and military life (Kimmerling, 1993). There are many reasons for this blurred distinction. Since its establishment, the IDF has been charged with a number of civilian tasks such as education and immigration absorption; because of Israel's small size, no military base or border is far from any home; and Israelis have historically had an intimate involvement with the IDF and with war. Indeed, Israel has been described as a society in uniform (Ben Eliezer, 1995; Kimmerling, 1993). Almost all Israeli women participate, often uncritically, in the state's military efforts. They send their sons and husbands to war, wash and iron their uniforms, and remain behind to maintain the home front. They are expected to accept their role as "natural"; if they question that role or refuse to carry it out, they are accused of weakening national security. It is precisely

because of women's roles that men in Israel are free to carry out their military duties. As enablers, women are participants in the military, including the colonial processes in which Israel has engaged in the last several decades.

A growing number of women do not accept or support Israeli policies, however. In the last two and a half decades, hundreds of Israeli women have been actively involved in protest movements that have challenged government policies regarding militarism, security, and the occupation. Women in Black,¹⁶ Mothers against Silence, End the Occupation, Four Mothers,¹⁷ and most recently Shuvi¹⁸ have all created discursive spaces in which motherhood has been politicized and from which women, and sometimes men, challenge the discourse of national security. There have been other similar protest movements, but these five groups are unique in that they were all started by women, four of them by mothers, who capitalized on the importance of motherhood in Israeli society and used it to plead for political change. Palestinian women citizens of Israel have joined Women in Black and, through their connection with Jewish women protestors, have gained a platform from which to demonstrate against Israel's continuous occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (until the 2005 withdrawal). In practice, these protest spaces are women's spaces, and the intense harassment that these women have endured, primarily from Jewish men, indicates they have challenged not only Israel's military policies but also Jewish men's masculinity.


We should not assume, however, that Jewish women are a homogeneous group. On the contrary, they reflect the divisions within Israeli Jewish society, based on ethnicity, class, and degree of religiosity. Jewish women of European descent have fared better than those whose origins are in the Arab world. Arab Jewish women (*Mizrahi*) are more traditional, less educated, and in the past have had large families. For the most part, they have not been represented in these protest movements in the same way as Jewish women of European origin have, and in general they seem to be less critical of Israel's policies regarding the West Bank and Gaza. Orthodox women, especially those who follow nationalist Zionism, also have not been critical of Israel's policies, and it is these two groups of women that are found in the settlements of the West Bank (and of Gaza until the Israeli withdrawal in 2005). Yet while Orthodox women of European descent are found in larger numbers in the more ideological settlement, the *Mizrahi* settlers are over-represented in the less ideological settlements. Their move to the occupied territories perhaps was motivated more by economic concerns than by religious ideology. The reasons do not matter, however. Settlers, among them women, who opposed every cause of the women's protest movements (e.g., Women in Black, Mothers Against Silence, Four Women), have helped redraw Israel's boundaries simply by moving to and settling in the West Bank. Thus, women on both sides of the Green Line have been important in the struggle to shape Israel's border. Women protestors aspire to a smaller Israel and the settlers to a greater one.

Women and the Memory of Boundary

Women, the social and biological reproducers of every nation, are also the protectors of its purity (Mayer, 2004; Yuval-Davis, 1997). Jewish women in Israel, especially settler women, have played an additional role; they have actively participated in marking and preserving the boundary of the nation, both physically and psychologically. As we have seen, religious women have been the backbone of the

settlers' movement, and, alongside their men as the "New Zionists," they have built dozens of settlements on land that was confiscated from Palestinian Arabs.¹⁹ These women's task has not been much different, however, from that of the Jewish women pioneers who settled historic Palestine in the early part of the twentieth century. Indeed, one of the major aims of Zionism, then and now, has been settling the homeland. But these two groups of women differ in ideology. The original Zionist mission was wholly secular and nationalist. The mission of the current settlers is anchored in religious ideology and texts; they believe these lands are the Biblical lands given by God to the Jews. For "New Zionist" women, nationalism and religion are one. There are differences in education as well; the current women settlers are better educated than the early pioneers (El-Or, 1994). Like many modern women, they are politicized, benefiting from feminism in ways that early women pioneers could not. In some cases, education has won for them leadership positions in their communities and in the Settlers' Movement, and thus they have become an important voice in the new nationalist Zionism that has developed in Israel since the 1967 war.

The structure and location of many settlements also play a role in women's contribution to the movement and in the question of which places are or are not to be included within the state boundaries. Some settlements and outposts are geographically remote (Map 4), and others are not large enough to provide employment opportunities. To obtain work, male settlers have had to commute to Israel or to the larger towns in the West Bank, leaving their wives behind to care for their families, their homes, and ultimately the home front. In these Jewish islands amidst a Palestinian sea, the women keep their communities alive by providing support and services to one another. In the absence of men, these women literally provide the foundation for a successful settlement project.



Source: PBS, 2005. Prepared by Milo Rhodes.

Men's daily commute has meant that the settlements in the West Bank have become almost exclusively women-only spaces during the day, and settler women have challenged what in the West are seen as differentiated public and private spheres. For the most part, a distinction between the two spheres cannot exist in the Jewish West Bank. Living on the front line, the women use traditionally private spaces and activities—cooking in the kitchen, or nursing in the living room—to study, socialize, support one another, and discuss their reactions to government policy. In these spaces they become further politicized, and many are ready to take action. Some have become involved in Mothers for Israel (Feige, 2002) and Women in Green (or Women for Israel's Tomorrow),²⁰ taking active roles in shaping both the physical and psychological attachment to "Greater Israel."

Although the Settlement Project has been a joint effort by both men and women, the women have not always followed their men. Beit Hadassah²¹ in Hebron was occupied in 1979 by ten religious women and forty of their children, all of whom were already settlers in Hebron (Feige, 2002, p.153). They defied the Israeli army, snuck into the building, and resided there for at least a year in physically harsh conditions before the Israeli government, led by the right-wing Likud Party, agreed to declare Beit Hadassa a genuine settlement. The Rechelim outpost was occupied by women settlers in 1991 after the murder of Rachel Drouk, a settler who had been killed a day or two earlier (El-Or & Aran, 1995). They held a vigil on the site, and, although the Israeli military and civil administrations initially opposed them, they later gave their support (El-Or & Aran, 1995). The Rechelim project²² was discussed by the political leadership of the Settlers' Movement the night before the move but the next day, when about two dozen women, many of whom were members of Mothers for Israel (Feige, 2002, p.151), occupied the site, it appeared to be a spontaneous action. Hundreds of religious women from settlements throughout the West Bank and from communities throughout Israel supported them; some briefly joined their vigil and others stayed longer. Men, too, visited Rechelim, bringing water and food and lending support. Rabbis came and offered Torah lessons. But the Rechelim settlement remained, at least for a while, a women's project. Reversing gender roles, women stayed at the site day and night, leaving their husbands to care for their homes and families (El-Or & Aran, 1995). Later however, the women went home at night, leaving their husbands and sons to guard the settlement (El-Or & Aran, 1995, p.62). Although they initially defied their traditional roles by spearheading these settlements, in the end these women reverted to the familiar position of allowing men to be the protectors of settlements, women, and children.

The actions of the women of Beit Hadassah and Rechelim, like those of thousands other settlers, had two primary goals. The first was to redraw Israel's map by appropriating another nation's land, which they believed was wholly justified; the second was to reshape Israeli Jewish culture, history, memory, and psyche. The settlement sites were not chosen at random. Rather, in an effort to connect the present to the past and the past to the future, the settlers selected sites anchored in deep memory and history: places mentioned in the Bible, areas in which there was a Jewish presence until they were lost in the 1948 war (Map 1 & Map 2), or where Jewish settlers had been killed by Palestinians within the last two decades. Each of these sites has become in itself a monument, testimony to the rich Jewish history in this land. In other words, they have become what Pierre Nora (1989) calls *Les Lieux de Mémoire*, sites of memory.

The more textured and nuanced these sites become and the more that settlers are committed to them, the deeper they are etched in the minds of settlers and their allies in Israel, and the more unmarked “Greater Israel” becomes. These sites, then, do two things; they recall the past and create a memory of a new boundary, and at the same time they erase the memory of the older boundary. Because remembering is inseparable from forgetting (Egoz, 2008; Legg, 2007; Hoelscher & Alderman, 2004), the settlers actively shape the memory of boundary and challenge the boundary of memory.

The settlers are not a monolithic group; their ideological commitment varies both by the age of the settlement, the number of years that individual settlers have lived there, and by gender. Those living in the older settlements, known as the ideological settlements, show a stronger commitment. But as Billig and Sauerkraut (2006) show, gender is perhaps a more important variable in determining commitment to remaining in place. Women, they argue, are more likely to stay in their settlements than men, especially as the threats from Palestinians increase (p.682). The longer women reside in a settlement, the stronger their ideological commitment, their sense of place and their willingness to stay in their communities despite Palestinian attacks. Their commitment to the land overcomes both fear for themselves and risk to their families (Billig & Sauerkraut, 2006).²³ Men also tend to want to stay in their settlements if they feel a deep attachment to place, but unlike women they are more inclined to leave if they perceive the Palestinian threat to be imminent (Billig & Sauerkraut, 2006, p.682). The gender differences perhaps can be explained by the mutual support that women give one another and by their experiences in the women-only spaces—experiences that men lack. But the men interviewed by Billig and Sauerkraut also see it as a result of “women [being] stronger”... and “stronger in their belief” (2006, 686).

It is unquestionable that over the last thirty-seven years both women and men have contributed to the physical marking of the landscape. Their goal has been not merely settling the Biblical lands, but also recreating and molding Israel’s collective memory, erasing the Green Line, and ultimately redrawing the map of Israel. Their struggle has been both physical and psychological. For a number of reasons, it appears that women settlers have been more central than men to the psychological dimension. Perhaps they are more articulate. Perhaps they photograph better, in tears as they confront soldiers who have come to evacuate them, or when as mothers with children in tow they passionately explain their commitment to the land. Or, perhaps it is because they are the only ones home when reporters come to interview, especially after a terrorist attack. Whatever the reason, women have appeared more dominant in the struggle over Israel’s memory of boundary.

Memory is always changing; it is heavily influenced by the dialectic of remembering and forgetting. Thus, it has been crucial for the settlers to be as vocal as possible, and to use the most effective methods to shape Israel’s collective memory. During the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in August 2005, for example, as the collision between the state and the settlers came to a head, the settlers fought hard to keep their settlements. The media broadcast every part of the struggle and played an important role in the war over memory. Determined and strong in their religious conviction, the settlers refused to leave their homes and their synagogues, and when forced to withdraw they did so fighting. Reports of the evacuees losing their homes, their communities and their own histories, coupled with footage of crying and screaming women forced to leave their

God-given land by none other than Jewish soldiers, were powerful elements in the psychological war of the settlers.

Perhaps the psychological war over collective memory and the shape of the nation would not have been as successful had it not been for the fact that some variables of this conflict were rather familiar. They echoed elements of myths that have been cemented in Jewish memory, myths in which a Jew faces a more powerful Other—a Goliath—or the few face the many. This binary relationship has been the most important building stone of Jewish nationalism since its inception. The violent confrontation in Gaza, which was broadcast to the world, was between a young woman who represented what she saw as the ultimate truth and an officer in uniform who represented the power of the state; between a religious Jew holding a Torah scroll and soldiers who escorted him, sometimes pushed him, out of the synagogue; between the few and the many; between idealists who held one truth and those who obeyed orders and held another (Asheri, 2005). Rabbis compared the removal from Gaza and some later outposts in the West Bank to the expulsion of the Jews from Spain as well as to the destruction of the First Temple and especially the Second Temple by the Romans (Shragai, 2006), evoking the familiar themes which in the past have constructed the Jewish collective memory. These themes and the pictures shown on television found a sympathetic audience throughout Israel, even though the Israeli public was divided about whether or not to disengage unilaterally from Gaza. Even those who supported disengagement were affected by the personal and communal stories, and the replaying of themes from the past helped the settlers in moving Israeli consciousness to the right and reshaping Jewish collective memory. In the war on the memory of boundary, the settlers, particularly women settlers with the help of the media, played a crucial role.

With close to half a million Jewish settlers now residing in the West Bank and over 200,000 in East Jerusalem, the Settlement Project has been a success in the eyes of Israel's government and more than half of Israel's Jewish population. They see the West Bank as part of the territorial contiguity of Israel. Indeed, maps of Israel in textbooks, newspapers, advertisements and even the weather map shown on Israeli television, for example, support and reinforce this perspective. The West Bank is Judea and Samaria, and this is Israel. The New Zionists (i.e., the settlers), and particularly the women, have been central to this accomplishment. As mothers, wives and leaders in the Settlers' Movement, women settlers have exhibited a physical and psychological resilience reserved only to those who are motivated by the deepest conviction. Without these women, or if they had played a lesser role, it is not clear that the Settlement Project would have been as successful and the struggle for the memory of boundary so potent.

Conclusion

One of the most important characteristics of a nation is its attachment to a territory it calls home (Smith, 1981, Connor, 1978). The Jewish nation is no different, but, unlike many other nations, the exact parameters of the Jewish homeland have never been defined clearly. As we have seen, this lack of unambiguous boundaries has posed major challenges to Israel's democracy and to the internal structure of its society: privileging one nation, one gender and one ethnic group (Jews from Europe). While in the first part of the twentieth century the international community had defined what would and would not be included in the future Jewish State (Mayer, 2008), this ceased to

be the case in 1948 after Israel won its independence and doubled in size. For more than sixty-four years the boundaries of the state have been articulated from within, through policies enacted by Israel's governments, sometimes in defiance of international agreements and always with the help of soldiers, settlers and/or willing citizens. The lack of clear boundaries of the state and the homeland has also been the cause of many of Israel's external struggles and wars as well as why security, one of Zionism's long-time goals, continues to define life in Israel.

In a society that has worshiped the IDF and its soldiers, women have nonetheless played important roles. As mothers, they have been drafted to fight the demographic war between Israel and the Palestinians within Israel and its occupied territories. As wives, partners and mothers, they have maintained the home front and supported their servicemen, enabling the IDF to maintain the physical boundaries between Us and Them—that is, between Jews and Palestinians, Israel and its neighboring Arab states. Although many in Israel may argue that women have not contributed to changes in boundaries, we have seen that is hardly the case. Women have been the backbone of the Project as its leaders and always as its willing practitioners.

With the erasure of the Green Line after the 1967 war, ideas of where the homeland lay began to correspond for some Israelis, especially religious Jews and those who are right of the political center, to the expanded new boundaries. The new Settlers' Movement translated their love for these lands into action. When the right-wing Likud party came to power, the government supported the efforts of hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews to make these territories their home, using religious ideology to justify settling on Palestinian lands. As Jewish nationalism has moved to the right, attachment to the lands of the West Bank as part of the historical Jewish homeland, has deepened. The ambiguity about the exact location of the homeland played into the hands of various Israeli governments and the Settlers' Movement. Since 1977, the government has capitalized on the settlers' movement's intense commitment to the Biblical homeland. At the same time, the settlers have benefited from the government's commitment to Greater Israel, which translated into major subsidies both for the development of infrastructure in the West Bank and for the settlers themselves.

Religious Zionist women have been important in this intersection. As we have seen, they sometimes initiated new settlement projects through acts of defiance, as in the cases of Beit Hadassah and Rechelim. But they have carried out many more of Zionism's tasks. They have maintained the home and the front, created strong and thriving communities, and helped fight the demographic war by reproducing in large numbers, even larger than Arab Jewish women.²⁴ Perhaps more than any other group in Israel in the last sixty-four years, "New Zionist" women settlers have challenged the distinction between the private and public spheres. Each woman is both a private and a public person, representing herself, her family, her community, and the settlers as a whole.

Their contribution to border-marking has been even greater. By settling in the West Bank and Gaza, women expanded Israel's border. By taking a central role in protesting the disengagement from Gaza in the summer of 2005, they expanded and maintained both the physical and the psychological border, even if for only a limited period of time. Through their sometime violent protest, they endeavored to etch the West Bank and Gaza into memory of Greater Israel, into the idea of the homeland. They have

fought for the memory of boundary, and they have expanded the boundary of memory, both of which are complicated tasks in the dynamic politics of the Middle East.

Much like the Green Line, Greater Israel itself is on its way to becoming a relic of the past. The controversial new Separation Wall erected at the edge of settlements in the West Bank, purportedly a temporary measure against terrorism, is quickly becoming the new de facto border. It has already changed the map of Israel, marking which Jewish settlements will remain part of the state and which will not, while at the same time further constricting the size of the future Palestinian state. It also marks the beginning of yet another chapter in Jewish nationalism in Israel, which in all likelihood will remain gendered.

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¹ The Arabs of historic Palestine who remained in Israel after its independence in 1948 now refer to themselves as Palestinian citizens of Israel or Israeli Palestinians (sometimes hyphenated and often not). Ethnically and nationally they are part of the Palestinian nation that was dispersed from Palestine to neighboring countries as a result of Israel's 1948 War of Independence. While the Palestinians of Israel hold Israeli citizenship, Palestinians who live in the West Bank and Gaza do not. They hold no citizenship because they are considered refugees and, hence, citizens of no state.

² Zionism, the Jewish national movement, sought to bring about the social, political, economic, psychological, and geographical transformation of the European Jew, who was excluded from the different national liberation movements of Europe of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As such, this was a revolutionary and utopian movement.

³ United Nation General Assembly Resolution 181 (passed on November 29, 1947) divided historic Palestine into two states: one for the Jews and one for the Arabs. Each of

these states was comprised of three distinct but not geographically contiguous sections. Jews were pragmatic and endorsed the plan and the Arabs, who feared the loss of much of their lands, did not.

⁴ While a state is a political unit, a subdivision of the globe, a nation is a group of people whose members share ethnic origins, language, religion and customs, who believe in a common past and hope for a shared destiny. What distinguishes a nation from an ethnic group is an attachment to an ancestral territorial homeland, for which members of the nation have political aspirations.

⁵ See footnote 1.

⁶ There are no pure nation-states anywhere in the world; with more than 3000 nations in the world and slightly over 190 states, all states are either bi- or multi-national states.

⁷ I use the term Arab Jews to refer to Jews who came to Israel from the Arab world. They are sometimes referred to as *Mizrachim* (Easterners or Oriental), or *Sephardim*. In the Israeli social hierarchy, where European Jews are at the top, Arab Jews have been for many years at the bottom with Palestinian Israelis not too far below them.

⁸ Two such programs have been the Population Distribution Policy (of the 1950s and 1960s) and the Judaizing the Galilee Project (of the 1980s and 1990s). Both these programs aimed at ensuring a regional Jewish majority within Israel. This was particularly pertinent in the Galilee, for example, where by the early 1980s Israeli Palestinians constituted more than 50% of the population.

⁹ The JNF practice was recently challenged in court; Israel's High Court ruled in favor of the Israeli Palestinians plaintiffs, but the practice of selling State lands only to Jews continues.

¹⁰ In economic terms, Israel now ranks only slightly behind Mexico and the US with the highest rate of income inequality per household in the world (OECD, 2011). These have social, political, and psychological ramifications.

¹¹ Theodor Herzl, the father of Zionism, defined very clear gender roles in his vision of the Jewish state: men would produce and women reproduce. Unmarried women would care for orphans (Herzl, 1956).

¹² The "Mother of the Year" Award competition continues in many municipalities in Israel, particularly in those with a large population of Arab Jews. It is no longer a national competition. The award is now given not only for raising a large number of children but for doing so while contributing to the community.

¹³ The commitment to a large population in Jewish Israel despite the already high birth rates, has made Israel the world leader in the number of IVF procedures (Kraft, 2011). Further, because Israel provides and fully pays for unlimited IVF procedures per woman, up to two "take-home babies" and until the age of 45, the use of reproductive technologies has been the largest public health expenditure in Israel (Kraft, 2011).

¹⁴ Because neither the Labor nor the Likud party has ever attained a clear majority, religious parties have always been needed for government coalition, and thus they have been able to pass legislation and demand amendments that fit more traditional values. Few things are as dear to religious parties as the status of Jewish women in Israel. In fact, these parties have stood in the way of legislation that would guarantee equality for women since the first coalition government in the early 1950s. They traditionally have been concerned with preserving and protecting the institutions of the family and marriage.

Most personal matters (certainly those regarding marriage and divorce) have been in the hands of religious courts, which also tend to disfavor women.

¹⁵ The 1949 Security Service Law was amended in 2000, dramatically increasing the type and number of military jobs for which women could volunteer. By 2003, the length of women's service in these new jobs had increased to match that of men (Levy, 2007, p.81).

¹⁶ Women in Black is an anti-war organization formed after the first *Intifadah* began in December of 1987. The women, who have demonstrated weekly for more than twenty years, protest Israel's occupation of the West Bank (and until 2005 of Gaza) as well as the serious violations of Palestinian human rights by Israeli soldiers

¹⁷ Four Mothers, a grassroots organization begun in 1997 by mothers of soldiers (later joined by men), was one of the more effective protest movements in Israel's history. It exerted tremendous pressure on Israel's government for a unilateral withdrawal from south Lebanon, which Israel occupied from 1982 until it finally withdrew in April 2000.

¹⁸ Shuvi, another grassroots organization, was founded by women to pressure Israel's government to disengage from Gaza. Once it was clear that the disengagement plans were in place, members of Shuvi turned their attention to the physical and psychological well-being of the soldiers participating in the disengagement from Gaza. This movement did not change the social structure but accepted it and worked within it.

¹⁹ In the more than forty years since the Settlements Project began, close to 200,000 Jews made East Jerusalem their home and another 500,000 Jews settled in the West Bank effectively displacing more than 160,000 Palestinians (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, p.78). The number of the displaced varies greatly depending on who does the reporting. Israeli sources claim 150,000 Palestinians have been displaced, and Palestinian sources claim over 400,000 (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2011, p.75). Regardless, the majority of the displaced are children and grandchildren of those originally displaced from historic Palestine in 1948.

²⁰ Women in Green, also known as Women for Israel's Tomorrow, is a right-wing political women's group whose members wear green hats to show their opposition to Women in Black. The group opposes any negotiations with Palestinians and any exchange of land for peace, and they aggressively support Israeli settlements in the West Bank and until 2005 in Gaza. They also opposed the withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.

²¹ Beit Hadassah, located in close proximity to the Cave of the Patriarch, was occupied by Jews until a massive Arab attack in 1929. A few families returned, only to flee again during the 1936 Arab Revolt, and for many years the building either stood empty or was used by UNWRA. When Israel conquered the West Bank and Jews settled Hebron, there was no government support to reclaim Beit Hadassah. Even Menachem Begin, whose West Bank expansionist ideology was well crafted, did not endorse the settlers in Beit Hadassah for more than a year.

²² The name *Rechelim* (plural for Rachel) was a way to honor two women named Rachel who were killed in terrorist attacks---Rachel Druck and Rachel Weiss---and the Biblical matriarch, Rachel.

²³ Billig and Sauerkraut's research appeared at about the same time as that of Avital Laufer (2006), who studied the relationship between exposure to terrorism and

ideological commitment among young adults who were politically inclined to the right, to the center, and to the left. She found that the most ideologically committed were the young adults who were most exposed to terrorist acts and that their commitment rose with the number of terrorists attacks they experienced.

²⁴ The settler population is growing twice as fast as the Jewish population in “Smaller Israel,” and in 2006 was almost 5.5% annually (Shragai, 2007).