This article examines a number of arguments I collectively term arguments from parasitism, which Nyāya employs to illustrate that rational reflection, the institution of language, and even error itself presuppose a ground-level basis of veridical cognitive interaction with the world. It further suggests that by such arguments, coupled with its stress on the inerrancy of pramāṇ as, Nyāya anticipates and supports the contemporary philosophical movement known as (epistemological) disjunctivism.
Dasti, M.R. (2012). Parasitism and Disjunctivism in Nyaya Epistemology. Philosophy East and West,62(1), 1-15. doi: 10.1353/pew.2012.0012
Virtual Commons Citation
Dasti, Matthew (2012). Parasitism and Disjunctivism in Nyāya Epistemology. In Philosophy Faculty Publications. Paper 1.
Available at: http://vc.bridgew.edu/philosophy_fac/1