Publication Date

2012

Document Type

Article

Abstract

This article examines a number of arguments I collectively term arguments from parasitism, which Nyāya employs to illustrate that rational reflection, the institution of language, and even error itself presuppose a ground-level basis of veridical cognitive interaction with the world. It further suggests that by such arguments, coupled with its stress on the inerrancy of pramāṇ as, Nyāya anticipates and supports the contemporary philosophical movement known as (epistemological) disjunctivism.

Original Citation

Dasti, M.R. (2012). Parasitism and Disjunctivism in Nyaya Epistemology. Philosophy East and West, 62(1), 1-15.

Identifier

DOI: 10.1353/pew.2012.0012

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Epistemology Commons

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